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SUMMARY
This thesis proposes a different approach to theorising, analysing and expounding 
antitrust issues. It states that at present, antitrust is addressed from top-down and 
narrow perspectives which in effect limit or exclude issues that could otherwise be 
addressed as antitrust-related especially where antitrust concepts are understood and 
applied from a broader perspective. The justification for seeking inclusiveness is 
premised on the concept of procedural justice and on the democratisation of ideas.
The thesis commences from a deconstructionist standpoint in order to show the 
weakness of top-down accounts. It is shown that the prevailing and dominant 
antitrust accounts cannot lay exclusive claim to antitrust. This is proved by 
establishing the deconstructability of such individual theories by making due 
reference to the position of “the Other”. The failure to give adequate countenance to 
the position of “the Other” means that this theories will likely fail to be inclusive. 
Thus, with the aim of correcting the problem of exclusion attributed to top-down 
accounts, the thesis identifies the need to construct a bottom-up account. As a 
precondition, the thesis recognises that any such bottom-up account must avoid 
making ex ante judgments about the suitability or otherwise of the normative 
contents of antitrust laws and theories. Taking this condition into account, two 
alternative approaches based on pure procedural justice are outlined -  Habermas’ 
Discourse Ethics and the person-centred approach. The former is shown to be 
incapable of practical application. This makes it imperative to thoroughly 
substantiate the latter.
The person-centred analysis showcases the conceptual value of inclusiveness by 
assessing antitrust law and policy through the position of the parties involved. The 
conceptual value of inclusiveness is also showcased from the policy perspective 
through the capability approach. This account also shows the value of inclusiveness 
to antitrust enforcement. It however falls short in terms of adjudicatory value 
particularly in terms of its practical application. The practical shortfall 
notwithstanding, this thesis concludes by emphasising how the idea behind the 
person-centred approach could potentially enrich antitrust discourse and also guide 
policy-makers and enforcers.
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PREFACE
Antitrust laws and policies have developed through high level theories that seek to 
designate goal(s) and specify procedures for antitrust institutions. Within each 
theoretical construct and also through fresh insights, the goals and specifications of 
antitrust undergo constant refinement: new grounds are discovered, old assumptions 
are replaced and exigencies dictate the activities of relevant institutions. Thus, by its 
nature, change is a constant in antitrust. This interesting “evolutionary” process is 
greased through a flowing stream of empirical analysis, argumentations, counter­
arguments, assertions, rhetoric, polemics and iconoclasms. However, even as 
antitrust continues to evolve, one thing remains constant -  the single constant is 
simply the manner of theorising antitrust. Most antitrust theories seek to establish the 
tasks of antitrust institutions. For instance, they propose the goals that antitrust 
institutions should champion. They argue on the veracity of a procedure. They debate 
the necessity of a measure. They argue top-down.
The postulations within and between these top-down schools of thought come in 
different shapes, most of which are undeniably relevant to antitrust as they give to 
the field both content and meaning. Notwithstanding, the problem is that if we isolate 
the reasoning within a particular theory and forge an antitrust regime on such 
reasoning, our framework will likely fail to give due consideration to the interests of 
persons. This is because the chosen theory is likely to eliminate any other form of 
antitrust analysis. The consequence is that antitrust is diminished as a result of its 
incompleteness and attendant exclusion of interests.
However, there is yet to be a single acceptable principled approach to antitrust 
analysis as authorities, courts, practitioners and scholars often fail to reach a 
convergence on simple terms because they understand those terms through different 
ideologies.
As a result of the problems associated with the present way in which we analyse 
antitrust, there is a temptation to propose an account of antitrust that avoids or 
corrects the present problems. However, before such step is taken, it is important to 
ascertain why a new paradigm is really needed. This is what brings us to the crux of 
this thesis. Where a particular antitrust issue is decided based on a mistaken 
assumption that the theory applied in any instance is complete, a possible
consequence is that the reasoning in such a case might unduly disparage those 
persons whose interests might very well have been protected if a broader foundation 
was adopted. Another likely effect is that we might end up protecting interests which, 
if the chosen theory was not mistaken in some way, would not have been protected. 
It is thus proposed as an idea of justice that we take a bottom-up, non-normative 
perspective to antitrust analysis. In an attempt to accomplish this goal, the person- 
centred approach to antitrust is developed and evaluated. Generally, this approach 
seeks to introduce a perspective to antitrust analysis whereby issues are conceptually 
addressed from the position of antitrust subjects. In any given case, antitrust subjects 
are those: consumers, businesses, individuals, and societies that have interests in 
specific antitrust issues, be it market-related, fairness or on public policy grounds.
The thesis develops the conceptual basis for the pursuit of “justice as inclusiveness”. 
To achieve this, it recognises the need to deemphasise the normative content of 
antitrust theories and practices. The thesis recognises that to achieve the 
inclusiveness sought, antitrust analysis must adhere to the principles of pure 
procedural justice whilst also remaining intelligible and functional for policy­
making, adjudication, and enforcement. To achieve this, the person-centred approach 
identifies the requirement of broadness as an essential condition. However, in order 
to avoid conceptual absurdities, the scope of the person-centred account of broadness 
is clearly delineated.
It must be noted that rather than seeking to build a conclusive theory of antitrust 
(which might fall short as being incomplete and mistaken), the person-centred 
approach simply states a perspective which gives a broader outlook on antitrust in 
order to accommodate a variety of interests held or that can be held by different 
persons.
To reiterate, my motivation for this research stems from the perceived need for 
justice (as inclusiveness). This germane requirement of justice is unlikely to be 
noticed if antitrust is addressed strictly through a top-down paradigm.
The main theme and specific arguments in this thesis are generally the result of 
queries, some of which are stated below:
On Substantive Antitrust
Should antitrust be based on a single/limited value(s) or should it be left open to the 
vagaries of what antitrust subjects may consider to be of interest in antitrust?
What are the practical disadvantages of a single/limited value approach and how 
does a broad scope solve them?
What form should the broader scope take?
What are the practical challenges that a plural valued system attract? E.g. 
uncertainty, unpredictability, practicality? Are they real concerns and, if so, how can 
they be remedied?
On Antitrust Enforcement
What is the proper mode of enforcing antitrust?
On what criteria do we determine if the system is broad enough at the enforcement 
level?
Can institutions seek conflicting goals in their enforcement?
What should be the scope of our enforcement effort and what does this mean to the 
task of accommodating the interests of different antitrust subjects?
The thesis makes due reference to seasoned scholarly materials and also draws on 
established legal and economic theories. To drive my points, I analogise with EU law 
and US antitrust law. There is, however, a stronger emphasis on the former.
Chapter 1
ANTITRUST -  The “Other” Mode o f Analysis
1.1 Introduction
The prevailing theories and practices in antitrust are important as they, in fact, serve 
as the spine of antitrust laws and policies. It would, as such, not be far-fetched to say 
that without theories antitrust law will make no sense.1 Theories set out conditions 
that guide our analysis and application of the law. Notwithstanding their value, it 
does appear that if one looks at antitrust from a different perspective, the prevailing 
antitrust theories have their downsides -  the divergence in the manner in which the 
field is understood and applied sometimes give the impression that the field is 
convoluted, confusing or confused.
Proponents of specific antitrust theories explain, explore and evaluate the field 
through the primary values inherent in their theories. They interpret issues in light of 
their theories. In sum, they take their peculiar antitrust theory as the back-bone of 
antitrust which sometimes require the elimination of values which are alien to the 
theory under consideration. It is however noticeable from an outsider’s point of view 
that in eliminating non-compatible values, such a proponent is prone to denouncing 
all together, other theories that recognise such non-compatible value. The variety of 
values that could be sought through antitrust should be preserved and celebrated as 
they potentially increase the interests that can be served when tackling issues. Thus, 
any claim that a theory of antitrust contains all that is to be known about antitrust 
must be addressed with a lot of circumspection because antitrust itself is ever- 
evolving and transient.
There is no better way to highlight the inherent incompleteness and transient nature 
of antitrust analysis than to view it from the postmodern philosophical perspective.
1 Joel Drexl, Laurence Idot and Jogl Mon6ger (eds), Economic Theory and Competition Law 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009) vii.
2 As Schuab notes, these debates lie between contentions that competition rules should be instruments 
to serve pluralism and democracy, as against claims that antitrust provisions should be limited to 
protecting the efficient functioning o f the markets or extended to controlling economic power. See 
Alexander Schaub, “Competition Policy Goals” in Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Laraine Laudati (eds), 
European Competition Law Annual 1997: The Objectives o f  Competition Policy (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 1998) 121.
Generally, postmodernism has been described as a set of critical, strategic, and 
rhetorical practices employing concepts such as difference, repetition, the trace, the 
simulacrum, and hyperreality to destabilise other concepts such as presence, identity, 
historical progress, epistemic certainty, and the univocity of meaning.3 In other 
words, postmodernists seek to challenge pre-existing notions, beliefs, interpretations 
and assumption by identifying alternative meanings. This is an established school of 
thought and its underlying principles have been applied in different contexts and 
have developed along different sub-schools in different fields. Notable scholars that 
have explored this school of thought include Lyotard with his Postmodern 
Conditions,4 Nietzsche5 and Foucault6 on genealogy and subjectivity, Deleuze’s 
productive difference, and Derrida’s deconstruction.7
Being a legal (interdisciplinary) thesis, the postmodern thought is channelled through 
critical legal theory with specific reference to Derrida’s deconstruction. Thus, from 
the postmodern point of view, the fallibility of theories, principles, and laws will be 
assessed in light of the idea of justice with the ultimate aim of identifying the justice 
deficit that is inherent in any single account of antitrust.8
To state briefly, deconstruction challenges any position of “truth” or “knowledge” by 
elucidating a “counter-truth” or “counter-knowledge” which Derrida refers to as the 
position of the “Other”. Thus proceeding from the premise that every position can be 
deconstructed, the idea of justice that will be sought in this thesis takes into account 
all these different interpretations and positions. As it would be thoroughly explained 
below, the basis for seeking justice by accommodating different interpretations of 
antitrust is partly because each account, whilst strengthening the interest of one
3 Stanford Encyclopaedia o f Philosophy, Postmodernism (30 Sept 2005) 
[http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/postmodemism/].
4 Jean-Fran?ois Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, Geoff Bennington and 
Brian Massumi (trans.) (Minneapolis, University o f Minnesota Press, 1984).
5 Friedrich Nietzsche, On the Genealogy o f  Morals, Walter Kaufmann (trans) (New York, Random 
House. 1967)
6 Michel Foucault, Surveiller et Punir (Paris, Gallimard, 1975) Discipline and Punish, Alan Sheridan 
(trans) (New York, Pantheon, 1977).
7 Derrida, Jacques, Speech and Phenomena and other Essays on Husserl's Theory o f Signs, David B. 
Allison (trans) (Evanston, Northwestern University Press, 1973); O f Grammatology Gayatri 
Chakravorty Spivak (trans) (Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 1974); Writing and 
Difference, Alan Bass (trans) (Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 1978).
8 To put the underlying postmodern ideology firmly into legal context and ultimately into antitrust 
context, due reference will be made to the works o f Cornell, Balkin, and Peritz.
party, has the potential of harming the interest of the “Other”. Hence, in order to 
protect such interests, we have to build an inclusive account.
To build such inclusive account, we cannot possibly rely on deconstruction because 
it does not provide any transcendental idea of justice.9 As such, we would have to 
follow a constructionist/reconstructionist path by building an account which is based 
on inclusiveness.
1.2 Deconstruction, Justice, and Antitrust
Postmodern analysis is not new to antitrust as it has been recognised over a decade 
ago that “[ajntitrust is the perfect vehicle for illustrating postmodernism’s 
fundamental tenet that texts do not have a single determinate meaning reflecting the 
author’s intention.” 10 However, its application to antitrust has been in an historical 
context. For instance, Peritz sought to challenge the belief that the framers of the 
Sherman Act were motivated by specific ideals. He argues that there is no single or 
true meaning for US antitrust law as it is merely an open-ended text that is quite 
porous to the prevailing norms of political economy11 such that, any discourse about 
the true meaning and interpretation of the law “is a rhetorical exercise in favour of a 
particular normative vision and not meaningful dialogue about the original intent and
19 • •legislative purpose.” Peritz established this claim by painstakingly detailing how
from generation to generation the supposed “intent” had been interpreted and
exploited in accordance with the exigencies of such times. He believes his
postmodern account showcases the “forgotten voices, rejected dissenting opinions,
11declined positions, and disparaged theories” that were part of early debate. He 
sought to “throw open an archive of counterpolicies and counterarguments, to recall 
the conflicts engaged in and the alternative views so fiercely held, views whose 
appeal continue to inspire debates about political economy” .14 His aim is to situate 
competition policy as a social, economic, and political construct that takes on
9 This assertion is explained in 1.2 below.
10 Spencer Waller “Market Talk: Competition Policy in America” (1997) 22 Law and Social Inquiry 
435, 436.
11 Rudolf Peritz, Competition Policy in America (New York, Oxford University Press, 1996) 5.
12 Waller, 438.
13 Peritz, 5.
14 Ibid.
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different legal understandings in different contexts and at different historical 
moments.15
The postmodern scepticism underlying this thesis is similar to that of the likes of 
Peritz given that it seeks to establish the values in alternative modes of normative 
analyses. However, this thesis differs significantly from such accounts for a number 
of reasons. First, this thesis addresses antitrust from the deconstructive point of view 
as against the genealogy and subjectivity (historical) position. Secondly and more 
importantly, postmodern thought is only relied on to the extent that it helps to situate 
and illuminate the fallibility of laws and also to identify the essential criterion for 
achieving justice in antitrust. Central to this thesis is the fact that the impossibility of 
finding correct normative answers to substantive legal issues implicitly mean that 
subjective interpretation of substantive laws would certainly be “unjust” to some. 
Thus, what is sought here is to identify the implicit unjustness in the different ways 
of interpreting antitrust whilst also seeking to establish an idea of justice that will 
bridge the gap between antitrust laws/theories and justice.
In the most basic form, Derrida’s deconstruction seeks to question underlying
assumptions about how something is constructed by constructing an alternative
which is outside the limit of the initial construction. It is therefore more or less about
building new ways of viewing and interpreting things that are seemingly established
as opposed to “deconstructing” such seemingly established order. Though Derrida’s
account and postmodernism in general have been criticised as meaningless and 
1 ( \nihilistic, it is, without doubt, valuable as it helps to unbind our scope and moves us 
closer to creativity through the possibility of questioning.
Applied to the question of law and justice, Derrida stated that law is essentially 
deconstructible either because the history of law often changes with time or because 
law’s ultimate foundation is by definition unfounded. He however argued that the 
fact that law is deconstructible is not bad news. Rather, it could be good for politics 
and historical progress. He thereafter made some seemingly self-contradictory 
statements which illuminates how complicated it is to seek justice through law. He 
stated that it is the deconstructible structure of law that makes deconstruction
15 Ibid.
16 E.g. Jtlrgen Habermas, The Philosophical Discourse o f  Modernity, Frederick Lawrence (trans) 
(Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1987)
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possible as justice, itself is not deconstructible. He emphasised that the 
deconstructability of law (for example, of legality, legitimacy or legitimation) makes 
deconstruction possible. Also, the undeconstructability of justice makes 
deconstruction possible. The result therefore is that deconstruction takes place in the 
interval that separates the undeconstructability of justice from the deconstructability 
of law. He stated further that “[i]t is possible as an experience of the impossible, 
there where, even if  it does not exist (or does not yet exist, or never does exist), there 
is justice. Whether one can replace, translate, or determine the x  of justice, one 
should say: deconstruction is possible, as impossible, to the extent (there) where
1 7there is (the undeconstructible).”
Balkin puts the deconstructionist argument about the relationship between law and 
justice into perspective by situating the reason for deconstruction in the first place. 
He stated that we might engage in deconstruction in order to demonstrate that the law 
or some part of the law is unjust. The aim could also be to show that the law or part 
of it conceals aspects to social life that we believe to be important, and that its failure 
to adequately deal with such aspect leads to injustice. We might also engage in 
deconstruction simply to showcase the ambiguity, uncertainty, and impenetrability of 
legal texts. Further, we might engage in deconstruction simply to show the tensions 
and contradictions within legal doctrines. Pretty much all these motivation for 
deconstructing will come into play in this thesis. I start first by deconstructing 
traditional antitrust theories/laws for the sole purpose of showcasing the tensions and 
contradictions inherent in them. My contention is that the deconstructability of 
individual antitrust theories renders any claim that any one theory covers the whole 
of antitrust to be mistaken, and therefore ultimately unjust. Afterwards, I will assess 
whether the injustice inherent in these traditional theories justifies the introduction of 
an alternative approach, not only for the purpose of deconstructing the traditional 
approach but also to cure the justice deficit. The two issues will be treated in turn.
17 Jacques Derrida, “Force o f Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority” (1990) 11 Cardozo Law 
Review 919, 945.
1.2.1 Injustice in Traditional Antitrust
Generally, it could be argued that the proponents of the prevailing theories in
antitrust would be convinced about the “justness” of their theory even where such
theory does not directly countenance any form of justice. For instance, we could
relate the consumer welfare concern about wealth distribution to some form of
distributive justice. Also, the economic freedom thought has its basis in distributive 
* • 1 8  •  • *justice. Even the efficiency theories can be linked to some form of utilitarian 
justice.19 It is thus ideal to assess all the accounts through the notion of justice.
The basic application of deconstruction will reveal that every account of justice is in 
real fact a statement of law which is intrinsically deconstructible and is thus unable 
to meet the “undeconstructible” idea of justice which it seeks to attain. Also, the 
inherent conflict between each of the account of justice also shows the 
deconstructability of justice itself. The exercise here is primarily to deconstruct the 
idea of justice underlying some of the mainstream antitrust theories. This naturally 
leads us to raise questions about the true content of the term “justice” in the context 
of antitrust.20 The task here however is to show the gap that exists between the ideas 
of justice upon which antitrust could be based. This analysis will very much bring to 
light Kolm’s statement that
“[ijndeed, any theory [that claims] to answer all questions of justice by application of 
the same specific principles or set of principles is easily proven to be mistaken, by 
counterexamples, and to be insufficient for practical application. Simplistic and 
reductionist universal claims are unwarranted and impossible dogmatism.” 21
The mainstream theories on antitrust seek to address antitrust strictly through the 
application of their specific principles. Some of these theories will be briefly 
explained and thereafter deconstructed through their shortcomings as identified by
18 Their root in distributive justice stems from the inspiration they derived from Schmoller’s 
sociopolitik. See Klaus Dieter John, “The German Social Market Economy -  (Still) a Model for the 
European Union?” [http://www.ectap.rO/articole/3.pdf].
19 It has been argued that even though they claim to be value neutral, efficiency theories are inherently 
normative and as such based on some form o f  value judgment. See Maurice Stucke, “Does the Rule o f  
Reason Violate the Rule o f Law”, in Philip Marsden and Spencer Waller, “Antitrust Marathon: 
Antitrust and the Rule o f  Law” (2009) 22 Loyola Consumer Law Review 21.
20 See ii below
21 Serge-Christophe Kolm, Modern Theories o f  Justice (Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1996) 10. 
(Emphasis mine, italics in original).
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other theories. For example, illustrating with the price theory, where agreements are 
assessed through the strict principles of price theory, competition is strictly seen as 
consisting of: “[cjonstant technological rivalry between autonomous firms, 
unconstrained by so-called nonstandard contracts; that is, agreements that constrain 
the discretion of purchasers and competitors. This rivalry, it is said, result in an 
equilibrium of competitive prices, output, and other terms of trade, an equilibrium 
that maximizes social welfare. Within this paradigm, any contractual arrangement 
that produces output, prices, or other terms of trade that depart from the competitive 
baseline is prima facie anticompetitive and properly subject to condemnation absent
99concrete proof of some justification that outweighs the harm.” This perception of 
competition, for instance, informs the US rule of reason. It also informs the goal 
competition law is set to achieve which in this case would be the enhancement of 
(total or consumer) welfare. In practice, this theory will require that a party alleging 
the anti-competitive effect of an agreement establishes a prima facie case by proving 
“actual detrimental effects”. This requirement, in line with price theory, rests upon a 
presumption that any departure from the prices or other terms of trade produced by
•  • 23technological rivalry reflects an anti-competitive exercise of market power. 
Similarly, the requirement that pro-competitive benefits offset or outweigh anti­
competitive effects by reducing prices or preventing their increase rests upon price 
theory’s partial equilibrium trade-off model and its assumption that any benefits 
resulting from a contract or transaction coexist with anticompetitive effects reflected 
in a prima facie case.24
Basic deconstruction of this assumption undertaken below will show that just like 
any other claim which seeks to address agreement strictly through its principles, this 
price theory-based account is bound to be mistaken and insufficient as it does not 
fully describe how antitrust can be analysed. It would thus be revealed that antitrust 
law is not based on a single value. Rather, it is undergirded by an array of irreducible 
independent values which are plural and diverse. As such, all relevant antitrust 
theories must discard all theoretical claims to completeness since such claims in
22 Alan Meese, “Price Theory, Competition and Rule o f Reason” (2003) 1 University o f  Illinois Law 
Review  80.
23 Ibid.
24 Ibid, 124.
general run “afoul of the plurality of values and the phenomenon of value 
incommensurability.”25
It must be acknowledged at this point that the prevailing theories on antitrust policy 
are rich in foundation. They describe the institution of antitrust through their theory 
in such a lucid manner that even staunch sceptics might be convinced. For example, 
ordoliberals understand competition within the constitutional framework which, they 
argue, is designed to clarify the relationship between government and individuals. To 
them, the guarantee of individual freedom and economic progress are the mainstay of 
competition policy and, as such, should form the basis of all its statutory. 
interpretations.27 On the other hand, there are those who explain that competition law 
and policy should be solely concerned with the need to attain market efficiency. 
Also, there are those who argue for a wealth transfer standard for antitrust and so on.
The claim is that these theories are all mistaken in some sense which makes it 
imperative that we apply a different approach that will correct their mistakes. This is 
because these theories expound on antitrust strictly within the confines of their 
doctrines.
To show the mistakes inherent in these theories, reference could be made to the 
views of practitioners and theorists who are often locked into their school of thought 
and as a result are normally convinced about the merit of their positions and the 
failings of others. The outcome of such banter between theoretical positions reflect 
that when it comes to real life decisions, one is faced with differing plausible 
theories, each of which is claiming to govern not merely a part but all of antitrust. As 
such, one of the mistakes inherent in these theories is noticeable from their manner of 
argumentation -  they seek to justify normative claims and discredit other normative 
claims by referring to their own normative claims which themselves need to be
25 Borrowed from Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1996) 98-99.
26 David Gerber, Law and Competition in Twentieth-Century Europe: Protecting Prometheus (Oxford, 
Oxford University Press, 1998); W olf Sauter, Competition Law and Industrial policy in the EU  
(Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1997). See also Karel Van Miert, “The Future of European Competition 
Policy” (1998) 17 September, available at: [europa.eu.int/comm/-competition/speeches/]. He stated 
that Articles 101 and 102 TFEU are not replicas o f ordoliberal thought, but their structure bears the 
imprint o f ordoliberal political philosophy.
27 Wolf for instance says that neither economic nor social policy goals should play a part in 
competition analysis. See Dieter Wolf, “Competition Policy Objectives” in Claus Dieter Ehlermann 
and Isabela Atanasiu (eds), European Competition law Annual: Enforcement o f  Prohibition o f  Cartels 
(Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2007) 131.
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justified. The process of argumentation is mistaken because it simply leads to an
•  • ' l O
infinite regress. For instance, some scholars explain all antitrust issues through the 
idea of allocative efficiency because they believe that allocative efficiency is the 
bedrock of all or certain aspects of antitrust.29 Those who hold this view often 
disregard the fact that their normative claim to allocative efficiency in itself needs 
further justification considering that it fails to explain some issues which others 
consider to be antitrust concerns. Another instance stems from the fact that efficiency 
theorists normally build antitrust into efficiency and vice versa when arguing against 
other theories. For example, they contend that economic freedom is not a good proxy 
for antitrust analysis where it produces fundamentally different results from those 
which would be achieved where efficiency standards are applied. Argumentations 
of this nature breed petito principiis.
The tension between these principles of antitrust are evident when one considers the 
often fierce criticism and counter-criticisms between the various scholars and 
practitioners. For example, Bork, an advocate of the efficiency theory, was of the 
opinion that outside the idea of efficiency, “‘[cjompetition’ ... meant the 
preservation or comfort of small businesses ... the preservation of political 
democracy, the preservation of local ownership, and so ad infinitum.” He noted that 
though these cornucopias have their attraction, “when it comes to finding and 
applying a policy to guide adjudication, horns of plenty make anything resembling a 
rule of law impossible.”31 He also criticised theories based on fairness and freedom 
as being based on “uncritical sentimentality” .32 In the same light, doctrines that seek 
to protect small businesses from the stranglehold of big businesses have also been 
characterised as nothing more than a “jumble of half-digested notions and 
mythologies” .33 Also, the consumer welfare school argue that efficiency “does not 
reflect the interest of consumers in preventing monopolists from extracting 
monopoly profits. It ignores various other interests that may be expected to flow
28 Jonathan Gorman, “Three-Person Justification” in George Pavlakos (ed), Law, Rights and 
Discourse (Oxford and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2007) 207.
29 See e.g. Okeoghene Odudu, The Boundaries o f  EC Competition Law  (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 2005).
30 See e.g. Barry Hawk, “System Failure: Vertical Restraints and EC Competition Law” (1995) 
CMLRev 978.
31 Robert Bork, The Antitrust Paradox (New York, Free Press, 1978) 427.
32 See Richard McKenzie, Trust on Trial: How the Microsoft Case is Reframing the Rules o f  
Competition (New York, Perseus Publishing, 2000).
33 Bork (1978) 54.
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from a competitive economy, including diversity of sources, variety of product and 
innovation.”34 One of the mistakes inherent in the efficiency school, as shown by the 
economic freedom proponents is that ideas based on efficiency are undemocratic and 
totalitarian.35
Further, ordoliberal ideology seeks to limit the understanding of antitrust to 
fundamental right/faimess while economic welfare-based accounts prefer to limit 
antitrust to rational choice. These claims are to be disregarded to the extent that they 
claim completeness since they fail to evince the whole of antitrust: with regards to 
efficiency, some commentators have rightly challenged the use of efficiency as the 
ultimate proxy and aim of antitrust. They argue that it cannot be right that antitrust 
requires us “to squeeze the greatest possible efficiency out of business”. Its 
incompleteness is also reflected by the fact that efficiency-based antitrust policies do 
not always have positive effect as they may very well exacerbate issues. Lande for 
instance, cautions against the use of efficiency approach as the sole assessment 
criterion. He is of the opinion that, rather than focusing on total welfare, wealth 
transfer or “price to consumer” should also be considered. He shows that total 
surplus is an insufficient criterion for antitrust by arguing that any increase in total 
surplus be matched by an increase in consumer surplus as that would show that 
efficiency benefits were passed or would be passed to consumers. The 
incompleteness of economic freedom ideology is showcased by the fact that 
restriction of competition may arise without a restriction of freedom to compete. For 
example, such restriction of competition may be the inherent effect of cooperation 
between competitors which cannot be characterised as a restriction of freedom. For 
example, joint selling or buying without exclusivity, information exchange, and
• 39inherent effects of joint ventures/minority shareholdings between competitors.
34 Eleanor Fox “The Modernization o f Antitrust: A New Equilibrium” (1981) 66 Cornell Law Review  
1140, 1161.
35 See e.g. Christian Watrin, “Germany’s Social Market Economy” in Alstair Kilmarnock (ed) The 
Social Market and the State (London, Social Market Foundation, 1999) 91-95. Economic freedom 
theorists claim to prefer a state o f inefficiency as long as there is freedom as against totalitarian but 
efficient state o f affair.
36 Eleanor Fox and Lawrence Sullivan, “Antitrust— Retrospective and Prospective: Where Are We 
Coming From? Where Are We Going?” (1987) 62 New York University Law Review 956-959.
37ICN, Report on the Objective o f  Unilateral Conduct Laws (2007) 21-22.
38 Robert Lande, “The Rise and (Coming) Fall o f Efficiency as the Ruler o f Antitrust” (1988) 33 
Antitrust Bulletin 429.
39 See Schuab (1998) 124.
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These kinds of fierce criticisms can also come from within a particular theory. For 
example proponents of market efficiency are uniform in their pursuit of social 
welfare effect. However, either because they differ about the standard of welfare or 
about the definition of efficiency itself, theorists seem to take time to show the 
weakness in other accounts. For instance, regarding the Rule of Reason, Stucke 
argues that neo-classical economic theories which are often premised on rational 
profit maximising behaviour might falter and thus be shown to be mistaken under the 
searching scrutiny of the “burgeoning behavioural economic literature” on the 
grounds that they fail to reflect marketplace realities.40 Regarding the definition of 
efficiency, Fox criticises the Chicago school on the ground that they define 
efficiency only in terms of artificial output limitation which is inefficient by 
definition because it blocks the flow of resources to the production of goods that 
people need.41
Also, some of the value-based arguments between scholars have revealed that none 
of the individual theories can effectively describe all the issues that can reasonably 
be attributed to antitrust. For instance, we can argue that though price theory can 
explain some aspects of antitrust, it does not go well enough to effectively explain all 
issues in the present day. The price theory which has been shown to underlie the US 
position on efficiency in antitrust is premised on a number of assumptions. With 
regard to the application of the Rule of Reason to restrictive agreements, the 
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE) theory challenges the underlying assumptions by 
showing that some of the principles under the price theory are not in consonance 
with modem day realities and as such should be substituted with a more reflective 
description under the TCE.42
As shown above concerning the Rule of Reason,43 Meese establishes that it is the 
price theory’s definition of competition that drives each of the three requirements. He 
however argues that each of the price-theoretic assumptions animating the current 
structure of Rule of Reason analysis in the US is inconsistent with recent advances in 
economic theory in particular, transaction cost economics. He shows the mistake 
inherent in the Price theory by stating further that:
40 Stucke (2009) 21.
41 Eleanor Fox, “Consumer Beware Chicago” (1985-1986) 84 Michigan Law Review 1714.
42 Meese (2003) 80.
43 See text accompanying n 22-25 above.
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“[ajccording to [transaction cost economics], technological rivalry unconstrained by 
nonstandard contracts can produce suboptimal results, as firms and consumers 
struggle to overcome various costs of transacting in an atomistic market. As a result, 
the transaction cost paradigm assumes that nonstandard contracts are presumptively 
efforts to overcome these costs, thus better serving consumers and society at large. 
On the other hand, price-theoretic competition—technological rivalry unconstrained 
by nonstandard contracts—will often result in a market failure, that is, output, price, 
and other terms of trade different from those desired by consumers and society at 
large.”44
This goes to show that there are plural justifiable positions even within the narrow 
economic welfare model of antitrust which all add up to give us a fuller 
understanding of antitrust. In effect, any claim that one of the economic welfare 
theories fully explains antitrust to the exclusion of the others is bound to be mistaken.
The contention that no single theory can make claim to the whole of antitrust can be 
extended to the enforcement part of antitrust. Some efficiency theorists would argue 
that enforcement should strictly be based on cost efficiencies.45 It is also possible to 
advocate a corrective justice basis for antitrust enforcement46 perhaps because it 
vindicates the normative equality between parties.47 The point here is simply that 
none of these accounts can solely explain how best to fashion an enforcement regime 
as each can be deconstructed from the position of the “Other”.
Those who oppose the idea of a multi-goaled antitrust regime might think that 
antitrust should be set up to achieve limited goal(s) such as efficiency while, for 
example, human right law protects freedom. Such suggestions are not only 
theoretically and practically inappropriate, they also unwisely peg antitrust into an 
isolated field as though it is not influenced or does not influence other areas of law. 
The practical concern is that it suggests that when handling a single case, one is 
meant to exhaust competition issues (on the basis of, for instance efficiency) before 
an antitrust focused court. Then the same case can be taken to a different forum 
where the court is to address issues firmly in light of some other laws.
44 Meese (2003)81.
45 See e.g. Associated Gen. Contractors v CSCC 459 US 519 (1983); Florida Seed Company andAnor 
v Monsanto 915 F.Supp. 1167 (1995).
46 Elbert Robertson, “A Corrective Justice Theory o f Antitrust Regulation” (2000) 49 Cath. University 
Law Review 741.
47 Ernest Weinrib, The Idea o f  Private Law (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1996).
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1.2.2 The Wav Forward
The problem of justice as it relates to antitrust has been identified, to wit, that the 
present theories on antitrust are individually deconstructible such that they raise 
questions as to their justness. The task here therefore is to forge an account of justice 
that seeks inclusiveness as it is believed that we can get closer to achieving justice by 
recognising the principles set by the different antitrust accounts.
This task should not be seen as seeking to build a substantive (undeconstructible) 
account of justice for antitrust. Rather, it should be seen as an attempt to protect the 
interests of different parties (within practical limits) through a procedural framework. 
I will therefore assess the alternative procedural accounts of justice that could form 
the basis of justice as inclusiveness -  Habermas’ communicative ethics and person- 
centred approach. After thorough analysis, preference is given to the person-centred 
approach.
To start with, even though the idea of justice as inclusiveness is independent of the 
theory of deconstruction, it is still important to show that the account of justice that is 
eventually chosen does not contradict the deconstruction ideology which without 
equivocation forms the basis for denouncing the present modes of antitrust analyses. 
One cannot overlook the possibility that Derrida’s deconstruction presupposes that 
all accounts of law and justice are deconstructible coupled with the fact that majority 
of deconstructionists think that justice is an impassable difficulty or paradox for any 
legal system rather than a transcendent ideal.48 If this is truly the case, the idea of 
justice as inclusiveness will itself be deconstructible especially in light of the laws 
that would seek such inclusiveness. Hence, even if there is an improvement to the 
law and its application because of the adherence to the idea of justice as 
inclusiveness, such improvement would likely lie somewhere between small and 
inconsequential. On the other hand, if a transcendental idea of justice (such as justice 
as inclusiveness) can practically exist within the remit of deconstructionist
48 See e.g. Cornell's redefinition o f deconstruction in Drucilla Cornell, Philosophy o f the Limit 
(London, Routledge, 1992). Also Carl Cohen, “Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional 
Approach” (1935) 25 Columbia Law Review  809, 812.
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philosophy, it means in effect that such account of justice can substantially move the 
law closer to achieving justice.
Even though most deconstructionists including Derrida do not approve of 
transcendental justice, there is scope for believing that an overarching idea of justice 
can be in line with deconstructionist ideology. For instance, Balkin thinks differently 
as regards the question whether and (if possible) how an ideal account of justice 
should be formulated. He believes that human practice of deconstructive argument is 
rhetorical as the arguments are always limited encounters with the many potentially 
deconstructible features of law, language and culture. In other words, deconstruction 
does not generally involve a scientific or algorithmic process but is rather informed 
by the values and commitments of the individual deconstructor and the direction he 
chooses to investigate. As such, while the practice of deconstruction is infinite, we 
respond to our pre-existing moral and political commitment which tells us when to 
stop. Balkin contends that we are only able to engage in this rhetorical practice 
because of the deconstructability of human law, convention, and culture. He however 
queries what makes such critical deconstruction possible in the first place. Quite 
contrary to other deconstructive disciples, Balkin contends that for human law, 
convention, and culture to be deconstructed for normative purpose (which is implicit 
in rhetorical deconstruction), the practice “must rest on the assumption of 
transcendental human values -  and, in particular, a transcendental value of justice.”49
One should however not be confused as to the oxymoronic nature of the phrase 
“transcendental deconstruction” as Balkin agrees that since human legal creations are 
always to some degree unjust, justice cannot be fully determined by any positive 
norm of human law, culture or convention. As such, positive norms must fall short of 
our value of justice. Hence, this means that Balkin’s reference to “transcendence” 
merely means that we must postulate a human value of justice which transcends each 
and every example of justice in human law, culture and convention even though we 
realise that such value of justice is insatiable and can never be fulfilled by human 
law. He stated that “the normative use of deconstruction becomes ... ‘transcendental’
49 Jack Balkin, “Being Just with Deconstruction” Yale Law School (1994). Faculty Scholarship Series. 
Paper 271 [http://www.yale.edu/lawweb/jbalkin/articles/beingjustl.htm].
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deconstruction, because it must presume the existence of transcendental human 
values articulated in culture but never adequately captured by culture.”50
Balkin states further that “transcendence”, which he refers to should not be seen as 
concerned with “an ideal of determinate content that exists separate and apart from 
human law, culture and convention.” He contends that it should rather be seen as 
“the insatiable yearning or longing for justice lodged in human heart” which, to him, 
is an urge that can never be fully appreciated by the positive norms of human culture.
This thesis proceeds on the basis of Balkin’s perspective on deconstruction and 
justice. It is imperative at this juncture to ascertain an idea of justice which people in 
a civilised society will undoubtedly yearn for. It is argued that “justice as 
inclusiveness” fits quite well with such transcendental idea of justice as it does not 
sound beyond reason that each and every one would yearn for a right to a voice in 
decisions that affect them even though such yearning is insatiable.51 The peoples’
52yearning for justice will be pursued through a procedural framework.
However, even though Balkin helps us to appreciate the possibility of forging an 
account of transcendental justice which is not necessarily opposed to the 
deconstruction ideology, he does not go as far as detailing how we can best tailor the 
law to strive at such transcendental value. How can we make sense of antitrust with 
the deconstructed principles of antitrust whilst also striving towards inclusiveness as 
the ultimate criterion of justice? Considering the decontructability of transcendental 
moral values, can we really build up an account of justice on the basis of 
inclusiveness? Can we really solve the problem of incompleteness militating against 
traditional antitrust? Can we really construct a solution? Would such construction be 
compatible with the theory of deconstruction?
It is the position in this thesis that it is possible in principle to construct a theory 
aimed at justice as inclusiveness. Deconstruction is not only about criticism. In fact, 
Bankovsky contends that deconstruction is not opposed to the constructive and
50 Ibid.
51 See Carl Cohen, “Have I a Right to a Voice in Decisions that Affect My Life?” (1971) 5 Nous 63- 
79.
52 See generally John Thibaut and Laurens Walker, Procedural Justice (New Jersey, Lawrence 
Erlbaum Associates, 1975).
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reconstructive approaches to justice.53 If this is the case, can we therefore formulate 
an idea of justice for antitrust while still respecting the tenets of deconstruction? If 
yes, what will be the philosophical premise of such account?
With regards to the first question, it is contended that regardless of pessimism 
expressed by the likes of Cornell, the pursuit of an idea of justice is still a relevant 
exercise within deconstructive thoughts. This response is justified by the fact that 
Derrida stimulates debate by constructing the position of the Other.
The critical issue therefore lies in the second question; how should such account of 
justice be formulated? It has been stated above that the “yearnings of the people” 
could be the desire of individuals to influence decisions that affect them. This, they 
will normally seek to achieve through a fair procedure. To put the question 
differently therefore, we need to ascertain how procedural justice can be achieved in 
antitrust issues. As stated above, Habermas’ communicative ethics and the person- 
centred approach will be assessed. However, before these alternatives are detailed, 
the values of procedural justice will be briefly identified.
Procedural justice helps to legitimise judicial and political decisions. As stated by 
Young, decisions should be considered legitimate “only if all those affected by it are 
included in the process of discussion and decision-making.”54 The requirement of 
inclusiveness should not be taken too literally to mean that everyone affected by a 
decision in any trivial way ought to be a party to them. Young notes that “affected” 
here means “at least that decisions and policies significantly condition a person’s 
options for action.”55 Also, this idea of procedural justice embodies a norm of moral 
respect as opposed to being treated as means. People are treated as means “if they are 
expected to abide by rules or adjust their actions according to decisions from where 
determination their voice and interests have been excluded.”56
Specifically linking the issues of procedural justice and legitimacy to the judicial 
setting, Tyler identifies two primary goals of the judicial system which are first, to
53 Miriam Bankovsky, Social Justice after Kant: Between Constructivism and Deconstruction (Rawls, 
Habermas, Levinas, Derrida) Thesis submitted to the School o f History and Philosophy at the 
University o f New South Wales in fulfilment o f the requirements of a PhD in Philosophy September 
2008.
54 Iris Young, Inclusion and Democracy (New York, Oxford University Press, 2002) 23.
55 Ibid.
56 TUi/-!
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provide people with a forum in which they can obtain justice as it is defined by the 
framework of the law, and secondly, that the court should be able to handle problems 
in a way that leads the public to accept and be willing to abide by the decisions made 
by the court.57 With regards to this second goal, it has thus been shown that the 
manner in which disputes are handled by the courts have an important influence upon 
people’s evaluations of their experiences in the court system. Hence, participants 
would accept “losing” more willingly if the court procedures used to handle their 
case are fair. Procedural justice has thus been identified as the key to the 
development of stable and lasting solutions to conflicts.59
1.3 Constructing the Procedure for Justice as Inclusiveness
Bankovsky is of the opinion that deconstruction theory is not opposed to 
constructionist theories of justice. Balkin also attempts to create an account of 
“transcendental deconstruction”. It is on the basis of these two deconstructionist 
assertions that this thesis finds the impetus for the construction of a procedure that 
meets the justice requirement of inclusiveness. In order to fully appreciate the 
essential ingredient for inclusiveness in antitrust, Rawls’ delineation of procedural 
justice will be helpful. Rawls recognises that justice has commonly been associated 
with outcomes or state of affairs rather than procedures when in real fact, substantive 
justice and procedural justice should go hand in hand.60 He identified four instances 
in which these two concepts of justice can be linked.61 The first, is where we know 
what justice requires and we also have in place a procedure that could be relied upon 
to yield the sought after outcome. Such instance will be characterised as perfect 
procedural justice. Secondly, we might know the outcome that is required as a matter 
of justice but our best procedure for reliably generating the sought after outcome is 
imperfect. This can be characterised as imperfect procedural justice.
57 Tom Tyler, “Procedural Justice and the Courts” (2007) 44 Court Review  26.
58 Allan Lind and Tom Tyler, “The Social Psychology o f Procedural Justice” (New York, Plenum 
Press, 1988); Tom Tyler, “Social Justice: Outcome and Procedure” (2000) 35 International Journal o f  
Psychology 117.
59 Tyler (2007) 27.
60 John Rawls, A Theory o f  Justice (1972) (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1999) 85.
61 Ibid.
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Another category relates to those instances where we do not know what the just 
outcome entails in substantive terms but we can rely on the procedure. In such 
instance, we may say that so long as there are fair procedures in place to determine 
winners and losers, the outcome or state of affair it produces is just. This is what 
Rawls refers to as pure procedural justice. The use of such procedure to arrive at a 
determinate and substantive judgment of justice is considered ideal where we have 
no clear, determinate noncontroversial independent standard of what justice 
demands. A fourth category is where procedural fairness is used to arrive at a 
determinate and substantive judgment of justice even though the procedure is 
insufficient to establish the justice of the results, as long as it is sufficient to establish 
a less demanding normative standard. This is termed quasi-pure procedural justice.
Pure or quasi-pure procedural justice is premised on giving people their due. As it 
can be inferred from the deconstruction of the prevailing antitrust theories, it appears 
there is no clear, determinate, noncontroversial method for picking a person’s due as 
a matter of justice. As such, justice as inclusiveness will have to be constructed on 
the basis of (quasi) pure procedural justice.
Considering that the there are no clear, determinate, and noncontroversial method of 
picking a person’s due, it is inevitable that the procedure adopted for achieving 
inclusiveness contains at least two core elements -  it must accommodate plural 
interests and it must facilitate objectivity in decision making. Hence, in light of the 
underlying deconstructionist philosophy, the construction of an alternative means of 
understanding and addressing antitrust issues will only be worth the while if it fulfils 
these two requirements. First, Habermas’ Communicative Ethics will be assessed and 
afterwards, the person-centred approach will be introduced.
1.3.1 Habermas ’ Communicative/Discourse Ethics
The task here is to evaluate Habermas’ discourse ethics in light of the requirement of 
broadness and objectivity with the ultimate attempt of formulating an account of 
antitrust that is premised on the idea of justice as inclusiveness.
To state in basic terms, discourse ethics is premised on the assumption that moral 
problems can be solved in a rational and cognitive way as long as its procedure
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follows the principle of impartiality (principle of universalisation). It also recognises 
the plurality of values and therefore accommodates the different conceptions and 
interpretations of the “good life” as may be discerned from different norms.62
Discourse ethics allows for different positions to be expressed, the consequence of 
which is that the better argument prevails. It should be understood that the normative 
positions expressed by participants are not to be treated as proposition or assertive 
sentences. As such, they are not to be assessed on the basis of “truthfulness” but 
rather on the “weaker assumption of validity claim that is analogous to the validity 
claim of truth”. For instance, the normative claim that margin squeeze ought not to 
be considered anticompetitive cannot be assessed on its “truthfulness” but rather on 
its validity in the particular context. This can be compared with an assertion that 
Article 101 TFEU covers restrictive agreements which can be assessed on its 
truthfulness or otherwise.
With regards to the principle of universalisation, Habermas states that a norm is valid 
only if “all affected can accept the consequences and the side effects it general 
observance can be anticipated to have for the satisfaction of everyone’s interests.” 
This condition could be fulfilled where: there is equal participation of all those who 
are affected, the postulate of unlimitedness, and the postulate of seriousness and 
authenticity.
Prominent legal scholars, such as Alexy, have transposed Habermas’ discourse ethics 
into legal jurisprudence. Alexy argues that discourse is a necessary requirement for 
reaching correct judicial outcomes. This dialectical approach, he says, forges 
coherence, clarity, empirical truth, consideration of consequences, weighing of 
reasons, the analysis of the genesis of normative convictions, everyone’s right to 
participate and freedom and equality in discourse.63 He also asserts that objectivity 
and correctness are components of rationality as “the law is an idea that is 
intrinsically connected with the idea of objectivity.”64 He states further that
62 See generally Jttrgen Habermas, The Inclusion o f  the Other: Studies in Political Theory (Cambridge 
Massachusetts, MIT Press, 1998) ch 1.
63 The Discourse theory is a procedural theory of practical correctness or truth. See generally Robert 
Alexy, A theory o f  Legal Argumentation, translated by Ruth Adler and Neil MacCormick (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 1989);.
64 Robert Alexy, “Thirteen Replies”, in Pavlakos (ed) (2007) 360.
19
“[o]bjectivity is an essential feature of law, a feature that is not compatible with 
complete subjectivity of the purposes at issue...”65
So far, it appears that the discourse ethics sits well as the basis of the idea of justice 
as inclusiveness particularly when one considers that it addresses the core 
requirements stated above. It is however contended that Habermas’ 
communicative/discourse ethics should not be relied on as an instrument for attaining 
(quasi) pure procedural justice because the account cannot guarantee 
objectivity/impartiality. The basis for this scepticism can be observed from a more 
in-depth analysis of Alexy’s work and also Andriychuk’s application of dialectical 
reasoning to antitrust.
With regards to the application of the discourse theory, Alexy concedes to the 
weakness of the theory. He stated that a correct solution to a conflict of interest can 
only be achieved by considering the relative weight of the conflicting interests. He 
argues further that “[tjhere exists ... no absolute and ... objective-scale that makes it 
possible to measure and compare the conflicting interests made by those who have 
them.”66 He also concedes to Heidemann67 that dialectics is not synonymous with 
correctness as there could be a divergence between what is correct or objectively 
valid and what is achieved as a result of a real discourse.68 Alexy states that “[t]he 
relationship between correctness and discourse is indeed, one of the most serious 
problems of the discourse theory”.69 He however tries to defend the focus on 
normative convictions by contending that the final answer reached at the end of the 
dialectal exercise is not entirely subjective because argumentations from different 
interests will have to be balanced by arguments that meet the claim of correctness as 
far as possible.
Notwithstanding the attempt to salvage the discourse theory as an impartial account, 
one would have to agree with Heidemann who argues that the discourse theory must 
fail on the ground that it cannot establish “a constitutive relations between the
65 Robert Alexy, “An Answer to Joseph Raz” in Pavlakos (ed) (2007) 49.
66 Alexy, “Thirteen Replies” (2007) 362.
67 Carsten Heidemann, “The Concept o f Validity in a Theory o f Social Action” in Pavlakos (ed) 
(2007)
68 Robert Alexy, “Problem of Discourse Theory” (1988) 58 CRIT1CA 61-64.
69 Ibid.
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performance of a real discourse and the objective validity of the result.”70 Moreover, 
dialectical reasoning presupposes the weighing of values. The problem here is that 
we cannot claim to have an objective procedure where we make judgments about 
competing values based on their intrinsic qualities as we would be drawn in the 
fallacy of merging mutually incompatible ideals.71
In order to illustrate the practical difficulty and the potential for inherent subjectivity 
especially when applied in legal context, Andriychuk’s dialectic antitrust is hereby 
analysed. Andriychuk advocates for dialectical antitrust which would help in forging 
a systemic understanding of competing competition policy values. He states that 
dialectical antitrust explains the necessity of the “competitory process”. The 
discretion given to antitrust enforcers should be substantial as they should be 
empowered to set up the most effective format of competition which should not be
TOpredetermined by other values. As such, competition should be protected and 
promoted as a thing in itself, as an independent public virtue. Dialectical antitrust 
however allows that competition as an independent economic value “competes” with 
other public values such as consumer welfare. Thus, the fine-tuning required of the 
regulator should be such that it reflects the basic expectations and priorities of 
society. For instance, where there is a tension between different schools, dialectical 
antitrust reassesses each of the theories and test their applicability to different 
economic contexts. This is to be done by applying a parenthesis theory “which 
presupposes to undertake an analytical inclusion of different public goals in separate 
‘boxes’”.74 As such, when one is faced with complex antitrust issues, we are to for 
instance, assess those issue in light of economic freedom in its own unique box. This 
is to be carried out for other competing theories as well. He argues that dialectical 
antitrust tries to understand and explain competition rather than provide 
prescriptions.
70 Heidemann (2007) 312.
71 The problem is equally present in Andriychuk’s dialectical antitrust. He stated that “[i]nasmuch as 
none o f the mainstream doctrines is capable o f solving all existing internal conflicts o f antitrust 
policy, there is a possibility o f  applying the elements o f different schools depending on the context.” 
See Oles Andriychuk, “How the Theory o f Dialectical Antitrust Perceives the Role o f Competition 
Authorities” (2009) Global Antitrust Review 93.
72 Oles Andriychuk, ‘Dialectical Antitrust: An Alternative Insight into the Methodology o f the EC 
Competition Law Analysis in a Period o f Economic Downturn’ (2010) 4 European Competition Law 
Review 155.
73 Ibid.
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The difficulty of maintaining impartiality when the discourse ethics is applied in the 
legal context is evident in Andriychuk’s work. For instance, he gives clear preference 
to economic freedom by seeking to protect competition even as he acknowledges 
“other legitimate societal values”. The tendency to categorise these goals ex ante as 
less important than economic freedom is evident as Andriychuk argues that 
competition, being a thing in itself and populated by independent public virtue 
deserves protection and promotion.75
Based on the foregoing therefore, it is thought that even though Habermas’ discourse 
ethics is interesting as a constructionist account of the idea of justice, the particular 
dialectical procedure cannot in practice achieve the germane requirement of justice 
as inclusiveness in antitrust.
1.3.2 Person-centred Approach
Considering that Habermas’ discourse ethics (which is arguably the foremost account 
of (quasi) pure procedural justice) has been found wanting and thus unable to attain 
justice (as inclusiveness) in antitrust issues, I hereby attempt to construct an 
alternative procedure called the person-centred approach. The thesis will substantiate 
this approach and then critically assess (in both theoretical and practical context) 
whether: (i) it escapes the narrowness and consequent deconstructability of the 
prevailing antitrust theories; (ii) it is theoretically well grounded; (iii) it is capable of 
practical application.
At this juncture, a brief summary of the approach is given. The person-centred 
approach to antitrust seeks broadness in antitrust analysis by focusing on the persons 
interested in or affected by antitrust issues. The logic behind assessing antitrust 
through the eyes of persons is that it ensures that adequate consideration is given to 
the possible interests that could arise from any single antitrust issue. A clear 
advantage with this model of antitrust analysis is that it serves as a good avenue to 
assess whether antitrust policies and practices do in fact take into account the 
interests of the antitrust subjects. Also, this approach effectively provokes a different 
way of thinking about antitrust issues -  it seeks to trigger debates on issues such as
75Ibid.
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whether it may be better to expound and rationalise antitrust through the interests that 
antitrust subjects really have in antitrust disputes. When applied, this approach 
requires that the individual interests are to be scrutinised on a case-by-case basis in 
order to reach a reasoned conclusion as to whether to accommodate such interests. 
To be able to engage in such elaborate and broad analytical exercise, it therefore 
behoves that the person-centred approach places “persons” as the focal point of 
antitrust theorisation, exposition, evaluation, practice and implementation.
The approach holds dearly the positions of different antitrust subjects; antitrust 
subjects include all persons (both natural and artificial) that could be implicated in 
antitrust related issues. As such, included among the mix are; the consumers, 
competitors, alleged infringers and those persons who could not be categorised as 
consumers but are primarily victims of deadweight loss and so on.
It must be noted that the person-centred approach does not have any technical 
meaning. It simply requires that the interests of antitrust subjects should be taken 
seriously. As such, it is not to be applied like a theory or thesis but rather as a 
philosophical stance. Thus, though it requires that antitrust terms are addressed from 
a broader perspective as the approach considers the traditional theories to be narrow 
and mistaken. Further, it should be noted that the person-centred approach should not 
be understood as an outright attack on the veracity of traditional theories.
In an attempt to avoid the narrowness of contemporary antitrust theories, the person- 
centred approach requires a broad platform. However, the requirement of broadness 
is not an end in itself. The approach is sought primarily because of the need to take 
seriously the various interests that may be affected in antitrust related issues. There 
are a number of arguments that could be made to support this approach. First, the 
person-centred approach makes us see clearly that our society is truly many-centred 
and is thus characterised by networks of interlocking interests. Also, from a strictly 
conceptual angle, it is a less demanding way of ideating both substantive and 
procedural antitrust -  it is less demanding because it helps to avoid the temptation to 
shoe-horn pre-determined theories into antitrust. Rather, it in fact aligns with the 
practical reality which is that there are varied interests which might legitimately seek 
protection in antitrust cases. In some sense, it could also be seen as a better approach 
because it embraces the reality of the complexity of antitrust interests and hence is a
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more realistic approach. It is more realistic in the sense that it helps to avoid 
abstracting in a mechanical way, the aims and objectives that institutions (should) 
pursue. In reality, institutions put various factors into consideration even in antitrust 
cases.
As a result of its open-textured nature, the person-centred approach guards against 
undue value judgments about others’ interests. A major weakness of theories that are 
laden with value judgments is that they are excessively built on an internal point of
• 7  f \  %view. As it will be shown, the person-centred approach is built on tested theoretical 
accounts of Sen’s Capability approach. At the centre of all these applied theories is 
the notion of the antitrust subject where the “subject” is either a single unit or an 
aggregation of persons.
1.4 Conclusion
It has been shown in this chapter that the present top-down approaches to antitrust 
analysis have the tendency to cause injustice through the exclusion of the interests of 
one or a section of antitrust subjects. We are able to draw this conclusion by using 
Derrida’s deconstruction to showcase the incompleteness of traditional antitrust 
theories. To solve this potential problem, it was considered imperative to construct a 
different mode of antitrust analysis. It was noted in this chapter that a strictly 
procedural framework is required if we are to meet up with the requirement of justice 
as inclusiveness. Two alternatives were thus identified -  Habermas’ discourse ethics 
and the person-centred approach. The former has been jettisoned as it fails to meet 
the neutrality required from a pure procedural framework. Still proceeding with the 
task of constructing a compliant procedural framework, the remainder of this thesis 
will be dedicated to developing and evaluating the person-centred approach.
76 As shown above in chapter 2, this conclusion can be drawn from our finding that the theories are 
inherently incomplete.
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Chapter 2
Person-Centred Approach 
2.1 Introduction
Having established the deconstructability of prevailing antitrust theories in the 
preceding chapter, the imminent need to construct an alternative mode of antitrust 
analysis was established. An alternative mode was considered essential in order to 
meet the requirement of justice as inclusiveness. As potential candidates, Habermas’ 
discourse ethics and the person-centred approach were identified. However, the 
discourse ethics proved inadequate as it fell under scrutiny. This left us to consider 
the other alternative -  the person-centred approach. This approach is the primary 
contribution of this thesis. However, for it to be adopted as the ideal mode of 
analysing antitrust for the purpose of achieving the requirement of justice as 
inclusiveness, it has to stand the thorough scrutiny which the discourse ethics has 
been put through. At this point though, there is not much to scrutinise. Thus, given 
that it is a whole new approach, it is imperative that the contours and sentient of the 
person-centred approach are established first and then consequently scrutinised. This 
chapter paves the way for the thorough elucidation of this approach by emphasising 
its core attributes with adequate illustration to competition law and policy.
This chapter is thus divided into five parts. Part one contains a summary of the 
person-centred approach. Part two identifies the values of this approach vis-a-vis the 
top-down approaches. Part three focuses on the requirement of broadness while part 
four delimits the scope of broadness sought by addressing the term “competition”. 
Part five contains the conclusion.
2.2 Person-Centred Summarised
The person-centred approach is built on tested theoretical accounts such as 
Coleman’s idea of rights and Sen’s Capability approach. At the centre of all these 
applied theories is the notion of the antitrust subject where the “subject” is either a 
single unit or an aggregation of persons.
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Since we are addressing antitrust from the bottom, a conceptually sensible way of 
conducting the analysis would be to build an account of antitrust right. It makes 
sense that if we are arguing from the position of persons and for the advancement of 
antitrust subjects, we should be able to ascertain whether there could be antitrust 
right which might require advancement and also to confirm the persons who actually 
have rights which should be vindicated. This task is important, considering the fact 
that the notion of the antitrust subjects span through all possible actors and subjects 
of antitrust analysis. Another advantage of this right-based proxy is that it could 
simplify the task of policy makers, enforcers and the court as it allows us to address 
issues closely through the questions that our account of antitrust right raise.
At the moment, many a theory concerning both the substantive and procedural 
aspects of antitrust is modelled on “firm” theories such as rational choice, economic 
freedom, deterrence etc. These theories are not without their value. The contention 
however is that they cannot solely dictate the process and content of antitrust right. 
As such, it is imperative that our account of right accords with broadness. Though 
the reasons for these assertions are fleshed out in subsequent chapters, a brief 
exposition on what we expect of the person-centred approach is given below:
2.2.1 Substantive Aspect
The reason for substantiating an alternative approach to antitrust is because, as 
shown above, the traditional approaches run the risk of being incomplete and 
inherently mistaken with their narrow analyses of antitrust issues. However, in 
suggesting alternatives, it is imperative that a host of concerns which might impact 
on market behaviour should be considered. For instance, thorough theoretical 
exercise could help us make sense of the plural values which have been neglected or 
at best acknowledged in passing by antitrust scholars. In the substantive aspect, it 
helps us to de-bias antitrust law and policy by challenging the exclusivity of some of 
the prevailing axioms on antitrust and supplanting them with broader and much more 
inclusive conceptual foundations.
It should be reiterated that the person-centred approach is strictly a procedural 
mechanism aimed at justice as inclusiveness. Hence, based on this premise, it should
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go without saying that our reference to antitrust right is merely in the procedural 
context. As such, to say that a person has antitrust right is to say that such person is 
entitled to procedural justice by being included in issues that involve or affect them. 
Thus, as it would be shown, the term antitrust right does not countenance any 
particular normative usage of the term right as it merely means that we are bound to 
consider the interrelatedness of interests held by persons in any given instance. For 
example, the way we conceive their relationship and the specific interests and values 
would influence how competition and hence, anti-competition is defined. Interests 
that could be considered in any given antitrust issue could range from employment to 
environment, integration, economic freedom to efficiency and so on.
If we accommodate different interests in line with the person-centred approach, we 
have to ascertain the proper way for analysing rights. The way we analyse could 
impact on our definition of competition and restriction and so on. Broadness can be 
ensured at the analysis stage by simply recognising that no single way of analysing 
right can conveniently represent all interests. Thus, in order to determine what best 
represents the interest of different persons the alternative approach is built on the 
idea that it is imperative to avoid holding a normative stance which renders 
traditional approaches to be inherently narrow.
Though it is possible that our idea of right in individual cases is influenced by one of 
efficiency, economic freedom, integration, industrial policy theories and so on, the 
extent to which they influence our idea of what best represents the interests of 
individuals and as such the goal of antitrust in such instance depends on what we 
consider to be correct. The idea of correctness cannot be premised on subjective 
considerations. Thus, the proper way of analysing the right and thereby determining 
the case-specific “goal(s)” of antitrust should result from our objective analysis of 
competing interests. However, maintaining objectivity is not always as easy as it may 
sound. Antitrust institutions would often have to deal with multitude of claims; for 
instance, a self-interested x who finds that competition is defined strictly through 
efficiency may genuinely think that another theory -  perhaps economic freedom -  
would have been better; a bystander may think that x ’s claim should not be rejected 
merely because some efficiency theories say so.
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Recognising these difficulties, “correctness” is to be achieved in relation to the first 
two questions on antitrust right by applying realistic theoretical constructs. This 
substantive aspect is thus primarily modelled on the capability approach and a 
decisional framework termed “antitrust pluralism”. The veracity and practicality of 
these frameworks would also be assessed.
2.2.2 Enforcement Aspect
In line with the person-centred approach, the aim at this point is to ascertain how 
antitrust should be enforced. The best way to enforce antitrust is to take note of the 
varied interests that could figure in antitrust enforcement. It is conceded that due to 
the nature of enforcement regimes, it is essential for institutions to set out well- 
defined prime enforcement objective(s). Nevertheless, antitrust institutions must be 
willing to balance such set priorities with alternative objectives. The argument is that 
if an antitrust body blindly insists on the pre-set enforcement objectives, it is bound 
to be in error at some point. The major task thus lies in maintaining a balance 
between the pre-set objectives and alternative objectives as individual cases may 
require. When such regime finds that an approach or methodology leaves certain 
antitrust subjects compromised, we must be willing to make the necessary 
improvement so as to protect the interest of such aggregate of antitrust subjects. The 
challenge that however arises is that since the person-centred approach to antitrust 
takes cognisance of all conceivable antitrust subjects, it must be certain that the 
proposed solution does not by itself create a unique deficit for some other (unit or 
aggregate of) antitrust subject(s). Thus, with equal measure, institutions would have 
to approach their antitrust enforcement task with a good dose of dynamism and 
caution.
Conclusively, it must be stated that the person-centred approach is not foolproof. In 
the substantive aspect, it raises concerns such as uncertainty which, if not properly 
managed, might complicate the field of antitrust even more than traditional theories -  
if a regime forges an account of antitrust that dwells on some or all interests that 
individuals could truly value, it might be faced with an herculean task in finding the 
appropriate interest which should eventually be vindicated. At the enforcement 
aspect, even with our best effort at incremental enforcement, we might still be unable
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to explain the extent to which a core enforcement priority (either in public or private 
antitrust) should accommodate other factors. This could generate its unique form of 
uncertainty as well.
2.3 Value of the Person-centred Approach vis-a-vis Top-Down Perspectives
Arguing from a bottom-up point of view, it is not too far-fetched to contend that the 
person-centred approach, being a bottom-up, broad and open account, could in 
principle increase the tendency of achieving inclusiveness. Also, based on the fact 
that different possibilities are to be considered, the bottom-up perspective could 
potentially increase the demand for greater thoroughness. As such we might be able 
to spot some often overlooked advantages and ills that result from the top-down 
accounts. For example, we can observe not merely that specific antitrust theories 
confine the reach of antitrust authorities and courts, but also that such confinement 
invariably impacts on the interests of persons. In effect, we can conclude that such 
narrow top-down accounts do not give adequate attention to antitrust interests.
•  77Top-down antitrust accounts are akin to Sunstein’s top level theories as they 
require firmly preset premises for the application of the law. Thus, just in the same 
way that top level theories can be criticised, one could say that top-down theories are 
equally “ill-suited to the extent of social heterogeneity and to the plurality of relevant 
values at stake.”78 More specifically, as it is herein shown, theories based on the top- 
down approach to antitrust fail primarily because they do not: (i) fully reflect 
antitrust practice and, as such, do not totally reflect what courts could truly consider; 
(ii) explain scenarios that fall outside their narrow construct; (iii) reflect the array of 
interests that could arise from a single antitrust issue.
77 See generally Cass Sunstein, Legal Reasoning and Political Conflict (New York, Oxford University 
Press, 1996).
78 Ibid, 99.
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2.4 The Person-centred Requirements
It would be foolhardy to build an entirely new concept of antitrust. This means in 
effect that any concept or perspective on antitrust must draw from the foundational 
core and established theories of antitrust in one way or another. Hence, it is 
imperative that the person-centred approach herein developed takes account of the 
present top-down theories regardless of their ills and shortcomings. The extent of 
their relevance to the bottom-up account however need be clearly stated -  for 
instance, they will be of value only to the extent that they accord with the primary 
conditions for the person-centred analysis which are that: antitrust analyses must be 
flexible, there must be adequate information and that we must be able to incorporate 
broad range of factors and interests. These conditions are addressed and substantiated 
through an evaluative exercise that showcases the ills of the top-down approaches 
while at the same time, drives home the value of the person-centred approach.
This analysis is undertaken in two parts. Part one emphasises the significance of the 
requirement of flexibility to the person-centred approach. In order to establish an 
acceptable reason for developing the person-centred analysis as a possible alternative 
to the traditional top-down approaches, rule-based accounts of competition law will 
be shown to be prone to the peculiar problem of inflexibility. It will then be shown 
that the potential problem(s) does not arise where the person-centred approach is 
applied. Further, in an attempt to solidify its basis, the person-centred approach is 
linked to certain laudable legal requirements such as the need to obtain adequate 
information for the purpose decision-making as well as the need for 
broadmindedness in legal discourse, analysis, decision-making, implementation and 
enforcement.
2.4.1 A Flexible Framework
A basic requirement of the person-centred approach under consideration is that 
antitrust analysis should be based on a flexible framework. It thus goes without 
saying that from a person-centred perspective, any account of antitrust modelled on
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rigid rules would not be ideal.79 This requirement should apply to every antitrust 
issue. It has unequivocally been stated that rigid rules must be avoided. We must 
however not lose sight of the fact that this assertion is not against rules per se but 
against rules that are inflexible. A person-centred analysis recognises the value of 
rules -  by their making, rules are aimed at specifying outcomes before particular 
cases arise and, as Sunstein states, rule-making is often thought to be the signal 
virtue of a regime of law as one might legitimately argue that the rule of law requires
OA
a system of rules. Moreover, rules could be desirable in the sense that they limit 
permissible grounds for actions and arguments. Rules by their very nature can play 
an enormous role in a heterogeneous society as they help in containing people of
• ft 1 *limited time and capacities. As acknowledged by Sunstein, rules “save effort, time 
and expenses.” He states further that “[b]y truncating the sorts of value-disputes that 
can arise in law, [rules] also ensure[s] that disagreements will occur along a narrowly
ftA
restricted range.” Rules thus have a tremendous advantage over other alternatives 
in this regard.
One particular characteristic of rules is that they generally say that considerations 
that are relevant in many settings are not relevant to the issue they address. “Rules 
will say what sorts of considerations bear on what issues, and what sorts of 
considerations do not. Rules decide questions of appropriate role, and they say what 
is relevant for people in different social roles.”83 This much is good about rules. The 
point at which we have to become wary of rules is when they interfere with interests. 
Even though it is inevitable to trade-off interests when concrete decisions are to be 
made, it would be inappropriate to engage in such trade-off solely on the grounds of 
external benefits such as administrative convenience. Further, when one gets 
fanatical about rules, it becomes quite easy to be blinded to some of the 
imperfections that result from such rules. The danger of unwavering fondness for 
rules can be noted from Hayek’s position. He was fanatical about rules so much that 
he was willing to perpetuate injustice in the name of rule-making. He stated that
79 It should be noted that it is not the aim o f this thesis to obliterate rule-making and to promote a 
regime totally devoid o f rules. Rather, the criticisms o f rules should be seen strictly in the light o f  
“excessively rigid rules” while the promotion o f flexibility should be such that even where a regime is 
rule-based, it allows for a discretional application o f the law.
80 Sunstein (1996) 102.
81 Ibid, 106.
82 Ibid.
83 Ibid, 107-108.
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“[t]he important thing is that rule enables us to predict other people’s behaviour 
correctly, and this requires that it should apply to all cases -  even if in a particular 
case we feel it to be unjust.”84 The reasoning underscores the danger of adhering to 
rigid rules as it may make people too mechanical such that they may insist on 
applying “general principles to particular cases [even where] they lead to palpable 
absurdity.”85
In fact, a closer look reveals that not all the values attributed to rules are true. Rules 
cannot always do what proponents of rule-making expect. This is because rules are 
not really what they appear to be -  we would find out that rather than answering all 
questions in advance, the best rules might still provoke substantive disagreement at 
the moment of their application. As such, since even the best rules would inevitably 
require ex post interpretation, the aspiration of rule-bound justice is greatly 
undermined.86 No matter how seemingly uncontroversial a rule might appear, it is 
not far-fetched to expect that substantive debates would arise at the stage of 
interpretation. We can thus wonder why we should be unduly fixated on rules 
especially where they may prejudice (some) antitrust interests.
Also, the general nature of rules and their blindness to particular instances is not 
always a virtue but rather a political vice, because a just system allows us to adapt 
the particular circumstances that shape individual cases. In effect, it may not be 
inappropriate in specific instances to say that rigid rules are obtuse since ideal justice
on
is flexible and based on the situation at hand.
In the context of the person-centred perspective, any theory that prescribes rigid 
antitrust rules will hardly be able to withstand scrutiny. It will struggle to show that 
its mode of analysing antitrust will fit in with the heterogeneous nature of society. As 
such, whatever the justifications are, we must keep in mind that “rules may misfire, 
precisely because they are too rigid and because they are laid down in advance; they 
go badly wrong when applied to concrete cases not anticipated when the rules are set 
down.”88
84 Friedrich Hayek, Road to Serfdom (Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 2007) (1944) 114.
85 Sunstein (1996) 15.
86 Ibid, 121.
87 Ibid.
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Moreover, sheepish application of rules may be a clear sign of incompetence and 
lack of rigour. For instance, we can infer from Posner’s statement that strict 
adherence to rules is often the easy way out for the mediocre and incompetent. 
Posner stated that it was perhaps due to the lack of substantive economic knowledge 
that trial lawyers tended to be combative in antitrust cases rather than reflective. He 
stated further that government lawyers who were young or mediocre applied rules 
slavishly because of their incompetence. Posner asserted that they “fashioned a body 
of substantive doctrine and a system of sanctions and procedures that are poorly
• O Qsuited to carrying out the fundamental objectives of antitrust policy.”
Other germane reasons why we should be cautious of excessive rule-making is that 
they will most likely end up being over- and under-inclusive if assessed by reference 
to their purpose. This conclusion is strengthened by the fact that rules can be easily 
outrun by changing circumstances. Also, legal abstraction involved in rule-making 
may sometimes mask bias. Rules may also drive discretion underground. Other likely 
downside of rules is that they may allow evasion by wrongdoers and can lead to 
procedural unfairness.90
The likelihood that we might be inflicted with the downsides of rule-making in 
market-related issues is pretty high. As Joskow observes, the relationship between 
the wide arrays of market structures, organisational arrangements, transactional 
attributes and contractual arrangements in a market economy and the market 
performance indicia of concern are imperfectly understood from both the theoretical 
and empirical perspectives. As such, there is always a tension between the 
specification of clear simple rules and their confrontation with situations where their 
rigid application can lead to type I or II errors.91 It is even more pertinent that we
89 Richard Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective (Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 
1976) 231-236.
90 Sunstein (1996) 129, 130-135.
91 Paul Joskow “Transaction Cost Economics, Antitrust Rules and Remedies” (2002) 95 The Journal 
o f  Law, Economics& Organization 100. For example, where we rigidly apply antitrust rules without 
taking into account our imperfect understanding o f market structures, organisational arrangement, 
market performance indicia and so on, we run the risk o f allowing anti-competitive practises (type I 
error) or punishing a pro-competitive behaviour (type II error).
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desist from strict rule-making in antitrust because it is a dynamic field92 that requires 
the complex interplay of law and economics.
It can be safely assumed that we should avoid rigid rules in most areas of law 
because the law has to be able to respond to changes in society. For example, courts 
have had to reinterpret their procedural rules on taking of evidence which was 
drafted prior to the computer age. If they are to keep up with the pace of the society, 
laws must be flexible enough to allow for a broader interpretation of relevant 
provisions in light of the technology in question. To this extent, the need to avoid 
rigidity is not unique to competition law. There is however a more peculiar reason 
why avoidance of rigidity is important for antitrust -  there is good reason to avoid 
rigidity in fields that still struggle with very foundational issues of definition. It is 
contended that antitrust is one of such fields. For instance, we still struggle with 
foundational issues such as “what is competition?” The problem pertaining to the 
volatility of the definition of germane terms is not cosmetic as definitions and 
theories have a very strong influence on actual implementation and interpretation of 
competition rules.
To illustrate the peculiarity of the need to avoid rigid rules in certain areas of the law 
such as antitrust, patent law is compared with antitrust law. In both areas of law, 
there are certain conditions and requirements which have to be interpreted in light of 
specific facts. For example, in most jurisdictions, patentability requirements include 
that an invention must: be of a patentable subject matter; novel; and involve an 
inventive step etc. In the same vein, there is often the need to identify the relevant 
market in antitrust cases. If one thus isolates the requirement of “novelty” under 
patent law and the question of “relevant market” under competition law and seek to 
interpret them in light of the changes in society, it is possible to give the same 
justification for requiring flexibility in the interpretation of both requirements. For 
instance, it could be observed that there might be need to avoid rigidity in the 
interpretation of the novelty requirement so as not to deny a hitherto uncommon but 
legitimate claims such as “product by process” patent claims. Many would decry an 
irredeemably rigid system which is not willing to adapt to such scientific
92 Femi Alese in Philip Marsden and Spencer Waller, “Antitrust Marathon: Antitrust and the Rule o f  
Law” (2009) 22 Loyola Consumer Law Review 42.
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advancement. In similar vein, provision regarding market definition must not be 
rigid and relevant authorities must not be numb to changing business environment 
which might impact on the scope of the market that is considered relevant. For 
example, regarding the requirement of demand substitutability in ascertaining the 
relevant market, it is imperative to remain flexible94 and to adjust counterfactuals 
accordingly. For instance, it could be important to take due note of present conditions 
in ascertaining whether a consumer is likely to switch to another product in the event 
of a Small but Significant Non-transitory Increase in Price (SSNIP). Though it can be 
presumed that a product is not substitutable where there are transaction and 
information search cost involved in buyer switching to other suppliers, one must not 
disregard the peculiarities of individual issues and the societal trends. For instance, 
certain non-price factors or even brute consumerism might change the nature of an 
erstwhile inelastic market such that consumers would switch as a result of a SSNIP 
even where they will incur increased searching cost thereby making hitherto non- 
substitutable products interchangeable.
Having noted the similarity in the justification for flexibility under both patent law 
and competition law, it is imperative to identify the antitrust-specific concern against 
rigidity. In many areas of law, foundational issues of definition are relatively settled. 
Even where the boundaries of such laws are not well defined, it is often an academic 
or theoretical concern as to whether such field of law can be considered a coherent 
and distinctive subject of law. Thus, even if there are foundational issues of 
definition, they are hardly of intrinsic importance to the field per se.
It must be noted that antitrust does by all means form a distinct area of law. It should 
also be noted that there is grave uncertainty in terms of foundational definitions. 
Since there is no doubt as to the distinctiveness of antitrust laws, the issue of 
foundational definitions should be taken more seriously. It is important to identify 
the uniqueness of these definitional issues in antitrust by comparing antitrust law
93 See generally the following US cases: In re Stephens, 345 F.2d 1020, 145 USPQ 656 (CCPA 1965); 
Scripps Clinic & Research Foundation v. Genentech Inc., 18 USPQ 2d 1001; Atlantic Thermoplastics 
Co Inc. v. Faytex Corp, 23 USPQ 2d 1481 (Fed. Cir. 1992) rehearing denied, 24 USPQ2d 1138; 
Columbia University v. Roche Diagnostics GmbH, 57 USPQ2d 1825 (D. Mass. 2000).
94 See generally Willem Boshoff, “Antitrust Market Definition: Rationale, Challenges and 
Opportunities in South African Competition Policy”
[http: //www. compcom. co. za/ assets/U ploads/e vents/Fourth-Competition-Law-Conferece/ Session- 
4B/Boshoff-Market-Definition.pdf].
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with patent law which is another clearly distinctive area of law. To a large extent, it 
is uncontroversial to assert that a patent consist of a set of exclusive right which is 
granted to protect an invention.95 On the other hand, the term “competition” cannot 
be so easily defined96 which implies that there is a greater need to avoid rigidity is 
antitrust law.
Another important reason why some degree of flexibility is required in antitrust law 
stems from the fact that it is a dynamic field. In Europe for example, in the 
primordial days of competition enforcement, agreements that restrain competition 
were interpreted formally to cover any restraint on a trader's freedom which was 
likely to affect the market. Whether or not an agreement restrains competition was 
decided in the abstract without a market analysis. This formalistic approach resulted 
in type I and type II errors as restrictions that are not legally enforceable were 
permitted, even if they restricted competition substantially, while enforceable
• • 0 7  .horizontal restrictions on conduct were voided even if they did not. However, in the 
recent past, Europe has unequivocally denounced its previous mechanical approach 
to competition law analysis. In the Article 81(3) Guidelines for instance, the 
Commission stated that the standards in the “guidelines must be applied in light of 
the circumstances specific to each case. This excludes a mechanical application. 
Each case must be assessed on its own fact and the guidelines must be applied 
reasonably and flexibly.”98
A degree of flexibility can be noticed in European competition law when one 
considers how the relevant European institutions assess provisions such as Article 
101 of the Treaty for the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU). Arrangements 
prohibited by Article 101 include those where a supplier restricts its distributors from 
competing with each other, and as a result, the (potential) competition that could 
have existed between the distributors is extinguished. However, the Union recognises 
that certain restraints may in certain cases not be caught by Article 101(1) when the
95 Note that the difficulty o f defining the term “invention” in patent law is a secondary definitional 
issue just like the problem with defining “relevant market”, “market share” “restriction” etc under 
competition law.
96 See 2.6 below.
97 See Valentine Korah, “Book Review: Rene Joliet The Rule o f Reason in Antitrust Law: American, 
German and Common Market Laws in Comparative Perspective.” (1973) 22 International & 
Comparative Law Quarterly 188-189.
98 Commission - Guidelines on the application o f Article 81(3) o f the Treaty OJ No C 101 of 
27.04.2004. Para 6.
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restraint is objectively necessary for the existence of an agreement of that type or that 
nature." For instance, territorial restraints in an agreement between a supplier and a 
distributor may for a certain period of time fall outside Article 101(1), if the 
restraints are objectively necessary in order for the distributor to penetrate a new 
market.100 Similarly, a prohibition imposed on all distributors not to sell to certain 
categories of end-users may not be restrictive of competition if such restraint is 
objectively necessary for reasons of safety or health related to the dangerous nature 
of the product in question.101
Another example is the question of market power. The present position in Europe is 
that the prohibition of Article 101(1) only applies where, on the basis of proper 
market analysis, it can be concluded that the agreement has likely anti-competitive 
effects on the market unless the practice is considered to have an anti-competitive 
object.102 In European Night Services v Commission,103 the Court of Justice stated 
that in order to find an anti-competitive effect, it is necessary to show that the market 
shares of the parties exceed the thresholds set out in the Commission’s de minimis 
notice.104 Further, the Commission is of the opinion that the fact that an agreement 
falls outside the safe harbour of a block exemption is in itself an insufficient basis for 
finding that the agreement is caught by Article 101(1) or that it does not fulfil the 
conditions of Article 101(3). Findings, it states, should be based on individual 
assessment of the likely effects produced by the agreement.105
Also, the flexibility of a regime can be assessed by the way it determines the 
restrictiveness or otherwise of an agreement. For example, should focus be placed on 
per se analysis or should the effects of agreements be assessed as well? Does the 
classification into per se and rule of reason approaches require some flexibility? If 
we say that a particular type of agreement (such as resale price maintenance) is to be
99 See in this respect, the judgment in Case 56-65 Societe Technique Miniere v Maschinenbau Ulm 
GmbH [1966] ECR 235; Case 258/78 L.C. Nungesser KG and Kurt Eisele v Commission [1982] ECR 
2015.
100 See para 61-62 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints (2010/C 130/01) - OJ C 291 o f 13.10.2000.
101 Art 81(3) Guidelines, para 18.
102 See in this respect Joined Cases T-374/94 and others, European Night Services v Commission 
[1998] ECR 11-3141.
103 Ibid.
104 Ibid.
105 81(3) Guidelines para 24.
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considered illegal per se, should we be able to alter this at a later stage where the 
circumstance requires us to look at the effect instead or are we to abide strictly by the 
rule which dictates the form by which we assess such agreements?106 In line with the 
bottom-up perspective, we must be willing to consider fresh insights. For example, in 
the US case of Continental T.V, Inc. v. GTE Sylvania Inc.,107 the Supreme Court 
abandoned its hostility towards vertical restraints. It recognised that certain contracts 
which were once deemed unlawful per se may in fact attenuate or overcome market 
failure with the result that courts should evaluate such agreements under the more 
forgiving Rule of Reason. According to Meese, such decisions implicitly recognise 
that contracts producing price, output, or other terms of trade different from the 
status quo ante can be beneficial, and there is no reason to confine this reasoning to 
decisions policing the boundaries of the per se rule.108
The EU example can be noted from the Research and Development (R&D) aspect. 
The previous Research and Development Block Exemption Regulation did forbid 
certain agreement which it categorised as hardcore violations. However, the new 
regulation reflects a systemic change as some agreements which were considered 
“hardcore” may now be placed under the category referred to as “excluded 
restrictions”. Article 6 of new Regulation109 now allows as “excluded restriction for 
example, a prohibition to challenge the validity of intellectual property rights 
protecting R&D after completion of the R&D etc.
The dangers of an extreme rule-based culture in antitrust is also vivid in the 
enforcement aspect. The US has a long standing tradition of awarding treble damages 
in antitrust suits. Determining whether multiple damages are an effective means to 
reach institutional goals is truly a complex task. This complication arises as a result 
of the many different types of conduct that might require the award of multiple 
damages. It is also worsened by numerous circumstances under which such conduct
106 See generally the Guidelines on Vertical Restraints.
107 433 U.S. 36, 38-39, 59 (1977).
108 Alan Meese, “Price Theory, Competition and Rule o f Reason” (2003) 1 University o f  Illinois Law 
Review 81.
109 Commission Regulation (EU) No 1217/2010 on the Application o f Article 101(3) o f the Treaty on 
the Functioning o f the European Union to certain categories o f Research and Development 
Agreements.
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could occur, be discovered, and prosecuted.110 Notwithstanding this, those who argue 
for an automatic multiple damages regime base their arguments on three main 
reasons. They say that: (i) treble damages are necessary to deter potential antitrust 
wrongdoers; (ii) treble damages provide necessary incentives for private plaintiffs to 
bring antitrust suits; and (iii) treble damages fully compensate victims of 
anticompetitive conduct.111
Noting the advantages of treble damages, the question is not whether the award
should be allowed or not. Rather, it is whether it should be applied blindly and
uniformly. As queried by Greenfield et al, even if we rightly conclude that some
conduct such as price-fixing and market allocation should attract harsh penalties,
whether all antitrust wrongdoers should automatically face multiple damages is
112another matter, particularly given the other severe penalties that wrongdoers face. 
The strictness of the rule on treble damages means there is a risk that the law will 
either be over-deterring or fail to deter.113 As such, one would expect that the 
inherent difficulty in assessing the ideal state of damages suggests that the question 
of multiple damages may best be resolved on a case-by-case basis rather than 
through uniform rules.
A major irony of the automatic treble damages rule is that the uncompromising 
nature of such rule could weaken the system such that infringing undertakings may 
go unpunished. If one of the primary reasons necessitating treble damages is to deter, 
it does then appear to be counter-intuitive that the regime is even worsened as a 
result of the rule-based nature of the treble damages. Greenfield et al state in this 
regard that:
“it is impossible to divorce the question of remedies from the procedural and 
substantive standards that govern antitrust litigation. Over the past decades, the U.S. 
courts have imposed heightened evidentiary, antitrust injury, and standing 
requirements on plaintiffs seeking to bring antitrust claims... Although it is very 
difficult to determine how much of this movement towards restricting private actions 
is attributable to the judicial concern about over-deterrence from treble damages 
awards, it seems likely that treble damages have played a role. Accordingly, the
110 Leon Greenfield and David Olsky, “Treble damages: To What Purpose and To What Effect?” 
Paper delivered at the workshop on Cartel -  Comparative Perspectives on Practice, Procedure and 
Substance at the British Institute o f International and Comparative Law (2 February 2007).
111 See, e.g., ABA Antitrust Section, Monograph No. 13, Treble-Damages Remedy 16-21 (1986).
112 Greenfield and Olsky (2007) 4.
113 Ibid.
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treble damages remedy in some instances may have the unintended consequence of 
limiting the circumstances under which plaintiffs can recover.”114
There are advantages that can be derived from the application of specific rules. In 
particular, rules can play a huge role at both the procedural and substantive levels of 
antitrust as they may help to prevent uncritical ideas from creeping into the field. 
This value notwithstanding, we must not lose sight of the fact that because of its 
unique dynamics, antitrust is not well suited for strict rules. Antitrust issues are not 
only highly fact intensive, they also depend heavily on a mixture of the antitrust 
ideas, the circumstance surrounding a case, and specific characteristics of the market 
in which the issue has arisen. It will therefore be disingenuous to have an “ideal” 
type of antitrust which is to be sought through strict rules.
From the foregoing, it becomes clear that antitrust laws should be applied flexibly. 
From the person-centred perspective, this is even the more so considering the fact 
that some interests may be unduly jeopardised where we apply a rigid construct.
2.4.2 Adequate Information
Apart from having a flexible framework, the person-centred approach makes it 
imperative that decision-makers have and obtain adequate information. Though not 
exclusive to it, this condition is built into the person-centred account in order to be 
able to decide firmly between different interests. It is thus expected that as a result of 
the unavoidable conflict of interests, antitrust institutions must, as a preliminary 
condition, seek adequate information at both the investigation stage and the decision­
making stage. The stages are explained in turn:
i. Investigation Stage
Antitrust institutions must actively source obvious and non-obvious information 
pertaining to various interests as identified through the person-centred perspective. It
114 Ibid, 13.
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is thus expected that for an antitrust regime to prevent or at least limit errors, antitrust 
arbiters must have adequate knowledge of market structures, organisational 
arrangements, transactional attributes and contractual arrangements in a market 
economy and the market performance indicia of concern and so on. However, due to 
human imperfections, we cannot possibly guarantee the perfect market information 
in order to eliminate errors. We are however expected to strive and put in extra 
efforts (within reasonable cost) to ensure that the knowledge we have and the 
information we seek with regards to specific issues are actually the best we could 
possibly get. This is particularly essential for authorities who have to make firm 
decisions on antitrust issues. For instance, with regards to antitrust adjudication, it 
might mean that the courts and antitrust authorities should be willing to follow an 
inquisitorial approach as opposed to an adversarial approach115 where the former 
generates more concrete and relevant information.
Over the years, there have been continuous debates as regard the trial procedure that
1 1 6helps most in obtaining the relevant information in a case. When one extends this 
debate to antitrust, it does appear that the need to consider the inquisitorial approach 
is strengthened because parties who are meant to play the role of claimant may not be 
easy to identify. They might also be too large in number which would raise free-rider 
concerns. In such instance, information is best gathered through inquisitorial 
approach whereby the antitrust authority or court plays the role of an impartial or
117active judge.
In the public sphere, it might be that institutions should make use of tools beyond 
their traditional investigative powers. They should be able to (if and when required) 
make use of other means that could help in information gathering. In Europe for
115 Inquisitorial approach should be preferred as long as it avoids extremism. See generally Damien 
Neven, “Competition Economics and Antitrust in Europe” (2006) Economic Policy 741.
116 See generally Gordon Tullock “Defending the Napoleonic Code over the Common Law” (1988) 2 
Research in Law and Policy Studies 3-27. Contra Richard Posner, “Comment: Responding to Gordon 
Tullock” (1988) 2 Research in Law and Policy Studies 29. See also the empirical analysis o f Luke 
Froeb and Bruce Kobayashi “Evidence Production in Adversarial vs Inquisitorial Regimes” (2001) 70 
Economics Letters 267-72. Also, Hyon Song Shin, “Adversarial and inquisitorial Procedures in 
Arbitration” (1998) 29 Rand Journal o f  Economics 378-405.
117 See Neven (2006) 763. This could be with or without a prosecutorial bias. For a contrary view on 
the preferred approach, see Bruce Lyon “How should Decisions be made in a
Competition Authority?” [http://competitionpolicy.wordpress.com/2011/06/02/how-should-decisions- 
be-made-in-a competition-authority/#more-579].
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instance, chapter V of the Regulation 1/2003118 endows the Commission with various
powers which include the power to request information119 and power to conduct
120inspections. In the performance of its duties, Article 18 allows the Commission to 
request for “all necessary information”121 vital to its duties. Article 18(2) states the 
conditions of the request which are that the Commission must state the legal basis 
and purpose of the request, with specific reference to: the information required; the 
time-line within which it is to be provided; and the penalties for non-compliance.122 
Article 19 empowers the Commission to interview natural and legal persons for the 
purpose of collecting information relating to the subject matter of an investigation. 
However this interview can only take place with the consent of the interviewee and 
there is no penalty for providing false or misleading information. Also, the 
possibility of a dawn raid also increases the chance of obtaining relevant information. 
Article 20 enables the Commission to conduct all necessary inspection on business
1 9T •premises. If it finds it necessary, the Commission can inspect other premises and 
also individuals’ homes.124 The possibility of obtaining information is also enhanced 
as the fining guidelines provide that refusal to cooperate with or obstruction of the 
Commission’s activities may be a basis for increasing the fine payable by the
19Sundertaking whose activity is under review.
These administrative powers indicate that the European Commission is modelled to 
actively seek relevant information. However, the system is by no means foolproof as 
the information gathered might be inadequate or even misleading. Where the 
traditional investigative powers prove inadequate, institutions should be willing to do
118 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 o f 16 December 2002 on the implementation o f the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty OJ L 1, 4.1.2003.
119 Ibid, Art 18.
120 Ibid, Art 20 and 21.
121 For the definition o f “all necessary information”, see case C-36/92 PSEP v Commission [1994] 
ECR 1-1911.
122 See Reg 1/2003, Article 23. The Commission has a choice between making a simple request or a 
decision. Where the Commission opts for a simple request, the undertaking would not be obliged to 
answer although there would be penalties for providing wrongful or misleading information. The 
undertaking is however expected to respond to the Commission’s request as failure to respond could 
lead to imposition o f penalty under Article 23. The letter must also state that the undertaking has the 
right to seek judicial review, should any penalty be imposed.
123 This inspection could either be by agreement or with an element o f surprise.
124 Council Regulation (EC) No 1/2003 o f 16 December 2002 on the implementation o f the rules on 
competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 o f the Treaty OJ L 1, 4.1.2003, Art 21. This should 
however be done with judicial authorisation, see also Recital 26.
125 Commission - Guidelines on the method o f setting fines imposed pursuant to Article 23(2)(a) of  
Regulation No 1/2003. OJ C 210 1.09.2006.
42
more in order to fill potential voids and consequently secure various interests that 
may be injured as a result of the gap. For instance, so as to increase the chance of 
obtaining relevant information, the institution could initiate a leniency programme. 
This scheme has been adopted with a substantial degree of success at both sides of 
the Atlantic. Another means of gathering relevant information is through the 
application of forensic economics. Information could also be sought through reward 
schemes.126
Worthy of particular mention is the UK’s market investigation whereby relevant 
authorities are inclined to actively assess markets over a period in order to ascertain 
the state of competition. Section 5 of the Enterprise Act 2002 provides, amongst 
other functions, that the UK Office of Fair Trading is to obtain, compile and keep 
under review information about matters relating to the carrying out of its functions. 
One way of achieving this function is to undertake market studies. Particularly, the 
Market and Policy Initiative Division of the OFT is responsible for examining how 
well markets are functioning and for considering when a market investigation 
reference would be appropriate.127 For instance, the OFT may make market 
investigation reference to the Competition Commission when it has reasonable
ground for suspecting that one or more of the features of the market prevent, restrict
* •  128 or distort competition.
Also in line with the bottom-up perspective is the Commission’s effort aimed at 
overcoming the structural information asymmetry in the private aspect of antitrust 
enforcement. For instance, the Commission suggests that a minimum level of 
disclosure inter partes for EU antitrust damages cases should be ensured across the 
EU. In particular, some of the Commission’s suggestions are that: national courts 
should, under specific conditions, have the power to order parties to proceedings or 
third parties to disclose precise categories of relevant evidence. Disclosure is 
however not automatic as the claimant has to show to the satisfaction of the court
126 These tools are addressed in chapter 6 below.
127 See generally Richard Whish, Competition law (6th edn, London, Lexis Nexis, 2008) ch 11, 439- 
468.
128 Section 13 United Kingdom Enterprise Act 2002. Note generally that there is presently a 
proposition to merge the OFT and the Commission to form the Competition and Market Authority.
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that he is unable, applying all efforts that can reasonably be expected, otherwise to 
produce the requested evidence.129
ii. Decision Stage
In line with the bottom-up perspective, it is important that antitrust enforcers and 
courts are awake to the complexity of interests and entitlements (for instance, 
interests of complainants, alleged infringers and the industry as a whole). As such, 
they are required to obtain adequate information about those interests and the 
different possible interpretations before they go about their decisional activities.
The problem with the top-down approaches is that issues are addressed by alluding
only to information and opinions which are considered important by the respective
• 110theories. The danger here is that we could be in error (be it type I or type II) as we 
are likely to jettison the necessary additional information because of our myopic 
inclination. To illustrate this point, Sen’s Fable o f the Bamboo Flute is instructive -  
How should an arbiter resolve a dispute between three individuals over ownership of 
a bamboo flute where the flute was made by A, B can play it best and C (unlike the 
others) has nothing else to play with? The resolution of such dispute which is 
quintessentially a dispute about ownership of a resource is contingent on the 
information available to the arbiter. Take it that the alternatives available to the 
arbiter are mutually exclusive and any choice made is conclusive and irreversible. If 
the information put before the arbiter is simply that the first individual “made the 
flute”, and if the arbiter thinks strictly through Marxian-Nozickian rule of allocation, 
she would allocate the flute to the first individual. If the information is however that 
the second individual “can play the flute” and if the arbiter is persuaded by 
Benthamite-Utilitarian rule, she would allocate the flute to the second individual. 
Finally, if  the information made available to the arbiter is about the “poorest” of the 
three and if she is persuaded by a Rawlsian rule, she would allocate the flute to the 
third individual.
129 European Commission, “White Paper on Damages Actions for Breach o f the EC Antitrust Rules” 
COM (2008) 165 final. 4.
130 Note that for the purpose o f this thesis, type I and type II errors are not to be predetermined by 
reference to any theoretical metric. In other words, the terms are not to be understood as terms o f art 
as, they are, for instance, understood by efficiency theorists.
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As far as the person-centred approach is concerned, we cannot underestimate the 
need to ask the three questions prior to choosing -  who made it, who plays it best and 
who is the most disadvantaged. It however does not end here. We should also 
endeavour not to be locked into any of the three rules of allocation.
However, from a neutral point of view, the alternative approach herein developed is 
not without its downsides. For instance, with regards to the condition for decision­
making, an expected objection is that the process of seeking information might be 
too expensive. In fact, we cannot afford to engage in an uncontrolled information
•  131gathering exercise. A more comprehensive evaluation of this alternative approach 
vis-a-vis the traditional approach will thus be conducted in subsequent chapters.
2.5 The Requirement of Broadness Expatiated
The ultimate requirement of the alternative herein developed is that antitrust analysis 
must be broad. This requirement invariably combines the requisite flexibility and 
adequacy of information. It could thus be stated that the precondition for the 
application of the alternative approach is that antitrust analysis should be open- 
textured so as to ensure that plural interests are respected.
It is imperative that the very idea of broadness envisaged under the alternative 
approach is clarified; the idea of broadness here encapsulates notions beyond mere 
flexibility. While flexibility and broadness may intersect in a lot of ways, they are no 
synonyms. Take for example the general effect-based approaches to antitrust 
analysis. Many economists would passionately and convincingly argue for a case-by- 
case reasoned analysis of antitrust issues. In fact, those who call for a “more 
economic approach” in Europe are particularly critical of rigid and formalistic 
approaches which mean in effect that they are in favour of a flexible approach to 
antitrust analysis.
The US’s Rule of Reason and Europe’s Article 101(3) exemptions are illustrative of 
the flexibility that exists in antitrust even if we consider it from the top-down
131 It would be delusional to aim at absolute information in antitrust. See generally David McGowan, 
“Between Logic and Experience: Error Costs and United States v. Microsoft Corp.” (2005) 20 
Berkeley Tech Law Journal 1185.
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perspective. In order to determine whether a particular agreement violates antitrust 
laws, the US applies a three-step tests in their rule of reason analysis which is 
generally believed to help courts distinguish those contracts that harm or destroy 
competition by creating or exercising market power from those that promote it.132 
First, a plaintiff must establish a prima facie case by showing that the restraint 
produces tangible anticompetitive harm. Typically, the plaintiff would have to show 
“actual detrimental effects” such as increased price or reduced output.133 Second, the 
defendants must prove that their agreement produces “pro-competitive” benefits that 
outweigh the harm implicit in plaintiffs prima facie case.134 Third, even if the 
defendants can substantiate the claim, the plaintiff can still prevail by proving that 
the defendants can achieve the same benefits by means of a “less restrictive 
alternative.”135
In assessing the pro or anti-competitive effect of agreements in Europe, Article 
101(3) TFEU affords the flexibility required. The sub-article contains four 
cumulative conditions which, if satisfied, would not void a generally anti­
competitive agreement. First, the agreement must contribute to improving the 
production or distribution of goods or contribute to promoting technical or economic 
progress, for instance, where such improvement leads to efficiency gains. Second, 
the restrictions must be indispensable to the attainment of the efficiency gains. Third, 
consumers must receive a fair share of the resulting benefits. To satisfy this 
condition, the efficiency gains attained by the indispensable restrictions must be 
sufficiently passed on to consumers. Hence, efficiencies only accruing to the parties 
to the agreement will not suffice. Finally, the agreement must not afford the parties 
the possibility of eliminating competition in respect of a substantial part of the 
products in question.
It can be observed that there are areas in both EU and US antitrust law and practice 
where flexibility is not only welcome but also promoted. However, this does not 
mean that they are broad, or at least, “broad” in the context of the alternative bottom-
132 Meese (2003) 80.
133 See, e.g., Re/M axInt’lInc., 173 F.3d at 1014-15.
134 See NCAA v. Board o f  Regents o f the University o f  Oklahoma, 468 U.S. 85 (1984), at 113-120 
where the court upheld the plaintiffs claim because the defendant failed to prove existence o f pro- 
competitive benefits.
135 See, e.g., Law v. NCAA, 134 F.3d 1010, 1019 (10th Cir. 1998).
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up perspective. The bottom-up perspective will consider the US rule of reason not to 
be broad enough for instance because it focuses on the concept of efficiency. The 
European equivalent is also not broad enough from a person-centred perspective 
despite the possibility of arguing that it allows for notions beyond efficiency and
•  1 ' Xfkeconomic welfare. Moreover, it appears that even its relative broadness might be 
pegged in the wake of the call for a “more economic approach”. In fact, a read 
through the recent Horizontal Guidelines137 indicates that Article 101(3) is likely to 
be interpreted more narrowly thereby further distancing it from the broadness 
required when addressing antitrust from a bottom-up perspective as it appears that 
the Commission seeks to focus on efficiency.
To show that the flexibility achieved in Article 101(3) is unlikely to match the 
bottom-up idea of broadness, we can consider the debate whether environmental 
concerns in their own right are likely to be factored into the decision to grant 
exemptions. In its 2001 Guidelines, the Commission affirmed that improving the 
environment contributes to improving production or distribution or promotion of 
economic or technical progress.138 It has even mentioned environmental protection in 
at least three decisions.139 The Commission had explained how environmental 
protection is to be weighted in the Article 101(3) balancing exercise. In fact, its 
provision on the mode of assessing cost has led some scholars to argue that Article 
101(3) might very well accommodate environmental protection as a matter of public 
policy. Monti had considered that the requirement that the “net benefit goes to 
consumers” in Article 101(3) actually refers to consumers as a whole. In other words, 
it would mean that we look at the benefit to the society at large rather than to 
consumers of the products in question.140
136 Guidelines on the applicability o f Article 81(3) o f the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements OJ C 3 06.01.2001.
1 Guidelines on the applicability o f Article 101 o f the Treaty on the Functioning o f the European 
Union to Horizontal Co-operation Agreements OJ Cl 1 14.1.2011.
138 Guidelines on the applicability o f Article 81(3) o f the EC Treaty to Horizontal Cooperation 
Agreements OJ C 3 06.01.2001. Para 193.
139 Commission Decisions, Assurpol, OJ 1992 L37/16 para 38; Ford/Volkswagen, OJ 1993 L20/14 
para 26; and Exxon/Shell, OJ 1994 LI44/20 para 68.
140 Giorgio Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” (2002) CMLRev 1065; Giorgio Monti, EC 
Competition Law (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2007) 92; Manuel L6pez, "Commission 
Confirms its Policy Line in Respect o f  Horizontal Agreement on Energy Efficiency o f  Domestic 
Appliances” (2002) 1 Competition Policy Newsletter.
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The fluid argumentations of scholars notwithstanding, just like in the US, the 
flexibility in Article 101(3) is likely to be considered narrow when antitrust issues 
are assessed from a bottom-up perspective. For example, all indications in the 2011 
Horizontal Guidelines are that efficiency and nothing else should be the basis upon 
which flexibility is to be employed regarding horizontal agreements. Moreover, the 
aspect of the 2001 Guidelines which arguably left open the room for public policy 
has been narrowed. The Commission unequivocally states that “for the purposes of 
these guidelines, the concept of “consumers” encompasses the customers, potential 
and/or actual, of the parties to the agreement”.141 This removes the possibility of 
viewing the public in general as “consumers”.
It is equally important that we assess the enforcement part in light of broadness. 
Concerning private antitrust for instance, while the US courts seek to ensure 
efficiency of the process, there has been an attempt in Europe to promote a damages 
regime.142 The manner in which enforcement is undertaken in the US requires some 
flexibility. This is because decisions on procedures and entitlements depend on what 
is considered efficient in the case at hand. For instance, an efficient process of 
antitrust enforcement seeks deterrence if  the enforcement cost is manageable. Thus, 
in looking for the “most efficient enforcer”143 and efficient enforcement,144 the 
regime would have to balance the need for deterrence with the transaction cost. 
Where the transaction cost is zero, everything can be thrown into achieving 
deterrence. However, such a regime might have to temper its deterrence drive if the 
transaction cost (either in terms of administrative cost or error cost) may be too high. 
In Europe as well, the willingness to adjust the procedures and practices so as to 
remove the unnecessary clog in private antitrust enforcement is also a sign that the 
regime is open to alternatives.
Their relative flexibility in enforcement notwithstanding, the important question is to 
see if  these regimes’ enforcement modus are in fact broad enough. There is no clear 
answer to this because what is broad enough within the context of a bottom-up 
analysis need to be balanced with what is feasible in implementation and
141 Horizontal Guidelines 2011, para 49.
142 White Paper (2008).
143 In the US, the conditions were set in the case o f Associated Gen. Contractors o f  Cal., Inc. v. 
California State Council o f  Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519 (1983).
144 i.e. in terms o f fines.
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enforcement. Thus, just as it has been emphasised in the preceding part, a thorough 
evaluative exercise will be conducted in assessing whether the very idea of broadness 
as promoted through the alternative bottom-up perspective is practicable. The answer 
to this query will ultimately lead us to determining whether the proposed alternative 
is truly worthy of trumping the traditional approach or whether antitrust is better off 
with the traditional approach despite its shortcomings.
2.5.1 Broadness Avvlied -  the example o f  enforcement
By according with the broadness required by the bottom-up perspective, we can fully 
reflect on all possibilities that may impact on various interests. The task at this point 
however is for us to determine what a broad antitrust regime should be like. In the 
substantive aspect, it is pretty straightforward; we should consider the different 
meanings of terms and the different standards which can be applied. We should also 
ensure that it is not applied in a way that infringers are able to escape capture or that 
some actions or inactions are allowed or disallowed solely because a single theory 
recognises or does not recognise them as infringements. This concern is strengthened 
if we streamline our analysis strictly through individual theories. There is thus a great 
deal of assessing and balancing that has to be done to avoid this problem. Achieving 
broadness at the enforcement aspect could even be more daunting. This is because 
institutions often have set enforcement goals and procedures. If one thus puts the 
bottom-up perspective on broadness in context, it might appear that such set goals 
and procedures might be too narrow. However, it is argued that the requirement of 
broadness can still be achieved despite the fact that enforcers have clear goals, 
objectives and procedures. It is for them to seek to achieve their goals through a 
broad mind-set. In a nutshell, the broadness required in antitrust enforcement is 
directed at the enforcers and the court. The level of their broadmindedness will be 
evident when one considers how much they are willing to modify their practices in 
order to reflect the peculiar factors that are unique to individual cases.
For illustrative purpose, a detailed exposition is given on how institutions could 
reason broadly while attempting to meet their institutional goals or objectives. Thus, 
for the sake of this analysis, an example of private action is given. Let us assume that 
an antitrust regime vindicates private claims based on their belief that injured victims
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should be compensated. In such regime, it is still for the court to consider whether 
compensation will truly vindicate antitrust interests. If in its remedial disposition, the 
arbiter could strictly requires that in order to grant compensatory award, the claimant 
has to prove the correlativity of gains and losses. It might disregard the fact that there 
could be cases in which it is necessary to alter those conditions because of the 
unusual difficulty the claimant might face as a result of the conditions. In difficult 
cases, the inability of a corrective justice-based regime to conceive the problem 
might, in effect, frustrate certain interests. From the bottom-up perspective, it is for 
us to consider in individual cases whether any specific goal which might be sought 
by an antitrust regime does not contain loopholes that might eventually jeopardise 
the effort to protect the society at large. Hence, if a particular mechanism is likely to 
lead to absurdities in specific cases, the relevant institution should take time to fully 
reflect on alternatives.
I illustrate here how an institution which has a set procedure for remediation in 
private antitrust actions can be broadminded in its disposition especially in difficult 
instances. I continue with the example of compensation. In those difficult cases, it 
will be for the relevant institution to take a practical view on whether their ex ante 
procedure be applied strictly or whether it should be modified or substituted. 
Generally, since no goal is all encompassing and perfect, there are bound to be 
loopholes. Thus, where we align with compensatory justice in antitrust, we should 
readily appreciate other thoughts such as those based on economic reasoning (for 
example, game theory) which may play a vital role in determining what the form of 
action should be.
The institutions could follow a descriptive bottom-up model. For instance, the 
analysis could be centred on the (prospective) violator. Assuming a firm wants to 
decide whether to join a cartel, we could assume (beyond the idea of moral rightness 
or wrongness of such decision) that the firm weighs its decision on a cost/benefit 
basis -  it may consider the possibility of being apprehended by the authorities and 
the likely penalty. In addition, this firm might have to consider the possibility of 
private actions by consumers.
Based on this brief scenario, antitrust institutions could (aside from establishing 
breach through the harm to consumers) test the effectiveness of compensatory
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remedy by factoring-in the (prospective) infringer’s likely thought process. Thus, 
they could proceed on the assumption that within its rational decision making 
process, the firm will consider the worst possible effect of its breach and thereafter 
decide whether its unlawful conduct could go unpunished. Breach will be 
advantageous where the damages and the cost of litigation are below the possible 
gains from anti-competitive practice. A firm will thus go ahead with the planned 
breach if the likelihood of being apprehended is below the benefit it would derive 
from the cartel. It is for the institution to pre-empt the firm and juggle its conclusions 
on how compensations could be sought. If it considers that the procedural 
requirements for granting compensation might tilt the cost over the benefit in the 
(alleged) infringer’s cost-benefit calculus, the authorities would have to find a way to 
streamline such procedural requirements.
In this instance, one could suppose that in order to ascertain the propriety of the 
procedure for the particular case in hand, the court could mirror the firm by 
considering the steps the firm might take in ascertaining the “efficiency” of its 
breach. For instance, we could assume that the firm might consider all the possible 
responses it might get where it either decides to engage in anti-competitive practice 
or abstain from it. Applying game theory idea, the court might find that a firm will be 
faced with at least four possibilities which are:
The firm engages in price-fixing but consumers do not sue;
The firm engages in price fixing and consumers institute court actions;
The firm does not go ahead with the price-fixing arrangement so consumers do not 
have any reason to sue;
The firm does not engage in price fixing but consumers sue anyway.
The firm will be more concerned about the first two possibilities since the last two 
are even farther beyond its control and they do not involve a breach on its part. The 
court might have to take into account that the firm might seek to take advantage of 
the loophole in the compensation regime. For instance, the firm could employ 
strategies that will indirectly influence consumers’ decisions to sue or not to sue. 
Depending on how the relevant institution conceives the likelihood that infringing 
firms can exploit the regime, the institution (because of its broad thinking) could 
modify the goal or the means of achieving the goal in specific cases.
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For the relevant institution to accord with the requisite broadness, it must think 
exhaustively on how such firm might take advantage of the system. For instance, the 
undertaking could, together with the other participants in the cartel, increase prices 
slightly and gradually on a broad range of products over a long period of time. The 
concern here is not about the firms’ evading capture. The purpose might be that even 
if their practice is found to be anti-competitive, they would have succeeded in de­
motivating consumers from instituting private actions since the products might span 
various markets and, as such, different categories of consumers who will all suffer 
“negligible” losses compared to the transaction cost of litigation.
If the likelihood of such sinister calculation is high, an antitrust institution that 
addresses antitrust from the bottom-up perspective should assess the possible 
reaction of a rational consumer in order to determine whether the level of his 
motivation to sue will change as different procedures and remedies are applied.145
In sum, the broad factors that might deserve the attention of the relevant institution 
may include the following:
Whether antitrust institutions should vindicate antitrust claims through a corrective 
justice mechanism in order to restore the injured to their pre-violation state. This in 
particular takes care of the interest of the victims;
In the same vein, they have to consider whether the mechanism is effective enough to 
deter anti-competitive practice. This is imperative in order to protect an even wider 
set of interests which includes victims, potential victims and other firms;
Thus, antitrust institutions should avoid a “too narrow and inflexible” enforcement 
strategy because;
(i) There is always the risk that undertakings may outsmart the 
enforcement institution by plotting strategies to, for instance, 
frustrate consumer actions by making private action 
undesirable on a cost/benefit basis;
145 In general, private actions are often a function o f the remedy sought. Ideally, the effect should be 
that the availability o f a substantial pecuniary remedy (e.g. account o f profit) will increase the filing of 
legal complaints since the remedy increases the value o f trial. In the long run however, the potential 
defendant will become cautious o f  its acts in order to avoid the injuries that propel law suits. The 
logical consequence therefore is that anti-competition will become economically “unfashionable” and 
law suits will reduce accordingly. The institution should also reflect on how structural constraints will 
impact on antitrust interests.
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(ii) Legal processes discourage certain potential claimants (direct 
purchasers) from instituting remedial actions since they have 
passed on the overcharge and have thus incurred no loss;
(iii) For indirect purchasers, the expected value of trial is so low 
that a lawsuit will be an economically irrational decision;
Conclusive therefore, it is opined from a person-centred point of view that a much 
deeper thought is given to the idea of broadness.
2.5.2 Is Broadness Becoming the Norm in Antitrust Analysis?
Above, the ills of the theories based on the top-down approach have been identified. 
It has however been emphasised above that the argument proffered in favour of the 
person-centred approach should not be considered definitive but rather should be 
seen as a substantiation of a point of view which still need to be thoroughly 
evaluated. At this juncture however, the thesis moves from the “ought” and “ought 
not” by assessing some patterns of antitrust analysis in order to ascertain whether 
(and if so) the extent to which the notion of broadness implied by the bottom-up 
perspective is discernible from the present practice.
Moving from abstraction to real practice, can we say that institutions truly act within 
the straight-jackets of theoretical constructs such that their activities would hardly be 
broad enough? It is contended that at the moment, institutions do not in fact channel 
their thoughts too narrowly. As Hawk observes, there is a consensus among 
stakeholders from different enforcement regimes that there is a considerable gap 
between the rhetoric of competition law objectives and the reality of their actual 
implementation.146
To show that enforcers and courts might be inclined to address issues from a broader 
perspective than the prevailing theories suggest, we can identify with some recent 
Article 101 decisions of the Court of Justice.
146 See Barry Hawk “Competition Law Implementation at Present” in Ehlermann and Laudati (eds) 
(1998)353.
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Concerning the recent case of GSK v. Commission147 which addressed Article 101 
TFEU, the Court of Justice was primarily asked to assess Glaxo’s differentiated 
pricing system for its products within the internal market. In general, Glaxo 
attempted (through sales conditions) to restrict parallel traders who sought to profit 
from arbitrage opportunities which arise from low prices imposed on medications in 
Spain. Deciding on the propriety of the practice, the Commission held that the sales 
condition which restricted parallel trade amounted to an infringement of competition 
rules. The General Court however did not agree with the Commission and rather 
assessed whether the clause resulted in a violation through a consumer interest 
analysis. In essence, the General Court opined that since the prices of medicines were 
shielded from the incidence of demand and supply, it could not be presumed that the 
clause would restrict competition to the detriment of the final consumer. As such, the 
Spanish intermediaries who take advantage of the arbitrage opportunities might as
148well keep the advantage.
However, the Court of Justice reasoned differently. Regarding Article 101(1), it 
stated thus:
“First of all, there is nothing in that provision to indicate that only those agreements 
which deprive consumers of certain advantages may have an anti-competitive object. 
Second, it must be borne in mind that the Court has held that, like other competition 
rules laid down in the Treaty, Article [101 TFEU] aims to protect not only the 
interests of competitors or of consumers, but also of the market, and in so doing, 
competition as such.”149
The Court of Justice disagreed with the General Court’s position which was that 
consumers are restricted to the “final consumers”. The Court of Justice’s reasoning 
reflects a level of broadness as this shows that consumers could also include 
businesses. Some degree of broadness is also evident from the Court’s statement to 
the effect that not only consumers but also competition in its own right is worthy of 
attention in antitrust.
The observations made in this part could possibly give the impression that the law is 
already taking account of the requirement of broadness, thereby reducing the
147 Case C-501, 513, 515 & 519/06 GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v Commission [2009] ECR I- 
9291. Hereinafter referred to as Glaxo.
148 See Case T-168/01 GlaxoSmithKline Services v. Commission [2006] ECR 11-2969.
149 Glaxo [2009] 2, 63.
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imperativeness of an alternative approach. Nevertheless, it would not be accurate to 
say that antitrust institutions and courts always apply in full the concept of broadness 
in their antitrust analysis. This means therefore that there is still a material difference 
between the traditional approach (whether theoretical or practical application) and 
the alternative person-centred approach. As such, despite the tendency for authorities 
to occasionally apply the concept of broadness in their antitrust analysis, it remains a 
worthy exercise to assess whether the traditional approach should be substituted with 
the person-centred account.
2.6 Delimiting the Scope of the Broadness Sought
So far, this thesis has continuously emphasised the primary aim of the person-centred 
approach which is to accommodate different interests in antitrust issues. This 
inevitably requires that the framework for antitrust analysis should be broad if we are 
to truly avoid the injustice that could result from excluding some interests. However, 
caution must be taken in applying a broad framework for antitrust in order not to blur 
the scope of antitrust claims such that any interest that claims to be “antitrust-related” 
is accepted within the person-centred framework. Even where we are intuitively 
aware of what really is an antitrust issue, there seem to be nothing yet in the above 
explanation of the person-centred approach that showcases a principled way of 
determining what falls within and outside of antitrust. If we have to rely on intuition, 
there is a serious risk that on the watch of the person-centred approach, antitrust will 
degenerate into an unintelligible discipline which is itself a recipe for arbitrariness.
Thus, in order to avoid over-stretching the bounds of antitrust, I attempt here to 
delimit the scope of the broadness sought by analysing the term “competition”. It 
should be noted that it is not the aim here to actually fashion a definition or to give a 
conclusive description of what competition entails. Rather, the aim is to keep the 
focus of the person-centred process on issues that truly matter to antitrust.
The term competition has been defined severally. For instance, competition is 
defined in the Oxford English Dictionary as “the action of endeavouring to gain what 
another endeavours to gain at the same time”. Apart from the general idea of 
competition, there is a different idea of “competition” which is often used by
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economists. This idea of competition, it has been recognised, has a theoretical 
dimension absent from its everyday use and, as such, to the economists, it has 
become a term of art that has broken away from its ordinary usage.150
To start with, it is taken as trite that the term competition as referred to in this thesis 
means “economic competition”.151 This leads us to the next query which is how to 
determine what amounts to economic competition. The answer to this query is far 
from straight-forward as even economists have not reached a consensus in defining 
the term. As Bork noted, there is yet to be “one satisfactory definition of
•  ♦ 1 S ' )‘competition’” as the term “has taken a number of interpretations and meanings,
1 ^many of them vague.
To illustrate the absence of satisfactory definition for the term “competition”, 
reference will be made to the analysis and counter-analysis of scholars on two 
specific interpretations of the term; the definition of competition as a state of perfect 
competition and as a process of rivalry. Each of these conceptions of competition has 
a unique effect on what we consider to constitute an antitrust concern. For instance, 
with regards to the former, competition is seen as constituting nothing other than a 
state of perfect competition which involves “no presumption of psychological 
competition, emulation, or rivalry”.154 Applying such a definition, a cooperative 
behaviour between competing firms would not necessarily be considered to be anti­
competitive.155 On the other hand, where competition is identified as implying rivalry 
between firms, we are invariably looking at the effect of competition by merging the 
concept of competition and the market which thus allows for the introduction of 
behavioural content in defining the term. In other words, “competition” is regarded
150 Oliver Black, Conceptual Foundations o f  Antitrust (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
2005) 8.
151 “Today it seems clear that the general goal o f the antitrust law is to promote “competition” as the 
economist understand that term” Philip Areeda and Hebert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law: An Analysis o f  
Antitrust Principles and Their Application vol 1 (3rd ed, New York, Aspen, 2006) para 100a.
152 Bork (1978) 61. See also George Stigler, “Perfect Competition, Historically Contemplated” (1957) 
65 Journal o f  Political Economy 1.
153 John Vicker, “Concepts o f Competition” (1995) 47 Oxford Econ Paper 1,3.  See also Yoshiro 
Kobayashi, “On Competition” (1970)
[http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/30639/1 /2_P43-54.pdf].
154 Frank Knight; "Immutable Law in Economics: Its Reality and Limitations" (1968) American 
Economic Review, 639-656.
155 See e.g. TCE approach in Meese (2003).
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as a phenomenon of exchange.156 This definition relates systematically to the 
technique of production within, or to the organisational form of firms. In this regard, 
this concept of competition puts prime importance on economic goods (price and 
quality) and to the firm’s external relationship in the market.157 As a result, 
cooperative behaviours will be treated with circumspection.
The two distinct definitions identified above have been faulted as inadequate or
inappropriate. For instance, definition of competition through the idea of perfect
market is considered inappropriate because perfect competition is a state that is quite
incompatible with the idea of any and all competition and even if it is compatible, it 
• • 1is incapable of actual realisation. The idea of competition is also considered 
antithetical because despite the fact that perfect competition results from free entry of 
a large number of formerly competing firms, such a state of the market would lead to 
a situation where the relationship of firms have evolved and progressed to the point 
where “the effect of competition have reached their limit”.159 This definition is also 
considered less than ideal because by viewing the term through the theory of 
monopolistic competition, it fails to take account of the concept of competitive 
market.160
The criticism for the definition of competition as a process of rivalry is that contrary
to the assumption that rivalry and self-interest serves as the spine of competition
which consequently implies efficiency as an integral definition of the term, there is
no unblemished evidence (empirical or otherwise) linking firm rivalry and
productive efficiency.161 Also, it has been argued by Stigler that the fact that this
definition merges the concepts of competition and the market is rather unfortunate as
1each deserved a full and separate treatment”.
There are also those who are of the opinion that the definition of competition is not 
restricted to either of these interpretations. For instance, Black sought to identify 
what constitutes a state of economic competition and what it mean when we say that
156 Paul McNulty, “Economic Theory and the Meaning o f Competition” (1968) 28 Quarterly Journal 
o f  Economics 645.
157 Ibid.
158 Ibid, 643.
159 Ibid, 642
160 Henry Moore “Paradoxes o f Competition” (1906) 20 Quarterly Journal o f  Economics 211-230.
161 McNulty, 656.
162 Stigler, 6.
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A competes with B.163 He identified that the operation of competition between A and 
B could be expressed in more than one way -  one may compete via rivalry or 
through cooperation etc.164
Based on these different views about the intrinsic meaning of competition, different 
ways of viewing a competitive state emerges. For instance, competition can be 
identified in normative terms. It could also be identified, as a matter of policy, 
through its effect.165
Though the specific inadequacies in the economic concept of competition have been 
said to impact on both analyses and policies,166 it is hereby argued from the person- 
centred point of view that such inadequacies should be celebrated rather than 
condemned. Also, it is equally good, especially in order to delimit the scope of the 
person-centred analysis, that we clearly recognise competition as meaning 
“economic competition” even though we cannot firmly define it. What this means in 
practice is that even within the broad framework of the person-centred approach, 
claims could only be instituted where they fall in line with one or more of the 
definitions of economic competition.
As a result of the diverging analysis of the term, scholars such as Bork attempted to 
streamline the various definitions of economic competition. For instance, Bork 
mentioned five conventional ways of discussing the meaning of competition. He 
states that competition has been seen as: a process of rivalry; the absence of restraint 
over one firm’s economic activities by another firm; the state of the market in which 
the individual buyer or seller does not influence the price by his purchase or sale; the 
existence of fragmented industries and markets; and a state of affairs in which 
consumer welfare cannot be increased by moving to an alternative state of affairs 
through judicial decree.167
It is contended that accounts that seek to define competition in one way to the 
exclusion of others will not fit with the person-centred approach. Thus, for example, 
competition should not be seen strictly in the Borkean sense whereby the term is
163 Black (2005) 6-32.
164 Ibid.
165 Maurice Stucke, “What is Competition” in Daniel Zimmer (ed) The Goals o f  Competition 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2012) 30-31.
166 McNulty, 639
167 Bork (1978) 58.
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intrinsically linked to consumer welfare. Rather, the alternative definitions should be 
accommodated within the definition of economic competition even though each 
definition of competition is individually deconstructible. It is important to 
accommodate the different conceptions of economic competition which we are only 
able to do if we avoid a rigid interpretation of the term. Fuch has thus rightly noted 
that:
“[T]he lack of a comprehensive definition of competition is not a relevant deficiency 
[as] you do not need a comprehensive definition of competition that fits all situations 
and applies to all kinds of economic behaviour. It is totally sufficient to identify 
certain acts of enterprises as interfering with undistorted competition... This indirect 
approach has the additional advantage that the rules are flexible enough to protect 
new forms of competition which were previously unknown and could not have been 
implemented into a concrete definition.”168
The analysis so far clearly shows that some degree of flexibility should be applied 
regarding the term competition. It however also implicitly limits the type of claims 
that could be brought within a person-centred antitrust framework. By defining 
competition in line with both present and future conceptions of the term as 
economists understand it, we are invariably implying that an issue can only be 
flagged as an antitrust issue if it fits in with one or more of these conceptions. As 
such, no “interested” person would be allowed to represent for example, a strictly 
environmental issue as raising an antitrust concern if such issue cannot be linked to 
one or more of the conceptions of economic competition; a spade does not turn into a 
spear merely because the owner calls it a spear.
As such, it is expected that to raise an antitrust issue from any enquiry or dispute, 
such issue must satisfy some basic conditions which are: (i) the issue must relate to 
interaction between market participants; (ii) the basis and the nature of such 
interaction must be economic; (iii) the issue must relate to one of the above identified 
patterns of competition between firms. For instance, a policy initiative that promotes 
competitiveness in an industry does not necessarily raise competition issues even if it 
is at the expense of other industries.
168 Andreas Fuchs, “Characteristic Aspects o f Competition and their Consequences for the Objectives 
of Competition Law -  Comment on Stucke” in Zimmer (ed), 54.
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The importance of these requirements can be brought to light by way of illustration: 
antitrust is not to be broadened to an extent such that politically-motivated policy 
which impacts on the competitiveness of an industry as against another is considered 
to constitute an antitrust concern. However, such issue might raise competition 
concerns where the so-called political decision is made by representatives of 
interested market participant especially where such decision is to their favour as 
against other firms that are unrepresented. This requirement also shows that 
completely non-economic factors can only play an auxiliary role in antitrust analysis 
rather than being considered to constitute antitrust issues in their own right.
2.7 Conclusion
In this chapter, a cursory exposition of the person-centred approach has been given. 
In addition to evaluating this approach as against top-down accounts, this chapter 
emphasises the requirement of broadness. However, noting the dangers associated 
with overly broad laws, an attempt has been made to delimit the scope of the person- 
centred antitrust analysis. This is achieved by addressing the term “competition”. The 
chapter stresses the need to remain open and to desist from following one conception 
of “competition” at the expense of another. It however succeeds in delimiting the 
scope of analysis by emphasising that an antitrust problem can only be said to have 
arisen when it involves economic competition in any of its ramifications.
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Chapter 3
ANTITRUST RIGHTS
3.1 Introduction
The preceding chapter reveals a peculiar drawback of the traditional modes of 
antitrust analysis which, as shown from a deconstructionist perspective, is that they 
fail to meet the requirement of justice as inclusiveness. In order to cure this defect, 
this thesis seeks to construct an alternative account termed the person-centred 
approach. So far, a broad overview of this approach has been given in the preceding 
chapter. While explaining the approach, due reference was made to the term antitrust 
right. It was emphasised that antitrust right is to be understood in the procedural 
context. In effect, to say that a person has antitrust right means that such person is 
entitled to procedural justice by being included in issues that involve or affect them. 
It was also stated that antitrust right does not countenance any particular normative 
usage of the term right as it merely means that we are bound to consider the 
interrelatedness of interests held by persons in any given instance.
There are two major reasons why the concept of right has been considered ideal for 
the person-centred exercise. First and foremost, this route accords with the 
procedural nature of this thesis. Secondly, it helps to situate all the theoretical bases 
for the person-centred approach within a single exercise -  the exercise of antitrust 
right.
This chapter seeks to elucidate on the idea of antitrust right as used in this thesis. To 
flesh-out this account, this chapter is divided into three parts. Part one explores 
various accounts of right from which the account most suitable for this person- 
centred approach is chosen. In the second part, I develop the account of antitrust 
right while in the third part, I draw conclusions accordingly.
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3.2 Accounts of Right
Wellman noted that our language of rights is lamentably vague and ambiguous.169 
This is because right is rather nebulous and generic term which has been used and 
can be used in multitudes of instances. This has led one commentator to note that 
“right can be used to express positions that have been worked out in accordance with 
normative principles, or non-normative policy instruments, or rights may be regarded 
as themselves constituting basic normative principles.”170 In effect, the variety of 
instances in which the term has been employed stirs a great degree of uncertainty 
when it comes to defining its purpose or contents.
In order to appreciate the context in which the term right is used here, different 
meanings of right will be explored. It is noteworthy that this thesis does not seek to 
evaluate the conflicting theories and to give an ideal meaning of right. The task 
rather is to ascertain and substantiate the account of right that fits the procedural 
agenda of this thesis.
Thus, different categories of right are hereby addressed after which the ideal account 
will be identified in part two.
3.2.1 Neutral Rights
There are theorists who imbue the concept of right with only legal contents. To them, 
the real usage of the term does not contain claims as to morality. In other words, they 
either disregard the impact of morality on the concept of right or they give it a rather 
insignificant room in their analysis. This group consider right to be a legal concept 
which is to be addressed neutrally.
Scholars who explain right through some form of neutral ideology include the likes 
of Raz, Waldron, Finnis and so on. For example, through his Source Thesis, Raz 
argues that legal right can only be established without reference to moral 
arguments.171 He however contends that legal rights are legally recognised pre­
existing moral rights and as such are protected interests which have legal backing.
169 Carl Wellman, Real Rights (New York/Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1995) 179.
170 Andrew Halpin, Rights and Law Analysis & Theory (Oxford, Hart Publishing, 1997) 210.
171 Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994) 250.
62
Rights are therefore merely names given to a collection of legal relations that are 
brought together on grounds that are not related to the moral meaning of right.172 
According to Waldron, legal rights (as a term) do not have a specific content or form. 
Thus, when we refer to legal right in different instances, there need not be anything 
that is common to the term in those instances. In a nutshell, the term legal right is 
more or less a homonymy.173 Another example is Finnis’ account of right. He argues 
that even though they may provide the conceptual apparatus through which a moral 
theory is expressed, rights in themselves do not constitute moral theory.174
3.2.2 Freedom-Based Risht
Another category of theorists are those who base their idea of right on the non- 
consequentialist theory of freedom. There are also those who support a freedom- 
based account of right on the ground that there is need to protect the individual and 
the minority who are left out by consequentialist morals.175 Lomasky, for instance, is 
of the view that right “stakes out chunks of moral turfs that others are forewarned not 
to trespass.”176 He also contends that rights are a kind of shorthand category for well- 
entrenched moral intuitions, principles, and standards whose aim is to support 
individualism as of paramount moral significance.177 Also, Kantian philosophy of 
right provides that from the ultimate value of individual freedom comes the guiding 
universal principle of justice which requires that freedom of choice of each 
individual should co-exist with everyone’s freedom in accordance with a universal 
law. In order for a person to possess a perfect right, there must be a corresponding 
perfect duty. The derived duty determines a person’s moral obligation towards others 
as well as himself. This moral obligation originates from the causality in accordance 
with the law of reason (categorical imperative).
Another freedom-based account of right is Nozick’s Libertarianism. He argues from 
the position of the “minimal state” that each person has absolute right to life and
172 Pavlos Eleftheriadis, Legal Rights (New York, Oxford University Press, 2008) 69.
173 Jeremy Waldron, “A Right to Do Wrong” in Jeremy Waldron (ed), Liberal Rights (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 1993) 63-65.
174 John Finnis, Natural Law and Natural Rights (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1980).
175 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Right Seriously (London, Duckworth, 1977).
176 Loren Lomasky, Persons Right and the Moral Community (New York, Oxford University Press, 
1990) 5.
177 Ibid.
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liberty, in the sense that no-one may justifiably interfere with another’s life or liberty, 
except in cases of self-defence or legitimate punishment. Further, Nozick states that 
by going through certain procedures, we can come to acquire rights to property. 
However, the fact that we have these rights does not guarantee that they will always 
be respected. It is the task of the minimal state -  the night-watchman state of 
classical liberalism -  to protect us from each other and from external threat. The state 
is justified, thinks Nozick, only in so far as it protects people against force, fraud, and 
theft, and enforces contracts. Thus it exists to safeguard rights, and the state itself 
violates people’s rights if it attempts to do any more than this.178
3.2.3 Welfare-Based Rights
To the consequentialists, a right either comes into existence or becomes enforceable 
where its application will lead to a specific result. For instance, utilitarian thought on 
right is modelled on the reasoning that right should exist where its outcome promotes 
the happiness of the majority even if the effect is that the interest of the minority is to 
be sacrificed. Within utilitarian thoughts, Halpin argues that there are different 
perspectives on how right interacts with aggregated pleasure.179 He states that some 
utilitarian ideologies can be summed up as creating right through the objective of 
either maximising everyone’s pleasure,180 maximising everyone’s pleasure so long as 
everyone gets an equal chance,181 maximising everyone’s pleasure so long as the 
pleasure of the worst off is maximised182 or leaving everyone to maximise his own 
pleasure.183
The utilitarian ideology of moral rights also extends to the area of welfare 
economics. One of the purposes of welfare economics is to explore the impact of 
different policies on social welfare and to forge ways through which it can be 
maximised. One of the primary instruments for achieving this end is efficiency. By 
and large, Kaldor-Hicks and Pareto efficiencies represent the theoretical foundation
178 See generally Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State, and Utopia (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1974).
179 Halpin (1997) 251.
180 This is the utilitarian conception formulated by Jeremy Bentham.
181 See Dworkin (1977); ibid, A Matter o f Principle (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1985) 359.
182 See generally Rawls (1972). See also Norman Daniels, Reading Rawls (Oxford, Blackwell, 1975); 
Halpin (1997) 235-241.
183 On Nozick as a utilitarian, see Halpin (1997) 241-250.
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for the economic analysis of rights. Regarding the role of efficiency in determining 
individual right, it could be inferred from Kaldor-Hicks that economic efficiency 
combines “a methodological individualism with a corporate substantive definition of 
the good”.184 Thus, while the “methodological locus of value” is the individual, the 
‘good’ is based on the foundational principle of greatest happiness which maximises 
the aggregate sum of individual welfare for the society as a whole so that “each 
individual counts equally methodologically only, as an equal and a fungible addend 
in the summation of aggregate social welfare.”185
Through its welfare orientation, the law and economics school employ the concept of 
right as an instrument for overcoming market failures. The pioneer work in this area
t CAis Ronald Coase’s thesis on transaction cost. This school of thought is modelled on
two rules for assigning legal rights. The first is that based on the assumption of
substantial knowledge, perfect rationality and absence of transaction cost and income
effect, assigning legal entitlements in cases of two-party incompatible land uses will
be neutral as to the goal of allocative efficiency. In other words, provided that
exchange is available and that obstacles to exercising it are insignificant, rational co-
operators will negotiate around inefficiencies.187 Legal right is thus nothing more
than a vessel for establishing a well-defined entitlement or negotiation point “which
create a framework in which mutually advantageous bargains leading to optimal
1 &&outcomes can be realized”.
Concerning the first rule, the real value of legal right does not rest on the initial 
distribution of entitlements. Put differently, the notion of right at a pre-transaction 
stage is worthless. Rather, its real value emanates from the unavoidable exchanges 
necessitated by the conflict in demand for the use of resources. This conflict, Coase 
argues, should be resolved by reference to which of the two conflicting uses has the 
greater social value. Expounding on this through the rancher-farmer analogy, Coase 
argues that if a rancher and farmer have different interest in a particular land -  the 
rancher wants the land to allow the cattle to stray while the farmer wants it free from 
the cattle so that the crop can grow. This problem is not to be solved by reference to
184 See Richard Wright, “Right, Justice and Tort law” in David Owen (ed) Philosophical Foundations 
o f  Tort Law (New York, Oxford University Press, 1995) 161.
185 Ibid.
186 Ronald Coase, “The Problem o f Social Cost” (1960) 3 Journal o f  Law and Economics 1.
187 See Jules Coleman, Market Morals and Law  (New York, Oxford University Press, 2003) 28.
188 ibid
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who had pre-existing rights but by ascertaining which of the two uses has greater 
value.
However, it should be noted that where the requirement of substantial knowledge, 
perfect rationality, and transaction cost and income effect are not met, the value of 
the first rule diminishes. As such, we would be unable to rely on the exchange 
process to overcome inefficiencies. In such instance, the second rule for assigning 
legal rights applies. Where the exchange process proves inadequate, the second rule 
requires that the court must allocate entitlements/rights efficiently from the outset. 
This, the court is meant to achieve by imagining what the exchange process would 
have been, had the assumptions under the first rule been intact. It is upon this 
“hypothetical Coasean market” that the court ideates a market paradigm to help it 
identify the efficient outcome it seeks to replicate.189
It is noteworthy that regardless of efforts to portray efficiency-based account of right 
as premised on a neutral account of legal right,190 it would seem unduly laboured to 
dissociate the idea from utilitarianism,191 and consequently from some form of 
morality.
Rights, under the law and economics paradigm, are primarily entitlements. Once 
entitlements have been assigned, the next task is to have them secured. Thus, in order 
to protect entitlement, Calabresi and Melamed set out a framework which explores 
three rules for securing rights.192 They are property rules, liability rules and 
inalienability rules. Property rule protects an entitlement by enabling a right bearer to 
enjoin others from reducing the level of protection the entitlement affords him except 
he is willing to forgo it at a mutually agreed price. To protect a right through liability 
rules means that a non-entitled party may reduce the value of the entitlement without 
regards to the right-holder’s desires, as long as he compensates ex post for the 
reduction in value. The value of the compensation need not be the same as what the
189 Richard Posner, Economic Analysis o f  Law (7th edn, New York, Aspen, 2007)
190 The law and economics school denounce the direct application o f legal right in reaching an optimal 
level o f resource deployment. See ibid
191 Coleman (2003) ch 4.
192 Guildo Calabresi and Douglas Melamed, “Property Rules, Liability Rules and Inalienability: One 
view o f the Cathedral”(1972) 85 Harvard Law Review 1089. See also Richard Epstein, “A Clear 
View o f the Cathedral: The Dominance o f Property Rules” (1972) 106 Yale Law Review Journal 209. 
See also Eleftheriadis (2008) 69.
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entitled party would have been willing to accept for the diminishment of his 
• 10^entitlement. Where inalienability rule applies, transfers of any sort are prohibited.
In order to secure an assigned right in light of the Calabresi-Melamed framework, we 
are to choose between the available rules by assessing their Pareto optimality. Thus, 
if transaction costs are high, a property rule could be seen as likely to be inefficient. 
This is because transfer to more valued use requires negotiation which means that 
there is a potent possibility that as a result of lack of agreement, property rule may 
lead to entitlements being held by individuals who value them less. In a situation 
where transaction costs are high, Calabresi and Melamed are of the opinion that the 
liability rule may be better as individuals who value entitlements more than those on 
whom the rights are initially conferred can secure the entitlement without ex ante 
negotiations. This could be by compelling transfer to themselves and paying 
damages for the usurpation.
In order to forge an account of right premised on efficiency, institutions would have 
to choose the most appropriate of the alternatives open to them. Based on their 
framework, Calabresi and Melamed argue that it is the rule which conceives of right 
as an instrument for securing a level of well-being or utility that should be followed. 
This would most often require the application of liability rules.
3.2.4 Eclectic Account o f Right
According to the neutral accounts, the term “right” has no fixed meaning. Moral 
accounts on the other hand view the concept either in terms of autonomy and control 
or as an instrument for securing a level of well-being or utility. Eclectic accounts 
give room for different interpretations of the term right. Of particular importance in 
this light is Coleman’s account of right as it allows us to imbue the term with 
different meanings.
Coleman states that rights primarily entail entitlements. He states further that an 
adequate theory of institutional entitlement must address three different sorts of
193 This is because the value is usually set by the relevant institution.
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questions which are: what is the foundation of rights? What is the correct analysis of 
right? How might or ought a system of institutional right be enforced?
In order to answer the first question, Coleman recognises that the normative 
foundational bases which would normally shape our response are those which are 
freedom-based and those which are somewhat welfare-based. On the second 
question, Coleman distinguishes between the correct logical form for analysing right 
and correct content for right analysis. Scholars who view the question in light of the 
former are more concerned with ascertaining whether rights are or entail for 
example, interest, liberties or claims. Whatever we consider rights to entail, its form 
could be the same regardless of the foundational theory we align to. On the other 
hand, Coleman states that when we consider the correct way for analysing rights in 
light of its contents, our finding is bound to vary depending on the foundational or 
normative theory of right advanced. He asserts that:
“[a] theory of the content of right is a theory of their constitutive elements. And 
these elements are not constitutive of right as a matter of logical form, but rather as a 
matter of contingent fact. In any overall theory of institutional rights, the constitutive 
elements of rights are a function of the foundational theory.”194
While the logical form of right represents the syntax of right, the constitutive 
elements represents the semantics of right. In Coleman’s view, a proper analysis of 
right addresses both the syntax and semantics of rights. The relevance of these two 
sub-components of right analysis is that even if we disagree on what rights entail as a 
matter of logical form, we could still share the same opinion as to its content. 
However, if we are motivated by different foundational theories, our ideas as to the 
content of right are bound to be different. Emphasising this point, Coleman states 
that “different views of the purpose of institutional rights may require different 
theories of their content, while maintaining that certain features of rights may be 
necessary features of them which obtain irrespective of the range of various 
foundational theories.”195
194 Coleman (2003) 34.
195 Ibid.
68
Regarding the question on the enforcement of right, Coleman states that reference 
need be made to institutional enforcement. At this stage, he states that “we want to 
know, for example, whether we ought to enforce or vindicate a particular set of 
claims by providing injunctive relief, tort liability and some combination of the two, 
or perhaps, by imposing criminal sanctions”196
In answering the questions as to the logical form of right, Coleman argues that rights 
are best understood as “conceptual markers” or “place holders”, used to designate a 
subset of legitimate interests or liberties to be accorded special protection by law. He 
states that once an interest has been chosen, it enjoys a privileged status by being 
labelled a right or entitlement. The answer to the semantics of right rests on our 
application of property and inalienability rules which as part of the overall 
institutional theory of right, specify the meaning of right. Concerning enforcement, 
Coleman states that the approach we adopt might derive (though not necessarily) 
from the foundational theory.
In a nutshell, Coleman’s account of right posits that:
“(1) All institutional rights are necessary conceptual markers designating certain 
legitimate interests or liberties as warranting a privileged status. (2) The privileged 
status is to be spelled out as follows: Each legitimate interest, for example, that is 
marked as a right is necessarily associated with, and in fact entails, some legitimate 
claims. In contrast, whether or not a legitimate interest [which is] not marked as a 
right generates enforceable claims is a contingent matter. Rights however, entail 
legitimate claims. (3) The specific content of these claims is the function of the rule -  
property, liability or inalienability -  applied to them. Therefore, I say that property 
rule and liability rule specify the content of right by generating specific legitimate 
claims from them. (4) The claims property and liability rules generate specify 
conditions of legitimate transfer. Thus, I refer to them ... as constituting a 
‘transaction structure.’ Though the claims given rise to by the rights within the 
domain of the transactions are a function of the transaction rules applied to them, (5) 
the choice of which rule or rules to apply depends on the foundational theory. That 
is, we cannot say whether a right’s content should be given by a property or by a 
liability rule or by some combination of the two until we know what general purpose 
we want institutional rights to serve. (6) Finally, besides providing the basis for 
determining the content of rights, the foundational theory specifies the appropriate 
institutions for enforcing the claim these rights create. In this way, the foundation 
theory fuels the complete theory of institutional right. A commitment at the 
foundational level will suggest, though it will not strictly entail, certain views about 
the content and enforcement of rights. We should, therefore, expect that different
196 Ibid.
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institutional arrangements confer somewhat different institutional rights and suggest 
different mechanisms for their enforcement.”197
3.3 Nature of Antitrust Right
Various accounts of rights have been identified in the preceding section. It now 
behoves that we forge a complete account of antitrust right. For our analysis of 
antitrust right to be truly complete, its associated elements and its defining core must 
be thoroughly substantiated. However, considering the barrage of theories on right, 
we are bound to face tough challenges in fashioning a universally acceptable 
understanding of antitrust right. The difficulty of the task results from the likelihood 
that we might end up with an array of (conflicting) antitrust expositions. We can 
however avoid such problem by considering antitrust right to be nothing more than a 
broad procedure through which all antitrust-related claims and counterclaims can be 
established. Of all the accounts considered, it appears that Coleman’s account of 
right is the closest as it merely raises the questions which trigger an implicit 
consideration of the different normative accounts of right. It also addresses the issue 
of enforcement. The associated elements and defining core of Coleman’s right are 
hereby synthesised into the account of antitrust right. This is to be achieved by 
focusing on the three questions raised by Coleman which are; what is the foundation 
of rights? What is the correct analysis of right? How might or ought a system of 
institutional right be enforced?
3.3.1 What is/are the Foundation^) o f  Antitrust Right?
Wellman in his thesis on right states that:
“[J]ust as a building rests on and is supported by its foundation and, ultimately, the 
ground on which it stands, so a legal action to claim a right, or any assertion that a 
legal right exists, rests on the reason or reasons that support it. Primarily, these are 
reasons found in judicial reasoning, legal norms and factual statements from which a 
court could validly conclude that some rights exist.”198
197 Ibid, 35-36.
198 Wellman (1995) 12-13.
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The question about the foundation of antitrust right is synonymous to the technical 
and policy questions about the meaning and goal of antitrust. In chapter two, a 
similar question has been addressed the conclusion to which was that the definition 
of these relevant terms should be left broad enough to keep with the spirit of justice 
as inclusiveness, but at the same time confined to and addressed within the remit of 
economic competition. It thus should make us wonder why a similar question is 
asked differently. Though the questions ultimately lead to the same answer, we are 
able to set in motion the operational perspective of the person-centred approach 
where we address the foundational core of antitrust through an account of right. 
Further, it gives us a unique avenue to consider the different usages of the term right 
in antitrust and to thus properly situate them within the person-centred framework. 
Finally, it reinforces the bottom-up nature of the overall exercise.
At this juncture therefore, the answer to the query about the foundation of antitrust 
right will commence with a conceptual analysis of accounts of right that has or could 
be potentially linked to present antitrust regimes. Particular reference will be made to 
Europe. This analysis is necessary so as to effectively dissociate such accounts from 
antitrust right.
i. Usage o f  the term Right in Europe
“Right” is not an unfamiliar term in the lexicon of EU law. Article 8(2) of the 
Maastricht Treaty declared that citizens of the Union shall enjoy the rights conferred 
by the Treaty and shall be subject to the duties imposed thereof. It has also been held 
that it is the duty of the national courts in each Member-state to uphold those 
rights.199 However, the foundational core of European right remains unclear as the 
Union has continuously been evasive on the meaning of EU right. As such, scholars, 
in their attempt to make meaning of the term and to elucidate its foundation, have 
postulated differently about the basis of EU right. For instance, while some argue 
that right in EU law has a normative foundation200 there are others who think that it
199 Case 106/77 Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629 para 16; 
Case C-213/89 R v Secretary o f  State for Transport ex p  Factortame Ltd [1990] ECR 1-2433 at para 
19.
200 SaSa Beljin, “Right in EU Law”, in Sacha Prechal and Bart van Roermund (eds), The Coherence o f  
EU Law: The Search fo r Unity in Divergent Concepts (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 2008) ch 5.
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is largely functional.201 With regards to the former position, it is expected that the 
specific regime indicates a legal norm necessitating such right. To support this 
contention, reference has been made to the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence202
whereby rights are determined by examining both the words and purpose of a
• • 201provision. On the flip side, those who think that EU right is based on functional 
motivations are of the opinion that EU rights is not so much about the interest of the 
individual as the grant merely mobilises the individual as an instrument for enforcing 
EU law.204 In opposition to this reasoning, Beljin argues that it would be hard to 
substantiate a claim that EU rights are totally functionalist oriented as it does not 
explain why there are EU norms that grant no right at all.205 However, grounding EU 
rights on functional orientation is no means inconceivable.206
The above expositions as to the foundation of European right should not be linked to 
the idea of antitrust right herein proposed. This reason for this assertion is expressed 
below.
ii. The Foundation o f  Antitrust Right Deciphered
It has been noted that Coleman’s account of right is primarily modelled on three 
questions -  its foundation, its analytical core and its enforcement mode. In the 
assessment of the foundation of the term antitrust right, much effort has been put into 
ensuring that the term is not mistaken with the foundation of right, for example, as
201 Johannes Masing, Die Mobilisierung des Burgers fur die Durchsetzung des Rechts (Berlin, 
Duncker & Humblot, 1997) and Arinin von Bogdandy in Eberhard Grabitz and Meinhard Hilf (eds), 
Recht der EU  (MUnchen, Beck, 2004) referred to in Beljin (2008).
202 c f Case C-37/98 Savas [2000] ECR 1-2927, paras 39, 46, 5 Iff and Joined Cases C-178/94, C- 
179/94, C-188/94, C-189/94, and C-190/94 Dillenkofer and Ors v Germany [1996] ECR 1-4845, paras 
34-36.
203 Beljin (2008).
204 “Right” in Europe is constantly linked to second-order principles such as subsidiarity and direct 
applicability. See Andrew Williams, “Taking Values Seriously” (2009) 3 Oxford Journal o f  Legal 
Studies 552. Thus though Van Gend en Loos Case 26/62 [1963] ECR 1 signalled the birth o f  Union 
rights, its creation was as a result o f an accident This is because the court was primarily concerned 
with whether certain provisions o f the Treaty were directly applicable. In effect, it is correct to say 
that individual right “came into existence as a by-product o f a provision’s direct applicability.” See 
Thomas Eilmansberger, “The Relationship between Rights and Remedies in EC Law: In Search o f the 
Missing Link” (2004) 41 CMLRev 1199 at 1202-3; Armin Von Bogdandy “Constitutional Principles” 
in Armin Von and Jtirgen Bast (eds) Principles o f  European Constitutional Law  (Oxford, Hart 
Publishing, 2006) 38;
205 There are rights based on functionalism. See Beljin (2008).
206 E.g., Case C-194/94 CIA Security International SA v. Signalson SA and Securitel Sprl [1996] ECR 
1-2201, para 48 wherein it was stated that right was granted in order to ensure the effectiveness on an 
EU legal act; Case C-253/00 Muhos and Superior Fruiticola [2002] ECR 1-7289, para 31 where right 
was granted in order to ensure fair trading and transparency o f market in the Union.
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used in Europe. However, while this analysis helps to differentiate the concept of 
antitrust right, it does not go as far as identifying its real background. The task here 
therefore is to explain what we mean by the foundation of antitrust right by assessing 
different normative alternatives. The reason for considering these alternatives is to 
make it clear that rather than answering the question through one normative 
foundation or another, antitrust right is meant to keep open these different normative 
foundations without choosing between them ex ante.
Without much ado, it should be reiterated that term “antitrust right” herein 
introduced is a sui generis right, Hence, considering that the term antitrust right is 
deployed for the specific purpose of developing a comprehensive framework for the 
person-centred approach which invariably requires that different interests are 
accommodated, the question about the foundation of antitrust right cannot be set in 
advance as a firm decision in one way or another might prejudice the interest of 
some.
To say that antitrust right is a sui generis right implies that the term has no strict link 
with any identified basis of right. To substantiate this assertion, I analyse antitrust 
right in light of foundations of legal rights has identified by Wellman.207 First, he 
stated that legal rights can be grounded on legislation. In this case, statutes 
explicitly establish a right and implicitly ground the complex Hohfeldian positions 
that constitute that right 209 Second, the legal grounds of a right could consist of 
several laws that have established the Hohfeldian elements. A third way is where a 
legal right is derived from some prior right.
The proposed antitrust right, being a sui generis concept, does not result from 
legislation so the first of the three possibilities does not apply. The question is 
whether it can be said that our proposed antitrust right is founded on several laws that 
align with Hohfeldian positions. If antitrust right is seen as constituting “several 
antitrust laws”, it would amount to nothing more than a loose phrase for antitrust 
provisions such as Article 101 and 102 TFEU. A clear example of where the word 
right is used loosely is under consumer protection law. For instance, in Europe,
207 Wellman (1995) 25.
208 Niel MacCormick, “Rights in Legislation” In Peter Hacker and Joseph Raz (eds) Law, Morality 
and Society: Essays in Honour ofH.L.A. Hart. (Oxford, Oxford University Press, 1977) 206.
209 Wellman (1995) 25.
210 Ibid.
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though the original Treaty made no mention of consumer protection,211 it soon 
became obvious that “consumer protection right” is simply an umbrella phrase for a 
couple of rights such as the right to protection against hazards to health and safety; 
the right to protection against damage to economic interests; the right to access to 
advice, help and redress; the right to information and education; the right to be 
consulted in the framing of decisions affecting the consumer’s interests and so on.212
Based on this analogy, it should be noted that the idea of antitrust right should not be 
represented as merely reflecting different antitrust provisions. In fact, even though 
the term antitrust right is a loose term with no intrinsic legal meaning, it has a far 
greater effect than merely representing the different laws because, through the 
questions that it raises, we are able to address different normative contents of 
antitrust by dealing with the substantive, procedural, theoretical, practical, and 
enforcement aspect of antitrust.
It is equally important that the concept of antitrust right is clearly distinguished from 
legal rights that are said to derive from prior rights. To say that a legal right derives 
from prior rights, the grounding right must be both temporarily and logically prior to 
the right it establishes. Wellman states that the grounding right must have been 
recognised in the law and it must somehow justify the inference to the new right 
derived from it.213 Prior legal right can ground a derived right in two ways; one way 
is by showing that the derived right is a more specific form of the prior right on 
which it is grounded while the other is to ground a right on some prior right as a 
matter of necessity.
There is the danger that the idea of antitrust right might at some point be linked with 
present usage of right in specific jurisdictions such that antitrust right is considered to 
be a derivative of some underlying rights especially as the term “right” is hardly 
novel within the jurisprudence of any legal regime. In Europe for instance, no 
attempt should be made to infer or ground antitrust right on the usage of the term 
right in Courage v Crehan214 and Manfredi215 In Courage, the Court of Justice held
2,1 See Andrew Geddes, Protection o f  Individual Rights Under EC Law (London, Butterworth, 1995) 
5.
212 Ibid.
213 Wellman (1995) 25.
214 Case C-453/99, [2001] ECR 1-6297.
215 C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assuricazione [2006] ECR 1-6619.
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that the Union’s law is intended to give rise to right which becomes part of 
individuals’ legal asset. The Court iterated further the prominence of European legal 
order and affirmed that the order has created rights and imposed duties on 
individuals. These rights, it was held, are not limited to instances where it is 
expressly granted by the Treaty. It also exists by virtue of obligations which the 
Treaty imposes in a clearly defined manner. Also in Manfredi,216 the Court stated 
that following from the need to protect individual rights, any individual can claim 
compensation for the harm suffered where there is a causal relationship between the 
harm and an agreement or practice prohibited under Article 101 TFEU. It would be 
wrong to strictly ground antitrust right on the usage of right as expressed in the above 
cases because the usage in this context is rather narrow, as such, it is unable to reflect 
the whole components of antitrust right.
Moreover, it is dangerous to place the theory of antitrust right on such pre-existing 
right because it could be susceptible to any weakness present in such pre-existing 
right. For example, in Europe, Courage was able to substantiate a right from a 
competition law obligation by stating that right would be granted “once the 
conditions for the application of [Article 101(1) TFEU] are met and so long as the 
agreement concerned does not justify the grant of an exemption under [Article 
101(3) TFEU] of the Treaty.”217 Following from the Treaty provisions on 
competition law, the Court of Justice was then able to derive a right through the 
obligation imposed on the institution in Article 3(1 )(g) EC. It was said in particular 
that according to Article 3(1 )(g) EC, Article 81 (now Article 101) of the Treaty 
constitutes a fundamental provision which is essential for the accomplishment of the 
tasks entrusted to the Community [Union] and, in particular, for the functioning of 
the internal market. It is the importance of this provision, the Court emphasised, that 
“led the framers of the Treaty to provide expressly, in Article 85(2) [Article 101(2) 
TFEU] ... that any agreements or decisions prohibited pursuant to that article are to 
be automatically void.”218
The problem at present however is that it is very debatable whether the competition 
law right which the Court had ostensibly linked to Article 3(1 )(g) EC still exist
216 C-295/04 to C-298/04 Manfredi v Lloyd Adriatico Assuricazione [2006] ECR 1-6619.
217 See para 22 o f Courage.
218 Ibid.
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considering that the TFEU has abolished this provisions and has brought in 
numerous changes which impact greatly on the institutions and functioning of the
219 • •EU. Thus, it might not be advisable to simply predicate antitrust right on such 
things as Treaty provisions and legislative intent especially where such underlying 
right is weak and could, as such, crumble at the slightest scrutiny. This is because the 
very foundation, which is built on layers and layers of assumptions, might leave us 
with an antitrust right that is vague, suggestive and haphazard.
So far, it has been shown that antitrust right should not be based on any of the three 
ways of creating legal rights as identified by Wellman. Rather, it is contended that to 
identify the foundation of antitrust right, it is more suitable to refer to jurisprudential 
expositions. It is therefore imperative at this juncture that we attempt to identify the 
ideal jurisprudential foundation for antitrust right. As it would be shown in 
paragraphs below, the ideal jurisprudential foundation for antitrust right is the 
capability approach as it enables us to effectively use the concept of antitrust right to 
conduct a comprehensive analysis of the person-centred approach whilst also 
maintaining the strictly procedural form. It does this by helping us maintain the 
neutrality required for building a framework that could potentially accommodate and 
(at least, occasionally) vindicate different interests.
To justify the reference to capability approach as the foundation of antitrust right, 
one has to consider the alternative normative bases which are then to be evaluated 
against each other.
A common underlying point should be noted -  that is, as stated by Coleman, what is 
considered to be the foundation of right is shaped by the perceiver’s inclination either 
towards freedom or welfare. This means that the different normative points that may 
exist would be based on either one or both ideals. The way one associates the idea of 
antitrust right to either of these ideals is of great importance as it has the tendency to 
affect our idea and definition of even germane terms such as competition itself. 
Where it aligns to one foundation at the expense of others, its definition of 
competition will be effectively skewed to that foundation, meaning that the definition
219 See e.g. Alan Riley “The EU Reform Treaty and the Competition Protocol: Undermining EC 
Competition Law” (2007) 142 Centre fo r European Policy Study Brief Contra Lord Leach of Fairford 
in House o f Lords, The Lisbon Treaty: An Impact Assessment (vol 1, London, Stationary House 
Limited, 2008) 218 para 9.15.
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of antitrust right would be exclusive to that foundation and can thus be pre­
determined through doctrines deriving from such foundation. This is the more reason 
why the person-centred approach requires that much care is exercised to ensure that 
the ideal jurisprudential foundation does have a normative undertone which would 
invariably narrow the interpretation of antitrust right.
Conclusively therefore, in light of the pure procedural nature of the exercise, the 
question about the foundation of antitrust right would have to be left unspecified.
3.3.2 How should Antitrust Right be analysed?
Given that the conclusion in the preceding part is that the foundation of antitrust right 
is to be left unspecified, it is important to consider how the conceptual analysis will 
proceed. This leads us to the question of how antitrust right is to be analysed. It 
would be shown here that the role of the person-centred approach is merely to 
provide a platform for the conceptual normative analysis which might be conducted 
by interested parties. In other words, the way to analyse antitrust right is by 
accommodating the different normative analysis of antitrust right. I also take time in 
this part to dissociate manner in which person-centred account seeks to achieve 
inclusiveness from other transcendental accounts which claim to combine different 
normative accounts of right.
As it has been reiterated in this thesis, specific antitrust theories and norms are 
undergirded by their own individual foundations which ultimately determine the 
interests that they choose. For instance, efficiency proponents would argue that 
antitrust subjects are better-off with an efficiency-based antitrust regime. It is this 
inclination towards efficiency that perhaps led some scholars to challenge the 
application of Article 101(3) in some cases as they considered that since the 
provision was either redundant or aimed at something else other than efficiency, it
fails to withstand critical analysis. This is because, as they argue, an agreement
•  • 220 would either restrict economic welfare, improve it or would have no effect on it. In
the same vein, if ordoliberalism is applied in establishing the interests of antitrust
subjects, it is needless to emphasise that there will be categorical preference for
freedom as the ideal foundation for antitrust analysis. For example, staunch
220 Phedon Nicolaides, “The Balancing Myth: The Economics o f Article 81 (1) and (3)” (2005) 32 
Legal Issues o f  Economic Integration 123-124.
77
ordoliberal theorists are not pleased with the continued reference to efficiency in 
Article 101(1) and (3) analysis since freedom should not be compromised, not even 
for productive efficiency gains.221
With regards to the central position in this thesis (which is that plural interests should 
be vindicated), the appropriate foundation of antitrust right is that which covers the 
wide range of interests and consequences that could truly enhance the position of 
antitrust subjects. This requires that the foundation of antitrust be broad enough. 
Thus, as stated above and as would be substantiated later,222 the capability approach 
could serve as an ideal framework for ascertaining the foundation of antitrust right in 
specific cases as it provides antitrust regimes with the requisite platform upon which 
they could truly reflect the diverging interests of antitrust subjects.
Using Europe as example, it has been shown that the idea of antitrust right should be 
dissociated from the pre-existing usage of right in European jurisprudence. 
Coleman’s account of right allows us to define antitrust right broadly. It however 
does not, by itself explain antitrust right. Thus, working through the flexibility of 
Coleman’s syntax and the semantics of right, we are to apply the capability approach 
which affords us the opportunity to utilise the idea of antitrust right as a vessel for 
accommodating plural interests. At this juncture, it is necessary to address the 
properties of antitrust right -  if the term is to be used in exploring plural interests, 
does it mean antitrust right can be wielded solely as a sword or as a shield? Does it 
mean that antitrust right is a convenient term devoid of legal content and as such 
cannot ground an action or serve as a defence on its own right? These issues will be 
addressed as I detail the syntax of antitrust right.
i. Syntax o f Antitrust Risht
The syntax of right is simply the logical form of right. A theory of the logical form of 
right seeks to specify the necessary features or properties of rights. As a matter of
221 Wemhard Moschel, “Competition Policy from an Ordo Point o f View” in Alan Peacock and Hans 
Willgerodt (eds), German Neo-Liberals and the Social Market Economics (London, Macmillan, 1989) 
150.
222 See chapter 4 below.
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necessity, all institutional rights possess peculiar features.223 Hohfeld sought to 
analyse legal rights by identifying the likely features that they could be comprised of. 
In his analysis, Hohfeld was of the opinion that its basic components, that is, “right” 
and “duty” have often been misused. He attempted thus to explicitly analyse legal 
right by disambiguating these components. He did this by presenting four kinds of 
right and four kinds of duty in an exact logical structure224 -  Hohfeld stated that right 
is a vague term which, in ordinary legal use, indiscriminately covers such things as 
claim-right, privilege, power and immunity. Opposite to generic usage of right is 
duty. When duty is put into more specific form, we have duty, no-duty, liability and 
disability. In substantiating the form of legal rights, specific form of rights bring 
about jural correlatives; Right, privilege, duty and no-duty are interrelated. As such, 
where x has a claim-right against y, then y  would have a correlative duty to x. Also, if 
x has the privilege to do /?, it means that x  has no duty not to do p. Similarly, power, 
immunity, disability and liability are logically interrelated so that if x  has a power 
against y, it is to be understood as y  being under a liability to x in the matter. If y  has 
no such liability, then y  is immune to the relevant exercise of power. If y  has such 
immunity, then x has a disability of exercising the power against j/.
As a result of the different forms in which legal right could appear, a query that we 
might have to grapple with concerning the syntax of right is how we are to determine 
what exactly makes them all “rights”. Here, there are primarily two schools of 
thought -  the benefit or interest theory of right and the choice or will theory. Another
relevant one is the theory of right as sanction.225 It has been said that the difference
• •  226between the two is best explained by returning to the issue of “correlativity”. 
Simply put, should a claim-right implicate a duty and vice versa? On the benefit 
theory, Raz, for instance, states that one has a right (i) if  he is an intended beneficiary 
and; (ii) if that person’s interest is sufficient reason for holding another to be under a 
duty.227 Regarding the choice theory of right, H.L.A Hart is very prominent. 
According to Hart, the essential feature of a duty which yields a right is that the
223 Coleman (2003) 34.
224 See generally Wesley Hohfeld, “Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial 
Reasoning” (1917) 26 Yale Law Journal 710-770. See also Jonathan Gorman, Right and Reason: An 
Introduction to the Philosophy o f  Rights (Chesham, Acumen Publishing, 2003) 88.
225 See Peter Jones, Rights (Hampshire and London, MacMillan Press, 1994) 39.
226 Ibid, 26.
227 Joseph Raz, The Morality o f  Freedom (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1986) 166.
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person to whom the duty is owed is able to control the performance of that duty.228 
As such, he argues that it is inappropriate to speak of a right correlating with a legal 
duty where the beneficiary of the duty can exercise no choice over its performance. 
Finally, opinion of jurisprudents such as Ross, Stoljar, Feinberg and Austin on right 
can be summed up as meaning that claims can only be converted to right by virtue of 
such claim being linked to sanctions.229 In the context of legal right, this means that 
the presence of a sanction upholding and enforcing a claim is essential to that claim’s 
being a right. In the context of moral right, it is believed that moral claim amounts to 
moral right only if that claim ought to be upheld by sanction.230
If the logic of legal right is to be considered in the context of our analysis of antitrust 
right, we might be tempted to undertake a thorough exercise into the strength of 
antitrust right; it might trigger our curiosity in ascertaining whether antitrust right 
truly brings about a right in terms of the benefit theory or more specifically, 
according to Raz’s account. Antitrust right can also be checked against Hart’s choice 
or will theory. For example, do antitrust subjects have a choice as to whether 
hardcore cartel violation should be punished or accepted in specific instances? If they 
have no power of choice, can it really be said that there could be anything like 
antitrust right in the context of Haft’s theory?
In the context of right as a derivative of a sanction, one might assess if antitrust right 
truly falls within the syntax of right by analysing its foundation and application. 
Thus, where we seek to identify the syntax of antitrust right through the sanction 
theory, it would be hard or impossible to identify antitrust right particularly when 
addressing antitrust issues which allows for the granting of for instance, exemptions 
as a result of efficiency benefits. This is because in such cases, the defendant may not 
be sanctioned for their restrictive or (potentially) abusive behaviour. Failure to 
sanction weakens any claim of right under the sanction theory.
Based on its procedural nature, the idea of antitrust right that is proposed in this 
thesis requires that we desist from subjective theoretical exposition of the syntax of 
antitrust right. Rather, antitrust right should simply be understood as a “conceptual
228 HLA Hart, Essays on Bentham: Studies in Jurisprudence and Political Theory (Oxford, Clarendon 
Press, 1982).
229 Jones (1994) 39.
230 Ibid.
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marker”. In putting forward their proposition on right, Coleman and Kraus231 
attempted to build the entitlement model in consonance with the Hohfeld’s scheme. 
They argue that rights are merely preliminary and incomplete markers for the 
allocation and protection of resources. Following from their explanation that rights 
are merely “conceptual markers” or “place holders”, they state further that “as a 
matter of logic or necessity, legal rights are neither protected domains of autonomy 
nor levels of protected welfare.” Thus, “[t]heir content is a contingent matter 
depending on the foundational theory”. As such, legal rights remain neutral while the 
chosen foundation theory in individual cases provides the required normative 
basis. In effect, “[w]hen interests or liberties are marked as rights, it is only as if an 
asterisk has been placed on them. The right that secures them is as yet (analytically) 
content-free.”
If this Coleman’s account is applied in ascertaining the syntax of antitrust right, the 
result is that the analysis of the syntax of right would be less convoluted. It would 
also respect the plurality and flexibility required for the enterprise as the syntax in 
every particular case will be determined by what is considered to be the particular 
theoretical foundation of antitrust right in specific instances. Antitrust right is thus 
not a concept to be wielded in any practical sense.
ii. Semantics o f  Antitrust Right
It has been stated that antitrust right is analytically content free. However, when 
claims and counter-claims are raised by interested parties, their usage of right would 
have to be imbued with contents. The issue about the semantics of antitrust right is 
therefore about how these normative accounts of right figure within antitrust right.
Where claims and counter-claims are made, right arguments often take the form of 
either or a combination of property rules, liability rules and inalienability rules. 
There is the tendency to imbue right with meanings that reflect our ideological 
stance. For instance, some scholars address the semantics of right from a utilitarian 
perspective. In this case, the meaning of antitrust right may be predicated on the
231 Jules Coleman and Judy Kraus, “Rethinking the Theory o f Legal Rights” (1986) 95 Yale Law 
Journal 1335.
232 Coleman (2003) 18.
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framework that, for example internalises the net inefficiencies in the market.233 Also, 
right claims and counter-claims could be made from a classical liberal perspective. 
For instance, White is of the opinion that antitrust right does not figure in the 
semantics of right. Basing his arguments on Kantian idea of right, he emphasises 
the relevance of freedom and the correlative nature of rights and duties. He thus 
argues that antitrust is a violation of property rights with no parallel justification. 
White’s conclusion in effect is that antitrust laws are baseless as there is no initial 
violation of property right which they can be said to protect. Bolstering his 
arguments with reference to Kant’s political theory, White argues that law is only 
meant to enforce citizens’ clearly defined rights against each other rather than to 
promote a consequentialist end such as welfare maximisation. He argues that Kantian 
philosophy presupposes freedom which naturally requires a corresponding duty on 
individuals, not only to perfect their own freedom, but also to avoid injuring the 
freedom of others. This order is to be sustained through the categorical imperatives 
which ground either perfect or imperfect duties. While perfect duties will ground 
legal responsibilities and thus create corresponding rights, imperfect duties are those 
that, even though may be desirable, cannot impose legal responsibilities. Example is 
the duty of beneficence. White’s claim is that competition law provisions require 
undertakings to be beneficent which thus mean that antitrust duties are imperfect and 
as such could not give rise to legal rights. In conclusive term, he asserts that antitrust 
laws are not firmly grounded at least in the light of Kantian right.
Similarly, one could infer from the libertarian position held by Armentano that 
antitrust right has no room in the semantics of right. He is of the view that activities 
such as price discrimination, tying and price-fixing do not violate any property right 
in the ordinary use of the term, “yet their regulation or prohibition by the state 
violates the property rights of the market participants.” He argues further thus that 
“[f]rom a strict libertarian or natural right position, antitrust laws are inherently 
unjust.” A liberal account that accords with antitrust right is the theory of economic
233 Louis Kaplow and Carl Shapiro. "Antitrust” NBER Working Papers 2007 94. Louis Kaplow, “On 
the Choice o f Welfare Standard in Competition Law” in Zimmer (ed) 3-26.
234 See generally Mark White “A Kantian Critique o f Antitrust: On Morality and Microsoft” (2007) 22 
Journal o f  Private Enterprise 161-190.
235 Dominick Armentano, “Efficiency, Liberty and Antitrust Policy” (1985) 4 CATO Journal 927. See 
generally, Armentano, Antitrust: A Case fo r Repeal (3rd edn, Alabama, Ludwig Von Mises Institute, 
2007).
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freedom. Here, the right is against the distortion of the competitive process which is 
to be protected through property rules.
As it can be inferred from Coleman, one thing that must be acknowledged is that 
whether we choose to see antitrust through either efficiency or the classical ideas 
deriving from Kant, libertarianism or economic freedom, our ideological preferences 
cannot fully reflect what it means to have antitrust right. It should be noted that 
whatever position we choose to follow is merely a contestable normative assertion 
connecting a particular normative theory to the idea of antitrust right. As such, when 
anyone of these theories is applied to the antitrust exercise, it would be merely 
normative and not analytic of antitrust right. These theories are, at best, supportable 
by substantive argument rather than taking the form of “linguistic convention” of 
the very idea of antitrust right.
Based on the imperfections of substantiating the semantic of right strictly through 
liability, property or inalienability rule etc, it becomes clear that none of the 
individual semantic interpretations can give a complete account of what it means to 
have antitrust right. In essence, a true analysis of the semantic of antitrust right might 
require a platform that accommodates all the rules.
In light of the overall idea of inclusiveness, we might think that the right option is to 
combine the different normative interpretations of these rights. If one merely wants 
to combine the incidence of liability rule and property rule, we might for instance 
want to ascertain the semantics of antitrust right through a flexible account of either 
property rule or liability rule. A flexible account of liability rule that comes to mind 
is the theory of indirect utilitarianism. This theory, it has been said, holds out the best 
prospect for reconciling welfare rights and liberal rights.237 Indirect utilitarianism 
rests upon the idea that institutions are often more successful in promoting utility by 
pursuing secondary principles formulated in non-utilitarian terms as opposed to 
attempting the direct pursuit of utility itself.238 The problem with this approach 
though is that it is difficult to conceive its steady application in competition law. 
Except for instances where there is likely to be a convergence of opinion and 
outcome (for example, hardcore cartel infringements) regardless of the meaning
236 Coleman (2003) 38.
237 Jones (1994) 59.
238 Ibid.
83
imbued into antitrust right, there could hardly be a complimentary outcome in the 
more complicated areas. Jones was sceptical about the rule as he doubted whether 
utilitarianism, even in an indirect form, would always deliver and respect those rights 
which we believe ought to be delivered and respected. He thereafter asserts that “[i]n 
any goal-based theory, no matter how sophisticated, values and institutions will be 
recognised and upheld only to the extent that they promote the favoured goal of the 
theory. It is hard therefore to entirely eradicate the fear that, at some point, [liberal] 
rights will be the sacrificial victim of utility [based rights].”239
What is truly needed in order to ascertain the semantic of antitrust right is an account 
that, at the pre-violation stage makes no obvious choice between liability rule and 
property rule. Such account, by and large, ensures the plurality necessary for the 
person-centred approach. For an ideal account of the semantic of right, Coleman’s 
position should be adequate. To Coleman, the task concerning the semantics of right 
is about the content of right. To re-iterate, he states that the specific content of 
legitimate claims that derive from rights is the function of the rule -  property, 
liability or inalienability -  applied to them. In other words, he argues that property 
rule and liability rule specify the content of right by generating specific legitimate 
claims from them and as such, the claims property and liability rules generate specify 
conditions of legitimate transfer.
Further, it is necessary to specify more completely the content of antitrust right. Prior 
to specifying the content and meaning of antitrust right, the only thing that could be 
firmly stated is that entitled persons have legitimate claims, for instance, against 
abuse of dominance or to exploit their dominance. What is unknown however is the 
precise nature of the claim. In order to move beyond conceptually marking a claim as 
a right, the rules for generating particular and fully specified legitimate claims from 
rights (through the application of property, liability and inalienability rules) need to 
be specified. The capability approach allows interested parties to move beyond the 
conceptual marker as they are allowed to generate particular contents for those rights 
from their own individual normative standpoint which might be reflected in different 
ways (i.e. through the general provisions, exceptions, exemptions etc).
239 Ibid, 61.
Because of the peculiarity of antitrust, the specific description of claims could boil 
down to hypothetical transfers amongst antitrust subjects. For instance, we might 
have to consider transfers between consumers and suppliers -  should the consumer 
be granted a right or should the supplier be held to be under no duty? The specific 
claims that are given rise to by antitrust rights are to be derived from norms or rules 
governing the term of legitimate transfer of rights and duties. These norms which are 
influenced by either efficiency thought, economic freedom etc, consequently find 
their way into the capability approach. By accommodating different norms, 
capability approach can be termed as the person-centred antitrust regime’s 
transaction framework. In other words, the capability approach is the framework 
which contains normative claims of antitrust subjects.
This conclusion is in line with Coleman’s position. He said that by generating claims 
entailed by right ownership, property, liability and inalienability rules (as well as a 
combination of them) specify the content of rights over a domain of transfer.240
The semantics of antitrust right depends on the scope and theoretical options within 
the capability framework as well as the practicality of those options. It is the practical 
aspect (that is, the fine line between what is desirable and what is feasible) that 
implicates the decisional frameworks and the enforcement priorities into the 
semantics of antitrust right.
3.4 Enforcing Antitrust Right
Having noted through the analysis of the syntax and semantics of antitrust right that 
it is a bare concept that allows us to carry out the person-centred analysis, the simple 
conclusion that could be drawn is that antitrust right is akin to antitrust as a field, the 
only difference being that it affords us the route for a fresh approach. Thus, when we 
talk of enforcing antitrust right, it means nothing more than enforcing antitrust 
violations -  once a specific antitrust issue has been assessed (in light of the 
framework for ascertaining the foundation of right as well as for identifying the 
syntax and semantics of right) and a conclusion has been reached or there exists a 
prima facie case to suggest the presence of a violation, we automatically move to the
240 Coleman (2003) 37.
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enforcement stage. The phrase “enforcement of antitrust right” simply refers to the 
enforcement of (alleged) antitrust violations either through private or public 
enforcement or both.
That enforcement is important for antitrust as a field (and in this context, antitrust 
right) should go without saying. What is the essence of a right that cannot be 
enforced? What can we make of antitrust right without a thorough elucidation of its 
enforcement? A firm account of antitrust right with no corresponding position on 
enforcement, metaphorically speaking, renders antitrust a clawless paper tiger. 
Considering that it is settled that any respectable antitrust regime should have a firm 
position on enforcement, the tricky task will be to ascertain the form which the 
enforcement should take. As it must have been observed above, the form of 
enforcing institutional rights is likely to follow from the foundational theory. It is 
thus the foundational theory that specifies the appropriate institutions for enforcing 
the claim these rights create and by so doing, the foundational theory fuels the 
complete theory of institutional right. Coleman opined thus that a commitment at the 
foundational level will suggest certain views about the content and enforcement of 
rights. He however acknowledges that the enforcement modality might not strictly 
entail the foundational theory.
To enforce antitrust right, it is required that, first, the enforcement process must be 
unclogged from practical and legal hurdles. Secondly, enforcement must 
accommodate plural interest en route enhancing the position of antitrust subjects.
Taking European framework as the institution of reference, one could observe that 
great efforts have been and are still being undertaken in order to meet the first 
requirement at both public and private levels. Perhaps, the value of an unclogged 
enforcement process to the idea of antitrust right will be better understood through a 
brief exposition of the developmental process (at both public and private level) in 
Europe.
Concerning legal hurdles, a clear example could be made of public enforcement. So 
as to stamp out anti-competitive practices, the Commission sought to oversee the
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enforcement of competition law Europe-wide through Regulation 17/62.241 Though 
the Commission had steadily improved on its enforcement over the years, its 
activities were still generally regarded as inadequate particularly when one considers 
the enormity of the market. For instance, to relieve itself of the heavy workload, the 
Commission, in its Article 101 enforcement, issued “comfort letters” for good 40 
years and did an average of mere 4 formal exemptions per year since 1979.242 The 
problem in enforcement at that time was as a result of legal hurdles which limited 
enforcement initiative to the Commission particularly as regards the present Article 
101(3) TFEU. Sensing the need to improve on the task of antitrust enforcement, the 
Commission identified the major structural deficiencies in its system and then came 
up with a functional structure called Modernisation.243 The reform decentralised the 
enforcement of the Community’s competition law so that national competition 
authorities could have a fair share of enforcement responsibilities.
Regarding practical hurdles, the private aspect of European antitrust enforcement 
illustrates the point. As far back as 1961, a legal base for private actions could be 
inferred as European Parliament unequivocally expressed its view on the value of 
private actions and the role it could play in ensuring that the aims of competition 
rules are met.244 The legality of private actions in competition law was even further 
strengthened by the decisions in Courage and Manfredi. This decision 
notwithstanding, the study revealed that there was “total underdevelopment”245 with 
regards to the institution of private actions by private parties. It was observed by the 
Commission that the poor state of private antitrust enforcement is traceable to: the 
rarity of collective actions; the difficulty of establishing fault; the difficulty of 
discharging a high standard of proof; limited power of courts to order presentation of 
documents; lack of binding effect of decisions of competition authorities and national
241 This would have been legitimate at the time where national hegemony was more prevalent. The 
idea o f centralisation worked at the time because there were just six members and because the 
members perceived the need to create a competition culture.
242 Clifford Jones, Private Enforcement o f  Antitrust Law in the EU, UK and USA (New York, Oxford 
University Press, 1999).
243 Regulation 1/2003 OJ [2003] L l/1 , [2003] 4 CMLR 551.
244 See the Deringer Report for the European Parliament. Also, in 1966, the Commission published a 
specific study examining the remedies in national laws for damage caused by infringement of 
competition rules see La Reparation des Consequences Dommageable d’une Violation des Article 85 
et 86 du traite Instituant la CEE, Series Concurrence No. 1 (Brussels, 1966) referred to in XHIth 
Report on Competition Policy 1983.
245 See study on the conditions o f claims for damages in case o f infringement o f EC antitrust rules, 
available on the Commission’s website at:
[http://europa.eu.int/comm/competition/antitrust/others/private_enforcement/index_en.html].
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courts; the complexities involved in quantifying damages; the problem of passing-on 
defence and indirect purchaser claims; the meagre amount of damages granted. In 
order to reduce these practical problems, the Commission has proposed a White 
Paper on damages action.246
Till this point, it does appear that Europe might meet the primary condition for 
enforcement if it is to adopt the idea of antitrust right proposed in this thesis. It is 
however left to be seen whether the Union’s antitrust enforcement can meet the core 
aim of the person-centred approach, that is, to give due consideration to the interests 
of antitrust subjects whilst striving to meet institutional objectives.
Unlike under the condition regarding the unclogging of practical and legal hurdles, 
the “plural interests” condition generates less common ground on how we expect 
antitrust to be enforced. This is because we are more likely to identify ideal 
enforcement objectives through our subjective inclinations. With regards to the 
ultimate requirement of broadness deriving from the person-centred approach, we 
could assess responses deriving from the debate about the best enforcement modality 
in a particular case. We might for instance disagree on the appropriate institutional 
objective -  is it deterrence or efficiency?247 Concerning private actions, we might be 
saddled with the task of ascertaining whether the positions of antitrust subjects are 
better enhanced where parties are taken as mere instruments for attaining institutional 
goals or whether the positions of antitrust subjects are better enhanced where private 
claims are vindicated for their own sake (for instance, as a matter of corrective 
justice).248 Overall, our idea of the appropriate enforcement modality seems to derive 
from our idiosyncratic idea of what is good or right.
We could also assess subjective responses to the issue concerning the relationship 
between public and private enforcement. Lawyers and economists debate whether
246 White Paper (2008). There has however been little or no development in this respect since White 
Paper was published.
247 See Gary Becker, “Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach” (1968) 76 Journal o f  Political 
Economy 169; William Landes, “Optimal sanctions for Antitrust Violations” (1983) 50 University o f  
Chicago Law Review 652 contra Wouter Wils, Efficiency and Justice in European Antitrust 
Enforcement (Oxford and Portland, Hart Publishing, 2008) 56. For a middle-way position see Nadia 
Calvino, “Deterrent Effect and Proportionality o f Fines”, in Claus Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela 
Atanasiu (eds), European Competition law Annual: Enforcement o f  Prohibition o f  Cartels (Oxford 
and Portland Oregon, Hart Publishing, 2007) 320.
248 See e.g. Abayomi Al-Ameen, “Restitutionary Remedy in Competition Law: A Bull in a China 
Shop?” (2009) 32 World Competition Law and Economics Review 327-346.
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public enforcement is enough, whether private actions should be discouraged,249 
whether private action can substitute public enforcement, or whether it complements 
public enforcement.250 So far, the debates about the appropriate enforcement 
institutions have been undertaken on the basis of their optimality. The various 
interpretations we have are subjective because they define “optimality” through their 
own lens. Even where we proceed from the same definition of optimality, 
controversies still arise as to what enforcement modality or combination of 
modalities is optimal.251 The question is, should our discourse be streamlined to 
optimality?
Another issue upon which we can assess subjective responses is about the 
appropriate mechanisms and instruments for enforcing antitrust. The propriety of 
applying particular enforcement tool or a combination of them has been hotly 
contested. In private antitrust, the nature and value of class actions has been 
debated. -  for instance, it has been considered whether the easing of the 
requirement of fault will enhance or endanger the position of antitrust subjects; 
whether the manipulation of burden and standard of proof will be helpful or whether 
it is more likely to be counter-productive; if the value of discovery process to the 
enforcement enterprise can be ascertained etc. One thing that is common to all these 
debates is that the instruments and mechanisms are continuously debated and 
assessed on how effective they are, whereby “effectiveness” is defined subjectively. 
The question here as well is whether we should only assess these issues on the 
account of their effectiveness.
249 See e.g. Wouter Wils, “Should Private Antitrust Enforcement Be Encouraged in Europe?” 26 
World Competition Law and Economics Review 413', Preston McAfee and Nicholas Vakkur, “The 
Strategic Abuse o f Antitrust Laws” (2004) Journal o f  Strategic Management Education 1; William 
Boumal and Janusz Ordover, “Use o f Antitrust to Subvert Competition” (1985) 28 Journal o f  Law 
and Economics 241.
250 Preston McAfee, Hugo Mialon and Sue Mialon, “Private v Public Antitrust Enforcement: A 
strategic analysis” (2008) 92 Journal o f  Public Economics 625-71.
251 Abayomi Al-Ameen, “Antitrust Fines: Seeking Justice” (2010) 7 Competition Law Review 81-102.
252 E.g. we assess whether criminalisation is appropriate see Wouter Wils, “Is Criminalization o f  EU 
Competition Law the Answer?” in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (2007).
253 Pierluigi Congedo and Michele Messina, 'European ‘C lass’ Action: British and Italian Points o f  
View in Evolving Scenarios ” (2009) 1 Europa e Diritto Privato 163-189.
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It can be argued that the present modes of analysing antitrust enforcement do not 
really take account of plurality -  the debates about the appropriate enforcement 
modality, the debates that address the relationship between public and private 
enforcement on the platform of optimality, and the debates about the 
appropriateness/effectiveness of enforcement tools fail to pay attention to the need to 
accommodate plural interests. It is therefore imperative that a fresh insight into 
addressing enforcement queries which takes account of the issue of plurality is 
introduced. It is hoped that substantial debates would arise on how we could best 
attain incremental enforcement of antitrust right.
3.5 Conclusion
It is contended in this chapter that since the person-centred approach takes a bottom- 
up perspective to antitrust, it will be ideal to develop the account through the idea of 
right. Coleman’s account of right was chosen as it fits with the pure procedural 
agenda of this thesis. Importantly, it helps to illuminate the person-centred approach 
through the eyes of antitrust subjects. The account of antitrust right, through 
Coleman’s questions, also affords us the room to give a holistic exposition of 
antitrust. Above all, the account of antitrust right helps us to situate and develop the 
major components of the person-centred approach.
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Chapter 4
CAPABILITY APPROACH: The Framework for the Person-Centred Analysis
4.1 Introduction
The prevailing accounts in antitrust have been shown to be deconstructible primarily 
because they are not broad enough to meet the requirement of justice as 
inclusiveness. It is thought therefore that if the herein constructed person-centred 
approach is to stand the scrutiny of post-modern deconstruction, there need to be a 
procedural and conceptual platform that can intelligibly accommodate conflicting 
interests. Hence, the need to introduce the capability approach
The person-centred approach rests on the idea that antitrust subjects should be the 
focal point of antitrust analysis. This approach, it is believed, will allow us to address 
real issues that concern antitrust subjects by requiring institutions to take account of 
the various interests held by different relevant persons in specific instances. On the 
part of the antitrust subjects, an antitrust institution that takes the interests of persons 
seriously is unlikely to have legitimacy concerns as it is likely to be perceived as just. 
In a nutshell, antitrust institutions should seek justice as inclusiveness. This 
inevitably requires a broad scope for antitrust.
It can be deduced from the foregoing that we should not structure our analysis 
merely for the convenience of antitrust authorities/courts or strictly on what 
institutions consider to be important. This however does not mean that the person- 
centred approach disregards the role of established institutions. Rather, it gives the 
relevant institutions a broader task. A broad framework is essential if the various 
interests held by different persons are to be taken into consideration. This same effect 
is not attainable under a narrow regime.
Their flaws (to wit, that they are mistaken and incomplete) notwithstanding, the 
prominent antitrust theories achieve one thing which eludes a plural regime -  their 
focus on predetermined and homogenous linear order means that they can avoid the 
problem of non-commensurability that often befalls the valuation of heterogeneous 
objects.
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The overall idea behind the capability approach however has to be addressed in light 
of suspicion often harboured by neoclassical thinkers about the balancing of plural 
factors. While the balancing dilemma raise genuine concerns, it appears that the 
capability approach may be insulated from such concerns as it is premised on the 
idea that we could consider plural factors without referring to their values in order to 
include them and to decide between them. Moreover, in the context of antitrust, strict 
focus on a single factor is not an option as it has been observed in chapter one that 
any such sole factor would be found to be insufficient and mistaken254 which in 
effect means that “social evaluation may be starved of useful information and good 
argument.” Hence, we cannot disregard the fact that it is impossible to reduce all 
things that one might have reason to value into one homogeneous magnitude.256
Following from the assertion that broadness in antitrust is inherently inescapable, it is 
pertinent to pay closer attention to what such broad-based antitrust regime should 
entail and how it should work. In this chapter, I set out the broadness conditions for 
the person-centred approach. I then test selected theories and approaches against 
these requirements. Ultimately, I show preference for the capability approach.
This chapter is divided into six parts. In part one, details of the person-centred 
conditions of broadness is given. In part two, I test the major antitrust theories 
against these requirements. Part three tests the more unconventional “eclectic” 
theories (one of which is the capability approach) against this requirement. In part 
four, I focus on the capability approach. Part five illustrates how the capability 
framework would achieve the requisite broadness vis-a-vis the other theories. I 
conclude accordingly in part six.
254 See chapter 1 above.
255 Sen (2009) 242.
256 Isaiah Berlin, The Proper Study o f  Mankind (Henry Hardy and Roger Hausheer eds) (London, 
Chatto & Windus, 1997), Bernard Williams, “A Critique o f Utilitarianism” in John Smart and Bernard 
Williams (eds) Utilitarianism: For and Against (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1973) and 
Bernard Williams, Ethics and the Limits o f  Philosophy (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 
1985). In fact, it has been argued that there is much diversity even in utility which is the very basis o f  
neoclassical thoughts. See Amartya Sen “Plural Utility” (1980-81) 81 Proceedings fo r the Aristotelian 
Society.
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4.2 Broadness Conditions in the Assessment of Wellbeing
The primary motivation behind this thesis is to fashion out an account of antitrust 
that will meet the requirement of “justice as inclusiveness”. The idea of “justice” 
herein referred to is measured by the extent to which such account accommodates 
plural interests. It is inescapable therefore that the person-centred approach be 
applied broadly enough to accommodate these interests.
At this juncture, it is imperative to break down the broadness requirement into sub­
components in order to ensure that it truly reflects plurality of interests as envisaged 
by the person-centred approach.
To begin with, in order to avoid conceptual confusion in our person-centred analysis, 
it is necessary to make conscious effort to set clear the contextual meaning of the 
broadness requirement. Hence, so far as this approach to antitrust primarily 
advocates that interests of persons should be the focal point of antitrust analysis, the 
first requirement of broadness is that the terms “persons” and “interests” should be 
interpreted in a way that is ultimately inclusive such that the “interests” and the 
“persons” holding such interests must not be unduly restricted. In essence, “persons” 
must not be understood as referring merely to a class of persons. Rather, it should 
refer to the whole range that could be interested or be affected by the state of 
competition in any given market. In the same vein, interests (which invariably relate 
to wellbeing) must not be defined narrowly.
“Interests” here can be equated to wellbeing in the general sense. Most antitrust 
institutions recognise and even emphasise the role of interest/wellbeing for antitrust. 
For example, the General Court in Osterrichische Postparkasse noted with regards to 
the role of EU competition law that “it should be pointed out ... that the ultimate 
purpose of the rules that seek to ensure that competition is not distorted in the 
internal market is to increase the well-being of consumers.” With emphasis on 
wellbeing/welfare, Europe’s recognition of the welfare aspect of competition law is 
also apparent from the Glaxo case.
257 Cases T-213/01 and T-214/01, Osterreichische Postparkasse AG v. Commission and Bank fur 
Arbeit und Wirtschaft AG  v. Commission [2006] ECR11-1601, para 115.
258 Despite their differences, both the General Court and the Court o f Justice recognised the welfare 
aspect o f competition law.
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The recognition notwithstanding, it is still imperative to define interests/wellbeing 
particularly as it is subject to diverse meanings under different antitrust theories. For 
example, considering present trends particularly in light of the often advocated 
“more economic approach”, there is a tendency to take a narrow view of what 
amounts to interest/wellbeing. Thus, for the purpose of the person-centred approach, 
wellbeing must not be given a narrow meaning. Mere broadness will also not be 
adequate. Rather, broadness under this approach is to be reached by focusing on the 
interests/well-being of each person as a unit rather than as an aggregate. The 
inescapable diversity of interests mean that antitrust must also be broad.
The requirement that “persons” should be understood as referring to diverse groups 
rather than a specified group appears to be particularly demanding especially when 
one considers that most antitrust regimes seem to narrow the scope of “persons”. For 
instance, we could consider the European position as expressed by the General Court 
in Osterrichische. Confirming the role of competition law in ensuring wellbeing, the 
Court particularly narrowed the scope of persons to the consumers as opposed to 
persons in general. The same can be said of the position of the General Court in 
Glaxo where the final consumers were identified as the relevant persons in antitrust 
analysis. However, as it has been stated earlier,259 it is quite debatable that the usage 
of the term “consumer” actually accommodates a broader definition beyond 
consumers within a specific product market as the exact import of Article 101 and 
102 TFEU remains unclear. Moreover, there are good reasons to suggest that 
“persons” should not be limited to selected groups. For example, most scholars and 
practitioners would agree that abusive use of dominance should be prohibited. 
However, where we are faced with a unique case of bilateral monopoly, it might be 
difficult to identify the “persons” whose interests should be protected. If “persons” 
are conceived strictly in terms of consumers260 such that we simply seek for our 
antitrust regime a state (on our Marshallian demand curve) where the consumer 
welfare is equal to the consumer surplus while totally disregarding producer welfare,
259 Above, ch 1.
260 This applies where, for example, consumer welfare is defined as buyer’s well-being -  that is, the 
benefits a buyer derives from the consumption o f goods and services. See Barak Orbach, “The 
Antitrust Consumer Welfare Paradox” Arizona Legal Studies Discussion Paper No 10-07 July 2010.
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then we might be blinded to the monopsony power261 of strong consumers even 
where the exercise of such power raises anti-competitive concerns. In such scenario, 
we are saved of this conceptual problem where we apply a more general definition of 
“persons”.262
There are a good number of reasons why institutions should be wary of narrowing 
their focus as it could have grave effect from the policy initiation stage to the 
implementation stage. For instance, focus on consumer welfare means that 
preference will always be given to type I error as against type II error when in fact a 
more detailed evaluation of specific cases might have led us to risk type II errors and 
not type I. Other justifications have been given in preceding chapters.
The second and third requirements build on our interpretation of “interests”. By 
saying that “interests” should be understood in their heterogeneous context, it partly 
means that antitrust institutions should understand and accommodate different 
interests held by different persons or groups. At the macro-level, rather than taking a 
simplistic approach by relating interests to the type of market (such as interests 
linked to different forms of free markets), a more ingrained approach should be 
adopted in identifying interests. For instance, we might factor into an institution’s 
competition policy the impact of an isolated behaviour on a wide range of interests 
within the community spanning from businesses to social groups and so on. They 
should be able to demand that their interests be considered as long as they are 
affected by and sensitive to competition policy concerns. This kind of reasoning 
implies a broader scope which includes different shades of interests held by 
consumers, labour union, legal profession, economists, big businesses, small 
businesses, export industries, importers and so on.
Third, interests also refer to the diverging interests which a single antitrust subject or 
a section of them may deem worthwhile in specific cases. Using consumers as 
example, our acceptance that the interests, which a set of consumers (or a single
261 On monopsony and buyer power, see generally the OECD Competition Committee Policy 
Roundtable Monopsony and Buyer Power 2008 [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/38/63/44445750.pdf].
262 This could be by taking the suppliers as relevant antitrust subjects. For instance, in the context of 
monopsonistic market, the US Court in Weyerhaeuser identified the sellers as consumers. See 
Weyerhaeuser Co v Ross-Simmons Hardwood Lumber Co., 549 US 312 (2007).
263 See Bruce Doem “Comparative Competition Policy: Boundaries and Level o f Political Analysis” 
in Bruce Doem and Stephen Wilks (ed) Comparative Competition Policy: National Institution in a 
Global Market (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1996) 23.
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consumer) may hold are plural and diverse, would have fundamental impact on the 
way we perceive antitrust concerns. By recognising plurality, we will realise that 
substantiating the interests of a minute unit or even a person may be more 
complicated than it initially appears. For individual cases, general assumption cannot 
be made regarding the interests held by a certain group (such as consumers). We 
have to specifically query -  what interests? Which consumers?264 A single case 
might spring up different interests between an erstwhile uniform set of consumers. 
Drawing analogy from the merger case of Tetra Laval/Sidel265 where, even though 
the consumers could be sub-grouped as customers as they were all into the business 
of bottling liquid foods, their concerns about the possibility of leveraging strategies 
that might result from the proposed merger depended heavily on the sort of food a 
particular customer was concerned with and the nature of offer they received. In sum, 
while some seemed to prefer the merger because the efficiency gains facilitate their 
business, others were, to varying degrees, sceptical and hence against the merger 
because of the negative impact it could have on their business.
The EU Intel decision is another example. In this case, one of the issues to be 
determined was whether the benefit made out to consumers by Intel amounted to an 
anticompetitive practice against competitors. If we look strictly at consumers 
perception of harm,267 we might find it difficult to justify the sanction imposed by the 
Commission on Intel especially where one thinks that the preferences of buyers is the 
only good measure of economic well-being. This is because it is possible that 
consumers do not, in fact, perceive any harm from the behaviour of Intel. If we are 
solely concerned with perceived harm, we have to grapple with the submission of the 
Consumer Association which was that most individual consumers do not really care 
whether Intel is built into their computer or not.268 We cannot hold such a narrow 
view of consumers’ interests as it has been argued, for example in relation to
264 Anne-Lise Sibnony, “How are Consumers' Interests Taken into Account when Applying 
Competition Law?” Paper presented at the EU Commission event Competition and Consumers in the 
21st Century on 21 October 2009.
265 Case No COMP/M.2416 -  Tetra Laval/Sidel.
266 Commission decision o f 13 May 2009, relating to a proceeding under Article 82 o f the EC Treaty 
and Article 54 o f the EEA Agreement (COMP/C-3 /37.990 - Intel), D(2009)3726 final.
267 Especially where one considers the definition o f consumer surplus given by Mankiw which simply 
requires that we measure “the benefit that buyers receive from a good as the buyers themselves 
perceive it.’'’ See Gregory Mankiw, Principles o f  Economics (5th ed, Cincinnati, South-Western 
College Publishing, 2008) 142. (Emphasis in original).
268 E.g. see the opinion o f the Federation of Consumer Associations in Intel Decision, para 1611.
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consumer perception, that from the standpoint of society, willingness of consumers is 
not necessarily a good measure of consumer harm or benefit.269 Further, if we limit 
the meaning of interest to consumer choice, we might find it difficult to justify the 
sanction against Intel where it is confirmed that individual consumers are particularly 
less concerned with having computers with alternative processors or that they even 
prefer to be locked into computers with Intel as it saves them from incurring 
searching cost and also reduces confusion.
Hence, it could help our antitrust analysis to for instance, acknowledge that a single 
consumer might be simultaneously interested in conflicting outcomes deriving from 
a particular market conduct. To illustrate this point, a consumer may hold diverging 
interests which may result in conflicting conclusions (both positive and negative) 
towards a particular conduct which results in parallel trade. Such individual may 
want the immediate benefits that are derivable from the parallel trade such as lower 
prices but at same time they might be concerned with the likely long term loss such 
as less innovation.
Fourth, great care must be taken to avoid masquerading ideas deriving from specific 
schools of thought as those which antitrust subjects hold. Thus, for broadness to be 
achieved, it is imperative to take note of real interests rather than grand propositions 
about persons’ interests.
The fifth requirement is that antitrust regimes should desist from enmeshing antitrust 
in the fallacy that interests of persons’ can be ranked on an ex ante basis. 
Considering the illustration above about parallel trade and coupled with the fact that 
institutions are to focus on real person and not the idea of persons, it should be noted 
that the interests of a single antitrust subject is likely to be too complicated to allow 
for ex ante prioritisation. Thus, it would be inappropriate, in light of the person- 
centred approach to set an a priori fixated ranking, for instance, between the short 
term benefit such as price increase and the long term loss such as loss of innovation. 
It must not be taken for granted that specific issues in individual cases may vary the 
preferences of antitrust subjects.
269 Mankiw (2008) 142.
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Conclusively, the above stated requirement should guide our antitrust analysis when 
applying the person-centred approach. They are summarised as follows:
(i) The nature of person’s and their interests must be viewed in plural term
- “Interests” cannot be strictly defined and as such we must evince 
plurality in our meaning of wellbeing
- The “persons” must relate to a wide range of persons and not a section 
or group such as consumers
(ii) The plurality represented by interests should be understood as different 
interests held by different persons or groups
(iii) Plurality of interests should also be understood as meaning different 
interests which a single antitrust subject or a section of them may deem 
worthwhile in specific cases
(iv) Focus of antitrust institutions should be on the real interests held by 
persons’, not the idea of the interests they should hold
(v) We cannot suppose that an antitrust subject or a class of them will have a 
set and universally predetermined preferential ranking of the interests that 
they deem worthwhile.
4.3 Testing Theories against the Requirements of Broadness
Economists and legal scholars have developed theories which guide antitrust 
analysis. The field however continues to evolve as fresh insights are brought to 
modify or replace old ones. The proposed person-centred approach is not a full 
blown theoretical construct on antitrust. It merely details the bottom-up perspective. 
This means that antitrust theories continue to have their relevance in antitrust 
analysis. However, the person-centred approach requires an assessment of these full 
scale and partial theories against the requirement of broadness. I start by detailing the 
theories and then checking their compliance with the broadness requirements set out 
above. For the purpose of analysis, focus is placed on theories which are either 
pervasive or contemporary. As such, I limit my analysis to total welfare, wealth 
transfer (consumer welfare), consumer choice, behavioural law and economics,
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public policy and economic freedom. 270 Each of the requirements on broadness will 
be flagged by their corresponding roman numeral.271
4.3.1 Total Welfare
According to Bork, competition policy should be guided by basic economic analysis, 
“otherwise the law acts blindly upon forces it does not understand and produces 
results it does not intend.”272 This approach to antitrust is the product of the so-called 
Chicago school. To Bork and other member of this school, antitrust can be summed 
up as the effort to “improve allocative efficiency without impairing productive 
efficiency so greatly as to produce either no gain or a net loss in consumer 
welfare.” The two types of efficiency -  allocative efficiency and productive 
efficiency -  primarily recognised by this school274 are explained briefly.
i. Allocative Efficiency
The economists’ concern for the efficient allocation of resources emanates from the 
concept of cost.275 The value of the concept of cost (opportunity cost) stems from the 
fact that the use of a resource in the production of a good precludes its use in the 
production of an alternative good. It means therefore that the cost of resources to 
society is its value in the best alternative use 276 Where resources are put to the best 
alternative use, a market is likely to attain allocative efficiency as its output will be 
maximised. This however fails to materialise where scarcity is contrived. Such
270 Though the list is not exhaustive, these theories represent a cross-section o f antitrust thoughts.
271 For instance, requirement i(a), requirement ii etc.
272 Bork (1978).
273 Ibid, 90-91.
274 These categories o f efficiency are regarded as static. Bork particularly does not think we should 
consider dynamic efficiency in antitrust analysis. He argued that “the propriety o f ‘progressiveness’ as 
an antitrust criterion is not obvious ... Progress ... is obviously not costless to consumers. It requires 
the devotion o f resources to research and development that would otherwise be devoted to the 
production o f other goods and services. Progress will occur even without special consideration by the 
law, but the rate will be that which consumers choose by the degree to which they make it profitable 
to engage in the activity o f producing progress. Courts have no criteria for establishing compromise 
deviations from consumer welfare here.” See Robert Bork, “The Goals o f Antitrust Policy” (1967) 57 
American Economic Review 251.
275 Donald Hay and Derek Morris, Industrial Economic: Theory and Evidence (Oxford, Oxford
University Press, 1979) 37.
276 Ibid.
99
contrivance can arise where firms find it profitable to reduce output because the 
increased price more than compensates for the lost sale. They thereby raise the cost 
the society pays for such resource, hence rendering the market’s allocation 
mechanism inefficient. In event, the consumer is worse off as he pays more for less. 
He could also be in a situation where, because he has been charged a value above 
cost which he did not pre-empt, his needs go unsatisfied.
ii. Productive Efficiency
Productive efficiency is a firm-specific way of ascertaining efficiency. Like 
allocative efficiency, cost is one of the key factors for aiming at productive
• 277 •efficiency. The difference however is that cost is not construed in terms of 
opportunity cost. Rather, it is the scale of operation that determines the resulting 
efficiency. In identifying the scale of operation through cost analysis, it is believed 
that to some extent cost determines price, “that price determines market share, and 
that all these together determine the profitability of the firm.” The material 
efficiency effect attributable to productive efficiency is the presence of economies of
• ♦ • 279scale, economies of scope, and efficiencies from synergies such as cost savings. 
Efficiency gains emanating from a firm’s scale of operation can also be ascertained 
by identifying the between-firm efficiencies. These efficiencies can be found where 
agreements increase the number and quantity of transactions between firms which
7R0may help to solve free-rider and hold up problems.
In the context of antitrust, productive efficiency is considered important because it 
increases social wealth over the whole range of output.281 The total welfare model is 
concerned about productive efficiency as it values any cost savings associated with
277 This cost-related aspect can be referred to as Cost efficiency. See European Commission (2004), 
Guidelines on the application o f  Article 81(3) o f  the Treaty, OJ C 101 27/4/2004, or Within-Firm 
efficiency. See Practical Methods to Assess Efficiency Gains in the Context o f  Article 81(3) o f  the EC 
Treaty Final Report by Copenhagen Economics published on 21 April 2006 2208 DG Enterprise and 
Industry, 56.
278 Hay and Morris (1979).
279 Cost savings either through the combination o f existing assets that reduces cost by avoiding 
duplication or the presence o f better production planning, reduced inventory or improved capacity 
utilisation. See Guidelines on Article 81(3) para 68.
280 European Commission Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 291, 13.10.2000, 1-44.
281 Joseph Brodley, “The Economic Goals o f Antitrust: Efficiency, Consumer Welfare, and 
Technological Progress” (1987) New York University Law Review 1020, 1027.
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the practices at issue since the efficiencies that affect marginal cost of production 
also tend to affect ultimate price.282 It is possible to take account of productive 
efficiency. This is because, under certain assumptions, the efficient solution under 
this approach is achieved through equilibrium prices at the intersection of the 
demand and supply curve.283
In sum, allocative efficiency is achieved when resources are distributed among 
alternative uses such that the goods and services it produces are those most highly 
valued by consumers.284 Regarding the relationship between allocative and 
productive efficiency, total welfare is achieved where the sum of consumer surplus 
and producer surplus is maximised. This occurs where price is equal to marginal
285cost.
At this juncture, the total welfare standard will be tested against the person-centred 
approach’s five requirements on broadness.
On requirement i(a) which calls for a plural understanding of the concept of welfare, 
the total welfare model fails because the efficiency goal has a rather limited scope. 
The Chicagoans’ interpretation of “maximise welfare” has a thin meaning as it
OCA 0 C 7relates to utility. It is thus unsuitable for a general conception of wellbeing. 
Even more serious is the cognitive argument against total welfare. It has been 
contended that the Chicago idea of “welfare” is not welfare in the intuitive sense let 
alone that it meets the general conception of wellbeing. Black argues that where 
Pareto optimality is conceived in terms of utility, “welfare” cannot mean “utility”,
for to say that no one’s utility can be increased unless someone else’s utility is
* • • • 288 * decreased does not imply that utility is maximised in any intuitive sense. This
282 Phillip Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (New York, Aspen Publishers, 2000) 106- 
107.
283 This implies that price is equal to marginal cost. It is the point at which consumer and producer 
surplus are maximised.
284 Brodley (1987) 1025, 1027.
285 Simon Bishop and Mike Walker, The Economics o f  EC Competition Law: Concept, Application, 
and Measurement (2nd ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2002) 25.
286 Accrding to Black, to say that a person is better or worse off is to say that his utility increases or 
decreases and that utilities are commonly understood to be numerical values o f a utility function that 
represents a person’s preference, and his preference to be revealed in the choice he makes. Total 
welfare theorists also believe that welfare and its maximisation do not have independent meanings.
See Black (2005) 35-39.
287 Ibid 36.
288 Ibid, 38. This position can however be contrasted with arguments which seem to link total welfare 
to utilitarianism. See e.g. Richard Posner, “Utilitarianism, Economics and Legal Theory” (1979)
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means that the cognitive argument for total welfare is not expansive enough as it is 
unlikely to cover utilitarian ideals even if it is conceptually possible to achieve 
utilitarian goals through total welfare.
Suppose we concede that the interpretation of welfare is to be limited to its economic 
meaning, total welfare still fails this narrower threshold as its strict focus on 
efficiency renders it inadequate in analysing economic welfare. This is because the 
issue of economic welfare has been shown to include not only efficiency concerns 
but also distribution concerns. It also fails because it tends to relate benefits and 
burdens strictly to price.289 Thus, in relation to the scope of wellbeing, it can be 
conveniently concluded that the total welfare standard fails to meet the person- 
centred requirement.
With regards to requirement i(b) which is about the broadness of the term “persons”, 
it is arguable that total welfare model is somewhat broad. This possibility stems from 
the fact that it requires neutrality in antitrust analysis. In other words, there must be a 
clear attempt to desist from making value judgement between consumers and 
producers.290 This is in fact the primary function of allocative efficiency which is that 
it is impossible to make any normative statement about the preferability of an 
efficient allocation A l, based upon distribution D1, compared to an efficient 
allocation A2, based upon another distribution, D2. In some sense, broadness is 
attained since the scope of persons who benefit from the resource distribution is not 
determined ex ante. This means that different interests (in this context, consumers 
and producers) are well within the definition of “persons” all of whom will benefit 
(either directly or indirectly) from the net welfare effect. There are however strong 
reasons to suggest that the promise of neutrality is a facade and that in fact, the total 
welfare approach which often advocates minimalist interference is primarily geared 
towards producer surplus because of its blindness to distributive injustice291 and as 
such follows a narrow meaning of “persons”. This likelihood remains strong despite
Journal o f  Legal Studies 103-140; “The Value o f Wealth: A Comment on Dworkin and Kronman” 
(1980) 9(2) Journal o f  Legal Studies 243.
289 This is the case when analysis is done through the price theory in general and more specifically on 
wealth maximisation.
290 Bishop and Walker (2002) 24.
291 Robin Boadway and Neil Bruce, Welfare Economics (Oxford, Blackwell, 1984) 62 fii 22; Allen 
Buchanan, Ethics, efficiency and the Market (Totowa, Rowman & Allanheld, 1985) 9.
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contrived explanations that consumers also benefit through their shareholdings.292 
Moreover, even if the total welfare standard is value neutral, its broadness cannot go 
far enough because of the exclusive focus on price and efficiency.
On Requirement ii which is that “plural interests” should be understood as different 
interests held by different persons, the total welfare model fails as it is unconcerned 
about the interests of persons; where in a particular instance, a person’s interest is 
recognised, it is merely derivative of the primary focus on efficiency. Thus, built on 
the Kaldor-Hicks or wealth maximisation principle, this model can be primarily 
faulted on the ground that it allows for a range of uncompensated redistribution 
between individuals and undertakings293 because the broad range of interests are 
totally ignored.294
Regarding requirement iii which is that plural interests should mean different 
interests held by a single antitrust subject or those held by a group of antitrust 
subjects, the total welfare model fails because of its strict focus on the idea of 
rational choice. This theory builds the notion of an “economic man” who focuses 
solely on utility. Conceived in terms of price, a person’s interest has to be explained 
through the homogeneous price-related proxy.
On requirement iv which is that focus should be on real interests held by persons 
rather than the idea of interest which specific schools of thought tend to attribute to 
persons, total welfare school is flawed because of its foundation in rational choice 
theory. Even where it advocates consumer welfare, this approach fails as well
295because it is based on the idea of the consumer rather than on real consumers.
Hence, unlike the idea of “homo economicus”, contemporary approaches have 
shown through empirical studies that real persons do not engage in unbounded
292 Bork (1978).
293 See Tibor Scitovsky, “A Note on Welfare Propositions in Economics” (1941) 9 Review o f  
Economics Studies 77.
294 Those who argue from the standpoint o f liberal right also sense the deficiency of the efficiency 
thoughts because where ideas of liberal rights are prevalent, society is not allowed to balance the 
positive effect on one person with negative effects on others as each person is allowed to decide 
according to his or her own preferences. See Amartya Sen “The Impossibility o f the Paretian Liberal” 
(1970) 78 Journal o f  Political Economy 152. Such right should be protected even if the well-being of 
others or the total welfare is reduced. See Wolfgang Kerber, “Should Competition Law Promote 
Efficiency? Some Reflections o f an Economist on the Normative Foundations o f Competition Law” in 
Josef Drexl, Laurence Idot, and Joel Moneger (eds), Economic Theory and Competition Law 
(Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2008) 105.
295 Eleanor Fox, “An Antitrust Fable -  A Tale o f Predation” Concurrence, No 3-2008, 1.
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pursuit o f self-interest; their interests are more diverse and must be recognised as 
such296
Concerning requirement v which is that interests of a person cannot be 
predetermined through a universal preferential ranking, total welfare fails because it 
seeks ex ante consistency of choice through the idea of rationality by mechanically 
seeking any state that is allocatively efficient in the relevant market over and above 
any other state.
In conclusion, the total welfare approach fails irredeemably as the sole proxy for 
antitrust analysis under the person-centred approach.
4.3.2 Wealth Transfer
From the total welfare point of view, antitrust assessments should be strictly based 
on efficiency concerns as we are bound to face problems if we give attention to 
heterogeneous factors. The concerns it generates, to them, can be avoided by 
focusing on the single goal of efficiency. The success and popularity of the 
efficiency thoughts was aided by the perceived lack of sophistication in antitrust at 
the time. However, as noted by the wealth transfer school, the lack of sophistication 
that attended antitrust analysis before the Chicago revolution was not solely based on 
the fact that antitrust regimes pursued more than one goal. Antitrust could still be 
rational with more than one goal.297 In other words, they argued that having more 
than one goal in antitrust and having a rational antitrust regime are not mutually 
exclusive ideals. Based on this finding, it thus became necessary to assess the 
validity of the total welfare standard in its own right rather than strengthening the 
efficiency argument primarily by reference to some “unsophisticated” alternatives. 
As such, it was necessary to assess the total welfare standard (which is solely 
premised on efficiency) with well though-out theory of antitrust which 
accommodated more than one goal. This revelation triggered the debate between sole 
efficiency goal and antitrust goals that included not only efficiency but also wealth
296 E.g. see below behavioural law and economics.
297 Robert Lande, “Chicago’s False Foundation: Wealth Transfer (Not Just Efficiency) Should Guide 
Antitrust” 58 Antitrust Law Journal 631.
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298transfer. The efficiency model was thus said to be particularly faulty as it failed to 
address distributional issues thereby disparaging the interests of those whom it 
should ordinarily protect. Even though efficiency proponents will recognise that 
redistributions which arise not as a result of better performance, but through 
restraints of competition and market power should be prevented, they argue 
notwithstanding that legal rules and regulation should focus only on efficiency 
effects. Distributional concerns, they say, should be dealt with through means such as 
taxation and social policy.299
The wealth transfer model seeks to protect consumers and as such seems to be the 
approach more deserving of the often misused phrase of consumer welfare. 
Proponents of this approach argue that competition law and policy should aim at 
enhancing consumer welfare by preventing or correcting the transfer from consumers 
to businesses. This model is based on the reasoning that antitrust law and policy has 
to be regarded as arising out of repeated interaction and coordination between two 
large interest groups the result of which leads to a political bargaining between 
consumers and producers.300 This background presupposes that the selection of 
competition policy objectives has to be regarded as a result of the bargaining process. 
Thus, if one takes it as axiomatic that consumers usually have a weaker position in 
the process of bargaining, lobbying and litigation, then a pro-consumer policy 
objective seem justified as the resulting wealth transfer standard can be seen
•  TO 1somewhat like a “rebalancing” measure.
As a result of its focus on the benefits to consumers, the wealth transfer standard 
does not accept instances where an undertaking’s practice generates allocative 
efficiency benefits while reducing consumer surplus302 as this undermines consumer 
confidence. According to proponents of this standard, it (as opposed to the total
298 Ibid, 649.
299 See e.g. Louis Kaplow, On the Choice o f Welfare Standard in Competition Law in Zimmer (ed) 3- 
26; Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell “Why the Legal System is Less Efficient than the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income” (1994) 23 Journal o f  Legal Studies 667-681.
300 Jonathan Baker “Competition Policy as a Political Bargain” American Antitrust Institute Working 
Paper No. 05-02 (16 January 2005) 2.
301 Kati Cseres, “Controversies o f the Consumer Welfare Model” (2006) 3 Competition Law Review 
121,127-128.
302 Consumer surplus is the difference between consumer reservation price for a commodity and the 
price they actually pay for it.
105
welfare which is not compatible with the Pareto criterion because it allows for 
redistribution between consumers and producers in the balancing of positive and 
negative effect between different persons)303 can be derived from the Pareto criterion 
because it stipulates that no one should be worse off. For instance, the criterion that 
consumer surplus should not be reduced can be seen as an application of the Pareto 
criterion.304
There are different variants of the wealth transfer standard. One of it is the consumer 
interest standard which emphasises the role of price, service quality and choice in 
welfare analysis.305 Its primary focus is on the impact of business behaviour on end 
users. The competitive effect to be considered could either be direct or indirect as the 
consequences are transmitted down the distribution chain.306
There is some measure of broadness in this approach especially when one compares 
it with the total welfare standard.307 However, testing the wealth transfer standard 
against requirement i(a) which calls for a plural understanding of the concept of 
welfare, it becomes evident that this standard is not quite as broad since it is still 
addressed through price. For requirement i(b) which is about the broadness of the 
term “persons”, the wealth transfer model can be particularly faulted because of its 
bias for consumers rather than focusing on persons as a whole. Instances abound 
where the assertion that consumers are generally in a weaker position can be shown 
to be incorrect particularly in highly competitive markets where there is a high 
potential for consumerism. With regards to requirement ii which is that “plural 
interests” should be understood as different interests held by different persons, it is 
likely that the wealth transfer account would fail; one just needs to consider the
303 This balancing activity is incompatible with Pareto because the Pareto criterion assumes that no 
interpersonal comparison o f utility is possible between different persons. As such, there is no way to 
balance different interests. In effect, total welfare cannot be derived from the Pareto criterion and 
neither can it be derived from the goal o f allocative efficiency. See Kerber (2008) 105.
304 Ibid
305 Eugene Buttigieg, Competition Law: Safeguarding the Consumer Interest (Alphen aan den Rijn, 
Kluwer Law International, 2009) 1.
306 ibid
307 Consumer welfare can be said to be broader than total welfare if  one considers that the former 
accommodates redistribution goals together with efficiency claims. It should however be noted that 
total welfare can be considered to be broader in certain respect particularly when assessing antitrust 
subjects. See Emanuela Arezzo, “Is there a Role for Market Definition and Dominance in an Effect- 
based Approach?” in Mark-Oliver Mackenrodt, Beatriz Conde Gallego, Stefan Enchelmaier (eds) 
Abuse o f  Dominant Position: New Interpretation, New Enforcement Mechanisms? (London, Springer, 
2008) 43.
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reasoning of the General Court in Glaxo (where it merely took into account the 
interest of consumers and failed to recognise the interest of pharmaceuticals to 
prevent arbitrage practices) in order to appreciate this possibility. Concerning 
requirement iii which is that plural interests should mean different interests held by 
either a single antitrust subject or those held by a group of antitrust subjects, this 
approach fails because consumers’ interests could be over and above price-related 
concerns. Finally, on requirement v which is that interests of a person cannot be 
predetermined through a universal preferential ranking, this approach fails because it 
is premised on an assumed political bargain between consumers and producers 
whereby the latter have the upper hand. Thus, in contradiction to the requirement 
against ex ante preferential ranking, wealth transfer standard presupposes that in 
order to redistribute, the interests of consumers would always be ranked over and 
above other interests.
Conclusively, though the wealth transfer standard signals an improvement and hence 
relatively superior to the total welfare approach in terms of broadness, it is still 
seriously inadequate in terms of the broadness required under the person-centred 
approach.
4.3.3 Consumer choice
The consumer choice approach is quite similar to the consumer interest approach and 
consequently the wealth transfer standard. However, the former seem to develop 
further the need to address non-price competition. The primary objection of the 
consumer choice approach, as identified by Averitt and Lande, is that price theory 
based antitrust law and policies are unable to handle important issues of non-price 
competition.308 This is despite the fact that institutions applying the price theory 
often attempt to address non-price issues indirectly. The scholars argue that these 
institutions often seek to achieve this by folding the non-price objectives into the 
price analysis in the form of quality adjusted prices, or by assuming that markets that 
are price competitive will also be competitive for non-price preferences. This 
notwithstanding, proponents of the consumer choice approach contend that such
308 Neil Averitt and Robert Lande, “Using the 'Consumer Choice' Approach to Antitrust Law” (2007) 
74 Antitrust Law Journal 175.
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indirect consideration of non-price issues is rather awkward and, as such, should not 
be encouraged.
Under the consumer choice approach, antitrust law protects a competitive array of 
options in the marketplace, undiminished by artificial restrictions. Proponents of this 
approach suggest that the role of antitrust should be broadly conceived as protecting 
all the types of options that are significantly important to consumers. These options, 
they argue, are not limited to price but also innovation, quality and other forms of 
non-price competition. As such, antitrust violation should be understood as activities 
that unreasonably restrict the totality of price and non-price choices that would have 
been otherwise available.309 Thus, what this approach does is to prohibit business 
conducts that harmfully and significantly limit the range of choices that the free 
market, absent the restraints being challenged, would have provided.
The consumer choice approach is broader than both the total welfare and wealth 
transfer models as it furthers the allocative, productive and dynamic efficiency
O 1 A
goals as well as the (wealth transfer model’s) consumer effect. It goes beyond the 
total welfare311 and wealth transfer model because, coupled with its focus on choice, 
it places true emphasis on innovation.312 This perspective on antitrust is of great 
value as there is a widespread undisputed empirical fact that technological progress
o I o
is the most important determinant of long term economic growth.
In line with the consumer choice theory, evolutional innovation economists argue 
that competition policy should take due account of dynamic factors.314 This is
309 Ibid, 182.
310 Ibid, 186-187.
311 It is thought that this model gives only limited attention to the factors o f innovation. Rather, 
efficiency defences are almost always cast in terms o f whether the practice will lower costs. As such, 
whether the practice might raise or lower the rate o f innovation in products is usually only an 
afterthought. See Michael Porter, “Competition and Antitrust: Towards a Productivity-Based 
approach to Evaluating Mergers and Joint Ventures” (2001) 46 Antitrust Bulletin 919, 958.
312 Ibid, 187. Orbach asserts that thinkers such as Bork underestimated the significance o f law to 
innovation and overestimated the significance o f  consumer preferences. See Orbach (2010) 23.
313 See Kerber (2008) 98. Orbach confirms that at present, it has been established that “legal regimes 
affect innovation and that the rate o f innovation is affected by many variables and strategic decisions” 
such that “consumer choice and preferences constitute only a subset o f variables in this vector.” 
Orbach (2010) 23.
314 On competition as a dynamic process o f innovation and imitation, see John Clark, Competition as a 
Dynamic Process (Washington, the Brookings Institution, 1961). It could also be seen as a 
knowledge-generating process o f parallel experimentation. See Friedrich Hayek “Competition as a 
Discovery Procedure” in Friedrich Hayek (ed) New Studies in Philosophy, Politics, Economics and 
the History o f  Ideas (Chicago, University o f Chicago Press, 1978) 179.
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because in a dynamic competitive environment, businesses compete not only on the 
basis of price, but also by carrying out R&D. Hence, businesses are encouraged to 
innovate where they are able to supply products which no other firm is able to 
supply.315 There is empirical evidence to support this claim.316 The strive for 
productivity in the midst of competitors means that a firm will take steps to develop 
new products, services and technologies at the lowest possible cost. The welfare 
benefit deriving from this sort of efficiency is that consumers are spoilt with choices 
and they can get better products at a lower price. However, the benefits to both the 
firm and the consumers may be lost if the value of dynamic efficiency is not 
recognised. Schumpeter regarded competition as a process of “creative destruction” 
in which innovative activities led to new markets, new industries and the death of old 
markets and industries. On this basis therefore, unless competition policy recognises 
its value, dynamic efficiency may be constrained as undertakings are not likely to 
invest if there is little or no expected profit from bringing a new product onto the 
market.
It appears that the consumer choice approach fails on account of broadness just as the 
wealth transfer standard notwithstanding its relative improvements. Thus, even 
though it promotes vividly that a wide range of choice be considered, the idea of 
choice is still narrowed to consumers317 instead of antitrust subjects in general. 
Moreover, one could sense that the big claims regarding the need to focus on non­
price analysis might not have much practical impact as the consumer choice 
approach appears to be rather too subtle on price theory. As such, institutions 
applying it may be ready to sacrifice non-price based choices. For instance, it may 
accommodate diminutions in choices on the ground that antitrust law does not
« # - i i o
require that the number of options be maximised.
315 Bishop and Walker (2002) 36.
316 See Sanghoon Ahn “Competition, Innovation and Productivity Growth: A Review o f Theory and 
Evidence” (January 17, 2002). OECD Economics Working Paper No. 317.
317 Under this model, consumers are normally ultimate consumers as well as entities engaged in 
purchase transactions, including corporations buying intermediate industrial goods. See Averitt & 
Lande(2007) 183.
318 Ibid 184.
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4.3.4 Behavioural Law and Economics
According to the behavioural law and economics school, the goals of antitrust and 
the ideal methodologies for analysing business conducts can only be correctly 
determined if we model antitrust law and policy on actual human behaviour and not 
on the idea of economic man. Thus, rather than analysing competition issues on the 
basis of false, narrow and strict conception of the individual (such as those based on 
the rational choice theory), the behavioural law and economics model moves away 
from the remits of rationality by arguing specifically against it. The central position 
of this school is that our actions, reaction and expectations concerning specific 
market behaviours are unlikely to follow a set rational pattern as there are always 
biases and errors that lead to predictable irrational behaviours.319
Arguing against the traditional assumption regarding the consistency of human 
rationality, the behavioural law and economics school seeks to establish that humans 
can be irrational with regard to their market behaviour. They support this conclusion 
with insights from psychology. Their finding thus is that humans are largely 
boundedly rational. In essence, we should not expect a consistent pattern of choice 
between different or even the same individual as people are at different times 
influenced by different factors and sentiments. For example, most persons do have 
limited cognitive resources and are often affected by emotions and motivations such 
that they are influenced to take a course of action or react in a particular way, for 
instance, because of the ease at which they could recall a particular related
• • • • • 320consequence or event rather than engaging in objective and rational analysis.
With regards to the impact of behavioural economics on the nature of antitrust 
analysis, it means that there is need to be suspicious of the idea of rationality. One 
should thus proceed from the understanding that since in real fact, humans do not 
always reason correctly in terms of maximising their welfare (regardless of the 
standard of welfare they consider ideal), we have to modify the assumptions of 
antitrust so that we can successfully tackle anti-competition concerns. From this 
perspective, there is a suspicion that the likelihood of type I and type II errors are rife
319 See Gregory Mitchell, “Why Law and Economics’ Perfect Rationality should not be Traded for the 
Behavioural Law and Economics Equal Incompetence” (2002) FSU College o f Law, Public Law 
Research Paper No. 49.
320 This is called availability heuristics in behavioural psychology.
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where market behaviours are assessed on the basis of rational choice. As such, by 
taking into account real behaviours and reactions of relevant antitrust subjects, we 
can provide a better description of market dynamic and thus more effective 
prescriptions for competition policy.321
This approach (in general and its application in competition law in particular) is still 
developing. Notwithstanding, there are clear signs on how it can promote broadness. 
To showcase how the behavioural thought generates vast thinking and consequently 
accommodates broad reasoning, we just need to take a look at the four conceptions of 
competition arising from four assumptions of the relative rationality of firms and 
consumers as analysed by Stucke.322 He gave four exhaustive analyses in four 
different scenarios. First, he identifies the ideal way of analysing antitrust issues 
where both the firms and consumers are rational. Second is where rational businesses 
interact with boundedly rational consumers. Third is where boundedly rational firms 
interact with rational consumers and finally, where boundedly rational firms interact 
with boundedly rational consumers.
It must however be noted that its likely value to the idea of broadness 
notwithstanding, it is still difficult at this stage to fully assess the extent to which the 
behavioural law and economics approach could be broadened beyond the realms of 
economic thought. There is however a likelihood that this approach might fail as it 
appears that its value is limited to the operational concerns; broadness is achieved not 
in terms of policy considerations but when assessing the economic impact of firms’ 
behaviour.
4.3.5 General Equilibrium and Public Policy
Based on economic and non-economic reasoning, arguments have been made that 
antitrust regimes should look beyond the welfare theories addressed so far. This line 
of thought advocates in general that some broader effects aside from the traditional 
efficiency and freedom-based considerations can be applicable in antitrust. This 
category of thought can be sub-grouped into economic and non-economic aspects.
321 Avishalom Tor, “A Behavioural Approach to Antitrust Law and Economics” (2004) 14 Consumer 
Policy Review.
322 Maurice Stucke, “What is the Goals o f  Competition Law” in Zimmer (ed) 27-52.
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Economic justification for this broader scope is based on the general equilibrium 
theory (otherwise referred to as the theory of second best) while the non-economic 
justification has been premised on public interest.
To neatly establish the economic justification, it is important to appreciate the 
difference between the partial equilibrium theory and the general equilibrium theory 
and to show how they affect antitrust analysis. The partial equilibrium analysis 
focuses on a subset of the economy which is often referred to as the “relevant 
market”. This is the basis upon which the hitherto addressed welfare standards are
323based. On the other hand, the general equilibrium approach looks at the market as 
a whole. For example, here, the requirement of allocative efficiency will be that the 
model of perfect competition is fulfilled by all markets such that the decentralised 
optimising behaviour of all agents will lead to an efficient allocation throughout the 
entire economy. For instance, the market could meet the Pareto criterion without the 
necessity of state intervention. It is expected that the market aligns with the 
assumption of perfect competition and desists from deviation otherwise it would lead 
to some kind of allocative inefficiency.
Under the second best theory, competitive equilibria are Pareto efficient. However, 
rather than seeking to achieve this state by solving market failures in isolated 
markets, it is believed that efficiency of market equilibria is an all-or-nothing 
proposition.324 As such, unless all conditions can be satisfied in a market, there is no 
guarantee that remedying separate market failures will improve efficiency. It is thus 
expected that in assessing the Pareto state (allocative efficiency) in the market in 
question, due account should be taken of the impact of such behaviour on other 
markets.325 We therefore need not restrict our analysis to an isolated market. Where 
there are substantial gains to other markets, it could for instance mean that such
• • 326behaviour is considered to be outside the purview of typical competition concerns.
323 Orbach (2010) 6.
324 Richard Lipsey and Kelvin Lancaster, "The General Theory o f Second Best" (1955-56) 24 Review 
o f Economic Studies 11-32.
325 Town ley gives an example o f liner-shipping conferences who engage in horizontal price-fixing. 
See Christopher Townley, Article 81 and Public Policy (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, Hart 
Publishing, 2009) 186.
326 This is regarded as highly controversial. However, Hammer favours this form o f reasoning 
particularly for intra-market second-best trade-off. To him, this trade-off analysis is geared towards 
ascertaining whether “competition” is either workable or desirable.
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It appears that this reasoning was applied in CECEl)327 where the Commission 
exempted an agreement between virtually all the European importers and 
manufacturers of domestic washing machines to stop importing or producing the 
least energy-efficient machines, thereby reducing the pollution emissions from power 
generation. The Commission was convinced that the environmental benefits for 
society trumped the likely increase in cost arising from the allocatively inefficient 
arrangement in the isolated market.328
Frontline antitrust theorists acknowledge the fundamental basis for the general 
equilibrium approach. For example, Bork acknowledged that “an expansion of output 
through increased efficiency would appear as pure gain in the consumer welfare 
model but might impose other welfare losses upon the society.” However, they are 
quick to discount its relevance by arguing that the problem which one might seek to 
solve through antitrust should better be left for legislatures and reflected upon in 
specialised legislation. The reasoning is that the approach would require us to trade­
off values which cannot properly form the stuff of antitrust litigation.330 Hovenkamp 
stated unequivocally that the “[p]roblems of second-best may be so overwhelming 
and so hypothetical that the antitrust policymaker is well off to avoid them.”331 One 
could disagree with the general equilibrium theory but one thing that remains is that 
its foundation is far from completely flawed. As such, rather than concerning 
ourselves with the perspectival positions of peculiar theories, the person-centred 
approach to antitrust simply requires us to assess the theory in light of the broadness 
requirement.
Set against the broadness requirement of the person-centred approach, the general 
equilibrium theory fails on similar grounds as the other welfare standards; despite the 
fact that it makes considerable progress by broadening the markets that could be 
considered in a single antitrust issue by internalising externalities in other markets, it 
does not escape one particular shortcoming of the above-explained theories. The
327 OJ 2000 Ll 87/47.
328 Note Guidelines on Article 81(3).
329 Bork (1978) 114-115.
330 Ibid, 115.
331 Herbert Hovenkamp, “Antitrust Policy After Chicago” (1985) 84 Michigan Law Review 213, 241.
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fundamental flaw which is still transferred to this theory is that antitrust issues are 
addressed through narrow proxies such as price and consumer choice.332
Regarding the non-economic arguments, antitrust institutions are meant to consider
public policy issues. It is possible that a standard welfare approach has public policy
implications such as the increase of competitiveness and consequently, substantial
growth and development.333 It could also stimulate the growth of technological
capabilities and exports.334 These likely public policy effects notwithstanding,
proponents of public policy are making bolder claims. One of such claims is that it is
not enough that these welfare standards can be used to promote different public 
•  •  •policy objectives as there are many other public policy objectives that these 
standards ignore.336
Attempting to showcase the need for the inclusion of public policy considerations in 
antitrust, Townley weighs the pros and cons of a regime that, on the one hand, 
excludes public policy considerations and another which forges a compromise 
between whatever welfare standard that is chosen and public policy objectives. He 
shows preference for the regime that considers public policy goals as long as such
• 338goals are rational, transparent and open and are determined in advance. Also, 
Monti argues that competition policy can never be isolated completely from other 
public policy choices relevant to democratic societies by making due references to 
EU provisions and cases.339
The general idea that public policy concerns should be considered on their own terms 
(as a non-economic objective) rather than strictly perceiving public policy benefits 
through economic indicators such as price and choice seem laudable.340 It is however
332 For example the CECED case. See below text surrounding note 280 above.
333 UNCTAD’s submission to OECD (2003); Townley (2009) 21.
334 UNCTAD document TD/B/COM.2.EM/10/Rev 14.
335 Either by internalising the policy area which would otherwise be external or by incorporating 
external considerations based on public policy such as the promotion o f small and medium-sized 
enterprises.
336 Townley (2009) 23; Charles Pearson, Economics and the Global Environment (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2000) ch 2, 3; Robert Nadeaus, The Wealth o f  Nature (New York, 
Columbia University Press, 2003).
337 Townley (2009) 30-41.
338 Ibid, 42.
339 Giorgio Monti, “Article 81 EC and Public Policy” (2002) CMLRev 1065.
340 Townley gives an interesting example. He queried that when evaluating the concept o f “better o ff ’ 
under the total welfare standard, would one encourage an agreement between manufacturers that
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difficult to assess it against the requirement of broadness primarily because open- 
textured, non-economic indicators of public policy lack conceptual foundation. The 
lack of theoretical underpinning for public policy in antitrust cases has over the years 
been the point of attack by the economic welfare scholars. Thus, even though some 
of the outcome deriving from the application of public policy goals may be the same 
as outcomes that derive from the person-centred analysis, we may still struggle to 
justify reasoning based on public policy as it fails to give a substantial theoretical 
reason as to why we should consider such non-economic concerns through antitrust 
rules and not through something else. On the other hand, the person-centred 
approach would argue for any such public policy consideration primarily because 
antitrust subjects who are interested in a peculiar public policy outcome should be 
included alongside others in our antitrust analysis on the account of “justice as 
inclusiveness”.
4.3.6 Economic Freedom
Quite different from the theories on antitrust law and policy discussed above, the 
theory of economic freedom, which is built on the ordoliberal ideology, takes as 
fundamental, the political choices of individuals which create the basic structures of 
an economic system.341 This thought was fostered during the Nazi era by some 
scholars at the University of Freiburg. The ordoliberals developed this concept as a 
wholesome political and economic philosophy aimed at preventing the accumulation
•  949of power which, if unrestricted, is often misused.
To the ordoliberals, the idea of choice is reflected through an economic constitution 
which contains “a comprehensive decision concerning the nature and form of the 
process of socio-economic cooperation.”343 For the choice of an economic 
constitution to be effective, the legal system should be structured to implement the 
constitutional choice. Thus, where the economic constitution calls for a transaction
would increase their total surplus by 1 million Euros, if  this were to immediately lead to an irreparable 
poisoning o f all drinking water?
341 Gerber (1998) 246.
342 David Gerber, “Constitutionalizing the Economy: German Neo-Liberalism Competition Law and 
the ‘New’ Europe” (1994) American Journal o f  Comparative Law 25-84, 29.
343 Bohm, referred to in Gerber (1998) 246.
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economy, the policy framework344 demands that the legal system should be 
configured so as to create and maintain the conditions of complete competition 
which would allow that type of economic system to function most effectively. 
According to this ideology, it is thus required that the economic knowledge behind 
the constitution should be translated into normative language.345 For instance, if an 
ordoliberal framework is to be effective, it must be built on the legal conception of 
economic freedom -  that is, the members of the community must have willingly 
supported it and actively co-operated in implementing it.
Since the policy framework requires that there should be a complete state of 
competition in order to reflect choices and also to ensure that the right of individuals 
are protected, the goal of competition law, according to this school, should be the 
fostering of economic freedom. This is achieved by focusing on the problem of 
economic power346 because such power threatens the competitive process and thus 
individual rights. The elimination or prevention of this harmful effect, proponents 
argue, should be the primary function of competition law. In other words, so as to 
prevent this economic power from turning into political power, it is essential to 
protect individual economic freedom. Hence, competition is necessary for economic 
wellbeing and economic freedom is necessary for political freedom.347 In effect, 
competition law is meant to enhance and promote economic freedom of the 
individual348 in the interest of a free and fair political and social order349 which will 
ultimately ensure that the society remains humane.350
It is noteworthy that ordoliberals accept the use of economics as they seek to 
combine open market and individual freedom with social justice. Even though it is 
clearly linked to the open market, the theory is based on humanist rather than
344 Ordungspolitik (order-based policy).
345 Bohm, in Gerber (1998) 247.
346 Ibid 251.
347 Werhard Moschel, “Competition Policy from an Ordo Point o f view”, in Hans Willgerodt & Alan 
Peacock (ed), German Neo-liberals and the Social Market Economy (London, Macmillan, 1989) 142.
348 Milton Friedman and Rose Friedman, Free to Choose: A Personal Statement (New York, Harcourt 
Brace Jovanovich, 1980). See also Hayek (1978) 179-190.
349M5schel (1989) 146.
350 Willibrord Eiichen, Grundsatz der Wirtschaftspolitik (Tubingen, Mohr/Seibeck, 1952) 290 referred 
to in Liza Gormsen, “The Conflict Between Economic Freedom and Consumer Welfare in the 
Modernisation o f Article 82 EC” (2007) European Competition Journal, 333 n 22.
351 See Gormsen (2007) 334.
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efficiency considerations such that efficiency thoughts are to take a mere 
subordinated role in developing a free order.352
There is an obvious similarity between the economic freedom theory and the person- 
centred approach to antitrust, to wit, its conceptual bottom-up nature. It however 
appears that this seeming connecting point is inconsequential especially after one 
analyses the concept in the light of the broadness requirements. On requirement i(a) 
which calls for a plural understanding of the concept of welfare, it is pertinent to 
assess whether the interests conceived under the economic freedom theory evinces 
adequate plurality. According to this theory, save for limited cases,353 wellbeing (that 
is, political and economic freedom) is achieved only if the competitive process is 
maintained. There is no gainsaying that this is too narrow to be accepted. For 
example, it can be clearly noted from the Glaxo case that even though an export ban 
could be said to be injurious to the competitive structure, the finding of anti­
competitive practices in specific cases need not be limited to this market structure. It 
is quite possible thus that the denting of the competitive structure could be acceptable 
where, for instance, we consider the well-being of the alleged infringer (in this case, 
the pharmaceuticals). Thus, as was identified in Glaxo, it would not be out of place 
to consider other factors such as: distortive effect on competition brought about by 
the existence of national price regulation; the importance of innovation as a driver of 
competition; the very high cost of innovation; and the need to recover R&D costs.354 
Hence, we might find that it is important to give detailed attention to the efficiency 
gains.
On requirement i(b) which is about the broadness of the term “persons”, economic 
freedom theory does consider the idea of “person” to be relatively wide -  it looks 
beyond a section such as consumer and focuses on individuals in general. 
Nonetheless, it is not adequate for the person-centred approach because it does not 
include every form of persons that are generally referred to as antitrust subjects under 
the person-centred approach.355 Further, this school of thought does not particularly 
fulfil other broadness requirements as well. For instance, contrary to requirement iv
352 Ibid, 333.
353 Such as cases where natural monopolies are expected because the market could not sustain more 
than one enterprise, i.e. utilities. See Gerber (1998) 251-252.
354 As recognised by the Court of Justice in Glaxo.
355 In the interest o f brevity, it is not necessary to address the remaining requirement since it already 
fails the first two.
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which is that focus should be placed on the real interests held by persons rather than 
the idea of interest which specific schools of thought seem to attribute to person, 
ordoliberal ideology tends to make assumptions of what individuals would prefer and 
choose to include in their economic constitution (that is, a competitive structure) 
rather than focusing on their real interests which might, in a particular instance, be 
strictly price-based.
4.4 Eclectic Platform for Antitrust
At this point, it is evident that the theories on antitrust addressed so far do not 
individually fulfil the person-centred approach’s requirement of broadness. It appears 
thus that a broad enough platform for antitrust must “combine elements of the 
different theories in a way that avoids the objection to each.”356 The eclecticism 
required, Black notes, is no embarrassment. This is because the act of combining 
theories “reflects the fact that we have disparate intuitions about welfare”. Hence, 
since interests and intuitions may not only be disparate but mutually contradictory, 
each theory will be inadequate as competing interests “cannot all be accommodated 
in a single acceptable theory.”357 With an eclectic approach however, we can 
adequately address interests by maintaining those interests as choices where in 
individual cases, “[t]he choice is between pursuit of a reflective equilibrium between 
intuition and theory, with some intuitions being rejected in the interest of meeting 
theoretical [and practical] constraints, and admission of more than one concept or
■ICO
conception of welfare”
In search for this reflective equilibrium and eclecticism, three approaches are tested 
against the broadness required in the person-centred approach. First are the 
philosophical theories on welfare, second is the differentiated normative approach 
while the third is the capability approach.
356 Black (2005) 47.
357 Ibid.
358 Ibid.
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4.4.1 Philosophy
It is possible to conceive a philosophical definition of welfare/wellbeing that should 
be sought in antitrust. A definition that appears to be sufficiently broad is provided 
by Black. He says that an intuitive understanding of a person’s welfare is simply 
what makes his life go well for him.359 However, we are never really able to ascertain 
the broadness of this abstractive definition until we assess philosophical positions on 
the intuitive meaning of wellbeing. Black identifies two theoretical positions on what 
is meant by wellbeing: the subjective/positive and the objective/normative.360
Theories based on the subjective/positive idea of welfare identify welfare with one or 
more mental states. These theories are usually hedonistic361 and are also based on 
proxies such as satisfaction, choice, preference or desire.362 Satisfaction theories have 
their value. For instance, it is widely believed that they allow empirical tests of 
welfare and avoid paternalism.363 More particularly as it might impact on antitrust, 
this perspective is favoured by those economists who view allocative efficiency as a 
test rather than as a definition of the maximisation of welfare.364 However, in terms 
of broadness, these satisfaction theories can be faulted; they either do not fully 
represent what amounts to wellbeing, or they might even consider things that do not 
necessarily impact on wellbeing. As such, subjective/positive theories have been 
criticised as inadequate in substantiating welfare. Thus, a possible conclusion is 
that this perspective cannot provide the eclecticism required by the person-centred 
approach. For instance, it is often strongly argued that welfare depends not only on 
one’s mental state but on whether they are veridical;366 satisfaction theories are built
359 Ibid, 34.
360 Ibid, 40. For a classification of welfare, see Mozaffar Qizilbash, “Wellbeing and Despair: Dante’s 
Ugolino”(1997) 9 Utilitas; Thomas Scanlon, “Value Desire and Quality o f Life” in Martha Nussbaum 
and Amartya Sen (eds) Quality o f  Life (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1993) 186; Amartya Sen, Choice, 
Welfare and Measurement (Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press, 1982) 29-30.
361 They are usually identified with states such as happiness, pleasure, comfort, contentment, 
enjoyments etc. See Black (2005) 40. For the downsides to this approach see Black ibid, 41.
362 It is hereinafter referred to as satisfaction theories.
363 See Black (2005) 42; Boadway and Bruce (1984) 8, 11, 31-32, 39, Tibor Scitovsky, The Joyless 
Economy: The Psychology o f  Human Satisfaction (revised edn, New York, Oxford University Press, 
1992) 4-5.
364 See Arthur Pigou, The Economics o f  Welfare (New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers, 2002) 10 
ff.
365 For details, see Black (2005) 42.
366 Alan Gibbard, “Interpersonal Comparisons: Preference, Good and the Intrinsic Reward o f a Life” 
in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland (eds), Foundation o f  Social Choice Theory (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 1989) 169; Robert Nozick, Anarchy, State and Utopia (Oxford, Blackwell, 1974) 
42-45.
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solely on mental state and as such their outcomes do not really reflect the plurality of 
interests. For example, it is argued that such theories give counter-intuitive results 
which make such theories hard to reconcile with theories of distributive justice.367 In 
the same vein, satisfaction theories are said to produce odd results which are difficult 
to reconcile with distributive justice in the case of adaptive, unduly demanding or 
anti-social desires.368
The difficulty of developing a general theory of welfare through the 
subjective/positive philosophical approach makes it imperative that we consider the 
objective/normative. In this context, the satisfaction theory is refined so that a 
person’s welfare consists in the satisfaction not of any desires he happens to have, 
but of the desires he would have under certain favourable conditions. This condition 
could, for example, be that he is perfectly rational and fully informed. Also, the 
desire could be set against the threshold of an idealised subject. It has been said that 
this philosophical approach avoids some of the objections of the subjective/positive 
approach. There are however credible objections which suggest that the revised 
theory is equally inappropriate for expounding on welfare.370 The major drawback of 
this arrangement in the light of the broadness requirement is that it directly 
contravenes the requirement that account should be taken of the interests held by 
persons rather than the idea of persons. Thus, by limiting its focus to the idealised
'J '7 1
subject, it fails to take into account the perspectival character of welfare (such as 
actual desire) as against the idealised desires. Also like the theories based on the 
rational choice, the account of an idealised subject unduly limits the scope and nature 
of “wellbeing”. For instance, a criticism which is similar (but distinct) to that often 
stressed by behavioural law and economics theorists, is that no matter how clear-
367 See Jon Elster, “Introduction” in Jon Elster and John Roemer, Interpersonal Comparison o f  
Wellbeing (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1993) 8. He explains that the implication would 
be that we would have to move resources from the happy “have-nots” to the discontented “haves” 
until their hedonistic levels are the same.
368 Amartya Sen, “Wellbeing, Agency and Freedom: The Dewey Lectures 1984” (1985) 82 Journal o f  
Philosophy 191.
369 Black (2005) 45.
370 E.g. there are objections concerning the specification o f the favourable conditions or the idealised 
subject and their relation to a person’s actual circumstance. Another is that the concept o f desire under 
the revised theory is idle which makes the theory unstable. See Ibid, 46-47.
371 Raz (1986) 289; Black (2005) 47.
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headed and well informed people are, they often times want things that makes their 
lives go badly for them.372
One can think of a third perspective as suggested by Black who argues that the “best 
account of welfare” will be a qualified form of the objective theory which 
emphasises participation in various forms of the good. This, he says, could be 
achieved by gerrymandering the conditions or the specifications of the idealised 
subject so as to ensure that the revised theory applies only to those desires unaffected 
by objections that have been raised against the objective theory.373 It is however 
difficult to appreciate this advantage in terms of broadness particularly with regards 
to the person-centred approach to antitrust because revised theory does not state the 
extent to which the objective theory is to be altered to accommodate subjective 
considerations such as “satisfaction”.
Conclusively, one is at pains to say that the philosophical approaches so far stated do 
not provide an adequate foundation for the mixed blend of attributes that fits the 
requirement of broadness herein sought.
4.4.2 Differentiated Normative Approach
In an attempt to build a bottom-up framework for antitrust, Kerber faulted the 
prevailing economic and legal approaches on the ground that they fail to focus on 
normative questions.374 He argues that rather than limiting the normative inquiry to 
debates between economic welfare standards, antitrust could recognise normative 
approaches in economics which offer much broader arguments that might allow for a 
more differentiated discussion about the goals of competition law. His position thus 
was that a bottom-up normative framework, which is based on principles of 
constitutional economics, be applied in antitrust. His reason is that this might allow 
for more consideration of normative issues that are often emphasised by legal 
scholars. Examples of such issues include the protection of right of market 
participants or concepts like competition on merit.
372 Black (2005) 45; John Harsanyi, “Morality and the Theory o f Rational Behaviour” in Amartya Sen 
and Bernard William (eds) Utilitarianism and Beyond (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 
1982) 39-62.
373 Black, ibid.
374 Kerber (2008) 94.
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Kerber sought to build a broader framework for antitrust based on normative 
individualism, constitutional economics and the rules of the market. Constitutional 
economics is premised on the idea that all relevant values and goals in a society have 
to be derived from the preferences and values of individual members of that society. 
Of note under Kerber’s approach is the requirement of voluntary individual
375 •consent. It is argued that by consenting to transactions or to mandatory rules of 
society, individuals reveal their preferences and legitimise contracts and mandatory 
rules. Built on the idea of social contract, the theory of constitutional economics 
describes the state as the result of a constitutional contract on which all members of 
society might agree under a “veil of uncertainty”.377
Aside from its broad scope, the normative approach is also flexible as it by-passes 
the condition of unanimity which might be a problem in a regime that requires that 
individual consents be sought. It forges a transition from the unanimity principle 
(which is one of the most important constitutional rules) to a more pragmatic
• 378decisions rule which is based on the post-constitutional level of normal legislation. 
The consequence is that there might be realms in which consent is deemed to be 
given to the state once a simple majority has been established. Likewise there might 
be other realms whereby basic right and freedom are considered sacrosanct and as 
such should not be tampered with even if it means that we lose some positive welfare
379effect that could have accrued to other persons or to the society as a whole.
Kerber’s perspective of the normative approach is said to be different from the 
welfare-economic approach because it emphasises the preference of citizens as the 
ultimate normative criterion.380 He argues that the citizens should decide:
“to what extent allocative efficiency and/or dynamic efficiency should be strived for, 
to what extent competition law should protect consumers from exploitation or 
competitors from being hurt through predatory strategies, and to what extent society 
is willing to sacrifice some “total welfare” in order to prevent redistribution through 
market power”381
375 James Buchanan, “The Constitution o f Economic Policy” (1986) 77 American Economics Review 
243.
376 Kerber (2008) 109.
377 Ibid.
378 Ibid.
379 Ibid.
380 Ibid, 110.
381 Ibid.
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Though he states that the task of economics is simply to analyse the effect of legal 
rules with regards to the goals as identified by citizens, the approach is based purely 
on economics and not politics. He then explains the focus on citizens in economic 
terms by stating that market rules are “optimal” if they correspond with citizens’
'IQ 'J
preferences. Kerber iterates that citizens’ preferences should decide the kind of 
competition that prevails in the market. Putting it in EU context, he states that:
“[W]hat ‘effective competition’ means in EU competition law is a normative 
question. If the European Commission defines ‘effective competition’ as competition 
that ‘brings benefit to consumers, such as low prices, high quality products, a wide 
selection of goods and services, and innovation’, then this is a normative decision, 
and the relevant question is whether this corresponds to the preferences of the EU 
citizens.”383
This perspective of the normative approach attempts to pre-empt the citizens on how 
they, for instances, would value allocative efficiency or dynamic efficiency. It is 
presumed that citizens would like both because these efficiencies increase their 
wealth. There is also an unsubstantiated analysis which suggests that citizens would 
hardly consent to a total welfare standard. In addition, the approach considers the 
likely response of citizens to a pure consumer welfare standard which Kerber 
reckons is unlikely to be positive. Thus he concludes that the standard which most 
likely will represent the preference of citizens’ is the weighted-surplus standard as it 
is considered to be an intermediate solution between pure total welfare standard and 
pure consumer welfare standard.
It is clear that Kerber’s approach is much broader than the prevailing welfare-based 
approaches. Just like the person-centred approach, the broadness in Kerber’s 
approach derives from his bottom-up perspective to antitrust analysis. It is relatively 
eclectic as, for instance regarding requirement i(a) which calls for a plural 
understanding of the concept of welfare, the approach defines interest from the plural 
perspective. In particular, it shows that the definition of interests (and consequently 
welfare) should not be narrowed down to either of the consumer welfare or total 
welfare standard. Moreover, the preferred weighted surplus standard combines some
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element of both total and consumer welfare. The approach sets a plural platform 
through which our definition of economic welfare can “take into account the effect of 
restrictive agreements, mergers and business behaviours not only on consumer 
welfare but also on a set of protected rights of competitors and up- and downstream 
firms which might suffer losses through the infringement of these rights.”384
Kerber’s differentiated approach fulfils requirement i(b) which is that “persons” must 
relate to a wide range of persons and not a section or group such as consumers. 
Arguing against the application of pure consumer welfare standard, this approach 
suggests that focus should be on citizens. This means that “persons” cannot be 
limited to consumers “but also owners of production factors such as, in particular, 
capital and labour, and are therefore interested in income from interest, wages and
-> QC
profits.” Thus, in line with this requirement, the differentiated approach does not 
accept a narrow conception of persons: It states that “the normative asymmetry 
which holds that competition law is only about the protection of consumers’ interests 
and that the interests of all other firms on the upstream markets are irrelevant is hard 
to justify”.386 This differentiated perspective is particularly strong on this 
requirement as it also vividly analyses why a narrow focus on consumers is far from 
ideal. By analysing the role of competition law in protecting businesses on the supply 
side of a market from the buying power of other firms (a kind of collective 
monopsony), it is argued under this approach that a strict focus on consumers does 
not give a credible explanation as to why buying power that lead to a reduction of 
input prices (and therefore consequently to lower prices for consumers) should be 
assessed negative especially where such reduction does not lead to negative effect on
387consumers.
However, though this approach is broad in its own right, it is arguable whether it 
affords a wide-enough interpretation of interests especially when one considers its
388likely position concerning other ideals that could be sought through antitrust. One
384 Ibid, 117.
385 Ibid, 113.
Ibid.386
387 Note the opinion o f Thomas Rosch who argues that the US Sherman Act protects consumers in the 
strict sense o f the word. See Thomas Rosch, “Monopsony and the Meaning of ‘Consumer Welfare’: A 
Closer Look at Weyerhaeuser” Milton Handler Annual Antitrust Review New York City, 7 December 
2006.
388 For example, competition law goals such as international competitiveness and economic 
integration.
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could also fault the contractarian foundation as it may deal with the idea of the 
person rather than real persons.389 This might lead to outcomes which are not truly 
reflective of what individuals consider to be of value to them. On these bases, this 
approach does not seem ideal for the person-centred analysis.
4.4.3 Sen’s Capability Approach
Considering that a broad account would “combine elements of the different theories 
in a way that avoids the objection to each”,390 our task will be to identify the 
approach which is accommodating enough to combine elements of different antitrust 
theories while at the same time maintains its intelligibility. This is clearly a hard task 
considering the fact that quite often, different theories would conflict. Indeed it has 
been shown in the preceding chapter that out of the various welfare/freedom based 
jurisprudential thoughts, it is the capability approach that affords the best chance of 
conducting a person-centred analysis of antitrust right as it accommodates different 
interests -  this approach is able to accommodate the element of different theories 
because it steers a middle course between mental-state and satisfaction theories on
391the one hand and objective theories on the other.
In the specific context, capability approach can accommodate elements of the 
antitrust theories that have been discussed so far. It sustains it intelligibility and thus 
deals sufficiently even with potentially conflicting effects because the approach, by 
focusing solely on opportunities, only serve as a platform and nothing more: it does 
not propose a theory that could help us decide within and between the multitude of 
theories whose elements have been recognised; it cannot tell us what exactly should 
be the goal of antitrust and what the mode of analysing antitrust should be. The 
strength of the capability approach lies in the fact that it concedes that the approach 
“cannot pay adequate attention to fairness and equity involved in procedures that 
have relevance to the idea of justice.”392 Thus, when applied to antitrust, it means we 
have to desist from specifying one goal as against the other.
389 For example, see Sen’s criticism o f Rawls’ Theory o f  Justice in Sen (2009) 87-113.
390 Black (2005) 47.
391 Ibid.
392 Sen (2009) 295.
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This thesis thus proposes the capability approach as the ideal platform upon which 
the broadness sought by the person-centred approach can be achieved. The next part 
is dedicated to detailing the content of the approach. It also contains the justification 
for choosing this approach.
4.5 Capability Approach as the Platform for Antitrust Analysis
To reiterate the point, capability approach is able to maintain the value of all relevant 
theories primarily because it desists from judging between them. The broadness it 
achieves is through a bottom-up analysis. To establish its suitability, I give greater 
details on the approach itself. An attempt is also made to set it clear of the theories 
that have been discussed so far especially those that are right/freedom based. 
Thereafter, the approach is tested against the broadness requirements.
4.5.1 Capability Approach Detailed
The capability approach is a broad normative framework for the evaluation of 
individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of policies and proposals 
about social change in society.393 One of its strengths lies in the fact that it can be 
applied in a wide range of fields. As such, the proposition that it should be applied to 
antitrust is by no means inconceivable. It can be used to evaluate a variety of aspects 
of people’s wellbeing, such as individual well-being, inequality and poverty. The 
diverse instances or fields in which the approach can be applied implies that the 
contours of the approach which are considered relevant in particular cases will derive 
directly from the disciplinary perspective from which the approach is applied or the 
nature of the task or purpose for which it is applied. For instance, the aspect of the 
capability approach that might interest a philosopher might be different from that 
which a mainstream economist or heterodox economist might express interest.394 For 
the purpose of this thesis, the aspect of the capability approach that is emphasised is
393 Ingrid Robeyns, “Capability Approach: A Theoretical Survey” (2005) 6 Journal o f  Human 
Development 94.
394 Sen said that the capability approach can be used for a wide range o f purposes. See Sen (1993) 49.
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the idea of broadness. In line with the very nature of antitrust, it is the 
wellbeing/welfare aspect that will be the focal point of our analysis.
The capability approach is concerned with evaluating a person’s advantage by 
focusing on what people are effectively able to do and to be. As it would be shown, it 
places primary focus on individuals. This approach is substantially different from 
those wherein wellbeing is addressed strictly through happiness, desire, price, 
income, preferences and so on. Expounding on the need to place individuals at the 
centre of policy analysis and evaluations, Sen states that by focusing on what people 
are able to do and be and on the quality of their lives, we ensure for them more 
freedom to live the kind of life which, upon reflection, they find valuable. He states 
that:
“[T]he capability approach to a person’s advantage is concerned with evaluating it in 
terms of his or her ability to achieve various valuable functionings as a part of living. 
The corresponding approach to social advantage -  for aggregative appraisal as well 
as for the choice of institutions and policy -  takes the set of individual capabilities as 
constituting an indispensable and central part of the relevant informational base of 
such evaluation”
Wellbeing is thus to be assessed in terms of people’s capabilities to function. 
Assessing people’s “achieved functionings” requires that we focus our evaluative 
exercise on their effective opportunities to undertake the actions and activities that 
they want to engage in, and to be the person they want to be. This approach concerns 
individual’s ability to achieve different combination of functionings that they can 
compare and judge against each other in terms of what they have reasons to value. 
While functionings refer to those beings and doings that have been realised, 
capabilities refer to those that are effectively possible. To put it differently, the 
former relates to achievement while the latter relates to freedom. The important thing 
is that people have the freedom (capabilities) to lead the kind of lives they want to 
lead, to do what they want to do, and be the person they want to be. Once they 
effectively have these freedoms, they can choose to act on those freedoms in line 
with their own idea of the kind of life they want to live.
395 Sen (1993) 30.
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We extend our focus to opportunities under the capability approach because it 
affords versatility; it is more general and more informationally inclusive than merely 
relying on achieved functionings. Sen argues that there is no loss in looking at the 
broader informational base of capabilities, which allows that we simply rely on the 
valuation of achieved functionings and also allows the use of other priorities in 
evaluation, thereby attaching importance to opportunity and choice.396
Capability approach operates at three different levels. It operates: as a framework of 
thought for the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangement; as a 
critique of other approaches to the evaluation of well-being and justice; and as a 
formula or algorithm to make interpersonal comparisons of welfare or well-being.
In the context of this research, while the first and second levels are of primary 
relevance in this chapter, the third level of application will be addressed in the next 
chapter. At the first level wherein the approach serves as a framework of thought for 
the evaluation of individual advantage and social arrangement, the focus on 
functionings and capabilities is the springboard upon which broadness is achieved. 
At the second level, whereby it serves as a critique, we are able to separate the 
capability approach from prominent theories in antitrust.
To identify the scope of this approach, it is pertinent that functionings and 
capabilities are addressed in greater detail. As already noted, while a person’s 
functionings are his “being and doings”, his capability is the various combinations of 
functions that a person can achieve. Hence, capability is “a set of vectors of
398functionings reflecting the person’s freedom to lead one type of life or another”.
To put the difference between the two in context, we could proceed on the 
assumption that in a specific market our functioning as antitrust subjects (either 
individually or collectively) might be that we are able to benefit from competitive 
prices and greater quality or simply to have a healthy competitive process in the 
relevant market. The relationship between that state of competition and the perceived 
functionings to achieve such state is influenced by three conversion factors.399 The 
first factor is the personal characteristics of the individual or group. Put into
396 Sen (2009) 236.
397 Ingrid Robeyns “An Unworkable Idea or a Promising Alternative? Sen’s Capability Approach Re­
examined, Discussion Paper 00.30, Centre fo r  Economic Studies, Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, 
2000 3.
398 Ibid.
399 The conversion factors are explained by Robeyns, ibid.
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perspective, whether or not a “functioning” is considered to be achieved will depend 
on our understanding of the antitrust subject. For example, if we are to analyse 
whether persons in a relevant market have achieved functionings, we might come to 
different conclusions depending on the antitrust theory we align to; our finding if we 
apply neo-classical economics will differ from that which we will be arrived at where 
we apply behavioural law and economics or economic freedom and so on because 
the metric for assessing functioning differ from one theory to another.
The second factor is regarding social characteristics. This means that our finding on 
whether relevant person have achieved functionings may depend on our 
understanding of the social state which they value. For example, aside from price, are 
consumers equally concerned about environmental factors or industrial policy to 
such an extent that they would readily factor them into competition law cases? The 
third factor relates to the environmental characteristics.400 With regards to this 
conversion factor, it is meant that whether a functioning is achieved will depend on 
the extent to which the relevant institution implements its antitrust policy.
It must be noted that it is not enough to know the functioning which persons’ can 
achieve by merely forming an idea of the beings and doings of persons’ in a market 
through the dictates of the conversion factors. Thus, in addition, there is need to 
know more about the person and the circumstances in which he is living. This is 
where the capability approach extends beyond mere functionings. Sen’s Capability 
approach does not consider the functionings that a person has achieved as the 
ultimate normative measure. Rather, it focuses on people’s real freedom. In sum, 
while the functioning of a person are the set of thing that they do in life, the 
capability of that person is the alternative combination of functionings that they can 
achieve and from which they can choose one vector of functioning.
It should be observed that, as a result of our theoretical inclination which is 
manifested through the conversion factors, a single competition scenario might 
require conflicting state of competition with each of those states positing on what 
amounts to achieved functioning. In effect, since the conversion factors might differ,
400 “Environmental characteristics” in the context o f the capability approach is different from the 
specific public policy issue o f environmental protection that can be debated in competition law. Note 
that the environmental protection concern comes up under the second conversion factor, which is 
termed “social characteristics”.
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even where two people have identical capability set, they are likely to end up with 
different types and levels of achieved functionings since different theories imbue 
each set with different choices. This is because they have varied ideas on what 
constitute a good life from their effective options. With regards to the need to respect 
the difference in opinion on what constitutes a good life, Sen argues that it is 
capabilities, not achieved functioning which should be the appropriate political goal 
of institutions.
Because capability could accommodate alternative functionings, it allows a much 
broader meaning of wellbeing if applied to antitrust. To fully appreciate why 
capability accommodates different functionings even if they conflict, it is imperative 
that we understand the connection between well-being and individual freedom. The 
idea of individual freedom under the capability approach contains two aspects: the 
opportunity aspect and process aspect. The opportunity aspect of freedom means that 
individuals should have more opportunities to pursue their objectives so that they can 
live as they would like and to promote the ends that they may want to advance. The 
process aspect requires that individuals should be able to achieve what they value 
while also paying due regard to the process through which that achievement comes 
about. Capability approach focuses on substantive opportunities of antitrust subject. 
The modest nature of the approach makes it possible for it to accommodate even 
conflicting functionings.
All aspects of the approach have their relevance. Take for instance that, based on a 
particular conversion factor, particular individual values efficiency as the metric for 
antitrust assessment because of some perceived welfare benefits. If a particular 
market condition is efficient, we can say convincingly that the process aspect of the 
relevant antitrust subject’s freedom is respected. However, we have to be able to 
conceive that the same antitrust subject might be influenced by different conversion 
factors such that he might prefer the pursuit of economic freedom. If an antitrust 
regime limits the meaning of achieved functioning to efficiency, the fact that in a 
particular instance, a person supports efficiency does not mean that his freedom has 
not been impinged. Thus, even though the process aspect of his freedom is fulfilled, 
the opportunity aspect of such person’s freedom is bruised. Hence, the elimination of 
choice in the opportunity aspect should not be tolerated even where we feel 
convinced that the antitrust subject is unlikely to make the alternative choice.
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5.2 Capability Approach and the Requirements o f  the Person-Centred Approach
From the preceding explanation, there should be no doubt that the capability 
approach contemplates a broad scope for social analysis. Nonetheless, it is important 
to put it in the antitrust context and specifically assess it in light of the person-centred 
approach. It has been noted that the capability approach seeks a good life which we 
can only say we have where the institutions are not only concerned with what a 
persons has achieved, but also the opportunity to achieve what he might want to 
achieve. This ensures that the institution takes note of the different interests held by 
people by paying attention to the circumstances in which people live. Put in context 
of antitrust, it means that even if, at one point, an antitrust subject desires a near 
perfect competitive state in a market, we should still take into account why such 
market condition might be justifiably undesirable to some other antitrust subjects (for 
instance, undertakings in an oligopolistic market). In sum, when these different 
interests are combined, we end up with the capability framework. Being a mere 
procedural framework, the capability approach herein deployed is completely 
agnostic of the normative appeal of the different interests. As such, it will be the 
responsibility of individual regimes to define the width and breadth of claims that 
might surface within the framework.401
More specifically on the person-centred approach, it behoves that since it has been 
shown that some relatively broad theories do not fulfil the broadness required in this 
thesis, it is pertinent that before the capability approach is firmly placed as the 
framework upon which the person-centred antitrust analysis is to be conducted, its 
realms have to be tested in light of the broadness requirement.
Starting with requirement i(a) which calls for a plural understanding of the concept 
of welfare, the capability approach evinces plurality in the meaning of wellbeing. By 
focusing on quality of life, this approach allows us to move away from the narrower 
understanding of interest which is that people primarily pursue their own wellbeing. 
Applied to antitrust, the idea of “good life” sought by the capability approach is a 
sum of the interests held by different persons and groups. A “good life” is only 
attained where we ensure that every antitrust subject who holds a stake in any
401 For example, it is for individual regimes to decide whether or not naked cartelist behaviour should 
or should not be included within the capability framework.
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antitrust issue must not be denied the opportunity to have their interest protected. In 
essence, we do not define good life or wellbeing by strictly focusing on interest of a 
type of person. In other words, we are not to define a good life by reference to the 
self-interested individual. Where an antitrust framework gives one or more persons 
the opportunity to fulfil their interests at the expense of others, it could imply that the 
framework fails to ensure a good life for the whole market and even for those who 
were opportune to have their interest included in it. The reason for defining good life 
from both an aggregative and individual standpoint becomes apparent when one 
considers Sen’s attempt to distinguish between agency402 and wellbeing on the one 
hand and freedom and achievement on the other.
On the first set (that is, agency and wellbeing), Sen argues that the distinction is 
between the promotion of the person’s wellbeing in the strict sense and the pursuit of 
the person’s overall agency goals. Agency is broader in that it includes all the goals 
that a person has reason to adopt, which can, inter alia, include goals other than the 
advancement of self-interested wellbeing. Thus, agency achievement will require that 
we achieve both our wellbeing and non-wellbeing objectives. As a result, one could 
argue that failure to achieve non-wellbeing objectives may cause dissatisfaction, 
which may lead to a reduction of wellbeing.
The distinction between achievement (functionings) and the freedom to achieve 
(capability) on the one hand, and wellbeing and agency on the other hand, yields four 
different concepts of advantage as it relates to a person. They are: wellbeing 
achievement; agency achievement; wellbeing freedom; and agency freedom. These 
possibilities are reflective of how broad our idea of wellbeing can be under the 
capability approach even though we would have to choose between these 
possibilities at a later stage. It is of value to the person-centred approach that the idea 
of a person’s interest (his wellbeing) could be either one of or a combination of his 
achieved self-interested wellbeing, his achieved non self-interested objectives, the 
freedom to achieve his self-interested wellbeing, the freedom to achieve his non self- 
interested objectives. From the foregoing, it is apparent that the capability approach 
satisfies requirement i(b) (which is on the meaning of “persons”) as well since the 
meaning of persons cannot be narrowed down to a self-interested group but rather to
402 “Agency encompasses all goals that a person has reason to adopt which can inter alia include goals 
other than the advancement of his or her own well-being” Sen (2009) 287.
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a wide range of persons. Moreover, this is a natural interpretation of the capability 
approach since no one or group of persons can possibly have a good life in isolation.
Put in context of European competition law, an example that can be given to 
establish this broader concept of advantage is the Court of Justice’s decision in 
Asnef-Equifax.403 This case was about Spanish banks setting up an information 
sharing facility which was to allow any bank to access the credit history of a 
borrower. Applying Article 101(3) in order to ascertain the benefits that this scheme 
could bring, the Court held that “registers such as the one at issue in the main 
proceedings are capable of helping to prevent situations of over-indebtedness for 
consumers of credit as well as, in principle, of leading to a greater overall availability 
of credit”. In light of the capability approach, it could be argued that though the 
banks’ ultimate aim was to maximise their profit, they could also be said to have had 
an intermediate goal which is partly motivated by their agency objectives. Thus, even 
if we are to address this case from the perspective of the banks as a group of persons 
(antitrust subjects) whose interests count, it was open to the court to consider 
whether their interests (wellbeing) are limited to their self-interested wellbeing 
achievement (in this case, their self-centred gain from collusion). Though not strictly 
apt on the fact of the case, one could possibly construe the finding in this case to be 
that the banks had an agency objective which is to prevent situation of over­
indebtedness for consumers and also afford greater availability of credit. Hence, in 
assessing the case, it is for the court to realise that the wellbeing of the banks may 
incorporate both their wellbeing freedom and agency freedom.
When assessed from the position of another set of antitrust subjects such as 
consumers, one could relate with how the capability approach ensures that their 
wellbeing is given a broad enough meaning. Take for example the Microsoft v 
Commission case.404 In that case, the General Court came to the conclusion that 
Microsoft’s tying arrangement amounted to a breach of competition law. This 
conclusion would have remained even if the Court was convinced by Microsoft’s 
argument that it did not charge anything extra from consumers for using their Media 
Player, which was the tied product. The Court’s allusion to the necessity of consumer
403 Case C-238/05 Asnef-Equifax v Asociation de. Usuarios de Servicios Bancarios (Ausbanc), (2006) 
ECR1-11125, para 67.
404 Case T-201/04 [2007] ECR 11-3601.
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choice would have been an adequate ground for the finding. One could analyse this 
reasoning through the broad idea of wellbeing as conceived by the capability 
approach. There are a number of achieved wellbeing effects that could be attributed 
to Microsoft’s conduct. First, the consumers got a valuable product for free. Second, 
it saves them from searching costs. Third, by tying those products, the less tech- 
savvy consumers are saved from the stress and confusion they could face if they had 
to source these products separately. However, all these advantages relate only to a 
part of wellbeing, that is, achieved wellbeing. The court recognised another form of 
wellbeing that was implicated in this case. By addressing the issue of choice, the 
court flagged up the consumer’s wellbeing freedom.405
In relation to requirement ii which is that “plural interests” should be understood as 
different interests held by different persons, the capability approach addresses 
“interests” as different interests held by different person all of which are worthy of 
consideration. Each person or a group of persons have a unique capability set. This 
approach maintains plurality of interests by recognising the different capability sets 
on the understanding that different persons could premise their interests on 
competing principles each of which may pass the test of non-rejectability.406 
Regarding requirement in which is that plural interests should mean different 
interests held by a single antitrust subject or those held by a group of antitrust 
subjects, the capability approach attains the requisite broadness by assessing the 
quality of life of persons. It is argued that in non-utilitarian philosophy, public policy 
and everyday life, well-being (which is the product of a person’s interests) is judged 
not only by preference fulfilment,407 or the attainment of satisfaction. It also includes 
other factors such as their positive freedom or capability, that is, the range of 
attainable valuable functionings they face. It can be easily inferred (from explanation 
and distinction between a person’s wellbeing freedom and agency freedom) that a 
single antitrust subject or a group of them may have multiple interests some or all of 
which are worth considering.
405 In this case, the court considered wellbeing-freedom to be of more importance. Note though that it 
is not the concern o f the capability approach to decide between both. The decisional process o f a 
regime will be addressed in chapter 5.
406 Note though that this does not mean we can demand equality o f capability for everyone. Again, it 
must be noted that this decision is not o f primary concern under the capability approach.
407 Since preferences may be poorly informed.
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In satisfaction of requirement iv which is that we should focus on the real interests 
held by persons rather than the idea of interest which specific schools of thought tend 
to attribute to person, the capability approach focuses on the real interests held by 
people by stressing the need to give them the opportunity to achieve what they value. 
Thus, rather than theorising their interest either through rationality, constitutional 
economics or through other contractarian approaches such as Rawls’ indifference 
principle or Kerber’s “veil of uncertainty”, the capability approach gives no 
principled account of interests. This makes it suitable for a comparative assessment 
that would eventually lead us to ascertaining the genuine interest of one or some of 
the antitrust subjects. This approach escapes the ills of idealised interests because, 
while the former could become relatively inflexible because of their transcendental 
stance, the framework based on the latter only calls on relevant interests on a case- 
by-case basis.
Take for example that an agreement is to be assessed. If we proceed from self- 
interest (rationality) as the idealised conception of interest, our framework might 
recognise only a state that primarily favours undertakings (total welfare) or one that 
primarily favours consumer either in terms of price (wealth transfer) or one that 
includes non-price considerations (consumer interest and consumer choice). There is 
no gainsaying that the real interest that could be held by antitrust subject either 
individually or collectively cannot be summed up under either of these idealised 
interests. What capability approach does in order to keep the real interests that 
different persons have is to leave open the possibility, that is, give antitrust subjects 
(either individually or as a group) the opportunity to achieve the interest (including 
one or a combination of the idealised sets) that they may value as the case may 
require.
The capability approach passes requirement v which is that interests of a person 
cannot be predetermined through a universal preferential ranking, because it desists 
from making judgments about the principles underlying individual interests. This 
ensures that the approach accommodates interests on an equal footing at an ex ante 
stage.
135
4.5.3 Capability and Traditional Antitrust Theories
It needs to be reiterated that the person-centred approach to antitrust is not just 
proposed for iconoclastic reasons. As it has been shown in chapter one, the 
traditional ways of analysing antitrust can be faulted on the ground that they are not 
broad enough where antitrust is addressed from a bottom-up perspective. On the 
other hand, it has been shown that the capability approach meets the requisite 
conditions of broadness. Logically therefore, there must be substantial (theoretical 
and also practical) differences between the capability approach and the other 
theories. A basic expectation would thus be that the capability approach requires 
processes and outcomes different from those under the prevailing antitrust theories. 
Hence, it is pertinent to identify its distinct nature through a comparative analysis 
with the other theories. The comparison will be undertaken at the very foundational 
level. This means that accounts such as total welfare, consumer choice and consumer 
interest will all be placed under the umbrella of the revealed preference approach. 
The other groups that will be compared against the capability approach are the public 
policy accounts (general equilibrium and public policy) and the freedom-based 
(economic freedom and differentiated normative) approaches.
i. Capability and Revealed Preference
The prevailing antitrust theories modelled on total surplus, consumer surplus and 
consumer choice408 accounts derive from the revealed preference theory409 
Regardless of the standard used, both static and dynamic effect410 of competition can 
be normatively measured with the criterion of the consumer or society’s net 
preference fulfilment. The link between these theories and preference fulfilment can 
be seen as a consequence of normative individualism, which is that all normatively 
relevant values in society derive from preferences of individual members of such 
society.411 In basic terms, it means that what we value (which primarily maximises 
our utility) is revealed through our actions. In this context, individual preferences
408 Averitt and Lande (2007) state that the options that consumers’ accord with are identified by their 
preferences as expressed in the marketplace. See 183-184.
409 Consumer surplus refer to the perceived welfare o f buyers in a particular market while total surplus 
refers to the perceived welfare o f buyers and sellers in a particular market. See Orbach (2010) 5.
410 Note though that dynamic efficiency is less geared on existing preferences.
411 Kerber (2008) 99.
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play two parts: first, they determine individual choices; and second, they represent 
individual welfares used in the evaluations of market equilibra.412
Before I detail the dividing line between the capability and the theories based on 
revealed preference, it is important to state what they share in common. Primarily, 
the two categories are motivated by preference of individuals -  the revealed 
preference theories are motivated by preferences which they explain through the idea 
of rationality. In similar vein, the capability approach fit into the fundamental 
theorem of welfare economics in terms of preference fulfilment by taking preference 
as the binary basis of choice regardless of what the underlying motivation for choice 
are.413 This is however where the similarity ends. While the capability approach 
seeks to represent all possible functionings in the framework because they invariably 
represent the preference of some antitrust subject, the latter seeks to achieve a set 
universal preference either for the society as a whole or for a group such as 
consumers. Hence, it must be understood that even where we use peculiar terms such 
as preferences or efficiency within either of the peculiar areas, the meaning of those 
terms are bound to be very different. For example, if we make reference to the term 
“efficiency” when addressing an antitrust issue in the context of either total welfare 
or the consumer-based approaches, we are unequivocally referring to allocative, 
productive or dynamic efficiencies. However, if we seek to assess the efficiency of 
the person-centred approach and the capability framework in particular, we are 
simply assessing how well we have achieved or are likely to achieve our ultimate 
quest of having every relevant preference represented. Institutions must pay 
particular attention to every capability framework as it is their duty to ensure that 
“the basic analytical result relate directly to the fulfilment of preferences (in choice 
sense)”.414
Thus, in relation to specific antitrust concerns, we are to seek the efficiency of the 
capability framework not narrowly through the self-interested conceptions of 
allocative, productive and dynamic efficiencies. Rather, we are to seek efficiency o f
412 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom (Cambridge, MA, Belknap Press, 2002) 520.
413 Amartya Sen, “Market and Freedom: Achievement and Limitations o f  the Market Mechanism in 
Promoting Individual Freedom” (1993) Oxford Economic Papers 533-534.
414 Ibid.
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preference fulfilment as the theory of competitive market equilibrium indicates.415 
This state of well-being is achieved where it is impossible to move any one to a more 
preferred position (for instance, a position that the person would choose given the 
opportunity), keeping everyone in an equally preferred situation.416 It would be 
impossible to achieve this unless we give adequate opportunity to all possible 
preferences and interests. Hence, the capability framework is efficient where it 
contains complete capability sets of each and every relevant antitrust subject.
Having noted the difference, it is pertinent to indicate why antitrust should be 
addressed through the capability framework rather than narrowing our analysis to the 
revealed preference theories. Primarily, there is a fundamental flaw in the revealed 
preference approaches which the capability framework is immune to -  by narrowing 
the basis upon which antitrust subjects express preferences, these accounts fail to 
take note of peculiar circumstances and, as such, they fail to fully reflect preferences 
or to enhance welfare 417 With the example of consumer-based approaches, it has 
been convincingly argued that there are a good number of cases in which revealed
A 151preferences are likely to lead to welfare losses. The first category of cases in which 
these theories fail is where it is presumed that consumers are so attuned to prefer low 
prices that they would seek low prices for “bads”.419 Where we narrowly focus on 
revealed preferences, we are likely to believe that a competitive state which ends up 
in low prices for consumers must be preferred in all conceivable cases420 when in 
fact, one cannot rule out the likelihood that there would be a certain antitrust subject 
or a category of them who will consider low prices for particular products such as 
tobacco and alcohol to be particularly disadvantageous to their welfare.421 The same
415 Ibid, 521. Under this approach to antitrust, the process is efficient where there is a clear structure 
that allows for us to keep every interest in an equally preferred position up till the point when we are 
no longer able to avoid making firm decisions.
416 Ibid. It should be noted that this is an ideal position which might be difficult or even impossible to 
replicate in real life.
4 This follows from the explanation that these specific theories are incomplete and mistaken as 
discussed in chapter 1.
418 Here, welfare is defined in the broader context.
4,9 We can possibly categorise “bads” as legal “bads” or undesirable “bads”. An example o f legal bad 
is tobacco. On the other hand, many other legal products and services are arguably undesirable. 
Examples include abortions, alcohol, firearms, gambling, pornography, and sex services. See Orbach 
(2010) 18.
420 The US Supreme Court gave this impression in Atlantic Richfield where it stressed that “low prices 
benefit consumers regardless o f how those prices are set, and ... they cannot give rise to antitrust 
injury” 495 US 328, 340.
421 Orbach (2010) 354.
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narrow reasoning fails when we consider status goods and innovation in durables and 
fashion.422
ii. Capability and Public Policy
At the conceptual level, the primary difference between the capability framework 
and public policy approach is that while the nature and purpose of the former can be 
effectively analysed (that is, based on the need for justice as inclusiveness), the latter 
does not furnish substantial justification for broadening the scope of antitrust beyond 
the fact that certain end-states must be preserved. It means in essence that while the 
public policy argument may be defeated where a solid counter-argument indicates 
that there are set mechanisms outside the realms of antitrust that can achieve such 
end-state, the capability-based approach will not be so affected because broadness is 
sought on the basis of justice -  that is, the freedom to have one’s interest considered 
in social and judicial evaluations. In this regard, even though actual analysis of 
individual cases might go in the same line, it is the justificatory basis of the 
capability approach that makes it superior to a mere public policy argument. This is 
because while public policy arguments are presented as a strategic issue which could 
consequently thus be shown to be inappropriate in particular instances through the 
identification of alternative strategies, the capability approach is presented as an 
atomistic account which is conceptually independent from institutional 
idiosyncrasies. As such, it could not be defeated by counter-examples of how a 
regime applies or could apply an alternative approach to antitrust.423
Further, the capability approach is able to pay greater attention to all the interests of 
persons since it concedes its inability to relate adequately with the diverging 
interests. This makes capability approach escape deconstruction as it merely paves 
the way for a comparative assessment of interests. On the other hand however, public 
policy accounts are likely to take a transcendental position which opens them to the 
scrutiny of the deconstruction ideology. For example, Townley’s attempt to build a 
balancing framework can be deconstructed on the grounds that it attaches relative 
weight to different interests. Analysing the text of the EC Treaty (now TFEU) in
422 Ibid, 20-24.
423 As noted above, it is however open to individual regimes to ascertain the width and breadth of 
interests which they seek to accommodate within the capability framework.
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order to build a principled account for EU competition law, Townley establishes a 
qualitative weight where he divides different interests into two categories -  High and 
Not High. Interests within each of these categories are further sub-categorised as 
“light” or “heavy”.424 This categorisation is susceptible to the deconstruction 
exercise. Moreover, an attempt to build a principled framework that balances welfare 
and public policy will likely impugn on the interest of persons and sets it far apart 
from the capability framework: while capability approach pays greater attention to 
interests because it merely accommodates every relevant interest without 
strengthening the value of one at the expense of the other, Townley’s balancing 
framework tends to rank public policy concerns thereby promoting some interests 
and relegating others at an ex ante stage.
iii. Capability and the Freedom-based Antitrust Theories
The theory of economic freedom and Kerber’s differentiated approach are theorised 
through the idea of the collectiveness of wills which interestingly has always been 
argued to be an integral part of European competition law.425 These theories reflect 
different brands of normative individualism which brings in both economic and 
political implications. Though to differing degrees, both theories can be addressed in 
terms of individual right. However, while the differentiated approach may lead to 
case-specific (and consequently broad outcomes), the scope of the outcome deriving 
from the theory of economic freedom might be more restricted. The difference 
notwithstanding, one could either trace both theories to the foundational theory of 
constitutional economics.426
424 For instance, in his qualitative assessment, Townley divides the relevance o f public policy 
consideration to “High” and “Not-High”. While the “High” group contains employment, public 
health, consumer protection, environment and competition, the “Not-High” group contains public 
policy concerns relating to culture, economic and social cohesion, R&D and development co­
operation. See Townley (2009) 295.
425 See e.g. Commission Report on Competition Policy 1979, paras 9, 10; Commission Report on 
Competition Policy 1985 para 11.
426 One o f the prominent accounts under the theory o f constitutional economics is Buchanan’s 
common agreement theory. It provides that the network o f rules constituting an institution are justified 
because they are freely consented to and that particular institutional events, in the form o f actions, 
policies and decisions, are justified because they are required by rules that are consented to. It is 
believed within this theory that policies, market transactions or political decisions and so on can be 
given content or meaning only within an institutional framework. In the justificatory exercise, one 
should not address a rule in isolation. Rather, the network o f  rules should be considered since it is 
what “gives it life and substance”. Even though desirable end-states such as utility and welfare have a
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Unlike the capability approach, the freedom-based thoughts (be it the ordoliberals’ 
ordungpolitik or Kerber’s “veil of uncertainty”) are based on a narrower 
understanding of wellbeing. Thus, an individual is expected to consent to a specific 
mode of analysing antitrust where it serves his interest whereas under the capability 
approach, “interests” and “choice” are beyond the actual interests or choice made or 
expected to be made. It also includes the opportunity to hold different interests and 
make other choices. The more practical difference between these accounts however 
lies in the fact that while the freedom-based thoughts are largely contractarian which 
means that processes and outcomes for antitrust are arrived at in advance through an 
ex ante recognition of a firm theory of antitrust, the capability approach on the other 
hand makes no grand statement on peculiar antitrust ideals, theories, policies or 
methodologies.
The effect of the freedom-based approaches is that their transcendental outlay (which 
gives a tone of finality on what antitrust should pursue) is likely to render the 
theories incapable of noting some imminent interests that are unique to specific 
cases. The capability approach on the other hand is able to escape this problem 
primarily because it is not a theory; it is simply a perspective for identifying interests 
irrespective of their theoretical undertone. Put in perspective, when one considers the 
assumptions of ordoliberals and Kerber, one can, without much effort, see some 
loopholes when we assess these theories through Smithian impartial spectator.427 It 
becomes clear that these theories are predisposed to the demands of institutional 
rules and thus fail to take note of some important social factors. Also, it appears that 
these theories might fail to take note of some voices and interests.428 The capability 
approach on the other hand accommodates all relevant functionings/interest as it 
particularly stays clear of decision-making.
role to play in this consent theory, they are merely derivative o f the main measure which is the level o f  
acceptance that the set o f rules enjoy within a given community. As such, welfare or utility will only 
be relevant to the extent that they figure in the evaluation o f institutions. See generally James 
Buchanan, Constitutional Economics (Cambridge, Massachusetts, Basil Blackwell, 1991).
427 See generally David Raphael, The Impartial Spectator: Adam Smith's Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2007).
428 Note though that Kerber’s account might substantially reduce this weakness since it allows for a 
differentiation o f the outcome o f the deliberative process such that minority voices might be protected 
in specific instances through the grant o f liberal rights.
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4.6 Illustrating Capability as the Ideal Broad Framework vis a vis Other 
Theories
To illustrate the role of capability approach in the analysis of antitrust right as against 
other theories, I will give examples of price and non-price competition issues. The 
examples will relate with both anti-competitive agreements/concertation and abuse of 
dominance. So as to observe the differences within them and most importantly how 
the capability approach absolves their (sometimes conflicting) implications, I apply 
the major theories underlying antitrust and the capability approach to a set of fact. 
Noting that certain anti-competitive behaviours such as cartelisation (even though for 
substantially different reasons) would in principle be found wanting under most of 
the dominant antitrust theories, this illustrative exercise will particularly not focus on 
such conducts. Rather, the assumed facts will be based on the conducts of tying429 
and a host of other specific antitrust issues 430 It will also include dimensions based 
on integration and the environment/health.
4.6.1 Capability Approach and Tvin2
It is trite to assert that anti-competitive behaviours ought to be prevented. We are 
however likely to disagree regarding what is meant by competition and what 
amounts to anti-competition. Different theories which have been stated above could 
shape our reasoning when we address competition issues. To showcase this 
difference and the role of the capability approach, I build an issue around contract 
franchise tying and tying as an exclusionary abuse. However, before I delve into 
those specific areas, it is pertinent to give a brief analysis of tying.
429 I choose tying because it can be applied under both anti-competitive agreement and abuse of 
dominance. Also, it allows for more diverse interpretation between competing theories.
430 Predation is chosen because of the diverse interpretation we could have between competing 
theories particularly since consumers may be (even if  it is merely in the short term) better off with low 
prices.
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/ .  Tying in Brief
Tying can be defined as the selling or licensing of a product or service made 
conditional on the sale or licensing of another related product.431 This conduct can be 
categorised into three main types namely bundling, tying and metering 432 The 
reasons why firms could choose to tie products has been categorised into two: 
efficiency and strategic reasons.433 Concerning the welfare enhancing aspect, tying 
can be used by an undertaking to reduce cost. Such reduction can arise as a result of 
reduction in production, distribution and so on. Economies of scale can also be 
achieved such that an undertaking may benefit from producing two products together 
rather than selling them individually. Consumers could also benefit from a tying 
arrangement through a reduction in transaction cost.434 In the same vein however, 
tying could possibly prejudice consumers in terms of price435 and may lead to anti­
competitive foreclosure effects on the tied market which affects consumer choice.436
ii. Franchise Contract Tying Assessed as a Restrictive Agreement
The meaning, the motivations and some of the impacts of tying have been noted. It 
should thus be further noted that the extent to which these observations might impact 
on antitrust analyses depend on the facts of individual cases as well as the theory we 
align to. It would therefore be helpful to illustrate how tying arrangement might be 
assessed under the different theories through an assumed fact based on franchise 
contract tying. However, before the fact is set out, the nature of the restrictive 
concerns in both franchising and tying are summarised.
Franchise agreements contain license of intellectual property rights and also the 
provision of commercial and technical assistance. Amongst other things, a franchise 
agreement usually contains a combination of different vertical restraints concerning
431 Hedwig Schmidt, Competition Law, Innovation and Antitrust: An Analysis o f  Tying and 
Technological Integration (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2009) 3.
432 Barry Nalebuff “Bundling, Tying and Portfolio Effect, Part 1 -  Conceptual Issues” (2003) 1 DTI 
Economics.
433 Ibid, 18.
434 See David Evans, Jorge Padilla and Christian Ahlbom, “The Antitrust Economics o f Tying: A 
Farewell to Per Se Illegality” (2004) Antitrust Bulletin 320.
435 Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, para 217.
436 Ibid, 216.
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the products being distributed, in particular selective distribution and/or non-compete 
and/or exclusive distribution.437 Tying on the other hand may constitute a vertical 
restraint falling under Article 101 where it results in a single branding438 type of 
obligation.439 The possible competition concerns arising from single branding are 
foreclosure of market to competing suppliers, softening of competition and 
facilitation of collusion between suppliers and, where the buyer is a retailer selling to 
final consumers, a loss of in-store inter-brand competition440 However, franchise 
contract tying arrangements do not automatically generate anti-competitive effects. 
Single branding through, for instance, non-compete obligations may be justified in a 
franchise agreement where there has been a transfer of substantial know-how from 
the franchisor to the franchisee.441 The more important the know-how, the more 
likely it is that the restraints create efficiencies and/or are indispensable to protect the 
know-how and that the vertical restraints fulfil the conditions of Article 101(3).442
Following from the broad explanation, let us assume that firm A franchises the Pizza 
service delivery of its quality brand to firm B. Some of the conditions in the 
franchise agreement is that firm B should source some related products from firm A. 
To put into perspective, we could say that the agreement requires firm B to buy 
dough, tomato sauce and paper cups exclusively from firm A or from approved 
suppliers 443 Based on the foregoing, should the conduct be considered anti­
competitive? Should our opinion depend on certain effects? What can the capability 
approach add to antitrust analysis in the context of the resulting issues?
Let us assume further that firm A’s franchising practice seeks to divide the market in 
order to block the loophole that exist for arbitrage trading as a result of the price
437 Ibid, para 189.
438 “Single branding” comprises those agreements which have as their main element the fact that the 
buyer is obliged or induced to concentrate its orders for a particular type o f product with one supplier. 
See ibid, para 129.
439 Ibid, para 214.
440 Ibid, para 130.
441 Ibid, para 148. See also para 190(b) which provides that “[a] non-compete obligation on the goods 
or services purchased by the franchisee falls outside the scope o f Article 101(1) where the obligation 
is necessary to maintain the common identity and reputation o f  the franchised network. In such cases, 
the duration of the non-compete obligation is also irrelevant under Article 101(1), as long as it does 
not exceed the duration o f the franchise agreement itself.”
442 Ibid, para 190(a).
443 This is what happened in Queen City Pizza v Domino’s Pizza, 124 F.3d 430, 433 & 438 (3rd Cir. 
Pa. 1997).
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differentials in another geographical market.444 If we also assume that firm A 
mandates franchisees to purchase dough and tomato sauce from its sales department 
for quality assurance purpose not solely for its image but because of its concern for 
the health of consumers, how should these added facts impact on our assessment in 
the context of the prevailing theories and the capability approach?
In Europe for instance, this issue could be addressed under both Article 101(l)(e) 
and Article 102(2)(d) TFEU.445 In order to showcase the role of the capability 
approach under both price-based and non-price based infringement, the facts stated 
above would be applied as a restrictive agreement with price implication after which 
it will be applied as a non-price exclusionary conduct.
Article 101(l)(e) of the TFEU provides that any agreement which has as its object or 
effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition within the internal 
market, and in particular those which make the conclusion of contracts subject to 
acceptance by the other parties of supplementary obligations which, by their nature 
or according to commercial usage, have no connection with the subject of such 
contracts.
Applying the idea of economic freedom to these facts, we would be most concerned 
with the maintenance of the competitive process so as to ensure that the freedom of 
choice of firm B is not trampled upon. If we apply this approach strictly, we would 
come to the conclusion that the condition in the pizza franchise agreement is anti­
competitive and as such should be voided regardless of the justifications (efficiency, 
health and so on) given by firm A. For as long as firm B can show that the condition 
is supplementary and has no connection with the subject of the contract, the 
condition will be regarded as illegal per se. Under this approach, the burden of 
proving that the tie-in condition has no connection with the franchising contract 
could be discharged by severing the need for quality delivery and adherence to brand
444 For example, let lis assume a well-known pizza company grants a franchise o f its service to 
different franchisees located in different countries. Let us say further that the franchisees are bound by 
contract to buy certain commodities from the franchisor in order to maintain brand quality. It is quite 
possible that the franchisor might charge less for the product in country A as opposed to country B. 
The franchisor’s pricing might reflect the economic conditions within both countries. In order to avoid 
arbitrage trading between the franchisees, the franchisor might seek to divide the market through its 
packaging. For instance, it might package the product under different names in the two countries.
It could also be brought under mergers. See Jose Carboja, David De Meza and Daniel Seidman, “A 
Strategic Motivation for Commodity Bundling” (1990) 38 Journal o f  Industrial Economics 283-298, 
285.
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standard from the direct condition on product purchase especially where such 
product could be sourced elsewhere without prejudicing the franchised brand. 
Moreover, since there is a clear link between market integration and economic 
freedom,446 firm B could strengthen its claim that the agreement is “anti-competitive 
by object” by also referring to the clause in the agreement as an attempt to prevent 
inter-state trading of the supplementary products.447
Where we apply the welfare approaches, it is often required that we put the 
agreement in greater economic context. This may require that we take one of two 
opinions -  it is either that we assess the fact and seek more detailed explanation as to 
whether or not the condition is, by its nature, not connected with the subject of the 
contract or simply that we should be able to rely on the provisions of Article 
101 (3).448 For the purpose of the exercise, let us assume that the relevant clause in 
the franchise agreement is not anti-competitive by object. Our conclusion whether 
the agreement has anti-competitive effect depends on the welfare standard we align 
to. Under the total welfare standard, we are to assess whether the condition has anti­
competitive effect and/or whether it should be individually exempted by 
ascertaining: if the franchisee incurs additional costs which could have been avoided 
but for the condition; and if there are clear efficiencies that make the tie-in condition 
increase net welfare. For instance, it could be argued that the tie-in might solve the 
free-rider problem449 and also address the possibility that the franchisee may reduce 
product quality.450 Another efficiency gain that could be argued is that the tying 
arrangement reduces the franchisor’s monitoring cost.451 To the total welfare 
proponents, it does not matter that the efficiency gains are not shared by both firms A 
and B. Thus, even though the efficiency gains go to undertaking A, the fact that the
446 See Monti (2002) 1065.
447 There are a lot o f cases regarding distributors and suppliers where the Court o f Justice decided 
against such restrictive practice. See e.g. case 19/77 Miller International Schallplatten GmbH v 
Commission [1978] ECR 131.
448 Undertakings have to self-assess in order to determine whether their conduct can be exempted 
under Article 101(3) TFEU.
449 This is considered to be very likely, as franchisees might seek to unduly cut cost and hence reduce 
the quality o f products. See James Brickley, “Incentive Conflict and Contractual Restraints: Evidence 
from Franchising” (1999) 42 Journal o f  Law and Economics 745, 748. Also Benjamin Klien and 
Lester Saft, “The Law and Economics o f Franchise Tying Contracts” (1985) 28 Journal o f  Law and 
Economics 345, 349.
450 Alan Meese, “Antitrust Balancing in a (Near) Coasean World: The Case o f Franchise Tying 
Contract” (1996) 95 Michigan Law Review 111, 119.
451 Klien et al(1999) 748.
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franchisee (who is the consumer/customer) incurs additional cost is immaterial as 
long as it leads to net welfare.452
If we are to apply the wealth transfer standard, it would be important to show 
efficiency gains to both the customer (firm B) and/or the final consumers. For 
instance, we might have to consider whether despite the additional cost incurred, the 
franchisee also benefits as a result of the reduction in searching cost and delivery 
cost. It would also be important to show how the franchisee’s efficiency gains affect 
the final consumers. For instance, in Queen City Pizza v Domino’s Pizza,453 it was 
alleged that the franchisor, Domino’s Pizza Inc., prohibited stores that produced 
dough from selling their dough to franchisees, even though the stores were willing to 
sell dough (which was of comparable quality) at a price 25 percent to 40 percent 
below Domino’s Pizza’s price.
The two welfare standards assessed are unlikely to take seriously the issue on market 
integration as long as efficiencies are gained on the one hand and there are no deficits 
in consumer surplus or that the gains are passed to the consumers. However, while 
we might fail to appreciate the health gains in the tying arrangement where we apply 
either of these two standards as they do not translate to cost benefits, a public policy- 
friendly welfare approach might, even in the absence of cost savings (either for the 
franchisor, franchisee or final consumer), hold that the tie-in of dough and tomatoes 
does not constitute a breach of competition law.
If the assumed fact is addressed in the light of the normative differentiated approach, 
it means that we cannot rely solely on account of economic freedom. We also cannot 
rely solely on account of welfare. Rather, our conclusion whether the franchise 
contract tying is anti-competitive and hence amounts to a breach would depend on 
the specific antitrust regime. Thus, with focus on citizen’s preference, it should be 
inferred whether the citizens in general would value quality delivery and uniformity 
in franchised products or services such that they are willing to dispense with the cost 
effect that is incurred by any of the parties or that they consider the freedom of the 
franchisee to source supplementary products (as long as it complies with the standard
452 For instance: that the franchisor can maintain the quality o f its brand; that the franchisor can 
benefit from the brand; and that the final consumers can receive the quality expected from the brand.
453 Above n 443.
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franchising criteria) to be strong enough to merit the status of a liberal right. The 
same reasoning applies to the issue on integration and health.
In line with the behavioural law and economics theory, we will be more concerned 
about avoiding errors based on theoretical assumptions on welfare. In this specific 
context, it has been stated under the welfare theories that tie-in could lead to 
efficiency benefits such as reduction of franchisor’s monitoring cost and/or reduction 
of franchisee’s searching cost. Without necessarily denying these possible benefits, 
the behavioural law and economics school will put to our attention more 
considerations which are not visible to the traditional welfare accounts. We may, for 
instance, note greater efficiency losses once we are prepared to move beyond the 
idea of unbounded rationality and realise that such tie-in might generate strong 
resentment and hence motivate franchisee to cheat. As noted by Benoliel, tying 
contracts increase centralisation: it leads to an increased tendency that the franchisor 
has a tight grip through direct involvement in franchisee’s decision making.454 As an 
aftermath of the concentration of powers in the franchisor, there is a constant 
deprivation of franchisee’s managerial autonomy. This by itself could be a source of 
dissatisfaction given that franchisees are largely autonomy-oriented entrepreneurs.455 
From this perspective of antitrust analysis, welfare considerations should include the 
fact that the dissatisfaction that might arise from franchisor’s effort to centralise 
might lead to inefficiencies such as an increase in franchisee’s opportunism.456 The 
ability to identify the tendency of the franchisee to lie, steal, cheat and engage in 
calculated efforts to mislead, distort, disguise, obfuscate, or otherwise confuse the 
franchisor457 as a result of its dissatisfaction458 sets this approach apart from the
454 See Uri Benoliel, “The Behavioural Law and Economics o f Franchise Tying Contracts” (2010) 41 
Rutgers Law Journal 10. Also Keith Pro van and Steven Skinner, “Interorganizational Dependence
and Control as Predictors o f Opportunism in Dealer-Supplier Relationship” (1989) 32 Academy o f
Management Journal 202,207.
455 Benoliel (2010) 12; George John, “An Empirical Investigation o f Some Antecedents of
Opportunism in Marketing Channels” (1984) 21 Marketing Research, 280.
45 This is defined as behaviour by the franchisee towards the franchisor that involves self-interest 
seeking with guile. See Oliver Wiliamson, Market and Hierarchies, Analysis and Antitrust 
Implications (New York, The Free Press, 1975).
457 See the context in which the term “guile” is used in Oliver Williamsom, The Economics o f  
Institutions o f  Capitalism  (New York, The Free Press, 1985) 47.
458 There are a number o f empirical studies linking decreased dissatisfaction and opportunism. See 
John (1984); Robert Dwyer and Sejo Oh, “Output Sector Munificence Effect on the Internal Political 
Economy o f Marketing Channels,”(1987) 24 Journal o f  Marketing Research, 347; Ronald Kidwell, 
Arne Nygaard and Ragnhild Silkoset, “Antecedents and Effect o f  Free Riding in the Franchisor- 
Franchisee Relationship” (2007) Journal o f  Business Venturing 522.
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traditional welfare assumption.459 Further, the extent to which the behavioural 
account will accommodate both the goal of integration and health will depend on the 
psychological effect arising from the surrounding circumstances.
We could relate the finding of the behavioural approach to the objective/normative 
philosophical account of welfare as both accounts, in this particular context, place a 
premium on franchisee/consumer satisfaction.
It is at this juncture that we assess how capability approach will deal with the stated 
fact. First, it is important to restate that one cannot apply the capability approach as 
the tool for choosing between antitrust theories and standards. This is because the 
approach itself makes no pretence of its capacity. Its strength and inherent broadness 
lies in the fact that it concedes that it cannot pay adequate attention to fairness and 
equity involved in procedures that have relevance to the exercise of “choosing”. This 
observation makes the application of capability approach to antitrust straightforward 
indeed. If we are to place the capability approach as the platform for our analysis of 
the fact surrounding this contract franchise tying analogy, we must be willing to 
accommodate all possible functionings which, when joined together, forms our 
capability framework upon which concrete decision are to be made subsequently 460 
In particular, we must be willing to accommodate:
The possibility that antitrust subjects may prefer to secure the competitive process 
and regardless of any benefit that could be derived from an otherwise restrictive 
tying arrangement;
The possibility of inferring that citizens value the franchisee’s independence as a 
matter of right;
Depending on the welfare standard we align to, the weighing of pros and cons of the 
alleged tying;
The possibility that the requisite weighing could also take into account public policy 
consideration, as in this case, the health concern;
A more in-depth analysis of welfare which might require the alterations of theoretical 
assumptions and the inclusion of psychological effects on the nature of franchise 
contract tying;
459 Benoliel (2010) 15.
460 The decision stage is addressed in chapter 5.
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The possibility that the subjective/positive or the objective/normative philosophical 
account of welfare could impact on functionings;
The possibility that the franchisor’s interest might be to divide the market and 
maximise profit;
And so on.
iii. Franchise Contract Tying Assessed as an Abuse o f  Dominance
If we apply the same facts in ii above in the context of abuse of dominance, our first 
task will be to ascertain when a tying arrangement might be abusive. For the act of 
tying to be found to be anti-competitive, certain elements have to be satisfied. They 
are that: the alleged infringer must have market power; there must be two separate 
products; there must be finding of anticompetitive effect or a likelihood of such 
effect and; the alleged infringer must have no objective justification for the tying 
arrangement.
It is basic to state that dominant firms could engage in tying arrangement for 
clandestine purposes. In order to identify such clandestine purposes, the “leverage 
theory” was propounded. As applied in the US case of Eastman Kodak,461 the theory 
provides that a tie-in agreement would amount to an abuse of monopoly power 
where: there are two separate products involved; the defendant had required the tied 
product to be purchased with the tying product; a substantial amount of commerce 
had been affected; and finally that the defendant had market power in the tying 
product. In other words, this means that dominant firms are in breach of competition 
law when they tie products so as to extend their market power from one market to 
another. This theory has however been heavily criticised as it has been shown that 
leveraging does not necessarily generate anti-competitive effects.462 From this 
position, the leverage theory is a flawed theory of abuse as it could well be pro- 
competitive for a company to leverage its position by typing products which 
ultimately results in efficiency gains. It means thus that the finding of abuse in a 
tying arrangement cannot be based on a set method which divides cases into two
461 Eastman Kodak Co. v Image Tech. Service, 504 U.S 1 451 (1992).
462 See Ward Bowman, “Tying Arrangements and the Leverage Problem” (1967) 67 Yale Law Journal 
19-36; Bork (1978), ch 19.
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mutually exclusive categories of “leverage” or “no leverage”.463 As such, effect 
analysis which takes into account the price of both the tied and tying product may be 
necessary to justify the finding of abuse.464
With regards to arguments that tying arrangements could have efficiency benefits, it 
can be argued that a dominant firm could be engaged in tying in order to improve 
quality. Tying could also be used for quality assurance purposes and to protect 
trademarks or trade secrets in franchising and leasing agreements. A lucid example 
of the tying of photocopier and cartridge has been given to illustrate this point.465 It is 
also possible that a tied package is more valuable than the sum of the individual 
products.466 Further, tying could reduce price inefficiencies. One way to achieve this 
is through price “discrimination by tying”. This arrangement can be used to recover 
fixed cost in market where it is high.467 There could be overall welfare effect arising 
from price discrimination by tying where a market is characterised by a combination 
of high fixed cost, network effects or economies of scale.468 It could also help reduce 
the price inflation that arises as a result of the double marginalisation problem; where 
there exist two monopolists at both the upstream and downstream market of 
interrelated products, welfare may be better enhanced if the products are tied in order 
to eliminate one of the mark-ups.469
Further, there could even be greater efficiency benefits for tying or bundling 
especially in dynamic industries such as: the potential for price discrimination to lead 
to efficient recovery of fixed cost; the need for firms selling complex systems to 
protect their reputation; the ability of bundling to reduce prices and increase sales; 
the potential for cost savings from bundling; and rational product integration.470
463 Bowman, ibid, 34.
464 Ibid.
465 For details on the example o f photocopier and cartridges, see Herbert Hovenkamp, Mark Janis and 
Mark Lemley, IP and Antitrust: An Analysis o f  Antitrust Principles Applied to Intellectual Property 
Law (New York, Aspen Law & Business, 2007) 21-29.
466 See Schmidt (2009) 18-19.
467 Charles River Associates, “Innovation and Competition Policy, Parti -  Conceptual Issues” 
Economic Discussion Paper 3, March 2002, report prepared for the Office o f Fair Trading 
[www.oft.gov.uk/shared_oft/report/comp_policy/oft377partl .pdf] 82-83.
468 Ibid.
469 See Augustin Cournot, Research into the Mathematical Principle o f  the Theory o f  wealth 
(Nathaniel Bacon ed) (Macmillan, New York 1897); Nalebuff (2003) 37-38.
470 Robert Lind and Paul Muysert, “Innovation and Competition Policy: Challenges for the New 
Millennium” (2003) 24 European Competition Law Review 87, 90.
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These benefits must however be weighed against the risk of market foreclosure, the 
discouragement to potential competitors and the stifling of innovation.471
In the same vein, tying arrangement could also lead to inefficiencies. Though, for 
such anti-competitive effect to be present, there must be; imperfect competition in 
the tied market; a commitment to tie; an inability on the part of the competitor to 
match the tie; the likelihood of competitor’s exit; barriers to entry; and absence of 
buyer power.472 Tie-in arrangements could affect both competitors and consumers: 
competitors may be excluded from such market473 while consumer choice may be 
severely limited. On its possible foreclosure effect, tying could impede or deter a 
potential competitor from entering a tied product market474 and also limit consumers’ 
choice on downstream product 475 It could also be used to protect the tying product 
market476 and to undercut rivals’ price.477 Tying could be used to make prices of 
products obscure which may impact on consumer choice. Also, a dominant firm can 
tie products in an attempt to mitigate the competition that has arisen as a result of a
A H Q
market entry by a competitor.
The European Commission, through its Article 82 Guidance, sets out circumstances 
which are likely to prompt intervention when assessing tying and bundling by 
dominant undertakings. The Commission states that an undertaking is dominant in 
the tying market where they tying products are distinct and where the tying practice 
is likely to lead to anti-competitive foreclosure.479 With regards to the latter 
requirement, the Commission has identified certain tying practices that might 
foreclose the market. For example, it of the view that the risk of anti-competitive 
foreclosure is greater where the dominant undertaking makes its tying or bundling 
strategy a lasting one.480 It also contends that by tying two products, a dominant 
undertaking may seek to chill the price elasticity that exists between its distinct
471 Ibid.
472 See Ahlbom, et al (2004) 331-333.
473 Michael Whinston, “Tying, Foreclosure and Exclusion” (1990) 80 The American Economic Review 
837.
474 Schmidt (2009) 30.
475 Hovenkamp et al (2007) 21-23.
476 Derek Ridyard “Tying and Bundling -  Cause for Complaint?” (2005) 26 European Competition 
Law Review 316,371.
477 William Baldwin and David McFarland “Tying Arrangement in Law and Economics (1963) 8 
Antitrust Bulletin 743.
478 Ibid.
479 Article 82 Guidance, para 50.
480 Ibid, para 52.
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products by tying them which then allows the undertaking to raise price.481 The 
Commission however recognises that tying arrangements could lead to savings in 
production and distribution that would benefit customers.482
Proceeding from this observation to the particular context of the assumed facts on 
franchise contract tying, we should assume further that firm A has substantial market 
power in the pizza market. We can then assess whether there will be a finding of 
abuse under the different theories and hence showcase how the capability approach 
accommodates these theories.
From the economic freedom perspective, we would be concerned solely about the 
anticompetitive object. Though heavily criticised, this appears to be more in line with 
EU practice as there are clear signs that Article 102 has strong links with ordoliberal 
thinking.483 Thus, in assessing the propriety of tying arrangements, economic 
freedom theory requires that we take into account the following steps:484
(1) Defining the relevant market and the existence of a tied product separate from 
the tying product;
(2) The firm concerned is dominant (normally in the tying product market, but 
can also be found dominant in the tied product market );
(3) There is an element of coercion as the customer is forced to purchase the 
bundle
(4) There is no objective justification for the coercion.
In the Microsoft case, the European Commission was concerned that tying Windows 
Media Player (WMP) and Windows Operating System would foreclose competition 
and stifle innovation in the Media Software Encoding and Management market 
because WMP would become the preferred choice for complimentary content and 
application provider. Economic freedom regimes, on the one hand, would have given 
more relevance to consumer choice instead of focusing on efficiency. On the other
481 Ibid, para 56.
482 Ibid, para 62.
483 Gerber (1998) 241.
484 See Schmidt (2009) 60.
485 Commission’s Decision IBM Undertaking [1984] OJ LI 18/24.
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hand, they are concerned simply about the exclusionary potential of tying rather than 
adding the requirement of consumer harm.486
Where we apply the traditional economic approaches (that is total welfare and wealth 
transfer), limitation of franchisee’s choice will not in itself be indicative of a 
competition concern. The focus will be on the pros and cons of tying (in terms of 
efficiency and/or distribution) as it could be deduced from the specific franchise 
arrangement. All consumer-based theories might take into consideration, the 
likelihood of market foreclosure. However, they might address it only to the extent 
that it affects consumers. Above all, any of these standards represent the “more 
economic approach”.
In all, these accounts require that we pay closer attention to the efficiency 
justification if we are to conduct a proper analysis of abuse cases (including tying). 
When applied, the outcome we arrive at after balancing efficiency gains with 
possible negative effects will depend strongly on the welfare standard we align to.
Applying the normative differentiated approach, “a more economic approach” in 
Article 102 (and consequently, the case at hand) does not require that only the effects 
on consumer (or total) welfare be taken into account. In addition the effects on a 
certain set of protected rights, which can be derived from the preferences of citizens, 
can be considered. For instance, we might have to ask if tie-in will conveniently 
foreclose the market against the producers of dough and tomatoes. If so, do citizens 
consider the competitor’s to be rights holders? This might involve us weighing not 
only the efficiency arguments but also to ascertain the risk of market foreclosure and 
the likes. Though Kerber concedes that the weighing suggested in his theory can lead 
to additional trade-off problems, he still contended that such a more general approach 
is still entirely compatible with economic theory.
So as to make the weighing of pros and cons more in line with reality, proponents of 
the behavioural law and economics could argue that firm A might take into account 
possible inertia on the part of franchisees. We might, as such, have to take note that 
even where it appears that the franchisor is tying its products in order to reduce price 
inefficiency, it could in fact be that it is enhancing its market share especially where
486 This is said to be the position in Europe. In support o f this conclusion, Monti referred to Case T- 
83/91, Tetra Pak Pausing SA v Commission (Tetra Pak II) [1990] ECR11-3092 see Monti (2007) 191.
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franchisees are unable to differentiate between the total price of the tied package and 
the price and cost of individual products. Such observations might lead to a change in 
the nature or outcome of our analysis.
Just as we noted under restrictive agreements, the capability approach will 
accommodate different possibilities within its framework. Individual theories, it has 
been shown, have their areas of strength but are all generally weak in that they 
cannot individually accommodate all reasoning and outcomes that antitrust subjects 
could possibly value.
4.6.2 Capability Approach and other Issues under Article 101 and 102
Since the capability approach simply accommodates the various theories that reflect 
different functionings of different persons, it is unnecessary to undergo the laboured 
exercise of assessing the adaptability of the approach to other antitrust issues. The 
simple message is that regardless of the antitrust issue, broadness should be ensured 
through the pursuit of inclusiveness. However, notwithstanding the fact that we do 
not envision that there might be any antitrust behaviour (outside of tying 
arrangement) which will be incompatible with the capability framework, it is still a 
good idea to relate with a few more examples; we could assess horizontal agreements 
and other Article 102 concerns such as selective low pricing.
When analysing horizontal agreements, one has to recognise that most welfare-based 
and freedom-based accounts would consider such agreements to be anti-competitive 
by object. The finding of breach is rife where parties agree to fix price or divide the 
market. It is important for us to ascertain how the person-centred approach will 
address such issue in the light of the capability framework. The need to be inclusive 
means that we should incorporate different possibilities that could arise from such 
horizontal agreement within the capability framework. Thus we cannot afford to 
decide ex ante that such agreement i.e. price fixing is anti-competitive. We should 
also take note of interests of antitrust subjects who, based on the application of a 
different theoretical insight such as transaction economics, are able to tease out the 
value that such cooperation brings to the market.
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Perhaps the European Commission took note of such reasoning in the Visa 
International-Multilateral Interchange Fee case,487 where, rather than merely see it 
as a price-fixing arrangement, it considered that an agreement containing a provision 
to fix the “Multilateral Interchange Fee” (MIF) paid by acquiring banks to issuing 
banks within the Visa system did not have as its object the restriction of competition 
since the MIF agreement in this instance, had “as its objective to increase the 
stability and efficiency of operation of that system ... and indirectly to strengthen
• • 0^0
competition between payment systems.” This decision was made despite the prima 
facie assumption on the collusive nature of information exchange by competitors.489 
If the Commission’s reasoning was narrowed to economic freedom, it might not have 
taken time to identify the efficiency justification of such arrangement. The same 
level of broad reasoning is expected if we are dealing with vertical agreements such 
as retail price maintenance, agreements granting absolute territorial protection490 and 
so on. We are to analyse these issues as object-based infringements and effect based 
infringements.
With regards to object-based infringements, there is need to understand the 
justification given by specific antitrust theories in designating specific behaviour as 
being anti-competitive by object. For example, if the competing capability 
sets/functionings present in the framework for deciding a pure cartel case lead to the 
conclusion that such cartelist activity is anti-competitive by object, we have to 
understand why the specific theory underlying each capability set/functioning (be it 
economic freedom, efficiency or any other) would come to that conclusion -  is it 
simply because such behaviour overtly impugns on the inalienable aspect of antitrust 
subjects’ freedom or because there is empirical evidence to show that such pure 
cartelist behaviour is bound to result in more efficiency loss than gain which thereby 
renders a full scale effect-based analysis unnecessary? When analysing their effect, 
we have to assess, on the basis of specific theories, whether they impact on inter­
brand competition, intra-brand competition or they merely amount to ancillary 
restraints.
487 [2002] OJ L318/17, [2003] 4 CMLR 283.
488 Ibid, para 69.
489 On information exchange, see generally OECD Competition Committee Policy Roundtables on 
Information Exchanges between Competitors under Competition Law 2010.
490 Example o f this is given in the decisional context in chapter 5.
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Concerning Article 102, reference can be made to the issue of selective low pricing. 
Some theories might find anti-competitive “intent” where even though low prices 
charged by dominant undertakings are not below cost as long as it can be shown that 
the pricing practice is part of a deliberate plan to eliminate competitors through 
selective price-cutting. Conclusions deriving from a rational choice analysis or a 
freedom-based theory may differ from the one reached under a behavioural law and 
economic analysis. Where for instance, we are concerned about economic freedom 
and hence the protection of the competitive structure, anti-competitive “intent” as 
shown by the Commission in Eurofix-Bauco491 and CEWAL 492 indicate that it would 
constitute abuse if it is shown that a dominant firm had exclusionary “intent” 
regardless of the fact that its pricing was not below cost. On the other hand, an 
account based on rational choice may lead to the conclusion that antitrust should not 
recognise any claim of above-cost predatory pricing regardless of the intent of the 
dominant firm since short-term threat or pricing strategies that exceed short-term cost 
should not be able to deter long-term investments or entry.493 A behavioural law and 
economic account might take exception to this rational choice analysis by, for 
instance, stating how a new entrant might be psychologically discouraged from such 
market as a result of the dominant firm’s exclusionary intent.
It is for us to consider all these possibilities within the capability framework. The 
same conflicting reasoning could be made of other abuse of dominance issues such 
as refusal to supply and so on.
4.7 Conclusion
The analyses of antitrust issues through the person-centred approach proceed from 
Coleman’s questions on right. It was stated in chapter three that when answering the 
question about the goal(s) of antitrust right, we should avoid choosing between 
normative propositions at an ex ante stage. In this chapter, we were preoccupied with 
the task of building a framework that would guide us to achieve inclusiveness by 
conveniently helping us resist the temptation to make categorical statements a priori.
491 Commission decision Eurofix-Bauco v. Hilti 88/138/EEC, [1988] OJ L 65.
492 Commission decision Cewal, Cowac and Ukwal [1993] L34/20.
493 Einer Elhauge, “Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants are not Predatory-And the 
Implication for Defining Cost and Market Power” (2003) 112 Yale Law Journal 681, 826-827.
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At the end of our analysis, it becomes clear that the capability approach is most 
appropriate for the person-centred approach as it maintains the broadness required.
However, as it will be observed in the next chapter, the capability approach does not 
practically answer the remaining questions of antitrust right which concern the 
proper way of analysing such right and how antitrust right should be enforced. We 
are unable to go any further with the capability approach because its impact is 
limited to the recognition of opportunities. It is therefore imperative that we make 
conscious effort to build a decisional framework.
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Chapter 5
ANTITRUST PLURALISM AND JUSTICE
5.1 Introduction
So far, this thesis has sought to establish the person-centred approach as an account 
that can truly strive towards justice as inclusiveness. It is hoped that this account will 
escape the ills of the prevailing approaches as revealed through the deconstruction 
analysis in chapter one. So far, the construction exercise seem to be taking due 
account of the position of the “Other”. It is however yet to be seen how the approach 
will hold up when concrete decisions are to be made. It is indeed very crucial that the 
person-centred approach is able to live up to its promise of inclusiveness at this 
decision-making stage; it would live up to its promise if the procedure is able to 
avoid subjectivity inherent in the deconstructed traditional approaches as well as the 
discourse ethics.
As shown in the preceding chapter, capability approach provides the conceptual 
foundation for accommodating various antitrust interests. However, while it could 
guide policy-makers to be prudent when formulating policies, it does not go as far as 
guiding competition authorities and courts in their decision-making. This is because 
while the framework gives antitrust subjects adequate opportunity to achieve/protect 
their interest or wellbeing, it cannot possibly deal with the process of reaching a state 
of wellbeing. In other words, the capability approach cannot, by itself choose 
amongst the lots, the interest which should be vindicated in specific cases. The 
reasoning, as identified by Sen, is that:
“Capabilities are characteristics of individual advantages and while they may 
incorporate some features of the process involved ..., they fall short of telling us 
enough about the freedom of citizens to invoke and utilize procedures that are 
equitable”494
The task here is to build a less fallible decisional framework as it would be outright 
unrealistic to aim at building an absolutely watertight framework. This is because 
every position is, as a matter of fact, deconstructible.495 To build a less frail account,
494 Sen (2009) 296.
495 Derrida (1990).
159
it is required that we maintain a broad framework even as we proceed to making 
concrete decisions. We are to maintain our impartiality when choosing between the 
set of interests within the capability framework. If we simply try to picture a 
decisional regime that promotes broadness all through, it becomes evident that it is 
quite impossible to ignore the enormity of the task -  how do we combine the need to 
get concrete results with the need to accommodate all relevant interests?
In an attempt to build up an acceptable process, I divide this chapter into four. First, I 
define the broadness that we should seek at the decisional stage. This is where the 
capability approach is still relevant. I argue that though it cannot help us build a 
process, we could make progress by following the capability approach’s concept of 
“broadness as inclusiveness”. In part two, I explain the nature of the process aspect 
wherein substantive decisions are made. In part three, I assess the possibility of 
reaching concrete decisions without falling short of justice as inclusiveness. Part four 
details the conclusions.
5.2 Broadness and the Informational Focus for Antitrust
Over and above theoretical discourse, when it comes to concrete cases, stakeholders 
are often primarily concerned about the outcomes, and consequently, the impact 
those outcomes have on the field of antitrust in general. The outcome arrived at in a 
specific case would invariably be the “state of affair” that is determined by relevant 
vectors and decisional variables (be it action of the parties, modes of argumentation, 
applicable rules or disposition) through which the case is decided.496
When we address issues from an idealised position, what we consider to be the 
appropriate constituent of the “state of affair” will largely depend on our school of 
thought. Our school of thought will shape the perspective (that is, the informational 
focus) from which we assess the antitrust issue. Our choice of the informational 
focus will be influenced by the outcome we desire. For instance, we might ask 
ourselves if the peculiar method of analysing the antitrust issues in any given 
instance results in the enhancement of consumer welfare. It is also possible that we 
take into account factors other than the desired outcome when deciding on the
496 Sen (2009)215-221.
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informational focus: we might take into account the process of choice and the agency 
information that may be relevant and all the personal and impersonal relations that 
may be seen as important to our decisional task.497 Where our focus is influenced by 
narrowly defined ultimate results, we are concerned with what is called “culmination 
outcomes”. On the other hand, where we take into account other factors such as the 
process of choice and the agency, we are concerned about “comprehensive 
outcomes”.498
A capability platform requires that we broaden our informational focus by taking 
note of and demanding comprehensive outcomes since the end does not always 
justify the means. To put this into perspective, what it means is that as opposed to 
individual theories that seek strictly to achieve specific goals, the capability approach 
will also take into consideration the need to have a procedure that gives due regard to 
different goals as this ensures that choices are presented before concrete decisions 
are made.
In line with the person-centred framework, we should be concerned with persons’ 
opportunities to achieve. In assessing such opportunity, we might follow a 
culmination perspective. For instance, we might assess a consumer’s opportunity in 
line with what he ends up with (e.g., competitive prices and brand choices) under the 
narrowly defined consumer welfare goal. We could also assess the outcomes from a 
comprehensive perspective. Here, we can assess the way the person reaches the 
culmination situation -  it means that we should not only be interested in the 
opportunity to get competitive prices and brand choices, but also whether the 
consumers had the choice to wish for something else even if we assume that they 
would most likely have chosen the advantages of competitive prices and choices.
The capability approach requires us to reach this idea of comprehensive outcome. It 
means thus that our analysis and evaluation need to take note of both the opportunity 
and the process aspect. The framework based on this approach sets the ground for us 
to achieve this comprehensive state by accommodating every relevant interests or 
outcomes that could be teased out of any antitrust issue. However, as it has been
497 Ibid.
498 Ibid.
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continuously iterated, the capability-based framework in itself cannot possibly deal 
with the process aspect.499
Consequently, in order to ensure that our person-centred approach meets the requisite 
comprehensive outcome, authorities and courts must not only desire that the process 
aspect is considered. It is imperative that we build a person-centred/capability 
compliant decisional process.
The Process Aspect
As stated above, the process aspect of capability approach simply focuses on the 
process of choice-making and the degree of agency information considered in 
particular instances. This is very much in line with the strictly procedural nature of 
the person-centred approach. For instance, one might assess whether a functioning 
has been achieved by assessing a peculiar end-state against relatively narrow agency 
information. Alternatively, one could assess such end-state against broader agency 
information.500
As earlier mentioned, the capability framework sets its focus on comprehensive 
outcomes. However, the framework in itself cannot be relied on by antitrust regimes 
in their decisional activities. In essence, we have to build a decisional process outside 
the capability framework. It must be further noted that the process aspect (that is, our 
decisional activities) and the opportunity aspect (the capability framework) are not 
independent of each other. We cannot thus be unconcerned with the process aspect 
especially as the overall theme of the person-centred approach centres around 
broadness. Our decisional process must not undo the steady and elaborate effort of 
the capability framework by failing to be inclusive.
As an indication of how a decisional process might fail to be inclusive and hence 
undo the capability approach, one could illustrate with Michelin II501 on rebates. The 
usage of rebate could spring up serious competition issues. Hence the Commission
499 Ibid, 225-230.
500 See explanation about culmination and comprehensive outcomes in 5.2 above.
501 See Michelin II, COMP/E-2/36.041-PO/Michelin.
502 See generally OECD Competition Committee Policy Roundtables on Fidelity and Bundled Rebates 
and Discounts 2008. [http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/22/41772877.pdf].
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stated in Michelin II  that by “providing an advantage not based on any economic 
service justifying it, [a] rebate system tends to remove or restrict the buyer’s freedom 
to choose his sources of supply and thus bar competitors from access to the
503 •market”. Contrary to the Commission’s statement, if we are to be in compliance 
with the broadness requirement at the process aspect, we cannot afford to exclude 
other reasoning in our decision.504 In Michelin 77, the Commission failed to be 
inclusive as it did not substantiate alternative efficiency justifications and other 
potential positions. For a decisional framework to comply with the requirement of 
justice as inclusiveness, it would be expected that alternative normative justifications 
are, at least, taken into account. For instance, it is quite possible that if we reason in 
the line of behavioural law and economics, buyers may well be willing to forego 
brand choices for the pecuniary benefit. We might also find, as part of that capability 
set that the undertaking was unlikely to have had anti-competitive “intent”.
Another example can be made out of predation cases. Europe’s tendency towards 
“culmination outcomes” can be inferred from the strictly form-based assessment in 
Wanadoo Interactive 505 and also the fact that in France Telecom,506 the Court of 
Justice refused to acknowledge the possibility of assessing through a consumer 
welfare approach which requires that the alleged infringer is able to recoup the cost 
of the predatory strategy. The failure to accommodate interests of the antitrust 
subjects as expressed through other theories (such as consumer welfare standard) 
weakens the decisional framework even if the form-based approach would have been 
chosen anyway.
However, even if we leave open the room for different consequences, the 
inevitability of making concrete decisions provides another challenge. To make 
concrete decisions between the duly recognised and substantiated theories, it is 
simply impossible for us to accommodate all conceivable interests till the very end.
503 Ibid, para 227. See also Monti (2007) 24 n 17.
504 The quest for broadness would however have to be done within reason. Cost burden and other 
relevant factors would have to be taken into account in determining the width and breadth o f  the 
informational focus.
505 COMP/38.233- Wanadoo Interactive. COMP/38.233 Wanadoo Interactive, Commission Decision 
of 16 July 2003. Note that we do not make judgment about the propriety o f applying a form-based 
approach. The problem is that in arriving at the decision, it does not appear that the Commission 
addressed other options.
506 Case T-340/03, France Telecom [2007] E.C.R. 11-107; C-202/07 P, France Telecom [2009] 4 
CMLR 25 para 333. Note that analysis o f recoupment in para 336 was merely subsidiary. This 
position was confirmed by both the General Court and the Court o f Justice.
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For instance, where there is no chance of recoupment in a predation case, how are we 
to satisfy the interest held by the defendant (which is that, since there is no chance of 
recoupment, there cannot be predation) and also those held by another antitrust 
subject (perhaps a competitor who initiated the claim) who claims that predatory 
intent is enough to prove anti-competition.
At this point, it is important for us to draw a distinction between accommodating 
various interests and vindicating each of them all the way. We cannot make concrete 
decisions and at the same time vindicate all (particularly conflicting) interests equally 
till the very end of our decisional activity -  it is simply impossible. As such, though 
it is ideal for us to apply a high threshold of equality in our assessments, it is 
imperative that if we are to make substantive decisions, the chain of strict equality 
might have to be broken at some point. Moreover, we cannot base our exercise on a 
strict threshold of equality as we have to realise that “a number of very well-known 
proposals cannot [all] be retained”.507 Hence, we might have to reject some proposals 
in the interest of meeting practical justice. This is in line with the deconstructionist 
reasoning of transcendental deconstruction. We can therefore see the inevitability of 
choice-making as deriving from the insatiable part of the people’s yearning for 
justice as inclusiveness.
Hence, our inability to treat various interests equally till the end does not mean they 
cannot be accommodated within the decisional process. If we strive towards 
inclusiveness, we would have desisted from ranking these interests ex ante thereby 
ensuring equality up until the operational stage whereby the chain of equality has to 
be broken. One thing we can be sure of is that even though some interests may be 
rejected, it is of value that they were included in the process of choice to which they 
could well have been vindicated had the circumstances that impacted on the 
decisional framework been different. Hence, comprehensive outcomes will be 
achieved in our antitrust analysis where we have accommodated all interests (within 
practical limits)508 into the capability framework (opportunity aspect) and also duly 
considered all those interests on our way to reaching concrete decisions (process 
aspect).
507 Kolm (1996) 4.
508 The practical limitations will likely differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.
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It is noteworthy that not even the capability framework will require equality of 
capabilities/functionings. Freedom is not akin to equality. When we apply the 
capability approach, we make no promises or state no a priori position on how these 
interests are to be subsequently addressed. It is thus pertinent to restate that the 
capability approach is no more than a perspective in which the advantages and 
disadvantages of a person can be reasonably assessed. Though this perspective plays 
a significant role particularly for theories of justice and of moral and political 
evaluation, the concerns of justice cannot be limited to the overall opportunities and 
advantages of individuals in society.509 As long as the capability sets/functionings are 
accommodated and even if we attach significance to the equality within and between 
these functionings, we are not required to define equality in one way or the other 
especially if a firm definition will conflict with other important considerations.510
Hence, required from our decisional process is that it must accommodate varying 
theories and ideals and as such, varying interests in order to reach a comprehensive 
outcome. We have to proceed on the ground that plural values are distinct and 
incommensurable and as such it is impossible to reduce all things we have reason to 
value into one homogenous magnitude. It is also required that we go about our 
decisional activities with persons as the main subject. Hence, whether implicitly or 
explicitly referred to, all analysis, evaluations and argumentations should be seen as 
firmly nested on the need to harness the best of the opportunities of antitrust subjects.
These germane requirements placed on the decisional process come with their own 
unique sets of concerns. There are debates as to whether accommodating plural 
interests in our decisional process will work. We are however also faced with real 
concerns that require compliance with the rule of law. Regarding the effectiveness of 
a plurivalued511 regime, Schaub for instance, states that we may debate whether 
competition rules could be an instrument to serve pluralism and democracy, and 
whether the provisions should be limited to protecting the efficient functioning of the 
markets or extended to controlling economic power.512 Also, as components of rule
509 Sen (2009) 297.
510 E.g. wealth transfer and allocative efficiency can both be seen as means o f achieving equality. The 
problem therefore is that there is no principled reason to follow one interpretation and not the other.
511 Word borrowed from Kolm (1996).
512 See Schaub (1998) 121.
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of law, legal certainty513 and the avoidance of arbitrariness are infinitely important to 
our decisional process; certainty, it has been said, should be given due consideration, 
otherwise the value of antitrust policy will be seriously impaired.514 In Europe, the 
importance attached to predictability and certainty is reflected by the Union’s 
religious pursuit of uniformity.515
It would not be far-fetched to say that a pluralistic regime increases our concerns for 
the attainment of the rule of law. In fact, it has been argued by some that by 
incorporating plural values to antitrust, we will be applying certain social criteria into 
antitrust enforcement and that such social, political and moral criteria are likely to be 
applied arbitrarily and subjectively because we have to define vague terms such as 
fairness and social justice.516 The potency of these concerns will be assessed as the 
decisional framework is further developed. However, short of dismissing these 
concerns, it is pertinent to note the unique position of the person-centred approach 
especially when compared with the traditional monist and pluralist ideals. The 
person-centred approach is unique because it avoids the two major problems that are 
respectively attributed to the monist and pluralist antitrust ideologies. Monists want a 
pre-determined sole goal for antitrust as they think this will curb arbitrariness and 
uncertainty. The pluralists think differently. They think that allowing plural values
c i 7
will lead to optimal balance of objectives. The person-centred approach however 
requires comprehensive outcomes. Monist ideologies fail to address substantive 
opportunities as they focus too narrowly on a set outcome (culmination outcome). 
Inductively therefore, since we are required by the capability approach to ensure that 
our decisional process does not merely lead to culmination outcome, it is clear that 
the person-centred approach is not affected by the shortcomings of monist thoughts.
513 Stefano Bertea, “How Non-Positivism Can Accommodate Legal Certainty” in Pavlakos (ed) 
(2007) 69; Zenon Bankowski, Living Lawfully: Love in Law and Law in Love (Dordrecht, Kluwer, 
2001)39-42.
514 Roger Van den Bergh, “The Difficult Reception o f Economic Analysis in European Competition 
Law” in Antonio Cicinotta, Roberto Pardolesi and Roger Van den Bergh (eds) Post-Chicago 
Development in Antitrust Law (Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2002) 35. Legal certainty is particularly a 
strong requirement in Europe. Though its necessity cannot be doubted, claims based on the idea o f  
legal certainty can be linked to the bounded rationality problem o f “availability heuristic”. As such, it 
must be noted that whatever the position of the law may be, there will always be criticisms based on 
legal uncertainty.
5 This is, for example, the motivation behind the provision o f section 267 TFEU which grants the 
Court o f Justice the power to grant preliminary rulings. See also Case C-63/93 Fintan Duff v Ministry 
o f  Agriculture and Food and Attorney General, [1996] ECR1-569.
5,6 Schuab (1998) 126.
517 E.g. see generally Townley (2009).
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On the other hand, pluralists consider it necessary that we take a broader view in our 
analysis as no theory is prescriptive enough to provide sufficient empirical guidelines 
for policy-makers.518 As such, any theory that lays absolute claim to a regime “will 
be ill-suited both to the extent of social heterogeneity and to the plurality of the 
relevant values at stake.”519 The monists however kick against the idea of plurality 
on the account that it is prone to arbitrariness as a result of the uncertainty involved. 
The person-centred approach seeks to be differentiated from other pluralist accounts 
as it aims at developing a firm procedure that will avoid arbitrariness while also 
focusing on comprehensive outcomes. It is important to the whole exercise that this 
is a reasonable and practical ambition. Of course, comprehensive outcomes require 
that we consider a broad range of interests, but inherent in this requirement is that the 
decisional process itself must be intelligible. This naturally implicates the need to 
avoid arbitrariness -  typically, an arbitrary decisional process will most likely 
generate self-contradictory outcomes and as a matter of logic, what is self­
contradictory is unintelligible and incoherent.520 The person-centred approach thus 
recognises that an unsubstantiated pluralistic antitrust regime is as bad, if not worse 
than a myopic one. Hence, it is required that to achieve comprehensive outcome 
through our decisional process, institutions must not act arbitrarily for how can we 
say that we have given due consideration to all relevant interests at both the 
opportunity and process aspect if our process rests absolutely on whims? Where we 
fail to structure our pluralistic regime, our efforts might end up to be nothing more 
than “mere assertions of a different set of personal preferences” which will 
definitely run afoul of the spirit of the person-centred approach.
Thus in sum, our decisional framework seeks to move away from the unrealistic 
specificity inherent in monist thought by seeking broadness. It is however yet to be 
seen whether it can reduce the likelihood of arbitrariness that attends a pluralistic 
regime.
518 Oles Andriychuk, ‘Dialectical Antitrust: An Alternative Insight into the Methodology o f the EC 
Competition Law Analysis in a Period of Economic Downturn’ (2010) 4 European Competition Law 
Review 163.
519 Sunstein( 1996) 99.
520 See Raz (1996) 261. Raz emphasises that “[c]oherence conveys a specific good, the value o f which 
is undeniable. What is incoherent is unintelligible, because it is self-contradictory, fragmented, 
disjointed.”
521 Bork (1978) 72.
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Summing up these requirements, what it means for the decisional aspect of antitrust 
is that the decisional process must stay plural but “follow a course” if it is to achieve 
comprehensive outcomes. This condition limits the relevant institution’s discretion in 
deciding on antitrust issues by making it necessary to mark the line so that “however 
discretional decision-making activities may be, they are never wholly arbitrary or 
irrational”. Consequently, “with the aid of tools, even forms of reasoning which are 
not completely rule bound can be made to follow a course” in a way that “legal 
decisions will not rest entirely on acts of will.”522
To achieve comprehensive outcomes, we have to develop a decisional process that 
“follows a course”. The primary ingredient for achieving this aim is to substantiate 
an ordering or structure for the person-centred analysis of the decisional aspect of 
antitrust. Without a structure, a pluralistic regime might be trapped into arbitrariness. 
To check this potential snag, the ordering herein proposed is called antitrust 
pluralism. Above all, we have to test the decisional process in order to ascertain 
whether the reality of decision-making is compatible with the overall idea of justice 
as inclusiveness.
5.3 Antitrust Pluralism
As it has been shown in the preceding part, a legal regime should be reasonably 
accommodating if it is to solve complex and controversial issues (such as those 
prevalent in competition law) mainly because social life is too rich in complicated
• C')'! #
details to permit resort to monistic overriding abstractions. A narrow focus will not 
be ideal as “[ejvery general principle will confront cases in which its application will 
run at cross purposes with its aspirations”.524 As such, antitrust law and policy should 
be pluralistic in nature.
Upon closer look, it appears that the call for plurality is after all not revolutionary 
especially when one considers that the major antitrust institutions’ accommodate 
plural goals and that even those who make claims to sole goal/limited goals such as
522 Stefano Bertea, “The Arguments from Coherence: Analysis and Evaluation” (2005) Oxford 
Journal o f  legal Studies 370-391, 371.
523 Ibid.
524 George Christie, “The Uneasy Place of Principle in Tort Law” in David Owen (ed) Philosophical 
Foundation o f  Tort Law (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1995) 115.
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consumer welfare are often times merely “philosophical”.525 For instance, one could 
sense Europe’s unspoken avoidance of monism in antitrust cases as its institutions 
have avoided abstracting relevant terms. For example, with regards to Article 101 
TFEU, Advocate General Tesauro in Gottrup-Klim stated that the protection of 
competition pursued by the Court cannot be defined in abstract terms but must rather 
be seen in the specific context in which the conduct of the firm came about.526 Even 
within the academia, there are some who not only accept plurality but promote it. 
Rodger, for instance, states that “[cjompetition law or policy has no fixed content... 
It can therefore be justifiably stated that in applying the core economic thesis which 
informs competition law, any set of principles and policies may play a part in a
c'-sn
coherent competition law system”
What we can infer is that, much more than it appears when addressed on surface 
level, there is a greater likelihood that plurality is/will be accepted by stakeholders. 
But the person-centred approach requires more. It must meet the requirement of
justice as inclusiveness.
Antitrust pluralism is the process of expounding the ordering of antitrust. It is the 
primary vessel through which stakes of substantive antitrust rights are assessed. The 
end result of such process is unknown but would be considered correct (regardless of 
its normative content) as long as such outcome derives from a pure procedure. This 
procedure, it is hoped, will also balance the need for legal certainty and the flexibility
• C ^ O
required for governing an economy in a state of constant flux.
The process of antitrust pluralism has been set into two stages; ascertaining and 
choosing. There are many factors that find their way into antitrust policy, some at the 
centre and others at the peripheral level. A single measure might be explicable 
through different theoretical groundings. In such cases, face value evaluation may 
lead us to conclude that it is not of much importance to identify the theoretical basis 
of an antitrust issue but in fact, the importance of such an exercise cannot be over-
525 Schuab (1998) 125. Hawk also observed the consensus among stakeholders from different 
enforcement regimes. He reveals that there is a considerable gap between the rhetoric o f competition 
law objectives and the reality o f their actual implementation. See Barry Hawk, “Competition Law 
Implementation at Present” in Ehlermann and Laudati (1998) 353.
526 Case C-250/92 Gottrup-Klim v Dansk Landbrugs, para (1994) I ECR 5641, 5654.
527 Barry Rodger, “Competition Policy, Liberalism and Globalization: A European Perspective” 
(2000) 6 Columbia Journal o f  European Law 303-304.
528 See Bertea (2007) 69.
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emphasised. This is because failure to ascertain all conceivable interests, 
corresponding theories and their consequences on the case in hand means that we 
might fall short of the broadness requirement. Afterwards, the next task is the 
choosing; here, we have to choose between competing functionings/capability sets.
The two stages in the process are treated in turn:
5.3.1 Ascertaining
In general, the task of ascertaining competition issues require that we take into 
account the actual context in which competition would occur in the absence of the 
behaviours under review. Here, our primary aim is to put the person-centred 
description of antitrust into more practical context. From the person-centred 
approach, the structure to be employed when attempting to ascertain the conduct in 
question is likely to differ from the structure under specific theories. First, the 
person-centred approach would require that we engage in ascertaining a broad range 
of legal conclusions that could be drawn from the behaviour under consideration. 
Each conclusion, backed by a theoretical insight and/or peculiar antitrust goal, 
represents a functioning/capability set. Second, depending on the way each 
functioning is to be ascertained, the person-centred approach might obscure the neat 
differentiation between traditional assessment methods. For instance, the task of 
ascertaining does not require us to make concrete judgment about how and whether 
Article 101(1) and Article 101(3) should be assessed. The ascertaining task does not 
limit the reach of any of the functionings. In other words, the relevant authorities 
should be able to fully describe a singular antitrust issue through each of the 
applicable antitrust theories. For example, while the functioning attached to the 
economic freedom theory may require that our ascertaining task ends with our 
assessment of Article 101(1), the consumer welfare or total welfare-based 
functionings might require a full scale analysis of both Article 101(1) and (3) TFEU
529 Case 56/65, Societe Technique Miniere, [1966] ECR 337.
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in order to reach substantive conclusions which are thereafter set against themselves 
at the choosing stage.530
To clarify the impact of the person-centred approach on the ascertaining stage, the 
ascertaining task is divided into two -  the general ascertaining task and the specific 
ascertaining. To effectively detail the nature of the general ascertaining task, closer 
attention is placed on effect-based infringement. The two tasks are treated in turn.
i. General Ascertaining Task
The general ascertaining task is about addressing and teasing out issues in relation to 
shared antitrust queries that could result from specific issues. In other words, it is 
about identifying, designating and describing issues which competing antitrust 
theories are likely to raise. For instance, concerning Article 101, we would take into 
account factors such as the likely impact on inter-brand competition, intra-brand
• c o  1competition, other markets or other policies. Regarding inter-brand competition, 
standard competition analysis would require that we ask if the agreement restricts 
actual or potential competition that would have existed without the agreement. To 
answer this question, account may be taken of competition between the parties and 
competition from third parties. For intra-brand competition, another question we 
would be expected to address is whether the agreement restricts actual or potential 
competition that would have existed in the absence of the contractual restraint. It is 
also imperative that we understand the divide between object and effect-based 
infringements.
At this stage, it is enough to merely address peripheral issues and to raise questions 
because we are only able to give thorough response to the antitrust issue when they 
are specifically ascertained through the lens of individual antitrust theories. It must
530 The reader might feel a sense of d6j& vu with this ascertaining task as the reasoning here is similar 
to that given for the semantics of right as well as the explanation under the capability approach. 
Rightly, the same thread o f reasoning runs through these concepts. But rather than being mere 
repetitions, it is important that they are explained separately. This is because while the semantics o f  
right addresses the issue o f broadness through the position o f the parties involved, the capability 
approach addresses it from the policy perspective while the ascertaining task addresses it from an 
adjudicative perspective. Also, the explanation under the ascertaining task gives greater details on the 
working of the whole system.
531 As it was stated in Joined Cases 56/64 and 58/66, Consten and Grundig, [1966] ECR 429.
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however be noted that the demarcation between the general and the specific 
ascertaining tasks is not watertight. For instance, even though questions about the 
objects and effect of an agreement can be asked at the general ascertaining stage, the 
importance and meaning of the object based assessment and effect-based assessment 
is also implicated at the specific ascertaining stage. So while ascertaining common 
terms of this nature, we are invariably engaging in specific ascertaining tasks as 
well.532
We also have to bear in mind at the general ascertaining stage the germane issue of 
market definition. On the one hand, the society could be identified as the relevant 
market and on the other hand, a specific product market could be identified etc. 
Regarding the latter, the task in the market power analysis is, based on welfare 
analysis, to ascertain if businesses can profitably raise price above marginal cost. 
From a liberal point of view however, market power analysis might be geared at 
simply preventing the accretion of private power. As such, it is expected at this 
stage to identify the ways in which market power could be potentially defined. For 
instance, in light of the welfare-based analysis of market power, firms with such 
power can raise prices without losing sales to the extent that the rise in price becomes 
unprofitable. For example, in line with the Lemer index,534 market power is 
expressed “as the setting of price in excess of marginal cost by measuring the 
proportional deviation of price at the firm’s profit-maximising output from the firm’s 
marginal cost at that output.”535
Without drawing conclusions, we have to consider factors and approaches that could 
impact on our market power assessment. For instance, we should identify the 
possibility that market power may be exploited in the short term or long term. We 
should also recognise the possibility of measuring market power directly or
532 For example, we might be defining object-based infringement through revealed preference 
whereby restrictions of competition by object are seen as those with such high potential o f negative 
effect on competition that it is unnecessary to demonstrate actual effect on the market. The freedom- 
based theories could hold that certain agreements are restricted by object because they breach a 
sacrosanct and inalienable market right.
533 Okeoghene Odudu, "Editorial - Competition: Efficiency and Other Things” (2009) 6 Competition 
Law Review 4.
534 Abba Lemer “The Concept of Monopoly and the Measurement o f Monopoly Power” (1934) 
Review o f  Economic Studies, 157.
535 Roger Van den Bergh and Peter Camesasca, European Competition law and Economics'. A 
Comparative Perspective {2nd ed, London, Sweet & Maxwell, 2006) 110.
536 i.e. by using econometric methods.
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* • 537indirectly. We could also ascertain the power of the firm or group of firms in the 
relevant market by focusing on the market share of the firms and/or by analysing 
barriers to entry in the relevant market.
What we should desist from doing at this stage is to make judgments about concepts 
such as market power. As it would be seen under the specific ascertaining task, we 
could attach different weight to the question of market power possession depending 
on the interpretative method we choose. Each of these methods represents an 
antitrust subject’s functionings and/or capability set.
As a guide to the general ascertaining task, we could sum up the task by saying that 
an agreement could be regarded as anti-competitive either by object or effect. It is 
not for the relevant authorities to decide at this stage on whether the agreement under 
review amounts to an object-based or effect based infringement as this depends on 
the specific theory applied at the specific ascertaining stage. Both forms of analysis 
could however require substantiation here. For instance, in relation to the effect- 
based assessments, when ascertaining the nature of an agreement under this general 
stage, our thorough exposition of the idea of market power would serve as an ideal 
background for determining the normative anticompetitive effect of such issue.
Hence, to elucidate this task, efficiency and public policy claims are addressed. 
Regarding the efficiency analysis, it should be noted that this ascertaining task will 
not be undertaken within the narrow context of any of the economic theories of 
antitrust.
For efficiency assessment, there are three levels of analysis involved in the 
measurement exercise. First is identification, followed by substantiation and then 
quantification.538 As the task implies, by identifying, we are to determine the identity 
of potential (anti) competitive effects. It should be noted that such effect could be on 
inter-brand competition, intra-brand competition, other markets or other policies. The 
nature of these effect-based assessments has to be noted. For example, in specific 
context of inter and intra-brand competition, the former is considered by the 
consumer welfare model to be generally more problematic than changes in intra-
537 i.e. through the use o f structural approach.
538 Copenhagen (2006).
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brand competition.539 We simply have to be aware at this stage, for instance, that 
agreements can reduce inter-brand competition either through coordination, 
foreclosure or tacit collusion.540 We should be aware that the next process is to 
substantiate by measuring the size of the effects from the agreement. It should be 
noted that while we are merely identifying the task here, actual substantiation will be 
undertaken in line with specific antitrust theories at the specific ascertaining stage.
Regarding the exercise of identification, we could be guided in our ascertaining task 
by a set of questions. We might identify an isolated issue by answering either in the 
positive or in the negative to whether: the agreement covers a significant part of the 
firms’ activities and cost; the parties exchange information on marketing strategy or 
pricing; the parties distribute each other’s products; the firms in the market become 
similar in terms of cost, technologies, or market share; price transparency increases; 
the parties cooperate on important Research and Development activities; it is not 
commercially justifiable to enter a new market without agreement; other suppliers 
cannot sell to particular buyers; other buyers cannot buy from particular distributors; 
buyers cannot switch easily and without significant cost to other suppliers; the 
agreement involves tying; distributors sell one brand only; the number of distributors 
decline; the agreement contains exclusive customer allocation; the agreement 
contains recommendation or maximum resale prices.541 The relevance of these 
questions will depend on the specific theories applied at the specific ascertaining 
stage.
Afterwards, the relevant authorities should identify the need for substantiation of 
anti-competitive effects. Substantiation makes it possible to ascertain whether the 
anti-competitive effects of an agreement are small or large without engaging in 
actual quantification. The overall anti-competitive effect of an agreement depends on 
three factors which are (i) the latent effect of each of the individual anti-competitive 
effects pertaining to the agreement (ii) the market power of the parties to the 
agreement and (iii) the sensitivity of the market to anti-competitive effects.
539 See e.g. See William Baxter, “Separation o f Powers, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the ‘Common 
Law’ Nature o f Antitrust Law” (1982) 60 Texas Law Review 661, 693; Eleanor Fox, “The 
Modernization o f Antitrust: A New Equilibrium” (1981) 66 Cornell Law Review 1140; Wesley 
Liebeler, “Intrabrand "Cartels" Under GTE Sylvania” (1982) 30 UCLA Law Review  1; Robert 
Pitofsky, The Political Content o f Antitrust, (1979) 127 U Pa. Law Review 1051.
540 Ibid, 29.
541 Ibid, 32.
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In assessing the latent effect when substantiating the agreement, the scope of the 
agreement is of vital importance542 as “knowing the scope of the agreement makes it 
possible to roughly calculate the share of the market affected by the agreement”.543 
We are expected to be aware at this general stage that regarding, for instance, intra 
and inter-brand competition, “the smaller the share of the market affected by the 
agreement, the smaller is the anti-competitive effect.”544 This can be measured by 
looking at the product, cost strategy and duration. Of course, the determination of the 
scope of the market is dependent on our conceptual foundation of market which is 
itself influenced by the specific normative account employed at the specific 
ascertaining stage.
Detailed knowledge is a prerequisite at this stage. For instance, if we are to establish 
our awareness of the possible latent effects that could arise from agreements, we 
must have a clear idea of the steps that will lead us to establishing the presence or 
absence of such effect. For example, in substantiating foreclosure, we should be able 
to ascertain that anticompetitive effect may arise where agreements raise 
competitors’ costs and where agreements reduce demand for competitors’ products. 
Indicators available to measure the importance of foreclosure effect include the 
determination of the share of the relevant market open to competition, typical 
contract duration, chum in the market and countervailing power. Concerning the 
likelihood that tacit collusion would arise, we are expected to generally ascertain that 
such possibility is limited to specific market circumstances where: firms are 
homogeneous; there is potential for retaliation; the market is relatively stable; and 
there is absence of short term incentive to cheat. In addition, the agreement itself 
must increase the likelihood of tacit collusion.545
Where we substantiate intra-brand competition, we focus on the tendency of the 
agreement to limit the number of distributors and the attendant risk that such 
agreement might result in collusion. Also, when substantiating the likelihood of 
foreclosure effect of an agreement, due consideration is given to the duration of the
542 It is important as “the broader the scope, the higher the risk that coordination leads to significant 
anti-competitive effects per se.” Ibid.
543 Ibid, 34.
544 Ibid.
545 Ibid, 37.
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agreement being reviewed.546 Substantiation of market power affirms that an 
agreement is more likely to cause anti-competitive effect if the parties to the 
agreement have significant market power. For horizontal agreements, what is 
considered is the combined market share of the parties to the agreement, while, for 
vertical agreements, attention is placed on the buyer and the supplier’s market 
share.547 Our ascertaining task requires that we engage in substantiation analysis on 
market power with the outcome that if contracting parties’ combined market power is 
low, the agreement is not likely to have significant anti-competitive effect vice versa.
Likewise, it must be noted that the overall result of substantiation is largely 
dependent on either the presence of competitive restraints or the incidence of 
sensitive market condition that induces anti-competitive effect. Thus, in order to 
make appropriate decision, the assessor would consider competitors’ market power, 
market concentration, market maturity, entry barriers and product characterisation.548
It is important that we engage in substantiation exercise under the general 
ascertaining task because, by so doing, we are able to assess the sensitivity of the 
market or the presence of competitive restraints regardless of conclusions that could 
be drawn under specific theories. Taking the substantiation of market concentration 
as example, we would find that substantiating the market condition at this stage plays 
a large role in determining the presence or absence of anti-competitive effect under 
specific theories. For instance, we might find under the specific ascertaining task that 
a small agreement actually causes major competition concerns as a result of the 
highly concentrated nature of the markets, while we might find that a large 
agreement actually raises limited concern because of the low concentration in the 
market.
546 Ibid, 36. In Delimitis for instance, the Court o f Justice, deciding on the anti-competitive effect o f  
beer supply agreements stated that: “the contribution o f the individual contracts entered into by the 
[supplier] to the sealing-off o f [a] market ... depends on their duration. If the duration is manifestly 
excessive in relation to the average duration o f ... supply agreements generally entered into in the 
relevant market, the individual contract falls under the prohibition under Article [101(1)].”
547 Article 3 o f the Block Exemption Regulation provides that the market share in any particular 
Article 101 TFEU issue is constituted by an analysis o f the supplier's market share on the market 
where it sells the contract goods or services and the buyer's market share on the market where it 
purchases the contract goods or services. The Article provides further that in order for the block 
exemption to apply, the supplier’s and the buyer’s market share must each be 30 percent or less. Also, 
para 88 and 89 o f the Vertical Guidelines (2010) states how market share is to be calculated from both 
the buyer and supplier’s perspective.
548 See European Commission (2000), Commission notice: Guidelines on Vertical Restraints, OJ C 
291, 13.10.2000, 1-44.
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Where substantiation of anti-competitive effect is not adequate, it becomes necessary 
to measure through quantification of anti-competitive effect. Thus, being a corollary 
to substantiation, this task does not add much substance to the overall task. However, 
it is still worth a mention. Quantification requires the use of complex economic tools. 
For example, for an analysis of coordination, the UK Competition Commission 
applied diversion ratio in the Somerfield-Morrisons case.549 It was also used by the 
European Commission in the Volvo-Renault case.550 Others are critical elasticity 
methodology and market simulation models. In quantifying foreclosure, the event 
study methodology and simulation models can be used. In relation to intra-brand 
competition, econometrics price studies and simulation models could be used.551
Amongst other factors which must at least be mentally noted at this stage, we are 
expected to have a clear idea of the types of agreements and the classifications of 
efficiencies. With specific example of efficiencies, it is imperative that we note the 
four issues in efficiency analysis. First, we have to note the need to identify the 
nature of the claimed efficiencies. Second, we have to note the need to assess the link 
between the agreement under review and the efficiencies claimed. Third, we have to 
note the need to assess the likelihood and magnitude of the each claimed efficiency 
and fourth, we have to note the need to determine how and when each of the 
efficiencies claimed would be achieved.552 At this stage of the ascertaining exercise, 
we should focus on the identification exercise (which addresses both the first and 
second issues) and the quantification (the third issue). The fourth issue is not to be 
addressed here because our finding at the point of weighing would depend on the 
welfare theory underpinning the specific ascertaining task.
Still on the example of economic effects, it is imperative at this stage that we note, 
for instance, the three efficiency gains that could be potentially substantiated through 
specific normative accounts, namely: within-firm efficiency gains; between-firm 
efficiency gains; and innovative benefits. It is expected that we are aware that 
within-firm efficiency gains could be one or a combination of economies of scale, 
economies of scope, bargaining power and duplication savings. Regarding between-
549See [http://www.competition-commission.org.uk/inquiries/ref2005/somerfield/].
550 European Commission Decision Case No COMP/M. 1980.
551 Copenhagen (2006) 53-55.
552 European Commission (2004), Commission notice: Guidelines on the application of Article 81(3) 
o f the Treaty, OJ C 101 27/4/2004.
553 See Copenhagen (2006) 56.
177
firm efficiencies, we are meant to understand that the agreement could solve either or 
a combination of the free rider problem, hold-up problem and double 
marginalisation. Innovation benefits could be obtained through technology diffusion, 
creation of new products and the creation of new processes. It is worthy to note at 
this stage that different agreements give rise to different efficiency gains. For 
instance, while production agreements often give rise to within-firm efficiency gains 
in the form of economies of scale or scope and so on, single brand agreements (such 
as specific rebate schemes) typically lead to between-firm efficiencies.554
Understandably, antitrust institutions are expected to be aware of every factual detail 
and how they could be harnessed by specific theories at the specific ascertaining 
stage. Thus, still with the example of efficiencies, it is imperative that if we are to 
have a sophisticated specific ascertaining analysis of economic effect of an antitrust 
issue, we should ordinarily know how to identify efficiency gains at the general 
ascertaining stage. For instance, we should be aware that to identify such gains, it 
might be necessary to assess the agreement in question to ascertain whether: 
production volume increases in at least one production facility thereby generating 
economies of scale; other products will be produced at the same production facilities 
thus leading to economies of scope; purchasing is to be coordinated or rationalised so 
that bargaining power is enhanced; parties have parallel production facilities upon 
which they agree in order to avoid duplication; parties increase their sale effort as a 
result of the reduction in free-riding; parties increase their investment as they could 
side-step the hold-up problem; the agreement is vertical and pricing or production 
will be coordinated in a way that solves the double marginalisation problem; 
significant technology knowledge will be shared between parties which leads to 
technology diffusion; new products of higher quality will be introduced into the 
market; or more cost efficient production techniques will be developed.555
At this stage, we are expected to clearly detail the conditions that have to be 
established for a specific claim to hold. For example, if we presume that the issue on 
ground is such that when specifically ascertaining efficiencies, we might have to 
show that the agreement in question is indispensable to the attainment of the 
efficiencies, then we should have clearly identified at this general stage, the
554 Ibid, 59.
555 Ibid, 60.
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conditions that have to be fulfilled. We could for instance identify the two tests that 
can be applied: first is that the restrictive agreement as such must be reasonably 
necessary in order to achieve the efficiencies; second, the individual restrictions of 
the competition that flows from the agreement must also be reasonably necessary for 
the attainment of the efficiencies.556 In Europe for instance, what we need to 
ascertain concerning the indispensability of efficiency gains is whether or not the 
restrictive agreement and individual restrictions make it possible to perform the 
activity in question more efficiently than would likely have been the case in the 
absence of the agreement or the restriction concerned.557 Once it is found that the 
agreement in question is necessary for the attainment of the efficiencies, it must be 
assessed whether individual restrictions are reasonably necessary to produce the 
efficiencies. In doing this, we would have to take into account both the nature of the 
restriction and its intensity.
We should also be aware at this stage that claims are to be treated in their peculiar 
context. For instance, as different from between-firm efficiencies, we should know 
that where claims are made about within-firm efficiency gains deriving from an 
agreement, the party making such claims is expected to substantiate economies of 
scale by assessing one of the cost function, the cost structure, the degree of 
specialisation, the degree of indivisibility and so on. Further, taking the free-rider 
problem as example of the between-firm efficiency gains, we would expect the party 
making the claim to substantiate the likelihood that there will be such market failure 
in the absence of the agreement.559
If a claim is to succeed within its specific theoretical category or capability set, we 
must know what to look out for. For instance, regarding the free-rider problem, three 
market criteria must be fulfilled in order to establish the efficiency gain: First, pre- 
and after-sales services should be important in the industry; second, promotion 
activities should be generic in character and not brand specific; third, products must 
be of a reasonably high value. The free-rider problem could be demonstrated by 
comparing the level of sales services with that of other brands or other industries.
556 Commission 2004, para 73.
557 Ibid, para 74.
558 Ibid, para 78.
559 Ibid.
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The general ascertaining task can be deployed to other antitrust related issues as well. 
Where for instance, an issue involves public policy consideration, the general 
ascertaining task should seek to identify the nature of the public policy concern -  is it 
about integration or trade policy? Afterwards, the task will be to ascertain how the 
claim links to a competition issue -  is it aimed at buttressing or substantiating an 
allegation of anti-competition? Is it raised as a defence or to mitigate the claim of 
anti-competition?
Conclusively, the general ascertaining task can be undertaken within the purview of 
the different interests and theories that are represented in the capability framework of 
any particular case.
ii. Specific Ascertaining task
On the specific ascertaining task, our primary task should be to ascertain what, 
within the confines of specific theories, competition law should protect. This stage of 
the process simply puts the abstracted capability framework into decisional 
perspective. For concrete assessment, decision-makers will have to give meaning to 
peculiar words -  what is competition, restriction of competition, object, effect, 
exception, exemptions etc in light of the individual normative accounts. We strive to 
make meaning of antitrust as an institution. Academics and competition authorities 
continuously endeavour to find the meaning of competition law terms and for every 
attempt, the inadequacy of adopted concepts become ever more vivid. Most theories 
generally attempt to rationalise the limits of antitrust and depending on their 
ideological inclination, some believe that specific terms should be incapable of 
manipulation,560 while others consider the obscurity of terms to be necessary since 
the market is prone to changes.561 An intermediate ideology is that which seeks legal 
certainty but also wishes to maintain the flexibility required for governing an 
economy in a state of constant flux.
560 Giuliano Marenco, “La notion de restriction de concurrence dans le cadre de 1‘interdiction des 
entenes’ in Melanges en homage a Michel Waelbroeck (Bruylant, Brussels, 1999) referred to in 
Townley (2009) 205 n 17.
561 Wemhard Moschel, “The Goals of Antitrust Revisited” (1991) Journal o f  International and 
Theoretical Economics 7.
562 Townley (2009).
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Using as example the term “restriction” as applied in Europe, it has been noted that 
neither the Court of Justice nor the Commission have defined “restriction of 
competition” with sufficient clarity or consistency.563 The lack of precision here has 
been regarded as a scandal for antitrust.564 However, rather than viewing the 
obscurity of the term as a problem, the person-centred approach celebrates it because 
it gives us the latitude to specifically ascertain the term in its different ramifications. 
In other words, the fact that the meaning of the term remains obscure is of value to 
our task of attaining heterogeneity, broadness and inclusiveness in antitrust. Thus, in 
light of the capability framework, our specific ascertaining task requires that we 
address every conceivable meaning within the context of the agreement under 
review. This exercise should be encouraged because each meaning represents a 
functioning or capability set which is worthy of recognition.
Hence, as a result of the specificity of individual normative accounts, it is pertinent 
that we give meaning to the term “restriction of competition” in line with specific 
theories or goals. To the freedom-based theories (particularly the ordoliberals 
thought of economic freedom), “restriction of competition” means an undue 
restriction of the economic freedom of the parties or a restriction of other market 
participants.565 Thus, we may engage in our specific ascertaining task by distilling 
the general terms such as inter/intra brand competition and object/effect through the 
goal of economic freedom. As stated in Metropole,566 the ascertaining task may thus 
require that we take into account the actual condition in which an agreement 
functions, in particular the economic context and the actual structure of the market 
concerned.567 Overall from the economic freedom point of view, we should only be
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concerned with undue restriction of economic freedom.
In ascertaining the term “restriction of competition” through the theory of economic 
freedom, we could adopt either a strict or effect-based approach. If we apply 
economic freedom in the strict term, it may be difficult to vindicate any state that
563 Ibid, 206.
564 Richard Whish said that the failed attempts to define “restriction o f competition” remain the central 
conundrum to EC competition law. See Ehlermann and Laudati (1998) 461. See also Odudu (2005) 
97.
565 See generally Monti (2007).
T-112/99 Metropole Television (M6) v Commission [2001] ECR 11-2459.
567 Ibid, para 76.
568 Monti (2007). This implies that behaviours that results in ancillary restraints do not fall foul of 
competition rules.
181
reduces competition regardless of its efficiency gains. The effect-based approach 
would however seek to challenge only “undue” restriction of economic freedom.569 
In this case, a restriction of economic freedom might be acceptable where there are 
overriding welfare/public policy gains. However, regardless of such gains, the 
restriction of economic freedom will be regarded as undue where effective 
competition is completely eliminated. Thus, it is essential to ascertain whether the 
firms involved hinder the remaining sources of (actual and potential) competition 
which then affects the proper functioning of the market. To establish this fact, we 
could check if the important barriers and drivers of effective competition have been 
significantly affected. The indicators can be alluded to by establishing the actual 
competition in the market against the ideal state of competition as recognised by 
specific antitrust theories.
In line with total welfare, “restriction of competition” would arise from allocative 
inefficiency. Our specific ascertaining task however requires more than abstractive 
definition. We must take note of the multiple implications that could arise from the 
application of this welfare standard as we could reach different outcomes depending 
on how we seek to address the market presumptions. Starting with total welfare 
analysis, it is explained how Williamson’s trade-off model can be applied in our 
specific ascertaining exercise. Regarding his basic welfare function, he stated thus:
“The partial equilibrium apparatus that I would propose for purposes of examining 
the trade-off question is one in which the welfare function is expressed as W = (TR + 
S) - (TC - R), where TR refers to total revenue, S to consumer surplus, TC to total 
cost, and R to intramarginal rents. The terms in the first set of parentheses reflect the 
social benefits associated with the activity in question, while the terms in the second 
(under appropriate restrictions) reflect social costs. The allocative efficiency 
consequences of any merger that increases both efficiency and market power can be 
evaluated only by estimating net effects.”570
569 See generally Monti (2007).
570 Oliver Williamson, “Allocative Efficiency and the Limits o f Antitrust” (1989) American Economic 
Review Papers 105, 107; Economics as an Antitrust Defence Revisited, (1977) 125 University o f  
Pennsylvania Law Review 708 n 27.
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The implications of the alleged restraint on allocative and productive efficiencies are 
simply sub-components in a broader welfare analysis. The ultimate focus is the 
impact of a proposed restriction on total welfare.571
The divergence that could arise from the different interpretation of the total welfare 
model is worth ascertaining. Over and above the requisite trade-off between 
allocative efficiency and productive efficiency, there are those who believe that 
market analysis should take note of second-best problems. If we assess restraint of 
competition strictly on the basis of Williamson’s trade-off on the one hand572 and 
combine the Williamson’s trade-off with the second-best theory on the other hand,573 
we are likely to address wellbeing in different ways and consequently vindicate 
different interests even within this narrow capability set.
The ascertaining task here requires an in-depth understanding of the rationale behind 
this welfare standard. Competitive equilibria are Pareto-efficient where there exists 
no reallocation of resources that makes someone better off without making someone 
else worse off. Interpreted through the general equilibrium theory, this Pareto-state 
relates to the whole economy. As such, the idea of allocative efficiency is built on 
certain restrictive assumptions574 which must all be fulfilled to have a perfectly 
competitive state. The impossibility of reaching a perfectly competitive state means 
that we should off-set gains in one market with loss in another. On the other hand, 
the partial equilibrium approach contends that where any of the conditions fail in a 
market, thereby resulting in allocative inefficiency, such failure should be addressed 
in isolation.
Regardless of the equilibrium theory we align with, we assess total welfare on the 
account of allocative efficiency. This cannot be the end of our analysis. Total welfare
571 Peter Hammer, “Antitrust Beyond Competition: Market Failures, Total Welfare, and the Challenge 
o f Intra-Market Second-Best Tradeoffs” (2000) 98 Michigan Law Review  878. Note however that the 
Borkean version o f total welfare is even stricter as he expressed his reservation to Williamson’s 
model. He believes that economic analysis would show that cost saving or social loss does not exist. 
He also argues that since all consumers are also owners o f businesses and hence benefit from 
monopolistic price increases, efficiency with price increases would not hurt the average consumer. 
See Bork (1978) 110.
572 E.g. Bork (1978) prefers this confined analysis on welfare.
573 E.g. Hammers argues that analytically, second-best concerns are the flip side o f the same coin as 
Williamson’s productive efficiency defence, and both fit comfortably within a total welfare
orientation. See Hammers (2000) 879.
574 See generally Williamson (1989).
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model states that a seeming market failure arising from an allocatively inefficient 
state might be counteracted by productive efficiency gains. As such, we should 
assess the Pareto state on net basis. Under this welfare standard, any productive 
efficiency gains (for example, the economics of scale or economic of scope) may be 
allowed and may trump the allocative inefficiency deficit regardless of whether such 
gain is transferred to the consumer. For instance, following from the explanation of 
the efficiency gains under the general ascertaining task, sufficient within-firm 
efficiencies may offset the allocative inefficiency even where such efficiencies are 
primarily internal to the firms and are in no way transferred to consumers.
The varying ideas of market definition mentioned under the general ascertaining task 
can impact on our total welfare analysis. In assessing allocative efficiency, the 
practical nature of the decisional aspect means that we might specifically find that 
the requirement of “net welfare” is established where, on the one hand, we balance 
second-best option with the allocative inefficiency in a specific market or on the 
other hand, we focus solely on the allocative (in)efficiency in the specific market. 
Where we apply the former, we might find a seeming allocatively inefficient state to 
be efficient. Assuming we find under both approaches that certain behaviour is 
allocatively inefficient, then we are to balance the allocative inefficiency with 
productive efficiency.
It is therefore possible that a total welfare model can be sub-divided into at least two 
forms of practical analysis. First is that, in line with the Williamson trade-off we 
might ascertain that an agreement is not unduly restrictive not because we challenge 
the claim that a state is allocatively inefficient but on the grounds that, on the net, the 
allocative inefficiency has been counteracted. This means thus that in our assessment 
of allocative inefficiency, we ascertain nature of “restriction of competition” by 
isolating the relevant market and assessing market power. On the other hand, a total 
welfare approach that accommodates the second best theory widens the functionings 
within a capability set. Thus, depending on the case in hand, we might, in regards to 
our ascertaining task, conceive of this broader scope of assessment by allowing for 
tradeoffs at two different ends: first, in assessing whether the specific product market 
is allocatively inefficient; second, where the general market is considered
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allocatively inefficient.575 Then we can assess whether such effect can be balanced 
with productive efficiency gains.
Under the wealth transfer (consumer welfare) standard and the consumer choice 
theories, we are to ascertain “restriction of competition” by analysing inter- or intra- 
brand competition in the relevant market through consumer harm. A state of 
allocative inefficiency would harm consumers. The correction of this market failure 
thus should form the initial aspect of this task.576 Recognition of allocative efficiency 
nonetheless, we still have to take into account distributional issues. Where the focus 
on consumer is adhered to in ascertaining whether an undertaking’s behaviour 
amounts to a “restriction of competition”, the concept of market power would be at 
the very centre of antitrust analysis.577 Thus, regardless of gains in other markets, 
there will be a restriction as long as market power impacts negatively on consumers
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in the relevant market. The initial aspect of our ascertaining task will thus be 
limited to the assessment of whether there is a (likely) increase in market power 
which could occur directly through an arrangement that facilitates coordination and 
reduces competition among rivals, or indirectly, by foreclosing rivals from the 
market.579
To assess an agreement in a particular market, we are to ascertain whether the 
behaviour in question is restrictive and consequently anticompetitive by building a 
theory of harm that explains how the agreement leads to an increase in price, reduced 
output, reduced choice and/or reduced innovation compared with a counter-factual
f O A
where there is no such agreement. Its restrictive nature notwithstanding, an 
agreement might be accommodated if there are corresponding gains to consumers. It 
is at this stage that consumer-based approaches diverge. The two broad categories 
that should be acknowledged in our specific ascertaining task are (i) those limited to 
efficiency effects on consumers and (ii) those that take into account, public policy
575 Christopher Townley, “The Relevant Market: An Acceptable limit to Competition Analysis?”
(2011) 10 European Competition Law Review 490-499.
576 See generally Odudu (2005) on the goal o f Article 101(1).
577 This is evident from the General Court’s assessment in Glaxo case.
578 In contrast to the second-best theory addressed above.
579 Andreas Reindl, “Resale Price Maintenance and Article 81 EC: Developing a More Sensible 
Analytical Approach” International Antitrust Law & Policy: Fordham Competition Law 2009 Ch 22, 
5.
580 Renato Nazzini, “Article 81 EC between Time Present and Time Past: A Normative Critique of  
‘Restriction o f Competition’ in EU Law” (2006) CMLRev 497, 514-517.
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effect on consumers.581 For the first category, the harm could be balanced against 
gains arising exclusively582 from either or a combination of productive and dynamic 
efficiency. We must however have in mind in our ascertaining task that it is only 
objective and direct efficiency gains for consumers that would count rather than 
subjective and indirect gains. For instance, cost savings resulting from mere exercise 
of market power will be rejected as an efficiency gain.
After applying the theory of harm, our measurement exercise gives meaning to 
“restriction of competition” while the weighing addresses whether we can 
objectively validate a seeming anti-competitive agreement as a result of the (likely) 
improvement such agreement could have on the production or distribution of goods 
or to the promotion of technical or economic progress.
Unlike the total welfare model, the consumer approaches require that efficiency 
gains are narrowed to the actual consumers. This must be reflected in the pass-on and 
weighing. Here, we first have to be sure that the efficiency gain is passed-on directly 
to consumers. This means that we are more likely to be interested in between-firm
• •  •  t f O Iefficiencies and innovation benefits as they are more likely to be passed-on. 
Afterwards, we have to ascertain the volume of the efficiency gains which are passed 
on to those consumers who experience the anti-competitive effect. There are various 
tests in this pass-on analysis. First, we have to ascertain who the consumers are. They 
could, for instance, include all direct or indirect users of the products which are 
covered by the agreement. Also, rather than focusing on the impact on individual 
consumers, it is the impact on the group of consumers of the relevant market that 
counts.
For within-firm efficiencies, the gains are usually internal cost savings which could 
lead to lower prices. We could ascertain the pass-on rate by analysing a number of 
indicators such as: type of cost saving, type of pass-on, state of competition, demand 
condition, and supply conditions. We might for instance be concerned about the
581 See generally Townley (2009).
582 For instance, it is believed that to allow a trade-off between allocative inefficiency and a range o f  
efficiencies and gains (other than purely productive efficiency and dynamic efficiency) as well as the 
pursuit o f  multitude o f non-efficiency goals is detrimental to consumer interest. See Buttigieg (2009) 
133.
583 Guidelines on Article 81(3), para 83-104; Copenhagen (2006) 98.
584 Guidelines, ibid; Copenhagen, 99.
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type of cost savings because of the distinction that exists between cost savings 
lowering marginal cost and cost savings lowering fixed cost.585
With regard to between-firm efficiencies, we could ascertain pass-on by, for 
example, assessing the willingness of consumers to pay for new products. Also, we 
could estimate the return on sales service or advertising services. Here, where the 
returns are high, it implies that consumers will receive additional value from the 
agreement, but where the returns are low it implies that consumers will not receive 
significant benefits from the agreement.586
The ascertaining task may be further illustrated by distilling necessary elements of, 
for instance, public policy in any single antitrust issue. Where the public policy issue 
relates to the environment, we should aim, through the specific ascertaining task, to 
establish the elements required for granting to grant an exemption for a seeming anti­
competitive practice. In such a case, what would have to be ascertained is first, 
whether consumers individually and in general have a positive rate of return from the 
supposed environmental benefit within a reasonable payback period. With this in 
mind, one would have to ascertain the implication if such benefit is immediately 
obtainable and also consider claims which have a longer gestation period and, as
c o n
such, would perhaps only benefit generations yet unborn.
It should be noted that the manner in which antitrust laws are drafted might impact 
on our ability to engage in the ideal ascertaining task. Hence, though there is always 
scope to interpret the provisions of Article 101 and 102 TFEU more flexibly and to 
some extent more broadly, those provisions (particularly Article 101) are not suitable 
for the person-centred antitrust because they limit the applicability of certain 
principles and theories which should in principle be allowed into the capability 
framework. For instance, with regards to Article 101 TFEU as a whole, it might be 
difficult to engage in the ascertaining task strictly in line with specific theories. For 
example, it might be impossible to argue on the basis of strict efficiency considering 
the requirement that any restrictive practice must not have the effect of eliminating
585 The distinction between these cost savings reflects the difference between short run and long run 
effects.
586 Copenhagen (2006) 101.
587 Chris Townley “Inter-generational Impacts in Competition Analysis: Remembering Those Not Yet 
Bom” (2011) 11 European Competition Law Review 580.
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competition in the relevant market. Strict efficiency argument might also be excluded 
because of the requirement that consumers get a fair share of the resulting benefit.
Taking into account these impediments, if a regime is to apply the person-centred 
approach, it should endeavour to leave its antitrust provisions as wide as possible. A 
good example of an antitrust provision that might be able to adapt with the person- 
centred approach is the Section 2 of the Sherman Act which provides that “[ejvery 
person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with 
any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among 
the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony.”588 
This provision is broad and open-textured. As such, it gives us the room to engage in 
detailed ascertaining. Thus, if the person-centred approach is successfully 
established, antitrust law should simply be broad enough to accommodate different 
interpretations that could be drawn from different antitrust principles and theories.
5.3.2 Choosins
The ascertaining task represents the starting point of the practical aspect of the 
person-centred analysis. It has been shown that the ascertaining task simply offers a 
much more detailed analysis of the various functionings that can be abstracted in the 
capability framework and sets them up in an adjudicative context. After the different 
functionings and their underlying antitrust logic have been thoroughly identified, the 
more germane task would be to choose between them. Here, the choosing task 
addresses the more practical question as to how functionings are to be chosen while 
maintaining the primary aim of the person-centred approach, to wit, meeting the 
requirement of justice as inclusiveness. How can we practically choose between 
different interests whilst at the same time respect the idea of plurality that has so far 
been emphasised under this approach? This is indeed an important question. It must 
be kept in mind that our answer to this question is particularly crucial in determining 
the true value of the approach -  the true value of the approach would have to be 
assessed on two criteria. First, it has to be shown that the alternative approach is
588 Sherman Act, February 30, 1890, ch. 647, 26 Stat. 209, 15 U.S.C.
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practical. Second, the alternative approach has to be evaluated vis-a-vis the 
traditional accounts and even against the deconstructed discourse ethics.
Once we think of choosing, we are typically faced with genuine practical restraints 
that could jeopardise our desire to ensure “broadness as inclusiveness”. This is 
because we cannot make concrete decisions that suit all the relevant functionings. 
This concern notwithstanding, we have to choose. An apt statement about the 
inevitability of choosing is given by Isaiah Berlin who said that:
“[W]e are doomed to choose, and every choice may entail irreparable loss. The world 
we encounter in ordinary experience is one in which we are faced with choices 
between ends equally ultimate and claims equally absolute, the realization of some of 
which must inevitably involve the sacrifice of others... . If, as I believe the ends of 
men are many, and not all of them are in principle compatible with each other, then 
the possibility of conflict -  and of tragedy -  can never be wholly eliminated from 
human life, either personal or social. The necessity of choosing between absolute 
claims is then an inescapable characteristic of the human condition.”589
To bring home Berlin’s point, I use predation to illustrate. The total welfare, 
consumer welfare, and economic freedom theories abhor predation. However, the 
difference in the way they define anti-competition might consequently affect our 
finding on whether a particular behaviour is predatory. For instance, depending on 
whether we are reasoning through either consumer welfare or economic freedom, we 
would have to determine whether recoupment is a condition for establishing 
violation. Even though we might, as a matter of principle, regard predation to be 
anticompetitive, our different theoretical inclinations would impact on whether we 
consider an undertaking’s behaviour to be predatory. In essence, we have to choose 
between the different interpretations. This is just one of numerous instances where 
choosing is ultimately inevitable. Another example can be derived from the T-Mobile 
case -  is a concerted practice an infringement by object chiefly because it obstructs 
economic freedom or because of the likely negative welfare effect?590 In this case, 
the Court of Justice stated that the distinction between ‘infringements by object’ and 
‘infringements by effect’ arises from the fact that certain forms of collusion between 
firms can be regarded, by their very nature, as being injurious to the proper
589 Isaiah Berlin “On Value Pluralism” (1998) 8 New York Review o f  Books, XL V.
590 Case C-8/08 T-Mobile Netherlands BV and Others Raad van bestuur van de Nederlandse 
Mededingingsautoriteit. 2009 [ECR] 1-4529.
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functioning of normal competition. Consequently, there is no need to consider the 
effects of a concerted practice where its anticompetitive object is established. Also, it 
is possible that we regard the same concerted practice to amount to an infringement 
by object but on a different ground -  perhaps because its anti-competitive effect is so 
obvious that we need not go into any detailed analysis in individual cases.591
The inevitability of engaging in some form of choosing does not necessarily mean 
that the person-centred idea of inclusiveness should be dispensed with. However, if 
the choosing task is to be compliant with the ideals of the person-centred approach, it 
is essential that some basic conditions are complied with. First, we must not choose 
functionings a priori. As such, just as some scholars contend, it would mean in 
practice that competition law provisions should not express objectives. In light of the 
alternative approach, the rationale for desisting from making a priori decisions is to 
resist the influence of normative accounts on fundamental antitrust conceptions. To 
illustrate the need to avoid normative subjectivity, reference can be made to the now 
commonplace assertions that antitrust laws should be strictly concerned about 
consumer welfare. From the person-centred point of view and in light of the 
condition herein addressed, the consumer welfare ideology could potentially restrict 
certain interests. As such, it offends the person-centred approach and would thus 
corrupt our choosing exercise.
The second condition is that the procedure for reaching concrete decisions must be 
appropriate since correct answers cannot be determined ex ante. The task here is to 
choose between the varied interests whilst at the same time give adequate 
consideration to various interests. To see if this can be achieved, a number of options 
would be substantiated and evaluated. First, I will consider the possibility of seeking 
correct outcomes by perusing the normative accounts objectively. It will be shown 
that this option is inappropriate as it fails on the same ground as the discourse ethics, 
which is that it is impossible to rule out subjectivity. Also, the social choice is 
considered. The result is equally pessimistic as it falls short of the requirement of 
justice as inclusiveness in general and more particularly of requirements (i) to (v) 
identified in chapter four.
591 Note though that this second example is not as serious as the first one.
592 See e.g. Hawk (1998) 353.
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i. Procedural objectivity and Correctness
Having developed the person-centred approach till this point, one is drawn back to 
the question as to whether we could reach concrete results by relying of our 
analytical strength to ascertain correct answers. The pursuit of correctness appears to 
run counter to the understanding that the person-centred approach is motivated by 
pure procedural justice since we do not know with certainty what is correct or what 
we should strive for. This is however not the case. Correctness is sought here, not on 
the basis of an idealised position or standard but as a consequence of a fair and 
objective procedure.
To substantiate the possibility of making substantive judgments objectively, the 
works of scholars such as Alexy, Finnis and Dworkin are worthy of mention. Alexy 
for instance, argues that law itself makes a claim to correctness. In principle, this 
means that we can achieve correctness. He states that law seeks correctness by 
linking the claim to those subjects who act for and in law by creating, interpreting, 
using and enforcing it. On the contrary, Finnis argues that a claim to correctness is 
completely based on subjectivism -  it is based on “the disposition of the chooser”.593 
Alexy recognises criticisms of this nature. He thus states that in raising a claim, the 
legal subject can be said to be correct only where he does so objectively. The claim is 
said to be objectively raised where everybody who decides, judges, or discusses the 
matter in a legal system must necessarily raise it.594 Thus though the claim is raised 
by “person”, he does not do so subjectively because he raises such claim on behalf of 
the law. It therefore could be said that “law raises this claim through persons who 
work for and in it.”595 Alexy contends that correctness implies justifiability. As such, 
in raising a claim to correctness, law also raises one to justifiability. He states further 
that in recognising the claim to correctness:
“law does not only accept a general obligation to justification on principles; it also 
maintains that this obligation is complied with or can be met. The claim to 
correctness therefore includes ... three elements: (1) the assertion of correctness, (2) 
the guarantee of justifiability, and (3) the expectation of acceptance of 
correctness.”596
593 John Finnis, “On Reason and Authority in Law's Empire” (1987) 6 Law and Philosophy 357.
594 Robert Alexy “Law and Correctness” (1998) 51 Current Legal Problems 205, 206.
595 Ibid.
596 Ibid, 208.
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The role of law as correctness can also be gleaned from Dworkin’s Law as Integrity. 
He argues that the goal of the interpretative attitude constitutive of the practice we 
call law is to find in every situation of civil dispute, the right which the given 
society’s law makes available in most difficult cases.597 Specifically, in their task 
towards correctness, “[j]udges who accept the interpretative idea of integrity decide 
hard cases by trying to find, in some coherent set of principles about people’s right 
and duties, the best constructive interpretation of the political structure and legal 
doctrine of their community.”598 To assess correctness, we can set a judge’s decision 
against conviction of f i t  and justification. Conviction of fit will provide a rough 
threshold requirement that an interpretation of some part of the law must meet if it is 
to be eligible at all. This will limit subjectivism as it will eliminate interpretations 
that some judges would otherwise prefer. The second conviction comes in 
particularly in hard cases where a judge’s threshold test does not discriminate 
between two or more interpretations. Here, he must choose based on inherent 
substantive moral soundness. In other words, he must choose between eligible 
interpretations by seeking the one that reflects the community’s structure of 
institutions and decisions in a better light from the standpoint of political morality.599
Any claim to correctness, particularly as it pertains to hard cases, would have to 
contend with the objection provided by Finnis. He argues that no judge, no matter 
how superhuman, could justifiably claim unique correctness for his answer to a hard 
case “for in such a case, a claim to have found the right answer is senseless”.600 
Finnis argues that hard cases can meet the threshold of not only the “fit” but also of 
“justifiability” such that “not only is there more than one answer which violates no 
applicable rule, but the answer thus available are ranked in different orders along 
each of the available criteria of evaluation.”601
If the idea of correctness proposed in the person-centred approach is considered to be 
theoretically sound, Finnis’ objection must be taken seriously. Every relevant 
functioning is recognised because they have theoretical depth and do fit with past
597 See generally Ronald Dworkin, Law’s Empire (Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1986).
598 Ibid, 255.
599 Ibid.
600 Finnis (1987) 372.
601 Ibid, 372-373.
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decisions. Further, owing to the exposition of the five requirements of broadness as 
they relate to specific theories,602 it has been shown that all the contending theories 
have their strong and weak points meaning thus that they will be ranked differently 
from requirement to requirement. If we cannot substantiate a way through which law 
could attain correctness, it really would not matter that, as Alexy says, law could 
make claims to correctness.
This concern, as raised by Finnis, brings to fore the difficulty of applying this 
approach in our choosing exercise. The problem identified by Finnis is to the effect 
that values are incommensurable. Thus, there cannot be an objectively correct 
choice. This reasoning particularly flaws the utilitarian assumption of the 
commensurability of basic good. Even Dworkin, in his attempt to head off the 
problem of incommensurability, falls into the utilitarian trap. His propositions on a 
kind of lexical ordering603 have been flawed.604 It must thus be conceded for the 
purpose of this exercise that to seek absolute correctness either by deciding 
objectively or by comparing objectively inherent values in the competing 
functionings will be far-fetched.605 This problem weakens the prospect of 
maintaining inclusiveness through correctness as it appears that every task aimed at 
correctness would, by itself, lead to inherent subjectivity.606
Notwithstanding the concerns raised, some scholars are convinced about the 
possibility of achieving correctness and objectivity. For instance, Nagel contends that 
the pressures towards objectivity and correctness (even on the basis of conflicting
• 607pluralistic values) are very strong wherever values come into practical conflict. 
Further, Alexy states that “the law is an idea that is intrinsically connected with the 
idea of objectivity.” He states further that “[ojbjectivity is an essential feature of law, 
a feature that is not compatible with complete subjectivity of the purposes at
602 As dealt with in chapter 4.
603 See Dworkin (1977) 340-341; (1986).
604 Finnis (1987) 373-374.
605 Note however the argument in Virgilio Da Silva “Comparing the Incommensurable: Constitutional 
Principle, Balancing and Rational Decision (2011) 31 Oxford Journal o f  Legal Studies 273-301.
606 As expressed by Germain Grisez, “Against Consequentialism” (1978) 23 American Journal o f  
Jurisprudence 21, 46-47.
607 Thomas Nagel, “Pluralism and Coherence” in Ronald Dworkin, Mark Lilia, and Robert Silvers 
(eds) The Legacy o f  Isaiah Berlin (New York, New York Review Books, 2001) 110-111.
608 Robert Alexy (2007) ‘An Answer to Joseph Raz’ in Pavlakos (ed) (2007) 49.
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It is noteworthy that the constraints to objectivity might vary depending on the case 
at hand. The task of maintaining objectivity might be easier where different antitrust 
theories and models lead to the same result.609 In such instance, one could afford not 
to make a categorical statement as to the underlying theory/model that is ideal. 
Contrariwise, objectivity could prove difficult where more than one functioning (and 
outcome) seem well poised to underlie a specific antitrust issue. These are cases 
where there exist several distinct reasons of justice each of which survive scrutiny 
but leads to different results.610
From the foregoing, as much as one might admire the concept of objectivity 
especially with regards to its inherent relationship with law, the prospects of this 
concept is weakened by two pitfalls. First, if correctness implies the presence of right 
and wrong answers, it is practically difficult or perhaps impossible to set out a truly 
objective criterion for deciding between these interests. Secondly, even where the 
criteria of objectivity is not to be applied in determining the rightness or wrongness 
of particular theories or outcomes but rather in determining the inherent logic of the 
competing theories, one still has to take note of the plurality of robust and impartial 
reasons that can emerge from searching scrutiny. This means the choosing task as a 
whole cannot be practically achieved while maintaining the purely procedural nature 
of the person-centred approach.
Given that it is practically impossible to follow through with the choosing exercise 
while at the same time applying the broadness criteria of the person-centred approach 
in its pure form, one might be tempted to make a contrived attempt at defining 
objectivity in a way that suits the exercise. For instance, of the two types of 
objectivity -  epistemic and metaphysical -  one might be disposed to building the 
choosing exercise on the definition that accommodates the inherent subjectivity 
contained in the choosing exercise.
Epistemic objectivity requires that our decisions are free of bias (or other factors that 
distort our judgment) that prevent the things we are judging from presenting 
themselves clearly and accurately.611 It thus demands that the cognitive process and
609 For example, naked cartelist behaviours.
6,0 Sen (2009) 201.
611 Brian Leiter, “Introduction” in Brian Leiter (ed) Objectivity in Law and Morals (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2001) 2.
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mechanisms by which we form beliefs about the world be constituted in such a way 
that they, at least, tend towards the production of accurate representations of how 
things are. Epistemic objectivity does not require that the cognitive process in 
question yields an absolutely correct representation.612 To be epistemically objective, 
our cognitive processes need not yield accurate representations. The standard test 
rather is that our cognitive processes are free of factors that we know to produce 
inaccurate representation. On the other hand, metaphysical objectivity requires an 
ability to deliver accurate representations of the way things truly or objectively are. 
Thus, we achieve metaphysical objectivity where we can see things as what they are 
independent of how we take them to be.
Applied to legal decisions and consequently to the task of choosing, we expect legal 
decisions to be objective in the sense that arbiters make decisions without letting bias 
or prejudice intervene. It is vivid that the idea of objectivity is inherently linked to 
the task of correctness. But it must be noted that this legal requirement says nothing 
about the meaning of objectivity in itself. In line with the above explanation about 
the types of claims to objectivity, it means that in metaphysical terms, the law is 
objective insofar as there are correct answers as a matter of law. On the other hand, 
the law is epistemically objective insofar as the mechanisms for discovering correct 
answers (for instance, the adjudicatory process and legal reasoning) are free of 
distorting factors that would obscure correct answers.
Thus, based on the foregoing exposition, the idea of objectivity can still be 
conceivable if it is understood in the epistemic sense. Nevertheless, it does appear to 
be impossible to divorce metaphysical objectivity from the claim that the law is 
epistemically objective.613 As we have seen, seeking metaphysical objectivity has 
been faulted on the grounds that our decisions are inherently value-based. If we 
cannot achieve epistemic objectivity without having to seek metaphysical objectivity, 
then our idea of objectivity and the whole attempt to achieve inclusiveness through 
the capability framework would appear to be a recipe for unbounded judicial 
discretion, subjectivism, inconsistencies and arbitrariness.
612 Ibid
613 Ibid, 3. He states that “we can get no purchase on the notion o f a ‘distorting factor’ without 
reference to the ‘things’ we are trying to know”.
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In theory, it is possible to seek epistemic objectivity between the relevant 
functionings within the capability framework when engaged in the choosing task. 
Postema has developed an account of objectivity that makes sense for law and 
adjudication and desists from combining the two types of objectivity.614 To him, the 
role of political and moral values in adjudication is compatible with the objectivity of 
law. We can view objectivity in generic terms such that we say that our act of 
choosing is objective when we are open in the appropriate way to the subject matter 
of the judgment. Specifically, we would be objective if our judgment is independent 
of the interests of antitrust subjects in the appropriate way. That is, the judgement on 
each functioning must be truth-evaluable, and that its truth-value should be an 
objective matter. Thus, if every functioning detailed through the specific ascertaining 
task is truth evaluable in that they are backed by substantial theoretical or empirical 
evidence, one would suppose that all that need to be done in the pursuit of objectivity 
is to ensure that the adjudicatory process and legal reasoning are free of distorting 
factors that can obscure correct answers. This simply reinforces the idea of pure 
procedural justice.
The above contrived analysis notwithstanding, the objectivity account is still severely 
flawed on account of the choosing exercise for two major reasons; it is impossible to 
attain metaphysical objectivity. Secondly, even though the attainment of epistemic 
objectivity is theoretically conceivable, this idea of objectivity falls short of telling us 
how decisions are to be made through the person-centred approach.
Metaphysical objectivity contemplates the setting of objective criteria for 
deciphering right from wrong. This has been shown to be conceptually and 
practically impossible. Epistemic objectivity is concerned about the objectivity of the 
process and not necessarily in the substance. If one is to rephrase this idea of 
objectivity, it means that one can for instance, subjectively rank different interests as 
long as the process through which ultimate results will be reached remains objective. 
Even if one is to accept that it is possible to attain objectivity in this sense, we must 
keep in sight that objectivity is not an end in itself but rather a vessel to ensure 
broadness and inclusiveness. The decisional framework loses its claim to broadness
614 Gerald Postema, Objectivity Fit for Law, in Brian Leiter (ed) ibid, 99.
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and inclusiveness the moment that we are able to rank and compare interests on the 
basis of their inherent subjective qualities.
Conclusively therefore, the idea of correctness and objectivity has proved unhelpful 
in moving us beyond the capability framework as it does not tell us how to make 
concrete decisions while at the same time respecting the idea of justice as 
inclusiveness.
ii. Social Choice Option
The task of choosing correctly between normative accounts on the basis of 
objectivity has been rightly shown to be rather unrealistic. We need therefore to look 
into an account that recognises this impossibility but still seeks to reach concrete 
result on the basis of impartiality, hence, the need to consider the social choice 
theory.
Social choice is an evaluative discipline which is deeply concerned with the rational 
basis of social judgment and public decisions in choosing between social 
alternatives.615 The outcomes of this procedure “take the form of ranking different 
states of affairs from a ‘social point of view’, in the light of the assessment of people 
involved.”616 Though its present mode of analysis is largely mathematical, it has
(\ 17 • •been said to be of very general application. This theory is concerned with arriving 
at overall judgments for social choice based on diversity of perspectives and
/ r  1 0
priorities. With this theory, judgments are arrived at by desisting from ranking 
interest on the basis of cardinal comparison of welfare. Rather, it only allows for 
ordinal non-comparable preferential rankings.619 Justice is sought by converting 
preferences over all positions in all alternatives into justice statement about the 
alternatives. In effect, interpersonal comparisons are made on the basis of 
individuals in society. This does not mean that an actual opinion poll is conducted. 
Rather, correctness is attained through practical reason. The impartial observer (i.e.
615 Sen (2009) 95.
616 Ibid.
617 John Craven, Social Choice: A Framework fo r Collective Decision and Individual Judgements 
(New York, Cambridge University Press, 1992) 1.
618 Sen (2009) 109.
619 It is otherwise called ordinal non-comparable preferences.
620 Craven, 126.
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competition authorities or the Court) could engage in a thought experiment621 
through which they are expected to choose by applying certain standards to the 
diverse perspectives and priorities. Recognising the impossibility of choosing 
objectively between normative accounts because of their ordinal nature, some social 
choice scholars claim that the theory takes us beyond the intrinsic value of individual 
norms by comparing outcomes on the basis of utility, equity and efficiency etc 
deriving from each.622
According to Sen, social choice is based on comparative justice as against the idea of 
transcendental justice which, he claims, keeps “us engrossed in an imagined and 
implausible world of unbeatable magnificence.”623 He thus considers comparative 
justice to be better because it is more practical. He also contends that since justice is 
sought on relational basis, social choice is better because it helps us to avoid making 
firm statements for future cases particularly where in the light of the social welfare 
standard, the outcomes reached when we applying the competing theories will be the 
same. In this light, Sen argues that through “dominance”624 and “intersection”,625 
there can be an overlap between interpersonally different orderings of principles of 
justice, leading to an overlapping consensus with respect to the particular point under 
consideration. In such cases, there will be no need to determine the relative priorities 
to be attached to the relevant criteria. This in other words means that high level meta­
objectives might be unnecessary especially where different accounts of justice all 
reach the same outcome in any particular case.
The potential for prudent decision-making makes the social choice theory truly 
appealing. One does not expect antitrust enforcers or courts “to express broad views 
on great issues of the day, at least if those views do not contribute to the particular 
outcome”626 because to do otherwise would amount to building a rule-based 
affirmative metric for assessing competing normative accounts. Thus, there are two 
ways that the prudence inherent in social choice helps the process of antitrust
621 John Harsanyi, “Cardinal Utility in Welfare Economics and in the Theory o f Risk-Taking” (1953) 
61 Journal o f  Political Economy 455
622 Marc Fleurbaey and Peter Hammond, “Interpersonally comparable utility” in S. Barber^, P. 
Hammond, C. Seidl (eds), Handbook o f Utility Theory (vol. 2, Dordrecht, Kluwer, 2004).
623 Sen (2009) 106.
624 Sen (1995) 46.
625 Sen (1992) 54.
626 Sunstein, vii.
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pluralism. First, the celebrated incompleteness of social choice theory saves us from 
subsequent absurdities that may derive from an a priori specification of a “correct 
and objective” social welfare standard. Secondly, it could foster general coherence of 
the system as it affords the relevant authorities to balance the need to vindicate the 
plurality of interest and also avoid arbitrariness. They can achieve this by 
maintaining their quiet in such cases and desisting from making high level theoretical 
statements.627
The above notwithstanding, most competition cases are characterised by hard 
questions which ultimately limits the possibility of overlapping consensus which 
means we might have to determine the priorities to be attached to relevant principles 
before we can make adequate judgments. This, it has been argued, renders social 
choice impotent because it reflects rather than resolves collectively incomplete
•  • •  £98ranking of principles. In particular, Sen’s attempt to solve the social choice 
problem by making comparative judgment rather than transcendental judgment is 
considered inadequate because it is incapable of giving determinate and 
unambiguous answer to the question of how to avoid, resolve, or transcend the 
different intuitive ranking people make.629
Further, even if it is possible to overlook the intuitive rankings because of 
overlapping consensus, an adjudicatory system is unlikely to benefit from such 
procedure as judicial decisions require concrete reasoning. It has thus been stated in 
this regard that “[ajrticulating reasons play a much more essential role in legitimizing 
a judicial decision ... A decision that is not supported by reason may be ignored 
distinguished into oblivion, or labelled as ‘bad law’ and simply overruled.” This 
means thus that whether there is overlapping consensus or not, a choice has to be 
made between different alternatives.
627 In addition to Sen’s Overlapping Consensus, other accounts that seem to favour prudence are in 
forging prudence are Rawls notion o f Reflective Equilibrium and Sunstein’s Incompletely Theorised 
Agreements In Particular Cases.
628 Martijn Boot, “The Aim of a Theory of Justice” (2012) 15 Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 2, 
18.
629 Ibid, 19.
630 Bruce Chapman, “The Rational and the Reasonable: Social Choice Theory and Adjudication” 
(1994) 61 University o f Chicago Law Review 42-43.
631 Reason may not play such as essential role in politics and in market transactions. In this regard, 
Chapman states that, in politics for instance, “while the final vote may be preceded by much 
discussion and exchange of reasons, the authority o f the vote is not affected by the quality o f this
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Hence, notwithstanding the seeming advantage of the social choice theory in terms of 
its comparative value and its potential for prudence, it remains problematic because 
when we are faced with the bottom-line task of making concrete decisions, it appears 
that the theory is bedevilled by three fundamental pitfalls. First, social choice, as a 
tool, fails to produce any result at all. Secondly, it fails to produce consistent and 
transitive result. Thirdly, the system of precedents, vulnerability of procedures, and 
the fact that the preference ranking could take the form of a mental exercise within a 
single adjudicator increase the chance that a decisional approach modelled on social 
choice will be susceptible to “agenda influence” or “path dependence”.
To flesh up these problems, I will illustrate with an assumed fact. However, a brief 
summary of Arrow’s impossibility theorem is first detailed.
Kenneth Arrow in his seminal work Social Choice and Individual Values,632 sought 
to prove that no reasonably consistent and fair voting system can result in sensible 
results. He proved this assertion by establishing the impossibility of formulating a 
social preference ordering that satisfies all of the following conditions:
i. Unanimity: If all people entitled to a say in the decision prefer one option 
to another, that option prevails.
ii. Nondictatorship: No one person's views can control the outcome in every 
case.
iii. Range: The system must allow every ranking of admissible choices, and 
there must be at least three admissible choices with no other institution to 
declare choices or rankings out of bounds at the start.
iv. Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives: The choice between options A 
and B depends solely on the comparison of those two.
v. Transitivity: If the collective decision selects A over B and B over C, it 
also must select A over C. This is the requirement of logical consistency.
Arrow states that no voting system can satisfy the five conditions simultaneously. He 
showed that ideally a broad-based framework that recognises the impossibility of
discussion ... [I]n market transacting, so long as one has the property right in question, one need only 
justify, or defend with reasons, one’s willingness or reluctance to trade. What makes a political vote or 
market transaction ultimately authoritative is simply the fact that those different acts o f choosing have 
occurred, not the cogency of the reasoning involved.”
632 Kenneth Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2nd ed, New Haven, Yale University Press, 
1977).
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ordinal ranking but still seeks to impartially decide between plural alternatives would 
have to abide by a voting system built on the five conditions. He however shows the 
impossibility of meeting all these conditions as one of the five conditions must go 
unsatisfied in every collective decision-making body. For instance, he contends that 
any process for making collective choices that satisfies conditions (i) to (iv) cannot 
also satisfy condition (v) on transitivity. Analysing Arrow’s account, Easterbrook 
recognised that it appears counterintuitive to assert that circular preferences, path 
dependence, and other problems are not only endemic to collective decision-making 
systems, they are produced by the very things we find desirable in such systems.633 
Nevertheless, he considers it a sound theory even for judicial application.634
Specifically on the concerns raised, the claim that social choice is likely to result in 
indeterminacy is explained through an illustration. Assuming there are three interests 
(efficiency (E), economic freedom (F) and market integration (M)) to be considered 
within the capability set in a single case and parties agree that the criteria to be 
assessed are consumer welfare, freedom and the public policy. In this case, two will 
represent the majority. If E and F rank freedom over market integration and E and M 
rank consumer welfare over economic freedom and F and M rank market integration 
over consumer welfare, the majority rule does not help us in making concrete 
decisions as it does not tell us the value that should be ranked first. This is because a 
majority rank freedom over market integration meaning that we cannot give priority 
to market integration; a majority rank market integration over consumer welfare so 
that we cannot give priority to consumer welfare; and a majority rank consumer 
welfare over economic freedom meaning that we cannot possibly give priority to 
economic freedom. This results in a voting paradox which according to Allingham,
635makes social choice susceptible to yielding vacuous results.
Regarding the transitivity problem, Arrow stated that any decision-making process 
that satisfies condition (i) to (iv) cannot satisfy the transitivity condition. Assessing 
this contention in light of judicial decision-making, Easterbrook stated that the first 
two conditions appear to be essential parts of any method of judicial decision­
making. Condition (i) means that a judge does not delegate his authority to someone
633 Frank Easterbrook, “Ways of Criticizing the Court” (1982) 95 Harvard Law Review 802, 814.
634 Ibid.
635 Michael Allingham, Social Choice Theory: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford, Oxford University 
Press, 2002) 94.
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else. Also, where issues are raised before an appellate court, it is important that the 
court does not allow a particular judge to always decide the cases. The idea of non­
dictatorship can also imply that the court should not always decide strictly on the 
basis of one normative claim as opposed to others. Concerning condition (iii), 
Easterbrook referred particularly to antitrust as an area where there is potential for at 
least three choices which may be ranked in multi-peaked fashion. For example, he 
stated that Justices have been divided about the utility of bright line test and about 
the objectives of antitrust laws as some believe that the per se doctrine should be 
employed frequently while others conclude that the Rule of Reason is preferable. 
This basic divide springs up at least four admissible approaches which are; per se 
rule for political values, per se rule for efficiency, rule of reason for political values, 
rule of reason for efficiency. The multi-peaked ways in which this condition can be 
reflected reinforces the contention that social choice approach is bound to result in 
inconsistencies.
The problem of inconsistency raises a serious concern for the person-centred 
approach particularly in terms of the potential for legal uncertainty and arbitrariness. 
These concerns cannot be overlooked as there is no doubt that as a precondition a 
good competition law regime must accord with the rule of law since anything to the 
contrary will be illogical.636 Stressing the requisite qualities of a competition regime, 
the OECD stated in its 2005 Roundtable that a standard antitrust regime would: strive 
towards accuracy; ensure that its standard should be easy to apply; strive towards 
consistency and predictability; ensure that decisions are reached objectively; ensure 
that the scope of the standard should be wide enough; and that the standard and its 
objectives should be understandable.637 In general, legal certainty is important to 
competition law as it is considered essential that businesses are able to assess and
638determine in advance the likely impact and consequence of their conducts.
The problem of intransitivity could perhaps be linked to Bork’s concern when he said 
that where we pursue plural ideals, “horns of plenty make anything resembling a rule
636 Maurice Stucke, “Does the Rule of Reason Violate the Rule o f Law?” Marsden and Waller (2009) 
16.
637 See Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, Policy Roundtables: Competition 
on the Merit 23 (2005). [http://www.oecd.Org/dataoecd/7/13/35911017.pdf].
638 It should be noted however that a regime such as Europe would still trade-off some level o f  
certainty because of the peculiarity o f the field. The present initiative o f moving away from the more 
certain rule-based approach and towards the more economic approach is a good example.
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of law impossible.”639 In effect, there will be legitimate concern that the potential 
uncertainty that might result from the comparative decision-making framework 
might gravely affect business such that it “increases the risk that firms may be 
breaking [the] law when they have been trying in good faith to abide by it.”640 The 
spiral effect of such uncertainty on business is aptly reflected by Stucke who 
identifies the potential for rent-seeking behaviours in such instance. He stated thus:
“[s]uppose a competitor abides by competition rules (and incurs cost to do so), while 
its rivals cheat (and seek a competitive advantage). Failure to uniformly enforce the 
rules will invite others to cheat. Without rules yielding predictable legal outcomes, 
firms may refrain from welfare-enhancing activity and opt for less efficient forms of 
doing business. Alternatively, competitors may engage in socially harmful activity 
but rely on lawyers and lobbyists to try to clear them of legal difficulties.”641
Some scholars have however attempted to challenge the claim that social choice 
theory facilitates inconsistency and arbitrariness in judicial decision-making. For 
instance they have broadly differentiated consistency and coherence.642 More 
specifically, they have argued that inconsistency is unavoidable in judicial decision 
making, and that the important criterion for the judicial system is coherence, not 
consistency. Hence, inconsistencies in individual cases add to the overall 
reasonableness of the system.643
Concerning the problem of path dependence, Chapman identifies the vulnerability of 
legal decision-making particularly in relation to the practice of precedence. He stated 
that:
“[Different legal precedents have, as a matter of contingent historical fact, set 
different agendas for rationalising like cases. Private law adjudication is quite self­
consciously and unabashedly, therefore, subject to what social choice theorists have 
come to refer to as ‘agenda influence’ or ‘path dependence’, a feature they claim is 
suspect within any theory of goal-directed rational choice”644
639 Bork (1978) 427.
640 Damien Neven, P6n61ope Papandropoulous and Paul Seabright, Trawling fo r Minnows (London, 
Centre for Economic Policy Research, 1998) 18, 19.
641 Stucke (2009) 16.
642 Chapman; Easterbrook (1982) 803.
643 Ibid
644 Chapman, ibid, 42-43.
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Easterbrook points out that social choice could still be susceptible to path 
dependence because of the law’s inherent respect for precedent which is needed to 
meet the transitivity requirement. Precedents, he argues, has the tendency to 
reinforce the problem of circular preferences.645 Also, social choice has been shown 
to be susceptible to strategic procedural manipulation. To this effect, Levine and 
Plott contend that the final social choice ordering of a group can be highly influenced 
by the agenda or groupings in which alternatives are considered for adoption or 
elimination.646 They contend that ethical and practical issues arise from the fact that 
participants in a decision-making or fact-finding exercise may be manipulated simply 
by conditioning the process in order to achieve a set preferential ordering. They state 
that:
“[processes seem to be accepted as legitimate in part because they are thought to 
allow decisions to be based impartially on the subjective preferences of the 
participants towards the alternative presented. Although ‘intrinsic’ qualities of 
procedures can probably be appraised normatively without reference to subject 
matter, it is ordinarily a serious objection to a candidate process that it systematically 
and predictably can be made to select certain outcomes even though other outcomes 
are thought to command ‘more’ support”647
Levin and Plott state further that for any given set of individual preferences, groups 
can reach a variety of outcomes by majority processes that reflect the views of the 
individual members with respect to the alternatives presented. They therefore assert 
that if there is no outcome that the group “wants” independently of the procedure 
used to reach the decision, all one can do is to choose an acceptable agenda that 
dictates the final result. However, they contend that the true subversion becomes 
empty if there is no single reflection of a group’s preferences, only a set of possible 
outcomes that depend on the agenda. Based on their empirical analysis, they are of 
the opinion that procedural deftness may be not so different from a rhetorical gift and 
charisma.
645 Easterbrook (1982), 824.
646 Michael Levine and Charles Plott, “Agenda Influence and its Implications” (1977) 63 Virginia 
Law Review 561, 564.
647 Ibid, 588.
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Conclusively, the social choice theory, just like the pursuit of analytical objectivity, 
fails to provide an acceptable framework for making concrete decisions. This is 
regardless of any advantage that has been attributed to theory or the wide ranging 
attempts to disprove or justify some of the above-mentioned pitfalls.
5.4 Conclusion
In the preceding chapter, the thesis identified the need to move beyond the 
opportunity aspect of the person-centred approach to the decisional aspect. This 
transition is important if the person-centred approach is to have a decisional 
perspective to it. Considering that the construction of this approach was motivated by 
the need to avoid exclusion of interests, it is essential that the person-centred 
framework is capable of producing concrete decisions whilst it at the same time 
maintains the pure procedural framework. Two alternative decisional routes were 
considered -  procedural objectivity and social choice. However, unfortunately, the 
finding is that there is no principled way of remaining value-neutral while we, at the 
same time, make concrete decisions. The only way concrete results can be reached 
without recourse of normative positions will be to completely disregard reason in 
decision-making. This is not in fact an option because failure to accord with reason 
will severely hamper antitrust as arbitrariness and uncertainty would reign.
Conclusively, this chapter reveals that as much as the person-centred approach gives 
a unique and helpful perspective to policy discourse, it is less potent as a decision­
making tool. The impossibility of making concrete decisions at the choosing stage 
means therefore that the elaborate ascertaining exercise may have to either be 
dispensed with altogether or scaled down dramatically. Even where it is scaled down, 
one would not expect that the ascertaining task will be undertaken in individual 
cases.
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Chapter 6
Person-centred Approach and Antitrust Enforcement
6.1 Introduction
The attempt to construct a procedural framework for the substantive assessment of 
antitrust has proved abortive. Much effort was put into creating a broad account so as 
to avoid the deconstruction trap. It has however been shown in chapter five that the 
constructed person-centred approach is difficult if not impossible to apply without 
taking a firm normative stance. It thus creates a sort of “catch-22” problem: despite 
our attempt to avoid deconstruction through the detailed exposition of the account of 
right, the capability approach and the ascertaining task, the only way to proceed 
would be to take a position one way or another on the prevailing antitrust theories 
whose deconstructability in the first place warranted the introduction of the person- 
centred approach. It is however not all gloom for the proposed approach as it appears 
that the person-centred reasoning could still be of value at the enforcement stage.
In terms of enforcement, the person-centred approach seeks to (in response to 
Coleman’s third question) ascertain how antitrust right might be enforced. In 
answering this question, it should be noted that motivation for enforcing antitrust 
right could differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. Possible differences 
notwithstanding, antitrust enforcers are generally expected to assess: the nature of an 
antitrust violation; the effect of such violation; and the degree of enforcement 
required to curb such anti-competitive behaviour. In line with the person-centred 
approach, there is an additional element to the question of how antitrust right is to be 
enforced. Thus added to the three elements stated above, antitrust enforcement 
procedures must be broad, flexible and adaptable.
To illustrate the need for flexibility and adaptability, examples can be made of areas 
of antitrust which have evolved over time. For instance, while an antitrust authority 
might feel or might have felt strongly against vertical integration or retail price 
mechanism, it became clear over time that the authorities should not disregard 
credible evidence to the effect that such behaviour is not in the particular instance, 
anti-competitive. Another example can be made of predation. We have found that it
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should not be enough to disregard an allegation of predation merely because the price 
charged by the dominant firm for its product is above cost. Authorities must take 
seriously and must be willing to follow necessary procedural channels where 
complainants allege a concealed abuse.
To put the proposition in this chapter in much graphical form and to effectively 
explore its whole components, I will focus on cartel enforcement. Cartelisation has 
been chosen because of the consensus in this area by antitrust institutions. It is 
therefore thought that if this proposition is to be effectively digested by a wide range 
of readers, cartel enforcement would be the ideal vehicle. Further, much in line with 
the other chapters, I focus on the EU regime in order to aid the fluidity of the thesis 
as a whole. I however make reference to UK and US under private enforcement.
This chapter is divided into six parts. In part one, I analyse briefly the nature of 
cartels and state why enforcement actions against them are imperative regardless of 
the perspective from which we address antitrust. In part two, I briefly state peculiar 
efforts that have been made by public enforcers as well as the attempt to encourage 
private actions. In part three, I establish a potential enforcement deficit which is often 
overlooked -  driven by their set objectives (such as the urge to discourage cartelist 
behaviours), the policies, mechanisms, procedures and remedies applied by 
institutions and courts may be structured too narrowly such that they overly disregard 
some interests. I argue that, from the person-centred perspective, this may result in 
an enforcement deficit which has to be corrected. To illustrate this problem, I explain 
generally how public enforcement activities of the European Commission 
(particularly against cartelist behaviours) might blind enforcers from appreciating 
other equally important aspects of enforcement. I also illustrate with private action 
initiatives. In part four, I argue that institutions and courts should follow an 
incremental enforcement method in order to balance the urge of achieving 
institutional goals with the need to address the interests of antitrust subjects. To show 
how this can work, I illustrate through the use of private remedies in antitrust cases. 
In part five, I analyse a recent EU case that warranted incremental enforcement. I 
conclude in part six.
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6.2 Ills of Cartels
The words of Adam Smith648 in his book, The Wealth o f  Nations, come to mind when 
we consider cartel cases. He stated that where businesses converge, there is a 
tendency that competitors regard themselves as friends while the consumer is seen as 
the enemy. A cartel is essentially an agreement to limit output with the objective of 
increasing prices and profit. The negative effect of cartelisation is that it generates 
overcharge and deadweight social loss to consumers.
That cartels have the potential to harm consumers649 is a fact that can be taken for 
granted. There are in fact enormous body of theoretical and empirical literatures that 
reflect this possibility. For example, it has been shown that the publication of firm 
specific transaction price leads to an average increase in prices by almost 20 
percent.650 As a result of the Vitamins cartel for instance, studies revealed 
monumental losses caused by this clandestine behaviour: on a worldwide scale, the 
size of the affected market was $31 billion.651 The total worldwide direct overcharge 
incurred by buyers was estimated at $7 billion. The deadweight loss would have been 
between one-fifth and one-tenth of the overcharge. In the US alone, the cartel was 
estimated to have generated economic waste of over $1 billion.653 To mention but a 
few, enforcement institutions such as the Office of Fair Trading (OFT) have also 
made practical efforts to substantiate the dangers caused by cartels. It estimated that 
if the cartel activities of Harbros/Argos/Littlewoods have not been brought to an end, 
consumers would have been overcharged by over £40 million.654 Also, it stated that 
price fixing for Replica Football Kit would have cost consumers over £50 million in
648 Adams Smith (1776) said: “People o f the same trade seldom meet together, even for merriment and 
diversion, but the conversation ends in a conspiracy against the public, or in some contrivance to raise 
prices.”
649 Jonathan Baker, “The Case for Antitrust Enforcement” (2003) 17 Journal o f  Economic Perspective 
27.
650 Mario Monti, “Fighting Cartels- Why and How? Why Should we be Concerned with Cartels and 
Collusive Behaviours?” Speech 00/295, 11/09/2000.
651 This estimate was based on the reflection o f 2005 currency. See John Connor, “The Global 
Vitamins Conspiracy: Sanction and Deterrence” American Antitrust Institute Working Paper No. 06- 
02 (22 February 2006). See further John Connor, Global Price Fixing: Our Customers Are the Enemy 
(London, Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2001).
652 This is based on a general finding in most manufacturing industries, ibid.
653 See OECD, “Hard Core Cartels” Meeting o f the OECD Council at Ministerial Level, 2000.
654 See OFT press release 149/06, dated 19 October 2006.
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overcharge.655 Even more alarming is the bid-rigging in the construction industry 
estimated at the value of £3 billion.656
The pecuniary impact of cartels to the society as a whole has been well documented. 
A case against cartel could thus be substantiated on the basis of this evidence alone. 
In order to avoid the ills of cartels, antitrust regimes have fashioned various 
enforcement tools. Some of which will be addressed below.
6.3 Enforcement Efforts
If the war against harmful cartels is to be won, it is imperative to deploy functional 
enforcement tools. For example, in order to control the reign of cartels, antitrust 
institutions such as the European Commission and national antitrust authorities have 
employed different mechanisms with the main objective of deterring such behaviour. 
Instruments often used include one or a combination of fines, economic tools, 
leniency, settlement procedure, criminalisation, private participation, reward schemes 
and so on. These instruments are summarised below:
6.3.1 Detection
Sophisticated investigative techniques are required if harmful cartels are to be 
uncovered. One of such tools which authorities utilise is dawn raid. Another effective 
and arguably more productive alternative is through use of the leniency programme. 
In Europe for instance, it can be argued that leniency has to a large extent been a 
great success as the Commission is more likely to uncover cartels which would 
otherwise have remained undetected.657 Another tool is through the use of settlement 
procedures which fast-track proceedings. A typical cartel investigation can last up to 
five years. This length is often further increased up to an average of ten years 
because the alleged infringer often appeal the Commission’s decision. This snag
656 See OFT press release 49/07, dated 22 March 2007. Over 122 undertakings were said to be 
involved in the bid-rigging.
657 Guidance on the present leniency procedure can be found in the Commission Notice on Immunity 
from Fines and Reduction o f Fines in Cartel cases (2006/C 298/11). This has a great deterrence effect. 
See Massimo Motta and Michele Polo, “Leniency Programs and Cartel Prosecution” (2003) 21 
International Journal o f Industrial Organisation 347.
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necessitated the settlement procedure.658 This procedure reduces the administrative 
burden through the introduction of simplified administrative process. In event, 
antitrust authorities will be able to utilise their resources more efficiently by 
redirecting their manpower to uncovering new cartels and consequently raise the 
probability of detection.659
Cartels can also be detected through forensic economic analysis. With this approach, 
one could imagine that the economic analysis will at least serve as an initial indicator 
of violation and hence increase the probability of cartel detection.660 For example, it 
has been recorded that the Netherlands Competition Authority used the structural 
approach,661 to uncover collusion in the Dutch shrimp industry.662
Further, antitrust institutions encourage private participation in order to increase the 
probability of detection. This could be achieved by encouraging whistle-blowing 
and/or encouraging the institution of private actions. Regarding reward schemes, a 
peculiar activity of the UK OFT is notable -  It publicised a reward of £100,000 to 
informants who help to uncover cartels. It is believed that such a scheme will be 
successful as it serves as a potent weapon against concealment664 as the initiative 
gives monitoring task to those closest to the relevant information.665 Concerning 
private enforcement, there has been efforts in Europe to encourage private parties to
658 See Commission Notice on the Conduct o f Settlement Procedures in Cartel Cases (OJ 2008 
C l67/1). Neelie Kroes had, at an earlier point, made unequivocal declaration that she aims at swift 
enforcement and timely punishment through direct settlement. See “Delivering on the Crackdown: 
Recent developments in the European Commission’s Campaign Against Cartels” Speech delivered at 
the 10th Annual Competition Conference at the European University Institute, Fiesole, 13 October 
2006.
659 Massimo Motta “On Cartel Deterrence and Fines in the European Union” (2008) 29 ECLR 211.
660 See Joseph Harrington, “Behavioural Screening and the Detection o f Cartels” in Ehlermann and 
Atanasiu (eds), (2007) 51; Paul Grout and Silvia Sonderegger, “Structural Approaches to Cartel 
Detection” ibid, 83; Patrick Rey, “On the Use o f Economic Analysis in Cartel Detection” ibid, 69.
661 Structural approach to cartel detection considers the characteristics o f  an industry that increases the 
probability that a cartel will arise or be sustainable. Cartelisation is likely where: there are fewer 
firms; demand is stable; the market is characterised by frequent interaction and price adjustment; firms 
encounter each other in different markets; and the products are homogenous. See Grout and 
Sonderegger (2007).
662 See Harrington (2007).
663 See
[http://business.timesonline.co.uk/tol/business/industry_sectors/industrials/article3458691.ece]. (Last 
assessed 14-08-2012)
664 See William Kovacic, “Bounties as Inducement to Identify Cartels” in Ehlermann and Atanasius 
(eds) (2007) 578.
665 There is no doubting the fact that it is more efficient to have an employee make copies of relevant 
cartel-revealing documents in the course o f his employment than having a “squadron” of public 
enforcers effect a dawn raid in order to obtain impossible information.
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institute actions against cartelists either on a standalone basis or through follow-on 
actions. Attempts are thus being made to sensitise private participants about the 
remedies available to them and also to unclog the private enforcement procedure.
6.3.2 Penalism£
Fines are a major tool for deterring cartel behaviours. It is thus believed that the fines 
that are to be imposed on cartel violations should be high enough to truly deter. 
Europe for example, has stepped up its fining policies and practice. For instance, in 
2007 the total fine imposed on 41 undertakings in eight final decisions was €3,334 
million. This was an improvement to the seven final decisions in 2006 wherein an 
aggregate fine of €1,846 million was imposed on 41 undertakings.666
Also, there is an increased use of criminal sanctions in order to deter cartels. Thus, 
rather than limiting enforcement to companies,667 the individuals primarily involved
/ / o
are also sanctioned. Only a few would doubt that individual criminal responsibility 
could be effective. For instance, the force of a possible jail term was obvious in the 
Lysine case as conspirator were clearly worried about the possibility of criminal 
prosecution if they were caught.669 Thus, the threat of imprisonment has been said to 
be the most potent deterrence tool.670 Furthermore, the possibility of imprisonment 
passes a strong moral message about the ills of cartels.671 Also, the newsworthiness 
of jail terms would discourage businessmen because of its socially and morally 
demeaning effect.672 At present, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Estonia and some 
other member-states673 do provide for criminal sanctions. In the case of Marine Hose
666 European Commission Report on Competition Policy 2007. COM (2008) 368 final.
667 See generally John Coffee, “No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick: An Unscandalised Inquiry into 
the Problem of Corporate Punishment” (1981) 79 Michigan Law Review, 408.
668 It is noteworthy that there is no one way to delineate enforcement procedures that are criminal in 
nature and those that are administrative. For example, The Danish Competition Authority use criminal 
sanctions but are only imposed on undertakings, while the Germans mainly impose fines on individual 
through an administrative enforcement mechanism (note exceptions in bid rigging cases). See Wils 
(2007).
669 Baker (2003).
670 Arthur Liman, “The Paper Label Sentences: Critique” (1977) 86 Yale Law Journal 630-31. It was 
also observed that international cartelists avoid the US like a plague. The reason for this is the risk 
aversion o f businessmen when jail is involved. See Scott Hammond, “Cornerstone o f the Effective 
Leniency Program” (2004) ICN Workshop on Leniency Programs, Sydney.
671 Wils (2007).
672 Gregory Werden and Marylin Simon, “Why Price Fixers Should Go to Prison” (2003) 32 Antitrust 
Bulletin 934.
673 France, Cyprus and Slovak Republic do provide for criminal sanction. However the enforcement 
seems to be limited to their statute books.
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Cartel, three businessmen were sentenced to jail and disqualified as directors in the 
United Kingdom.674
All these enforcement efforts are laudable especially where they help to avoid, stop, 
or limit the negative effects of cartelisation. It is however still important especially 
from a person-centred perspective that activities of antitrust enforcers do not act 
rigidly. It sounds banal to state that antitrust enforcers should be cautious by 
maintaining a broad outlook to antitrust. But in fact, such emphasis is helpful 
especially when one considers that antitrust enforcers could be drawn into their 
prime enforcement objectives which make it likelier that they disregard and injure 
other interests held by antitrust subjects.675 Where we address antitrust from the 
person-centred point of view, we could very well abhor cartels because perhaps we 
believe they have negative effects on different shades of antitrust subjects. 
Nevertheless, it is still expected that we consider other competing interests when 
enforcing so that we do not create a fresh deficit to the interest(s) of some other 
antitrust subject(s) whilst attempting to solve one.
6.4 The Potential Harm to Persons’ Interests
It has been stated that it is likely that our sole focus on institutional objectives can 
blind us to other important antitrust concerns. Here in particular, the assertion is that 
institutions might fail to consider interests of some other antitrust subjects. One could 
take a look at regimes that are firmly focused on deterrence and efficiency. In such 
systems, it is likely that by focusing on end result, enforcers might dampen the 
regime’s internal critique. In Europe for example, it is commonplace that the 
European Commission is empowered to initiate investigation and assess the 
compliance of firms. This process could be initiated either directly by the
i'inc. .
Commission or through complaints made by a third party. Where there is a 
complaint, the Commission is duty bound to investigate it to the extent of
674 See United Kingdom Office o f Fair Trading press release 72/08 o f 11 June 2008.
675 From the person-centred point of view, even an infringer is an antitrust subject whose interest 
needs to be accommodated.
676 Article 6 o f Commission Decision o f 23 May 2001 on the Terms o f Reference o f Hearing Officers 
in Certain Competition Proceedings (notified under document number C(2001) 1461(2001/462/EC, 
ECSC) states that such interested third party should submit his application to be heard in writing, 
together with a written statement detailing his interest in the outcome o f the procedure. To determine 
whether or not to grant the third party’s application, the hearing officer is to consult with a director.
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ascertaining whether there is enough evidence or sufficient interest to warrant a full
• • 677 • •inquiry. The likelihood that the interests of antitrust subjects would be disregarded 
starts here. It must be noted that the problem is not that the Commission is not bound 
to follow up with every complaints. That could in fact be a good thing -  in fact, there 
could be good reasons why the Commission should not be made to take up more 
cases than it could manage. The Commission should very well be entitled to take into 
consideration what it regards as public interest and can thus, target its limited 
resources only to those cases revealing substantial interest for the Union. It can also 
be claimed that such procedure could eliminate frivolous claims. The likely problem 
however is that where we are too focused on institutional objectives, the cases we 
choose to investigate and those we decide to reject may depend heavily on how clear 
cut or easy the complaints are, rather than on the nature of interests affected. This is 
more likely considering the fact that the Commission is not only allowed to refuse to 
investigate where a case is not serious. In fact, it has a broader discretion -  it can 
desist from proceeding with an investigation if it considers the claim not to be worth 
the effort perhaps even if it is potentially serious. One would expect rather that 
even if the Commission cannot vindicate all interests, it should decide whether to 
proceed on a complaint on the basis of their urgency and the nature of detriment that 
might be suffered by the complainant.
Once the Commission decides to proceed with a case, a fresh concern arises for 
another type of antitrust subject. By choosing to follow on with a case, its goal drive 
is likely to go into overdrive as it would be under constant pressure to justify its 
decision to proceed with the case.679 The likely impact this could have on alleged 
infringers is worsened by the fact that the Commission is both the prosecutor and the 
judge. In a nutshell, the temptation to disparage the interests of alleged infringers
677 See European Commission Dealing with the Commission: notifications, complaints, inspections 
and fact-finding powers under Articles 85 and 86 o f the EEC, 54. See generally Wouter Wils, 
“Discretion and Prioritisation in Public Antitrust Enforcement: In Particular EU Antitrust 
Enforcement” (2011) 34 World Competition 1-32.
678 See Automec Sri v Commission (no. 2) Case T-24/90 [1992] 5 CMLR 431.
679 See Wils (2008) 161.
680 Ariana Andreangeli, et al, “Enforcement by the Commission -  The decisional and enforcement 
structure in antitrust cases and the Commission's fining system”, Draft Report presented at the Fifth 
Annual Conference o f the Global Competition Law Centre, 11-12 June 2009, (“GCLC Report”). See 
also Adrianna Andreangeli, EU Competition Enforcement and Human Rights (Cheltenham, Edward 
Elgar Publishing, 2008). See also International Chamber o f Commerce, “The Fining Policy o f the 
European Commission in Competition Cases”, ICC Document No. 225/659 o f 2 July 2009. Karl
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is rife where we are too focused on procedural and/or substantive goals. Indeed, the 
OECD aptly stated that “combining the function of investigation and decision” may 
“dampen internal critique” .681 This is in no way good for the enforcement regime as 
it has been noted by the European Court of Human Right that the difficulty that 
arises from such structure is that impact of possible bias on outcome of a case is 
extremely difficult to measure.682
The concern also exists in the context of private enforcement. In the wake of the 
Commission’s effort to promote private antitrust actions, Lawrence683 called for 
caution. Among other specific issues he addressed, Lawrence advised that there is 
need for balance between claimants and defendants. He stated that procedures 
incorporated in order to alter the risk-retum analysis that a claimant undertakes in 
considering whether to bring proceedings should be carefully assessed in order to 
prevent problems for the defendant. In sum, he contended that:
“Changes positively to incentivise litigation would not only provide a potential 
advantage to claimants, but also simultaneously, a real disadvantage to defendants. 
This could well tip the balance between claimants and defendant too far in favour of
( LQ A
the former, unless carefully managed.”
It however does not appear that the Commission took the advice seriously when it 
came up with the White paper on Damages. This is evident when one considers the 
proposition made by the Commission regarding the appropriate procedure to be 
followed where an indirect purchaser sues an infringer in a follow-on action.
The Commission observed that in order to prove that the damage claimed was caused 
by the initial competition law infringement, the claimant will have to, not only
£ Q C  #
reconstruct the incidence, but also bring evidence to establish harm. It recognised 
the difficulty this could bring to both claimants and defendants where they are 
respectively saddled with the burden of proof. The Commission reckoned that
Hofstetter, “EU Cartel Fining Law and Policies in Urgent Need o f Reform” (2009) 2 The Antitrust 
Chronicle.
681 OECD, “European Commission -  Peer Review o f Competition Law and Policy, Competition Law 
& Policy in the European Union” (2005) 62.
682 Judgment o f the ECtHR of 14 November 2006, Tsfayo v United Kingdom , App. N 60860/00 para 
33.
683 Jon Lawrence in Ehlermann and Atanasiu (eds) (2007) 461.
684 Ibid
685 Commission Staff Working Paper accompanying the White paper on Damages Actions for Breach 
o f the EC Antitrust Rules COM (2008) 165 final.
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“[b]ringing sufficient evidence of whether and if so, to what extent, the overcharge 
that resulted from the initial infringement has been passed on along the distribution 
chain is equally difficult for both the defendant and for the claimant who is not a 
direct purchaser. That implies that whoever bears the burden of proof risks a negative 
effect.”686
In line with its drive to stamp out cartels, the Commission chose to put the burden on 
the defendant. This conclusion is not by itself controversial as the Commission stated 
clearly its reasons. However, the troubling part as far as we are concerned from the 
person-centred point of view is that, even though it was justified on the basis of 
acceptable risk-allocation calculus,688 the Commission’s willingness to trade-off the 
interest of the infringer still raises concerns for the position of the “Other”.
The Commission stated thus:
“If the claimant would bear the full burden of showing the passing-on and its extent, 
he risks not being compensated for the harm he suffered. In such scenario, the 
defendant, who may (have) successfully use(d) the passing-on shield vis-a-vis 
another claimant upstream, does not compensate anyone for the harm caused by the 
infringement. This outcome would not only be contrary to the objective of effective 
and full compensation of the harm caused by a competition law infringement, but it 
can also be qualified as an unjust enrichment of the defendant. If, conversely, the 
burden of proof would lie with the defendant and he cannot prove the limits of the 
passing-on, he risks multiple liability in case both the direct purchaser and others 
claim damages for the same (part of the) overcharge. In such a scenario, claimants 
other than the direct purchaser may receive damages for a harm they did not suffer. 
Such payment amounts to an unjust enrichment on their side”689
It stated further that:
“[BJecause the scenario according to which the defendant is unjustly enriched is 
more likely than the one where he would face multiple liability, it considers it 
appropriate to ease the claimant’s burden of proving the passing-on and its extent. 
Indeed, for the defendant to face multiple liability, three conditions are to be
686 Ibid para 226.
687 Ibid, para. 227.
688 It stated that once the victim has demonstrated that there was an infringement and an overcharge, it 
is considered more equitable that the one who breached the law bears the risks flowing from the 
infringement, rather than his victim.
689 Para 226.
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fulfilled. First, he is sued for compensation of the same (part of the) overcharge by 
both direct and other purchasers, while only one has suffered the harm due to that 
given overcharge; second, the defendant cannot successfully invoke the passing-on 
defence; and third, the court acting in a joint, parallel or subsequent action does not 
offset the damages already awarded/paid to another claimant. The likelihood that 
these three cumulative conditions are fulfilled, and that as a consequence a defendant 
faces multiple liability, is considered to be much lower than the likelihood that, in a 
scenario where the overcharge has been passed on to the claimant, the latter is 
nonetheless not compensated because he could not bring sufficient evidence of the 
passing-on and its extent.”690
The Commission concluded that once the victim has demonstrated that there was an 
infringement and an overcharge, it is considered more equitable that the one who 
breached the law bears the risks flowing from the infringement, rather than his 
victim. One would expect from a person-centred point of view that the Commission 
exercises some caution by stating that the decision about who holds the burden of 
proof in such instances would be determined in the context of the specific cases.
Proponents of the person-centred approach will be wary of the negative effects that 
our enforcement activities might have on other interests held by antitrust subjects. It 
is however conceded that it would always be difficult to get the balance right. As 
such, we could work around our inevitable imperfections by adopting an attitude of 
incremental enforcement.
The idea of incrementalism arose from the recognition that human problems are 
extraordinarily complex, while our analytical capabilities are quite limited.691 The 
concept of incremental enforcement derives from the incremental decision-making in 
general. Lindblom, one of the pioneers, argued that adjustments among competing 
partisans will yield more sensible policies than are likely to be achieved by 
centralised decision makers who rely on political analysis. In other words, rather 
than trying to overcome complex and human limitation by brute analytical strength, 
we should proceed strategically. A form of strategic analysis proposed by Lindblom 
is disjointed incrementalism which consists of: limitation of analysis to a few 
somewhat familiar policy alternatives; adjustment of objectives in light of the
691 See generally Herbert Simon, “A Behavioral Model o f Rational Choice” (1955) 69 Quarterly 
Journal o f  Economics 99-118 and Charles Lindblom “The Science o f  'Muddling Through” (1959) 19 
Public Administration Review 79-88.
692 Lindblom (1959).
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policies potentially available, rather than considering ends in the abstract; more 
preoccupation with ills to be remedied than goals to be sought; a sequence of trials, 
errors, and revised trials; exploration of only some, not all, of the important possible 
consequences of a considered alternative; fragmentation of analytical work to many 
partisan participants in the policy making.693
Though it developed as a political decision-making idea, there is no reason why 
incrementalism should not be applicable to an enforcement regime especially where 
such regime seeks to take account of varied interests. However, in relating with the 
components of incrementalism, we are to discount the inherent differences that exist 
between political bodies as against judicial/administrative bodies.
Incremental enforcement is a systematic attempt at enhancing the position of antitrust 
subjects. It means that antitrust enforcement should take place with stronger 
emphasis on correcting the detrimental effect of anti-competition on antitrust 
subjects. This approach serves as a middle course between, on the one hand, taking 
excessively bold steps at correcting a perceived deficit to persons and on the other 
hand, taking no steps at all -  It saves us from inertia and leads us towards the 
constructive path of dynamism. It also seeks to avoid triggering unique detriments to 
antitrust subjects while solving a prevalent one. It simply requires that while working 
our way towards achieving a big goal (for instance, to deter cartels) we should take 
“small steps”. We should endeavour to evaluate each step in the light of broadness. 
Potential errors are to be corrected so that at the end of the process, we would not 
only have achieved our big institutional goal, but also ensure that interests held by 
antitrust subjects at enforcement level have been duly addressed. It means thus that 
the incremental approach to enforcement is progressive as we continually fine-tune 
the procedure. In sum, the incremental attitude is constituted by a mixture of caution 
and dynamism especially where we are unclear how a proposed improvement in our 
enforcement will affect other related parties.
An enforcement body is attuned to incremental enforcement where, for instance, it is 
not so blinded by its objectives by ensuring that it protects defendants’ procedural 
guarantees such as right to fair trial, right not to be tried twice and so on. It requires 
that authorities reach the outer limit of their expertise so that the more far-reaching
693 Charles Lindblom, Democracy and Market System (Oslo, Norwegian University Press, 1988) 239.
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an enforcement goal is, the more cautious the authorities should be in structuring 
their procedures on such goal.
The idea of incremental enforcement is to be deployed whenever an antitrust 
institution either decides on unprecedented issues, procedures or remedies. It is also 
to be applied where the institution seeks to improve on existing procedures, penalties 
and remedies. Let us take for instance that an antitrust institution seeks to improve its 
procedure such that the system eases the difficulty of establishing anti-competitive 
practices. If the institutions are to consider introducing procedures such as disclosure, 
it has to take cognisance of the complexities involved. It has to be aware of the 
numerous interests of even a single party which may be impacted upon. By 
acknowledging the complexities and its inherent limitation in identifying 
conclusively all shades of consequences that may result, the antitrust institution 
might be better off with an incremental approach. In the same light, if an antitrust 
regime considers that antitrust fines are too weak to deter or punish anti-competitive 
behaviours, it might consider it appropriate to increase the level of fines. It however 
has to be alive to the complexities here as well -  human right issues, economic 
impact etc. In essence, it has to proceed incrementally.
Considering the novelty of the aspect in Europe and consequently the enormous 
likelihood that institutions would be faced with unprecedented issues coupled with 
the fact that there are bound to be scopes for improvement, a full analysis of the idea 
of incremental enforcement will be made through the example of private antitrust 
enforcement. To make the example more apt, I will narrow my analysis to remedies.
Typically, the party initiating a private claim for injury suffered aims to recover 
damages for loss suffered. It is however undoubted that as valuable as damages 
awards might be, they do not necessarily serve as ideal remedy in all cases. To put it 
differently, there are some cases where alternative remedies would have to be sought 
and granted if the injured party is to be protected or restored to its pre-violation state. 
However, while seeking the ideal remedy in instances where damages will be 
inadequate, it is imperative that antitrust institutions do not forget that they cannot 
exhaustively analyse how the improvement should be because of the complexities of 
the interests at stake and because of their limited capability to appreciate every 
possible consequences. The Devenish Nutrition Ltd & Ors v Sanofl-Aventis SA
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(France) & ors694 case touches on this specific issue about the adequacy of damages 
and more importantly, it allows us to appreciate the role of incremental enforcement. 
Thus, I will use this case to exhaustively explain the nature of incremental 
enforcement and its role in antitrust.
The argument I proffer here is that the English Court of Appeal, in line with the 
person-centred requirement, were incremental in addressing the claim for 
restitutionary remedy as sought by the claimant as against compensatory damages. 
By so doing, it is argued that the Court was able to give meaning to the interests of 
the antitrust subjects. It achieved this by simply asking the right questions.
6.5 Incremental Enforcement -  The Example of Restitution
With restitution as the point of reference in analysing how antitrust enforcers and 
courts could imbibe an attitude of incremental enforcement, I start by assessing the 
usage of restitutionary remedies in antitrust cases. Afterwards, I detail how it has 
been applied in the US. Then I assess how restitution could be applied in UK 
competition cases. This is an important part of the analysis because there are 
different ways we could apply restitution and the interpretation a court chooses 
speaks volumes on its attitude to incremental enforcement. The English Court of 
Appeal had to make a choice in Devenish case. I start with the fact of the case and I 
ultimately explain the incremental aspect of the case.
6.5.1 Devenish Case
In 2007, the UK OFT suggested that courts may grant restitutionary remedies in anti­
competition actions.695 Also, some scholars have interpreted section 47A of the 
Competition Act 1998 (now Section 18 of the Enterprise Act 2002) to mean that
694 [2008] EWCA Civ 1086; [2008] WLR (D) 317. Hereinafter referred to as Devenish.
695 See Private Action in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers and Business: OFT’s 
Recommendation (November 2007). It should be noted however that OFT is o f the opinion that 
restitution should only be available in certain circumstances. See Office o f Fair Trading, “Response to 
the European Commission’s White Paper, Damages Action for Breach of the EC Antitrust Rules” 
published in July 2008, OFT 1006, ch 4.
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restitution is an available remedy in anti-competition suits.696 However, neither of 
these opinions represented the position of the law. Just a month before the OFT’s 
recommendation, a High Court judge decided otherwise in Devenish It stated that 
restitution was not a valid remedy in competition disputes. Though Devenish’s claim 
was also disallowed on appeal, the court did not go as far as saying that restitution in 
its generic context cannot be applied in antitrust cases.
In this case, Devenish sued the respondents who, as a result of their involvement in 
the notorious vitamins cartel, had been fined heavily by the European
♦ • 07  f ♦ • •Commission. During the lifetime of the cartel, Devenish purchased vitamins, or 
products containing vitamins, from the respondents. Its practice was to mix these 
vitamins with other ingredients to make animal feeds which were then sold to 
customers. In this follow-on action, Devenish sought for restitution instead of 
damages because, in its opinion, damages would have been inadequate. Moreover, 
Devenish argued that proving damages would have resulted in unnecessary 
difficulties. English law provides that restitutionary claim of unjust enrichment could 
be awarded either to strip a defendant of his profit or simply to cause the reversal of a 
benefit conferred by a claimant. In this case, Devenish’s claim was to strip the 
defendants of the profit made from their wrongdoing which will be a sum equal to 
the overcharge or the amount of the respondent’s wrongful net profit. Consequently, 
the appeal was rejected.
6.5.2 The Grant o f  Restitutionary Remedies in European Competition law Cases
Member states within the European Union have procedural autonomy which implies 
that they can decide on the remedies that could be sought in private actions698 
(including competition-related claims). However, whatever remedy they seek to 
apply would have to be in compliance with the principles of effectiveness and
696 Daniel Beards, “Damages in Competition Law Litigation in the United Kingdom” in Tim Ward 
and Kassie Smith (eds), Competition Litigation in the UK (London, Sweet and Maxwell, 2005) ch 7.
697 Prior to the reduction of fines for two o f the undertakings, the total fine imposed in 2001 was 
€855.22 million. See Vitamins Cartel, Commission Decision o f 21.11.2001 (2003) OJ L611; (2003) 4 
CMLR 22.
698 See generally Paul Craig and Graine De Burca, EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials (4th edn, 
Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2007).
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equivalence.699 Hence, once the use of restitutionary remedies in competition law 
was challenged on the basis of these EU principles, it became imperative that the 
court in Devenish addresses whether Europe allows the usage of restitution in 
competition law cases. The court answered in the affirmative.
In reaching its decision, the English Court of Appeal started by referring to Courage 
case wherein the Court of Justice ruled that the method for effective enforcement of 
private actions is to be decided by national courts subject to the principles of 
equivalence and effectiveness.700 In her lead judgment, Arden LJ had to decide 
specifically whether the Court of Justice’s statement suggested that Member States 
were bound to apply gain-based remedies in competition law cases. Her decision was 
that Courage did not compel national courts to grant restitutionary remedies.
Also, the court had to determine whether EU law prevented a restitutionary award in 
competition law. The respondents argued that an award of restitution will run counter 
to Article 16 of the Modernisation Regulation since such an award is aimed at 
deterring anti-competitive behaviours.701 Their argument was that since the 
Commission had penalised them with high fines, another award aimed at deterrence 
will offend the principle of ne bis in idem. Devenish argued to the contrary that the 
award will not be punitive. To justify its contention, it referred to the opinion of 
Advocate General Geelhoed in Manfredi702 where it was stated that public and 
private enforcement should co-exist, and that compensation greater than the harm 
suffered could be envisaged where such special form of damages can be awarded 
under national law.
It was held that EU law does not compel a court to refuse to grant a restitutionary 
award simply because a regulatory provision is capable of resulting in a fine. The 
Court also held that restitution is not a pre-condition for the attainment of 
effectiveness. Elaborating on this decision, the Court said that the principle is
699 C-94-95/95 Bonifaci andBerto v IPNS (1997) ECR 1-3969; C-45/76 Comet v Produkschap (1976) 
ECR 2043; C-78/98 Shirley Preston and ors v Wolverhampton NHS Healthcare Trust and ors (2000) 
ECR 1-3201; C-343/96 Dilexport (1999) ECR 1- 579; C-410/98 Metallgesellschaft (2001) ECR 1- 
1727; C-228/96 Aprile (1998) ECR 1-7141; C-62/00 Marks and Spencer Pic  v Commissioners o f  
Customs and Excise (2002) ECR 1-6325.
700 See C-261/95 Palmisani (1997) ECR 1-4025 on the principles o f equivalence and effectiveness.
701 Art 16 o f Regulation 1/2003 provides that “where national courts rule on agreement ... under Art 
81. . .  they cannot take decisions running counter to the decision adopted by the Commission.”
702 ibid.
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directed at ensuring sufficient remedies rather than the fullest possible remedies. 
Referring to Manfredi, Arden LJ ruled that purely compensatory remedies are 
sufficient for the purpose of safeguarding the rights of private persons under the then 
Article 81 EC (now Article 101).
In conclusion, it could be inferred that it is up to Member States, subject to the 
doctrine of equivalence and effectiveness to allow for restitutionary remedies in 
competition law proceedings as the case may require.
6.5.3 The Application o f Restitution
Prior to the Devenish case, one could not particularly say how restitutionary remedy 
was to be applied in competition cases within domestic regimes such as England and 
Wales. Because restitution is multifaceted, the answer will hardly be clear cut. If one 
however had to imagine how it might be applied, the closest point of reference is the 
United States.
In 2003, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) issued a policy statement on 
monetary equitable remedies in competition cases.703 This statement, in a nutshell, 
meant that the FTC was going to seek restitutionary remedies in their antitrust cases. 
However, the policy explains that these remedies should not be seen as routine as 
they will be sought only in exceptional cases. In those cases, the FTC reckoned that 
restitutionary remedies can play a useful role in complementing more familiar 
remedies.
In order to invoke restitutionary remedies, the FTC applies three vital conditions 
which are that: the antitrust violation must be clear; there must be a reasonable basis 
for calculating the amount of the remedy based on gains or injury from the violation; 
and that the use of the remedy would add value because other remedies will either 
fail or be inadequate. However, the FTC had been seeking restitutionary reliefs in a 
number of cases704 even before it issued the policy statement. The most recent of
' } / ) £  7 f i / \  7 0 7these cases are Mylan, Hearst and Perigo.
703 FTC 68 Fed. Reg. 45,820 (4th of August 2003).
704 See the Art supply cases: In the Matter o f Binney & Smith Inc, 96 FTC 625 (oct 1980); In the 
Matter o f  American Art Clay Co, 96 FTC 809 (Nov 1980); In the Matter o f  the Joseph Dixon Crucible
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In Mylan, the FTC sued Mylan Lab who manufactured two generic anti-anxiety 
drugs. Mylan had entered into a 10 year exclusive dealing contract with most of the 
producers of the active ingredients for these drugs and, in exchange, it agreed to pay 
the producers a percentage of its gross profits. This agreement enabled Mylan to 
raise its prices to consumers for the two generic drugs by 1900 percent and 3200 
percent. Though the case was settled out of court, it was on the understanding that 
Mylan would have to disgorge the unlawful profit. $100 million was disgorged and 
put into a fund to be distributed to injured consumers and state agencies. This 
amount, according to the complaint, represented nearly all the $120 million estimated 
as the unlawful profits. In addition, private plaintiffs settled for $39 million.
On how it should be applied, the FTC stated that it is “important and beneficial that 
there be a number of flexible tools, as well as potential enforcers, available to 
address competitive problems in a particular case.”708 This assertion makes it 
necessary to give particular consideration to the third condition that has to be 
fulfilled in order to be able to succeed with a restitutionary remedy. The condition is 
that the restitutionary award must add some value to the enforcement regime.
The FTC gave instances where gain-based remedies are likely to add value to its 
antitrust enforcement: it would be most valuable where statutes of limitation or 
market disincentives to damages actions are likely to make violators escape with 
their ill-gotten profit; also, it will be useful where a potential claimant will either be 
dissuaded or lose as a result of practical and legal difficulties that may preclude the 
award of compensation. Putting this point into perspective, the FTC gave the 
example of Hearst. This was a case of a consummated merger that had passed 
through the authority’s review process. If damages reliefs were sought, the plaintiffs 
would have faced a rather unusual burden posed by two codified laws. Another 
example is when significant aggregate consumer injury results from relatively small 
injuries not justifying the cost of a private law suit. Here, a representative body (such 
as the FTC) can institute a gain-based remedial action against violators.
Co, C80-700 (Ohio 1983). See also The Matter o f  Commonwealth Land Title Insurance Company, 
126 FTC, 680, 688 (Nov 1998).
705 FTC v Mylan Labs., Inc., 62 F. Supp. 2d 25, 36-7 (D.D.C. 1999).
706 FTC v Hearst Trust, Civ. No. 1: 01CV00734 (D.D.C. Dec. 14, 2001).
707 FTC v Perrigo Co. andAlpharma Inc., Civ. No 1: 04CV1397 (RMC) (D.D.C. Aug 12, 2004).
708 FTC (2003) 3.
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Addressing the relationship between gain-based remedies and penalties, the FTC is 
of the view that civil penalties are not to be offset against restitution since the 
purpose of both remedies are different. While restitution is aimed at removing an 
unjust profit from a violation, penalties “are intended to punish the violators and 
reflect a different, additional calculation of the amount that will serve society’s 
interest in optimal deterrence, retribution and perhaps other interests.”709
The disgorgement of gains deriving from anticompetitive practices has gained 
judicial support in the recent case of US v Key Span Corporation710 where in the 
District Court Judge ruled that disgorgement was a proper remedy under the 
Sherman Act.
If we view the issue from an institutional perspective, the usage of restitutionary 
remedy in this way is laudable. In fact, a person-centred antitrust analyst will be 
pleased with a regime that seeks to purge violating antitrust subjects off their ill- 
gotten wealth. He might however disagree with how this is to be achieved especially 
if it comes as a strictly private suit. This is because for such analyst, the consequence 
of granting restitutionary claims is more than its effect to the claimant. It could have 
serious repercussions for the defendant and the institution as a whole. It is thus 
important to appreciate the modes through which restitution can be sought. From 
there, we are able to assess them in the light of the person-centred requirement of 
incremental enforcement. After this analysis we are then able to put the US position 
in context and then effectively relate with the Devenish case.
6.5.4 Devenish Case Detailed 
Summary o f the Court ofAppeal’s Decision
The decision to reject Devenish’s restitutionary claim was unanimous. However, the 
judges gave different reasons. Of importance for this thesis is the aspect of their 
decision wherein they respectively showed preference for damages over restitution 
and substantive unjust enrichment over disgorgement. The reasoning of Arden LJ, 
Longmore LJ and Tuckey LJ are thus stated briefly.
710 Civil Action No.: l:10-civ-01415-WHP.
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Reasoning through precedents, Arden LJ refused Devenish’s claim because, from the 
case of Stoke-on-Trent City Council v W & J  Wass Ltd,711 an account of profit could 
not be awarded in a non-proprietary tort case.712
Of more relevance to this thesis though is the part of her judgement whereby she 
considered whether disgorgement could be applied assuming her interpretation of 
Wass was wrong. Premised on the understanding that restitution could only be 
granted in exceptional circumstances, her Ladyship began her analysis on the basis of 
the conditions set out by Nicholls LJ in Blake. The general condition was that a court 
should ascertain whether a claimant has a legitimate interest in preventing the 
defendant’s profit making activity and depriving him of that illegal profit.
Applying similar conditions, Arden LJ had to decide: whether there was deliberate 
breach of duty which is sufficiently abusive to meet the need for restitution; whether 
Devenish had a legitimate interest in bringing the case; whether the respondents 
made any gain at the expense of Devenish; and whether the remedy was a 
precondition for the attainment of justice in the case.
Arden LJ stated that the “conduct of the respondents was sufficiently abusive to meet 
any need, as part of the overall requirement for exceptional circumstances”. She 
based this on the Commission’s abhorrence of cartels and the very substantial nature 
of the fine imposed on the vitamin cartel in particular. Further, she decided that 
Devenish had a legitimate interest for instituting an action because the breach had a 
direct effect on it. However the court noted that the determination of “legitimate 
interest” is subject to the passing-on defence which was not in issue in Devenish. To 
support its ruling, the court referred to the discussion paper and recommendation 
from both the Commission713 and the United Kingdom.714 Arden LJ also reasoned 
that Devenish’s claim was justified because there had been a transfer of value to 
which it sought recoupment. The court substantiated this reasoning by reference to 
the policy initiative encouraging private actions. For restitution to be a pre-condition
711 (1988) 3 All E.R. 394
712 In her judgment, Arden LJ said that since Blake and Hendrix did not discuss non-proprietary torts 
at all, it cannot be said that Blake had overruled Wass.
713 EC Commission’s Green Paper on Damages Action for Breach o f EC Antitrust Rules (COM 2005, 
672 final).
7,4 “Private Action in Competition Law: Effective Redress for Consumers and Business” 
(Recommendations from the OFT, 26 November 2007). See also the Department for Constitutional 
Affair’s consultation paper “The Law o f Damages” (CP/9/07) (May 2007).
225
for justice in this case, Arden LJ stated that damages had to be inadequate. It is not 
for the claimant to choose which remedy it prefers. In order to determine whether 
damages would be inadequate, the difficulty of proof had to be insuperable. After 
detailed analysis, the court came to the conclusion that the claimant was in fact 
responsible for the evidential difficulties it encountered, hence the restitutionary 
claim was bound to fail.
Applying the general condition, Arden LJ held that Devenish did not have a 
legitimate interest in depriving the defendant of its illegal profit because proof had 
not been insuperable: Devenish failed to prove its loss only because it failed to 
maintain effective records. Secondly, the justice of the case did not warrant 
restitutionary relief of account of profit because it was not enough that the claimant 
failed to prove his loss on conventional grounds. Also, justice does not demand that a 
claimant should be able to seek account of profit so as to side-step the difficulties of 
a possible passing-on defence.
In his judgment, Longmore LJ refused Devenish’s claim of account of profit as there 
was no obvious reason why the respondents’ illegal profit should be passed on to 
Devenish without it being obliged to transfer the disgorged profit down the line to 
those who had actually suffered the loss. In general, Longmore LJ took a different 
approach in his reasoning. His approach goes directly to the ordering of restitution 
and equity. He highlighted two separate claims, the first being an account of profit on 
the ground that the respondents had profited from their wrong while the second 
account of profit claim was based on Devenish’s inability to prove loss of sale. 
Regarding the first claim, he insisted that it was a mere account of profit case 
because it took the form of gains that the defendants had wrongly made, which was 
the surplus profit remaining after the claimant had passed on the artificially high 
price on re-sale. In other words, he considered disgorgement claims not to be claims 
pertaining to restitution at all.
Longmore LJ ruled that the difficulty of proof does not necessarily mean that no 
damages would be awarded. Further, he stated that if no or few damages reliefs are 
awarded, it does not mean that such damages are inadequate since loss of a possible 
sale is less serious than actual out-of-pocket loss. He asserted that while it may still 
remain useful to consider whether damages are adequate or not in areas such as
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interlocutory injunction, it would be treacherous to apply the same principle for 
account of profit claims. He was apt in his opinion about the nature of cartels and 
how they could influence the remedial awards. He stated that cartel cases do not fall 
under the condition of exceptional circumstances envisaged by Nicholls LJ in 
Blake’s case. Also, Longmore LJ stated that the Wrotham Park cases do not serve as 
authority as the remedy is awarded by reference to the price that the defendant would 
have paid to obtain a claimant’s consent. In particular, he stated that it was not 
possible to apply Wrotham Park because “it may be said that the defendant should be 
content with a proportion of the defendants’ profit rather than all of it”. He stated 
further that “it is not possible to see a principled way in which that could be done 
since there is no obvious way in which the claimant’s loss can be related to the 
defendants’ gain.”
According to Tuckey LJ, Devenish sought to obtain the overcharge arising from the 
cartel activities as if that overcharge were the defendant’s net profit. By doing so, 
Devenish tried to prevent the court from taking into account that it passed on the 
whole of the overcharge to its customers. Thus, in his decision, Tuckey LJ agreed 
with Arden LJ that Wass prevented restitution in non-proprietary torts and also 
agreed with both Arden LJ and Longmore LJ that there were no exceptional 
circumstances warranting such remedy.
Relevant Aspects o f the Reasoning
There are two vital aspects in the decision that deserve to be exhaustively addressed 
in the light of incremental enforcement. First is whether the applicable remedy 
should be damages or restitution while the second question is whether restitutionary 
remedy should be granted on the basis of either substantive unjust enrichment or 
disgorgement. While Arden LJ and Tuckey LJ addressed only the first one, 
Longmore LJ addressed both questions.
Pertaining to the first question, the court’s attitude would be considered incremental 
if it seeks to balance the interests of both claimant and defendant. Where a claimant 
suffers damages and the court grants compensatory reliefs, the claimant’s interest is 
protected. The interest of the defendant is considered because the court would seek to 
ensure that the award is not excessive. A claim may however be made in specific 
cases where the award of damages would not serve the claimant’s interest and as
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such, restitutionary remedy should be applied. The court in Devenish was faced with 
similar issue. In assessing whether it was possible in principle that restitution be 
applied instead of damages in competition law cases, Arden LJ answered in the 
affirmative. She however stated that the remedy would only be applied on fulfilment 
of certain conditions. By affirming this possibility, Arden LJ takes into account the 
interest of the defendant (as against excessive awards) but also that of the claimant as 
there could be instances where damages would not be enough. Though she justifiably 
refused the restitutionary remedy, of more importance here is that she took little steps 
before she came to the ultimate conclusion. All the way, she was weighing the 
interests of both parties in line with incremental enforcement.
Longmore LJ addressed the second question. He identified correctly that the task 
before the court was to determine whether it should grant restitution on the basis of 
either substantive unjust enrichment or disgorgement of profit.715 In a manner which 
shows that he took into consideration the interest of the defendant, Longmore LJ 
refused Devenish’s claim because there was no obvious reason why the defendants’ 
profit should be passed on without Devenish being obliged to transfer the profit to 
those who had actually suffered the loss. The judge appreciated the need to deter 
cartels, but it did not blind itself to the institutional goal. In fact, he stated that though 
cartels are evil which we should seek to expunge, it is not in the place of the courts to 
provide remedies solely to deter. Disgorgement has a deterrence tone so it could be 
suspect -  while the court should be determined to rid the defendant of his illegal 
gains, it should equally take time to solve the puzzle as to why the claimant had 
resorted to a disgorgement remedy. It may simply be that the “claimant has no other 
remedy because the claimant deserves none.”716
There is no doubting the fact that Longmore LJ considered the interest of the 
defendants: surely the defendants will be interested in knowing why Devenish should 
benefit when it (the defendants) might still have to face claims from the final 
consumers who actually suffered the loss. Hence, it could be argued that he imbibed 
the attitude of incremental enforcement while deciding whether to grant
715 He saw substantive unjust enrichment claims as restitution while disgorgement sought as not 
restitution but mere account of profit.
716 Hedley (2001) 106.
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restitutionary remedy in competition law on the basis of either substantive unjust 
enrichment or disgorgement.
6.6 Incremental Enforcement -  Effective Leniency programme v Right
The need to be incremental in enforcement could come up when for instance a 
regime is attempting to improve its enforcement. Earlier on, examples have been 
given on how Europe has steadily strengthened the effectiveness of its enforcement 
drive through the continuous refinement of existing enforcement tools and the 
introduction of new ones. The gradual pace over the years is clearly incremental and 
thus is in line with the proposition herein made. There is however another aspect to 
incremental enforcement which was explained above through the Devenish case. 
That aspect of incrementalism dealt with how a regime should proceed where an 
enforcement body is caught between its ' desires to achieve two conflicting 
enforcement objectives. A third aspect to incremental enforcement can be observed 
from the Pfleiderer AG v Bundeskarllamt case.717 Here, it is to be argued that there is 
need to be incremental where institutions are caught between two plausible and 
settled but conflicting principles.
This part details the third aspect by analysing the Pfleiderer case which showcases 
the severity of the dilemma institutions could face where high level principles 
conflict and how such problems could be by-passed through incremental 
enforcement.
6.6.1 Pfleiderer Case
In 2008, the German Competition Authority (the Bundeskartellamt) imposed fines 
amounting in total to EUR 62 million on three European manufacturers of decor 
paper and on five individuals who were personally liable for agreements on prices 
and capacity closure. This decision has since become final. The cartel was uncovered 
through the use of the Leniency programme.
Subsequently, Pfleiderer submitted an application to the Bundeskartellamt seeking 
full access to the file relating to the imposition of fines in the decor paper sector, with
717 Case C-360/09; [2011] WLR (D) 196.
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a view to preparing civil actions for damages as it had purchased goods with a value 
in excess of EUR 60 million over the previous three years from the penalised cartel 
members. In response, the Bundeskartellamt sent three decisions imposing fines, 
from which identifying information had been removed, and a list of the evidence 
recorded as having been obtained during the search. Dissatisfied, Pfleiderer expressly 
requested access to all the material in the file, including the documents relating to the 
leniency applications which had been voluntarily submitted by the applicants for 
leniency and the evidence seized. The Bundeskartellamt partly rejected that 
application and restricted access to the file to a version from which certain 
information such as confidential business information, internal documents had been 
removed, and again refused access to the evidence which had been seized.
This refusal led Pfleiderer to initiate an action before the Amtsgericht (Local Court) 
Bonn challenging that decision of partial rejection. The Local Court delivered a 
decision by which it ordered the Bundeskartellamt to grant Pfleiderer access to the 
file, through its lawyer, in accordance with German laws. In the view of the Court, 
Pfleiderer was an “aggrieved party” within the meaning of application legal 
provisions given that it may be assumed that it paid excessive prices, as a result of 
the cartel, for the goods which it purchased from the cartel members. Further, the 
Court held that Pfleiderer had a “legitimate interest” in obtaining access to the 
documents, since those were to be used for the preparation of civil proceedings for 
damages. It therefore ordered access information relating to the notice on leniency 
and to the incriminating material and evidence collected. It however limited access to 
confidential business information and internal documents such as notes on legal 
discussions of the Bundeskartellamt and correspondence within the framework of the 
European Competition Network (“the ECN”).
According to the Local Court, various interests had to be weighed in order to 
determine the extent of the right of access, which is restricted to documents required 
for the purpose of substantiating a claim for damages. However, following objections 
to that order, the Court, without intending to change its view on the law, reversed the 
state of the proceedings to that which existed before the contested order was made. 
Thus, in order prevent violating European laws and to avoid undermining the ECN 
Model Leniency Programme, the Court stayed proceedings and referred the case to 
the Court of Justice for Preliminary Ruling. The question formulated goes thus:
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“Are the provisions of the Community competition Law -  in particular Articles 11 
and 12 of Regulation 1/2003 and the second paragraph of Article 10 EC, in 
conjunction with Article 3(1 )(g) EC -  to be interpreted as meaning that parties 
adversely affected by a cartel may not, for the purpose of bringing civil-law claims, 
be given access to leniency applications or to information and documents voluntarily 
provided in that connection by applicants for leniency which the national competition 
authority of a Member State has received, pursuant to a national leniency 
programme, within the framework of proceedings for the imposition of fines which 
are (also) intended to enforce Article 81 EC”
6.6.2 Court o f Justice’s Ruling
The Court of Justice started by affirming the role of the Competition authorities of 
Member states and their courts and tribunals in ensuring the effective application of 
Article 101 and 102 TFEU. More specifically on the right of access to documents, 
the Court stated that n the provisions of the EC Treaty nor Regulation 1/2003 did not 
lay down common rules on leniency and access to documents relating to leniency 
procedure. It also emphasised the non-binding nature of the Model Leniency 
Programme as well as notices on cooperation within the ECN. More importantly, it 
asserted that “it is, in the absence of binding regulation under EU law on the subject, 
for the Member States to establish and apply national rules on the right to access, by 
person adversely affected by the cartel, to documents relating to the leniency 
procedure” .718
Hence, though noting that the effectiveness of the cooperation and leniency 
programmes could be jeopardised if documents relating to leniency procedures were 
disclosed to persons wishing to bring an action for damages, it nevertheless 
concluded that EU law does not preclude any person who has been adversely 
affected by an infringement of EU competition law and is seeking to obtain damages 
from being granted access to documents relating to a leniency procedure involving 
the perpetrators of that infringement. The Court however added that it is for national 
courts and tribunals to determine on the basis of their national law, the conditions 
under which such access must be permitted or refused by weighing the interests 
protected by EU law.
718 Para 23.
231
6.6.3 Implication o f the Decision and Potential for Incremental Enforcement
Due to the fact that it was a preliminary ruling and that the Court of Justice was not 
obliged to state issues of procedure, it appears as though the Court succeeded in 
dodging the main issue and effectively deflected the problem to Member States. If 
however one addresses the Court’s reasoning from the person-centred point of view, 
especially when one considers the strength behind each of the incommensurable 
principles underlying the conflicting claims, one would note a potential for 
incremental enforcement especially in very hard cases of this nature.
The Court of Justice recognised the value of both ideals. In the spirit of incremental 
enforcement, it leaves open the room for Member States to seek to respect the right 
of antitrust victims as well as maintain the effectiveness of the leniency programme. 
The careful step to enforcement taken by the Court should even be more appreciated 
when one consider that the Advocate General had given a categorical opinion which 
would have effectively institutionalised the quest for effective leniency programme 
and would have thus relegated individual rights in antitrust cases.
Advocate General Mazak had identified the tension between the need to keep public 
enforcement effective and the right of individuals in private enforcement. He 
however argued that the tension is more apparent than real. He contended that in 
addition to being effective in meeting public interest, leniency programmes are also 
beneficial to private parties injured by cartels. He supported this position with two 
arguments. First, he stated that in the absence of effective leniency programmes, 
many cartels may never come to light and their negative effect on competition in 
general and on particular private parties could therefore persist unchecked. Second, 
he contended that final decisions reached by competition authorities could at least be 
treated as corroborative evidence and hence softens the evidential burden on private
719parties.
In this case, both the claim to vindicate individual right as well as the need to 
maintain the attractiveness of the leniency programme are perfectly justifiable 
reasons to support the claim for improving or maintaining the level of antitrust 
enforcement. Though the path it chose is rather uneasy and perhaps might have some
719 See para 41 o f Opinion of Advocate General Mazak on Case C-360/09 Pfleiderer AG  v 
Bundeskartellamt delivered on 16.12.2010.
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other practical consequences,720 the Court of Justice rose above finding reasons for 
picking one of the enforcement ideals and rightly recognised the need to be 
incremental by allowing for the balancing of these interests in individual cases.
6.7 Conclusion
It has been argued so far that antitrust institutions and courts should imbibe the 
attitude of incremental enforcement in order for them to be able to take account of 
plural interests. It has been shown that there is a high tendency that institutions will 
fail the requirement of plurality and broadness if they are strictly focused on 
institutional enforcement goals. Thus incremental enforcement requires us to take 
little steps which should be continually reviewed in the light of the person-centred 
requirement of broadness.
Illustrations of how we could achieve broadness have been given. It was stated for 
instance that in order to balance the interest of different antitrust subjects who all 
make different allegations against different alleged violators, the antitrust enforcer 
should choose objectively between these interests. It is also argued that in between 
victims of cartel infringement and (alleged) infringers, public enforcers should 
balance the interest of both parties. Thus, institutions should not only be motivated 
by the urge to detect and punish violators. Rather, they should, for instance, be 
equally interested in respecting the procedural guarantees of the (alleged) infringer.
In greater detail, I illustrated with private remedies. The main point discernible here 
is that in the context of a claim against an infringer, we should seek to achieve 
deterrence. However we should equally be cautious of the interest of the (alleged) 
infringer. On the flip side, while there is great need for caution in order to protect the 
interest of defendants, we should also be wary of simply switching from the 
“mantra” of deterrence to the “mantra” of excessive caution. This will amount to 
mere reversal with the likely effect that we might trivialise or inadequately address 
the interests of claimants.
720 For instance, it is possible that the decision might lead to the emergence o f different standards for 
the disclosure o f different leniency documents from various Member States. This could lead to a 
breakdown o f co-operation and information exchange between Member States.
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The value of incremental enforcement could however be compromised if it is shown 
to diminish the effectiveness of antitrust enforcement. Regarding cartel enforcement, 
enforcers seek to utilise relevant tools in order to deter anti-competition. Fines, for 
instance, are often aimed at deterring future violations. If enforcers and courts have 
only in their mind, the need to compensate the society for deadweight loss and 
ultimately to discourage anti-competitive practices, they might be disposed to setting 
the fine to such an amount that it would have the requisite deterrence effect. Such 
fine would be effective where it creates a credible threat of penalty which weighs 
sufficiently in the balance of expected costs and benefits in order to deter calculating 
firms from committing antitrust violations. In the words of Calvino, such fines would 
be optimal “if and only if, from the perspective of the company contemplating 
whether or not to commit a violation the expected fine exceeds the expected gain 
from the violation”721
On the other hand, where we adopt an attitude of incremental enforcement, we 
would, for instance, have to put into account the interest of the infringer by seeking a 
balance between a relatively high fine and the need to ensure that the punishment is 
proportional.
The way we value fines would thus depend on our enforcement attitude. Where we 
have a strict deterrence attitude, the value of the expected fine will depend on the 
effect it has on violators while for a regime with the attitude of incremental 
enforcement, the value of its fines is not limited to the deterrence effect but also the 
“fairness” of the fine. It could be plausibly argued that while the latter might be more 
effective in ensuring an acceptable state of competition, the effectiveness of the latter 
could be relatively weakened as a result of the compromise involved. We must 
however be cautious not to overstate this possibility. Aside the fact that interest of 
one antitrust subject is as important as those held by others who desire an effective 
enforcement regime, one must not lose sight of the fact that we need to take a holistic 
view of the enforcement regime in order to assess its effectiveness rather than 
addressing enforcement tools in isolation. Thus, by combining different enforcement 
tools, antitrust enforcers might be able to achieve the requisite effectiveness while at 
the same time give considerable attention to the interests of other antitrust subjects.
721 Calvino (2007) 320.
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Hence, even with relatively reduced fines, the fact that there are other tools such as 
leniency and criminalisation means that the effectiveness of the antitrust regime will 
not be necessarily weakened.
In sum, we stand a greater chance of achieving broadness as inclusiveness as 
required by the person-centred approach where antitrust institutions imbibe an 
attitude of incremental enforcement. Antitrust enforcers and courts are more likely to 
be incremental in their enforcement where they are alive to the interests of all parties 
and continuously strive to balance those interests rather than concentrating on one at 
the expense of another.
235
Chapter 7
Conclusion
Addressing antitrust from the deconstructionist position, this thesis identified that the 
traditional modes of antitrust analyses are incomplete. This incompleteness, it has 
been shown, has the tendency of unjustly denying some interested parties from being 
considered in antitrust deliberations. Concerned about the tendency of injustice 
resulting from the traditional approaches, I sought to fashion an account of antitrust 
which is particularly modelled on the idea of justice as inclusiveness. The thesis 
justifies the pursuit of inclusiveness by alluding to the intrinsic urge of an average 
person to be included in decisions that affect them. The idea of inclusiveness is also 
justified from an extrinsic perspective as it legitimises the decision-making process.
Conscious of the need to avoid the problems of incompleteness identified with the 
traditional approaches, this thesis sought a purely procedural approach. Hence, it was 
shown that the pursuit of pure procedural justice is the means through which we can 
achieve justice as inclusiveness. It was also considered important that the alternative 
approach puts the “person” at the centre of antitrust analysis.
In order to proceed accordingly with the exercise, two options were considered -  
Habermas’ discourse ethics and the person-centred approach. After a thorough 
analysis, it was shown that the discourse ethics does not effectively solve the 
problem identified in the thesis. Focus was thus placed on the person-centred 
approach.
The person-centred approach has been shown to be closely linked with broad-based 
procedural accounts such as Coleman’s account of right and Sen’s capability 
approach. The approach emphasises the bottom-up perspective to antitrust analysis. 
A large part of the thesis was devoted to developing this approach by clarifying its 
content and scope and by differentiating it from other accounts. Ultimately, just as 
Habermas’ account was evaluated in light of the theme of the thesis, the person- 
centred approach was also assessed and unfortunately, was also found to fall short of 
the “utopian” height of justice as inclusiveness
Based on this revelation, it is conceded that even though the overall idea of 
inclusiveness in antitrust is laudable, there are some aspects (particularly the
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substantive aspects) where inclusiveness remains a “yearning” which cannot be 
attained in practice. The impossibility of maintaining the interests of all parties till 
the very end and at the same time making concrete decisions between competing 
normative accounts is fatal to the exercise as its very operational core is easily 
deconstructible. The exercise appears to be an all or nothing affair as, for instance, 
one cannot be partly objective. It means thus that the problem is not merely about the 
“yearnings” that are insatiable but rather about unrealistic “yearnings”.
We are thus left with a rather damning revelation which is that any account of 
antitrust will be ultimately deconstructible. In effect, if antitrust is to make any 
practical sense, relevant institutions must identify the normative standard upon which 
such regime stands. However, this thesis does not go as far as suggesting the goals 
and objectives that are “ideal”. Indeed, any argument that a goal is better than 
another is a mere contestable assertion and should, as such, not be treated as an 
analytical truth.
Even though we cannot possibly pursue justice as inclusiveness in our decisional 
exercise, there are aspects of this thesis which I believe will aid in the holistic 
understanding of antitrust policy and also enrich antitrust regimes. First, an 
understanding that all traditional approaches could potentially be too narrow helps to 
reinforce the argument that antitrust provisions should be implemented in a broader 
fashion. Secondly, the thesis demystifies the idea of “right” and “wrong” in antitrust 
by stressing that any such claim as to the rightness or wrongness of a theory is 
merely a contestable normative assertion. Thirdly, this thesis will help antitrust 
pedagogy by opening students to various perspectives and thus disabusing 
stereotyped ideas of antitrust. Fourth, it will help practitioners think outside the box 
when assessing facts and also help them to anticipate counter-arguments. Fifth, it is 
believed that this thesis will facilitate independent thinking and consequently regime- 
specific approaches. This is very important for transition economies and countries 
yet to firmly establish their path in competition policy. Further, the person-centred 
approach is valuable as it provides a personalised perspective to antitrust. The 
approach in itself could help policy makers to think not just as policy engineers but 
also as antitrust subjects. Perhaps, with the revelations from the person-centred 
approach, antitrust subjects could be considered not merely as means to an end.
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For the purpose of emphasis, I will focus on two aspects that reflect the value of the 
person-centred approach. First, I explain the assertion that there is no universally 
right way of understanding and addressing antitrust by illustrating through the 
question of international competition law. Secondly, I expatiate on the way the 
approach helps to avoid treating persons as means to an end through an illustration of 
antitrust enforcement.
International Antitrust Law
As revealed in this thesis, the person-centred approach allows us to assess “welfare” 
at an atomistic level. It is thus argued that regardless of the shortcomings of the 
approach, antitrust scholars and institutions could potentially find plausible 
conceptual basis for assessing the extent to which their national law should be 
influenced by outside forces. Since the turn of the century, the spate of globalisation 
has increased the clamour for some form of harmonisation of antitrust systems. It has 
thus been contended at some quarters that globalisation has rendered the position of 
difference rather unhealthy.722
To justify the need to internationalise antitrust rules, references have been made to 
transnational cartels and international mergers. The argument is that such 
transactions and activities, if not addressed in a harmonised fashion, might 
undermine antitrust enforcement in general.723 Proponents often flag up the problems 
associated with the divergent practices in the treatment of anti-competitive behaviour 
especially where such behaviour is capable of preventing foreign firms from 
penetrating domestic markets.724 They have considered internationalisation to be the 
best solution as other alternatives such as the extraterritorial application of one
79  c #country’s law to another could be counterproductive. Different variations of the
722 See Maher Dabbah, The Internationalisation o f  Antitrust Policy (Cambridge, Cambridge 
University Press, 2003) 12-14.
723 Ibid.
724 Ibid; Martyn Taylor, International Competition Law: A New Dimension fo r  the WTO? (Cambridge, 
Cambridge University Press, 2007).
725 E.g. Boeing/McDonnell Douglas merger 1997; MCI/Honeywell merger 1999; GE/Honeywell 
merger 2001; Dabbah, ch 7.
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internationalisation agenda have emerged. While some seek to merge plurality with 
the internationalisation agenda,726 others advocate a uniform law.
Broadly speaking, the person-centred approach does not kick against the 
internationalisation agenda. In fact, it recognises the legitimate concerns that may 
arise from the divergence of practices. However, by addressing antitrust issues from 
the perspective of persons, perhaps, proponents of internationalisation may avoid the 
temptation of developing an inflexible international antitrust code and instead 
explore the possibility of respecting the diverse national perspectives whilst they 
proceed with the internationalisation project.
The role of the person-centred approach in building a broader conceptual base for 
antitrust can be brought to light by analysing Taylor’s internationalisation proposal. 
Proposing a largely inflexible international antitrust code, Taylor justifies his call for 
countries to look beyond their national interest in formulating their antitrust policies 
and laws on the grounds that such nation-centric practice increases the potential for 
under- and over-regulation which could consequently impact on collective global 
welfare. He contends that this would occur either where the coverage of domestic 
competition law is incomplete so that anti-competitive conduct is not regulated at all 
or where the relevant anti-competitive conduct is regulated by national competition 
laws but the level of regulation is below the globally optimal level.727 He also argued 
that absence of harmonised competition code may lead to over-regulation which 
might impact negatively on collective global welfare. Citing the example of cross- 
border mergers, Taylor contends that a country, acting in its national self-interest 
may prevent conducts that would have adversely affected its national markets, 
regardless of whether or not the same conduct would significantly benefit other 
nations. He feels collective global welfare would be unduly diminished when the
• 728benefit to one country is outweighed by the loss to other nations vice versa.
Where the person-centred reasoning is applied, the danger inherent in Taylor’s 
conception of “welfare” becomes apparent. The person-centred approach reveals the 
potential for disconnection between policy makers and antitrust subjects where 
welfare is assessed on a global scale. From a person-centred point of view, one might
726 Ibid.
727 Taylor, 45.
728 Ibid, 46.
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therefore be more likely to appreciate the need to protect interests at the atomistic 
stage by, for example, fashioning a person-specific understanding of common 
competition terms such as economic freedom, free competition, and efficiency.729 
Where, for instance, we think of efficiency, the person-centred approach will 
emphasise the need for countries to adopt a definition that suits the need of their 
people. For example, it could be disastrous for a least-developed country to follow a 
Schumpeterian definition of competition. To this effect, Bhaduri states that where 
low income market economies adhere to the idea of dynamic efficiency, there is a 
tendency that:
“[t]the poorest section of the population becomes economically marginalised mostly 
through their lack of access to productive assets, education and acquisition of skill 
through employment in a market economy. The Schumpeterian process of 
destruction operates by denying them access to reasonable livelihood, training and 
skills through the usual mechanism of price rationing in the market economy.”
In the same light, arguments that have been made in favour of plurality include that 
of Ratnakar and Knight-John who identified the need for developing countries to 
formulate for themselves unique competition law and policy that will align with their 
developmental needs. Otherwise, they contend, the law will fail to serve national
730development objectives and improve on respective consumers’ welfare.
Short of endorsing any particular definition of terms for any kind of economy, the 
illustration here simply reinforces the need for a bottom-up, person-centred approach 
to antitrust. For instance, a regime with a large informal economy should be able to 
explore broad range of possibilities within the limit of economic competition that it 
might find most suitable in addressing the interest of its people.
The person-centred approach could be applied in formulating a conceptual basis for 
the internationalisation agenda. It can also be used as the basis for engaging in a 
thorough comparative and empirical analysis of the present internationalisation 
schemes such as those undertaken by United National Centre for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), OECD, World Bank, the International Competition
729 See e.g. Mor Bakhoum. “Reflections on the Concepts o f ‘Economic Freedom, Free Competition, 
and Efficiency” in Zimmer (ed) 408-440.
730 Knight-John, Malathy and Adhikari, Ratnakar, “What Type o f Competition Policy and Law Should 
a Developing Country Have?” (2004) 5 South Asia Economic Journal 1-25.
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Network (ICN), Commonwealth Organisation etc. Such analysis will invariably 
extend to the model laws that have been proposed by these organisations.
The person-centred approach also helps us to better appreciate the need for flexibility 
in a dynamic world. With this in mind, technocrats and policy maker can move 
beyond populist and political pandering by identifying the true value of competition 
policy in light of their level of socio-economic development. In Japan for instance, 
between 1950 and 1973 when the country was undergoing industrialisation, the 
government prioritised the generation of high rates of profit and reinvestment for 
industry. To achieve this aim, some “anti-competitive” practices such as cartels, 
coordination of investment by rival firms, and state intervention in firm exit and 
entry had to be encouraged. At this point, the aim is not to decide the propriety or 
otherwise of any such competition regime. It is merely to show how, within a single 
jurisdiction, the idea of welfare could change over time. More importantly, the 
person-centred approach can serve as the conceptual basis for the evaluation of an 
antitrust regime’s policies in specific periods.
Person-centred Enforcement
As stated at the beginning of this chapter, it is conceded that the laudable idea of the 
person-centred approach cannot be applied to its logical conclusion as it falls short at 
the point of application. It has however been contended that the idea behind the 
approach can still be of value to antitrust. Example of its potential value to 
international competition law in general and development in particular have been 
shown above. Here, the value of the person-centred approach to antitrust 
enforcement is emphasised. As shown in chapter six, the person-centred approach 
strengthens our urge to strike a balance between maintaining an effective 
enforcement regime and the need to respect the rights and interests of parties. Thus, 
by seeking an incremental enforcement approach, we are more likely to seek 
effectiveness without compromising the interests of parties.
Conclusively, the person-centred approach should be seen as an avenue to foster a 
more correct and thorough understanding of antitrust. Given that this thesis addresses 
antitrust concerns in general terms, there is scope for further research on specific
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antitrust issues. At this point however, the hope is that the thesis successfully stirs up 
healthy curiosity on how antitrust can be better conceived, articulated, and applied.
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